On April 1:
Update
Based on findings derived from the MD-82’s flight and cockpit voice recorder, the wing flaps of the Spanair airliner (that crashed killing 154 people) were not set for take off, and pilots were unaware of it because the warning alarm did not go off.
The faulty valve that prevented the first attempt at takeoff was disconnected rather than repaired. Planes are allowed to fly for up to 10 days with the system involved disconnected.
Newlywed Brazilian Ronaldo Gomes Silva, 25, and his Spanish wife Yanina Celisdibowsky had been living in the UK for three years. a month ago in Sao Paolo, Brazil, they got married; They had just gotten on a plane to visit the Canary Islands, where Yanina was going to meet her in laws for the first time.
They got on the wrong plane. They were two of the victims of Spanair Flight JK5022.
Juliao Alves da Silva, the groom’s father said: “I have lost my son and a daughter-in-law. I am destroyed.”
I don’t even know these people and I am nearly inconsolable.
Pictured: a Gazprom Avia Mi-8 helicopter
Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact Photographer Senior
What: Gazprom Avia chartered by Lukoil Oil company Russian-built Mi-8 helicopter
Where: Volgograd
When: July 22, 2009
Who: 8 aboard: five engineers and one crew member killed. Two crewmembers survived
Why: The helicopter crashed into the ground and burst into flames. The crash is attributed to engine failure.
George’s Point of View
Maintenance, Maintenance, maintenance
A small plane crashed in Owyhee County, Idaho, on November 3rd.
The plane was carrying two people when it went down.
The pilot Dean Hilde, 56, was killed in the crash. His passenger Gerald Bublitz, 42, sustained serious injuries and was flown to a hospital.
The FAA is investigating.
Press release from the BEA and the Commission d’Enquêtes Accidents et Incidents de l’Aviation civile (Mali)
Following the publication of the Interim Report on 20 September 2014 in Bamako (Mali), investigative work has continued, based on the analysis of the accident flight parameters. Progress made in this work has led the Republic of Mali Commission of Inquiry and the BEA to communicate jointly the following information.
On 24 July 2014, the MD-83 registered EC-LTV was performing scheduled night flight AH 5017 from Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) to Algiers (Algeria). Takeoff occurred at 01h15, the climb towards the cruise altitude took place without any significant events, and the crew made several heading changes in order to fly around a storm cell. The autopilot and the autothrottle were engaged. The aeroplane reached the cruise altitude of 31,000 ft, that’s to say about 9,500 m. The autopilot then switched to the mode that maintains the altitude and the autothrottle to the mode that maintains the speed (Mach).
About two minutes after levelling off at an altitude of 31,000 ft, calculations performed by the manufacturer and validated by the investigation team indicate that the recorded EPR , the main parameter for engine power management, became erroneous on the right engine and then about 55 seconds later on the left engine. This was likely due to icing of the pressure sensors located on the engine nose cones. If the engine anti-ice protection system is activated, these pressure sensors are heated by hot air.
Analysis of the available data indicates that the crew likely did not activate the system during climb and cruise.
As a result of the icing of the pressure sensors, the erroneous information transmitted to the autothrottle meant that the latter limited the thrust delivered by the engines. Under these conditions, the thrust was insufficient to maintain cruise speed and the aeroplane slowed down. The autopilot then commanded an increase in the aeroplane’s pitch attitude in order to maintain the altitude in spite of this loss of speed.
This explains how, from the beginning of the error in measuring the EPR values, the aeroplane’s speed dropped from 290 kt to 200 kt in about 5 minutes and 35 seconds and the angle of attack increased until the aeroplane stalled.
About 20 seconds after the beginning of the aeroplane stall, the autopilot was disengaged. The aeroplane rolled suddenly to the left until it reached a bank angle of 140°, and a nose-down pitch
of 80°
The recorded parameters indicate that there were no stall recovery manœuvres by
the crew.
However, in the moments following the aeroplane stall, the flight control surfaces remained deflected nose-up and in a right roll.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
At least two similar events occurred, in June 2002 and in June 2014, with no serious consequences.
The event in June 2002 was the subject of an NTSB investigation report. On 4 June 2002, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registered N823NK performing Spirit Airlines flight 970, suffered a loss of thrust on both engines, in cruise at an altitude of 33,000 ft, that is about 10,000 m. The two pressure sensors, located on the engine nose bullets, were blocked by ice crystals, leading to incorrect indications and over-estimation of the EPR. The crew noticed the drop in speed and the precursor indications of a stall just before disengagement of the autopilot and putting the aeroplane into a descent. They had not activated the engine anti-ice systems. This event occurred during the day, outside the clouds.
On 8 June 2014, the MD83 registered EC-JUG belonging to Swiftair, which was performing a passenger transport flight at flight level FL 330, suffered a drop in speed while it was flying during the daytime above the cloud layer. The crew detected the problem, put the aeroplane into a descent and activated the engine anti-ice systems without reaching a stall situation, then continued the flight.
This background, as well as the data on the accident to flight AH5017, was shared with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and through EASA with the American authorities (FAA); they should serve as the basis for future publication of corrective measures aimed at assisting crews in identifying and responding to similar situations to those encountered at the time of this accident.
NEXT STEPS
The investigative work is continuing, in particular on the analysis of:
the flight parameters to complete the scenario described above,
possible crew reactions, despite the absence of Cockpit Voice Recorder data from the accident flight, which remain unusable to this day,
the training and follow-up of Swiftair crews,
previous events and the follow-up undertaken.
The publication of the final report is planned before the end of December 2015.
Download Interim below:
https://airflightdisaster.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ec-v140724.e1.en_.pdf
What: Ponderosa Aviation Inc. Rockwell Commander 690A en route from Mesa, Ariz to Safford, Arizona
Where: Apache Junction, Pinal County, AZ
When: Nov 23, 2011
Who: 6 fatalities
Why: On a thanksgiving flight that took off at 6:15, the pilot was flying to Safford and struck a rockface at the Superstition mountains. The children’s mother, Karen Perry, was not aboard. The fuselage is jammed between rocks.
The victims of the crash included Joseph Hardwick, 22, mechanic; pilot and aircraft owner Russell Hardy, 31; pilot Shawn Perry, 39; and Perry’s three children, Morgan, 9, Logan, 8, and Luke, 6.
The plane had just left Mesa’s Falcon Field when it crashed. It is a six hour hike from a campground to the wreckage. A ten member sheriff’s rescue team was flown in by chopper, and hiked down from a mountaintop.
The flight path that the pilot took is a controversial one. The FAA redesignated Phoenix airspace, raising the floor altitude for commercial traffic at almost the same height as the tallest peak in the Superstitions (5,057 feet). Planes such as this one flying east from Mesa’s Falcon Field must either go around the peak or request permission to enter commercial airspace to fly above it.
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