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- Air Safety | FAA | Speech
Number of Serious Runway Incursions Cut in Half
Thank you, Laura (Brown). And thank you to everyone for coming to Logan today.
I want to share with you some very good news about runway safety in the United States.
This year we have cut the number of serious runway incursions in half. It’s the second year in a row we’ve cut the number by 50 percent.
A serious runway incursion is when a collision is narrowly avoided.
We are down to six serious incursions in the entire country. And that is down from 67 ten years ago.
This marked increase in safety would not have been possible without the concerted efforts and partnership of the aviation industry.
The FAA made a call to action in 2007 to ask the entire industry to focus on reducing runway incursions.
And the entire industry really came together—airlines, pilots, air traffic controllers, airport vehicle operators, associations, management, labor and the FAA. We all worked together to reduce these occurrences. We have maintained the focus and we have cut the number.
Our goal is to get the number down to zero.
That brings me to some great safety innovations we are rolling out in Boston.
We just finished 90 days of testing a new warning system at Logan International that will keep our runways safe. Boston is among the first airports in the country to get this new safety technology.
This runway safety system consists of three types of safety lights that give pilots direct warnings about possible dangers on the runway.
In a simplified explanation, the new safety lights work much like a traffic light. They warn a pilot if it’s not safe to cross, enter or proceed down a runway.
Boston is the first and only airport in the country to install these lights at intersecting runways.
A series of red lights embedded in the pavement at Logan will provide 3,000 feet of warning leading up to the runway intersection.
If there is a potential safety problem, the red lights come on and stay on as long as the collision potential exists. You stop what you’re doing and stay where you are.
Boston has added two more types of safety lights. It now joins Dallas/Fort Worth, San Diego and Los Angeles airports with these safety features.
Boston added safety lights for planes leaving a taxiway and entering a runway. The lights turn red if it’s not safe to enter or cross the runway.
The third type of safety lights are called takeoff hold lights. These lights turn red if it’s unsafe to begin or continue to takeoff on a runway.
These three types of runway status lights are going to give us an additional layer of safety. They will help us improve the exceptional work we are already doing with runway safety in this country.
By working together we have markedly reduced the serious incursions and we’re making progress on all of them.
We want to get at the root cause of an incursion, no matter how serious or minor, in order to improve our procedures and training.
Why do incursions happen, you may ask?
Why can’t a pilot tell if a danger exists on a runway?
Ideally the air traffic controller will tell the pilot where to taxi and the correct runway to use. And ideally the pilot will hear it correctly and follow through.
But we are all human. And with larger airports there is a lot more to keep track of, including vehicles and people.
These lights will make it very plain that a pilot should stop and avoid the runway intersection.
If you see a red light, the typical human reaction is to stop. That’s the whole idea.
We plan to add runways status lights to an additional 19 of our busiest airports in the country over the next five years.
These lights provide a direct and immediate indication to pilots and vehicle drivers that a potentially unsafe condition is developing and they should avoid it.
They will help us to continually improve safety.
I’m happy that you will have the chance to board a plane today and see how they work.
Thank you for your time.
Next I’d like to introduce Congressman Michael Capuano who represents Massachusetts’ 8th District, including Logan International Airport. We have worked closely together on many issues and I’m pleased he could be here today.
- Airbus | airliners.net | audio | cabin pressure | Emergency | error | instrument panel | liveatc.net | United Airlines | USA
United Visual Landing Without Instruments, Boston

Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Jason WhitebirdWhat: United Airlines Airbus A320-200 en route from Chicago to Boston
Where: Logan International
When: Oct 23, 2012
Who: 144 passengers, 5 crew
Why: The pilot was on approach to Logan when he noticed a problem with his instruments.The pilot informed ATC of instrument failures and pressurization issues. ATC cleared a holding pattern, until the pilot performed a visual landing.
The pilot taxied to the Terminal C gate at 12:42 pm. Below is the pilot’s audio.
Pilot audio
Pilot’s audio provided by http://www.liveatc.net NTSB Meets
NTSB TO MEET ON BUSINESS JET RUNWAY EXCURSION ACCIDENT THAT KILLED FOUR AND INJURED TWO IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public Board meeting on its investigation into an accident in which a chartered business jet crashed during a rejected takeoff in Columbia, South Carolina, 18 months ago.
The purpose of the meeting will be to determine the probable cause of the accident and to consider proposed safety recommendations to reduce the likelihood of future such mishaps.
On September 19, 2008, at 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) operated by Global Exec Aviation and destined for Van Nuys, California, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured.
- Air Safety | FAA | NTSB
Wildlife Feedback Wanted
The FAA is looking for comments regarding minimum acceptable standards for the conduct and preparation of Wildlife Hazard Site Visits, Hazard Assessments and Hazard Management Plans on the following document:
For more information, visit Clarification of Wildlife Hazard Management Requirements for Non-Certificated Federally Obligated Airports in the National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS)
The purpose of this notice is to clarify the FAA’s interpretation of 49 U.S.C. 47107(a) (19) and the corollary Grant Assurance No. 19, relating to airport operations and maintenance. The FAA proposes to require sponsors of federally obligated, non-certificated airports that, after the effective date of this Federal Register Notice, accept a new airport development grant funded under the Airport Improvement Program, or accept a transfer of land under the Surplus Property Act for airport purposes to identify and mitigate wildlife hazards at their airports. These actions will take the form of initial Wildlife Hazard Site Visits (WHSVs) or Wildlife Hazard Assessments (WHAs), depending on the size of the airport, potentially followed by more detailed Wildlife Hazard Management Plans (WHMPs).
The purpose of a WHSV is for the sponsor to identify any immediate hazards and for the FAA to determine whether a more comprehensive WHA is necessary.For More information, see APHIS below:
Airport Wildlife Hazards Program Venezuela Crash: 17 Dead
updated

View large photo at Jetphotos.net
Contact photographer Nigel SteeleWhat: Conviasa Aerospatiale ATR-42-300 en route from Puerto Ordaz to Porlamor Venezuela
Where: Puerto Ordaz
When: Sep 13 2010
Who: 51 aboard, 15 fatalities, 36 passengers and crew survived
Why: After takeoff while 10 miles from Manuel Piar International Airport, the crew experienced “control problems” requiring a return to the airport. Between the Caribbean island of Margarita and Puerto Ordaz, the plane crashed. 36 survivors were recovered from the wreckage and taken to hospitals and the remains of 2 were recovered.As of Sept 18, the number of dead has risen to 17. Conviasa is suspending flights for two weeks for safety assessments.
The pilot was Conviasa Ramiro Cardenas.
The plane crashed in the Sidor Steel Mill junkyard/storage area amid heaps and barrels of unused steel.
While attempting an emergency landing, the plane became entangled with electrical wires and crashed.
Current reports indicate 23 survivors. We will be updating as we hear news.
Bolivar State Governor Francisco Rangel Gomez gas opened the following number for family members:
0800-BOLIVAR / 0800-2654827 for more information on passengersPreliminary survivor list Unconfirmed
Regarding Boeings New Generation Take on Old (Persistent?) Problems. Maybe. Maybe not.
George’s Point of View
The 787: Dreamliner test flight suffered from extensive smoke, fire and structural damage originating in the P100′ electrical panel, a key component that distributes power from the left generator to power vital systems
The 777: United electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire. This was initially reported as smoke. Thus no reason for the FAA to go there. And the full narrative said only “electrical fire” but did not elucidate beyond “electrical fire” to explain the electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire.
The AAIB conclusions 4,5, and 6, were:
- “The RGCB and Right Bus Tie Breaker (RBTB) suffered from severe internal arcing and short circuits which generated temperatures in excess of 1,000°C, and resulted in uncontained failures. The RGCB was probably the first to fail.”
- “ Molten copper and silver droplets from the failed contactors dropped down through the open base of the P200 panel and ignited the insulation blankets below.”
- “The insulation blanket fire spread underneath a floor panel to the opposite P205 power panel, causing heat and fire damage to structure, cooling ducts and wiring.”
The three requirements for a fire: oxygen, ignition source and fuel.
From 2000 to 2008, over 22 ADs are directed at insulation blankets that burn. Before that, from 1988 to 2010, 8 FAA Tech Center reports and 2 FAA Safety Conference Papers are directed at electrical induced fires or the insulation blankets that give fuel to the fire.
When was the latest AD ?
2008-23-09. REMOVE PET (AN-26). Boeing Model 727-200s, 737-200s, 737-300s, and 737-400, 747s, 757s, 767s Series Airplanes.from the fuselage. Such insulation blankets could ignite and propagate a fire that is the result of electrical arcing or sparking.
DATES; Issued Oct 24, 2008 -effective Dec 15, 2008 – Comply by 2014. If you read the AD, you can note that the compliance date is actually set beyond the affected planes anticipated passenger service-life. Compliance is put off until the planes will likely be converted from passenger to cargo.2002 FAA ASTRAC Conference Conclusions
- In-flight Fires In Hidden Areas are a risk to aviation safety.
- Most hidden fires are caused by electrical problems.
- Non-compliance with Safety Regulations have been uncovered.
- Fire Safety Problems and Improvements are in various stages of correction and study.
- It is impossible to predict the relative risk of serious fires occurring in Hidden Areas or Locations.
Without being too critical or belaboring the obvious, I do have to say that the 2002 conclusions are overly obvious and simplistic. These same points will probably be as true in 2002 and 2011 as in 3011. Point by point? Consider this:
- In-flight fires are a risk to safety, whether they’re hidden or not. Certainly if one doesn’t know where they are, they have more time to be destructive before they are found. And as for being predictable-there probably is a random statistical probability that can come pretty close; but translating theory back to real life situations perfectly only happens on tv.
- Electrical problems are certainly a broad umbrella-one might even say the current problems with rogue batteries to be a form of electrical problem.
- Non compliance regarding safety is hardly an issue when a plane is in the testing phase; in fact, that is when the manufacturer is are troubleshooting to get rid of potential safety issues. The 777 electrical panel issue may or may not have a common cause; and if it does have a common cause, then, isn’t that splendid for Boeing? The detective job (i.e. finding the cause) is half of the problem already solved. What luck! But in real life, are the causes that easy to find? And in practice, how many times are non-compliance with Safety Regulations due to poor operator maintenance versus to unsafe parts?
- Fire Safety Improvements are an ongoing process. It’s the nature of the beast.
So here is the problem as it should possibly be stated:
-We need compliance now because people are on these planes now, not at some random future date. Pushing back solutions puts more people are at risk. We need feasible compliance that doesn’t put good companies out of business but still maintains the highest possible safety standards NOT the lowest possible cost. Putting off compliance over a combustible insulation blanket until 2014? Really? How is this safe?
-The lowest common denominator should not be lowest possible cost-to-the- industry. It should be the highest possible safety for the passenger. These things are not always mutually exclusive.
-If the root problem is less than ideal materials used across many manufacturer and model applications, then quit pussyfooting around.
If the boy is going to cry wolf, let it be for a real wolf. If the wolf is real, then act. If inadequate materials, composites, etc are the problem, then don’t point the finger and do nothing. Questionable materials have no place in an industry that lives under guidelines advocating and promoting safety over all.Like Yoda said, “Do or do not. There is no try.”
Raise the standards.
