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    Family Charges Bombardier with Negligence

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s decision on the Colgan Air Flight 407 crash is that the pilot responded inappropriately to the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. The stick shaker only comes into play when the plane is already slow enough to stall. The plane fell 800 feet before crashing pointing northeast, away from the airport

    The family of Ellyce Kausner has filed a lawsuit against Bombardier. Bombardier is the manufacturer of the plane involved in the crash. The suit charges that Bombardier was “negligent and careless” in the design of the plane by not providing more efficient internal mechanical warning systems.

    Kausner was a 24 year old Jacksonville law student traveling to NY to visit family.

    At least 19 other families have filed suits.

    At the time of the crash, the automated “stick-pusher,” pushes the control column down in order to send the aircraft into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall but Capt. Renslow yanked back on the controls while adding thrust, manually overriding the stick-pusher.

    Colgan Air, Clarence Center, NY, Accident Dockets

    George’s Point of View

    Time for Bombardier to step up to the plate. Although this has little to do with the pilot, who had flunked numerous flight tests during his career and was never adequately taught how to respond to the emergency that led to the airplane’s fatal descent. Maybe Ellyce would still be here if the warning systems on the Bombardier were simply better.

    When the plane slowed down to a dangerous level, it set off the stall-prevention system, and the pilot performed the opposite of the proper procedure. So there were hiring and training issues involved too. And Captain Renslow had about 109 hours of experience, hardly enough to be pilot.

    Even if procedures seem counter-intuitive, shouldn’t the pilot be aware of them?

    Barring the inefficiency of an ill-prepared pilot, shouldn’t Bombardier have some kind of way to limit ineffective pilot responses?

    When the hiring and training fails, and when the pilot fails, shouldn’t there be some kind of fail-safe within the plane? Even a copy of the Complete Idiot’s Guide to Not Crashing your Bombardier for pilots who flunked their last check write 16 months before and who apparently didn’t read the real manual?

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  • Advice from Good “Friends”

    So I’m drinking my coffee this morning in London, and look what Bloomberg’s headline says that Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy said…

    Boeing 747-8 Needs Passenger Evacuation Tests, Airbus Says
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-16/boeing-747-8-should-run-passenger-evacuation-tests-airbus-says.html

    So it is news that Boeing should do more tests on the basis of a rival’s comment that “I intend to fly in that airplane one of these days and I’d like to know you can get out of it.” Well. I guess it is news. Who knew. If I were Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy, I wouldn’t want to fly Airbus either, but I don’t know that I’d tell a newspaper reporter that.

    Certainly Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy’s advice in the article is kindly meant. Surely Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy would not be wishing problems on a rival company, especially looking back on Airbus’s own evacuation problems: “They evacuated 873 people from its A380 in 80 seconds, 10 seconds faster than its goal. One person broke a leg in the exercise, which was carried out in a dark hangar at an Airbus factory in Hamburg.”

    Let’s get real.

    As if Airbus doesn’t have a vested interest in causing Boeing further delay.

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  • Safe But Not Safe Enough: Helicopter Crash Reduction

    International Helicopter Safety Team is a task force composed of American and European government agencies–an international safety team–forecasts to reduce the rate of helicopter crashes 80 percent within eight years, no doubt a good idea as helicopters crash three times more frequently than commercial airliners

    Seventy percent of helicopter crashes are determined to be the result of human error (training, overwork or poor design)

    Partial list of Fatal crashes in 2008
    Date ——– Location ——– Craft ——–#

    12/27/2008 Honiara, PO HUGHES 369 N104BN Fatal(1)
    12/11/2008 Sabine Pass, TX BELL 206 N180AL Fatal(5)
    11/16/2008 Lingen, Germany Rotorway PH-NTL Fatal(1)
    11/16/2008 Quitman, AR BELL OH-58C N153GF Fatal(1)
    11/2/2008 Gallatin, TN Robinson R-44 N300FX Fatal(1)
    10/16/2008 Dryden, NY Robinson R22 N943MH Fatal(1)
    10/15/2008 Aurora, IL BELL 222 N992AA Fatal(4)
    10/13/2008 Conroe, TX BELL 206 N6ZV Fatal(2)
    10/13/2008 Sedona, AZ BELL 407 N42AZ Fatal(1)
    9/27/2008 Forestville, MD AEROSPATIALE AS365 N92MD Fatal(4) 0
    9/21/2008 Kenosha, WI Robinson R44 II N999ZD Fatal(2)
    9/6/2008 Muzino Village, Russia Robinson R-44 RA-04180 Fatal(2)
    9/3/2008 Persian Gulf, United Arab Emirates Bell 212 A6-AVL Fatal(7)
    8/31/2008 Greensburg, IN Bell 206L-1 N37AE Fatal(3)
    8/29/2008 Ridgedale, MO Robinson R44 II N41411 Fatal(2)
    8/17/2008 Olalla, WA Robinson R-22 N301MA Fatal(1)
    8/6/2008 Alice Arm, Canada Hughes 369D C-GZIO Fatal(3)
    8/5/2008 Weaverville, CA Sikorsky S-61N N612AZ Fatal(9)
    7/19/2008 Price, UT Hughes 369D N400BE Fatal(3)
    7/15/2008 Salesville, AR Hughes 269B N469E Fatal(2)
    7/4/2008 Sunol, CA Schweizer 269 C-1 N2011A Fatal(2)
    6/29/2008 Flagstaff, AZ Bell 407 N407GA Fatal(7)
    6/29/2008 Flagstaff, AZ Bell 407 N407MJ Fatal(7)
    6/8/2008 Huntsville, TX Bell 407 N416PH Fatal(4)
    5/29/2008 Panama City, Panama Bell UH-1N SAN-100 Fatal(11)
    5/25/2008 Sunrise Beach, MO McDonnell Douglas 500-E N686F Fatal(1)
    5/24/2008 Avalon, CA Aerospatiale AS-350-D N67GE Fatal(3)
    5/16/2008 Comstock, MI Fairchild Hiller FH-1100 N5049F Fatal(1)
    5/10/2008 La Crosse, WI Eurocopter Deutschland EC 135 T2+ N135UW Fatal(3)
    5/9/2008 Muanda, Congo Bell 206 L-1 N5014V Fatal(1)
    4/30/2008 Paraty, Brazil Agusta/Westland A109S PR-IPO Fatal(2)
    4/28/2008 Bartlett, TX Robinson R44 N477SH Fatal(1)
    4/15/2008 Chickaloon, AK Eurocopter France AS350B2 N213EH Fatal(4)
    3/13/2008 Wilmington, NC Robinson R22 Beta II N2215R Fatal(1)
    3/11/2008 Santa Cruz, Peru Bell 412EP N417EV Fatal(10)
    3/2/2008 Nizhnevartovsk, Russia Robinson R-44 II RA-04223 Fatal(2)
    2/13/2008 Gascoyne Junc, Australia Robinson R44 VH-ZDP Fatal(2)
    2/8/2008 Totes Gebirge, Austria Bell 206B OE-XRH Fatal(2)
    2/5/2008 S. Padre Island, TX Eurocopter France AS350B2 N911VA Fatal(3)
    1/25/2008 Los Angeles, CA Robinson R22 N705JJ Fatal(1)
    1/22/2008 Ochopee, FL Robinson R44 N18HB Fatal(2)
    1/11/2008 Puebla, Mexico Bell 412HP XC-JCD Fatal(8)
    1/7/2008 Zuzenhausen, Germany Bell 206B D-HJET Fatal(1)

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    Questioning Compliance and Public “solutions”

    I’m not an expert but there are aspects to this Lithium Ion battery story which concern me. I completely understand why these planes are grounded as this battery situation is examined, and applaud that solutions are being considered even as I write this. I cannot help but wonder what the actual time-frame will be. When I start wondering, I start asking —and quoting—the experts available to me and my company.

    The FAA maintains a database of Service Difficulty Reports (SDR’s) for US Registered airlines. There’s a long ignominious history recorded of fire and smoke events previously examined by the FAA in the unique category that the fires are hidden, i.e. in locations inaccessible or unknown to crew: mundane items the public never heard of–such as the built-in Halon 1301 trash receptacle extinguishers that failed to extinguish trash fires– were found and fixed or replaced. Battery ground cables have been known to arc (Northwest Airlines DC-10, March 1988), insulation blankets to burn (April of 1988, a Continental 737), overheated fluorescent light ballasts smoked (115 incidents way back in 1991).

    Here’s an example of why I am concerned:
    At least twenty-nine fires have been identified as being ignited by electrical short circuits in/from flammable acoustic blankets. One of these flammable circuit types that was identified back in a 1991 report is permitted in Boeing products until 2016.

    When the solution to the battery problem is determined, what time frame will the Airworthiness Directives require? Will compliance be to exchange, replace or modify the battery system or to put it off till later? ADs are issued with overly generous compliance times in years.

    Will a temporary measure be taken along with a compliance date set years from now?

    Regardless of whether the bottom-line business of aviation is wrestling with the expense of safety, a dicey potential fire starter component is a problem that should be addressed.

    If the Dreamliner is going to be in service for the next 40 years, an issue causing a component to cause a fire should not be covered with 40 years of bandaids. It should be fixed now.

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    Is Oxygen Hose Length an Issue?

    We talked about the May 16 cockpit fire on a United Boeing 757 (New York to Los Angeles) that made an emergency diversion to Dulles. That event involved an airborne cockpit fire so extreme that the pilot reached for the fire extinguishers to put out flames coming from his windshield—but he was brought up short by the length of the oxygen hose. In the smokey situation, it must have been a special concern to have the oxygen mask rip away from the pilot’s face. I can only assume there is other essential gear stored and unreachable due to the length of the hose, because I haven’t seen anyone talk about solving the hose length issue by moving the extinguishers closer.

    In fact, on some Boeing 757 and 767s the length of the hose attached to the pilot’s oxygen mask and smoke goggles is under scrutiny now by the FAA for being too short to reach the fire extinguishers. Apparently Boeing has resisted lengthening the hose because of the danger of the pilot getting tangled in the hose.

    Since the FAA is looking into the issue of the possibility of the hoses being too short, one can not help but wonder if this problem were a factor in the May 22 – Air India Express Flight 812 Boeing 737-800 crash at Mangalore International Airport, or the Jan 25 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 Boeing 737-800 that crashed into the Mediterranean Sea shortly after take-off from Beirut. How do we know that too-short hoses did not contribute to those tragic events?

    Conversely, if the 737 hose length is not too short and allows the pilot to reach where it essential for the pilot to reach, and there is no hose problem on the 737, then why has Boeing not corrected this problem on 757s and 767s?

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  • What Would EASA Do?

    IF the European Aviation Safety Agency is going to uphold its own mission “to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation,” it must take strong action when it receives the French Accident Investigators results.

    There’s so much speculation out there regarding what this account will be, it just seems better to wait and see what it says before second-guessing it. You know the report is going to talk about 1. lightning and weather 2. pitot tubes. They may also talk about computer issues, composites and the stabilizer/tail fin/rudder also.

    The only thing I don’t understand is why Airbus 330’s have not already been grounded pending the results of the investigation. With several recorded incidents of Airbus 330’s suffering near-disastrous incidents and generating data similar to what was received from the AF447 flight, it makes more sense to ground these planes now before another accident occurs. Why are they letting people fly around in a plane that is an accident waiting to happen?

    Or are all of these paying passengers just guinea pigs for Airbus to test their craft on until they get it right?

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