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Category: <span>Colgan Air</span>

Colgan Main Gear Landing in Houston


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer A. Kwanten

What: United/Colgan de Havilland Dash 8-400 en route from Little Rock,AR to Houston
Where: Houston
When: Apr 7th 2012
Who: 31 passengers, 4 crew
Why: While on approach to Houston, the gear did not come down. The crew performed a fly by, and ATC confirmed that the main gear were down but not the front (nose) landing gear.

The pilots made a second approach which concluded landing on the main gear. The pilots kept the nose up as long as possible.

1.9 Million Civil Penalty Proposed against Colgan Air

Formerly Colgan Air was under fire for long-distance commuting, crew-room sleeping and other fatigue-related factors that came to light after the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407. Now the Federal Aviation Administration proposed a $1,892,000 civil penalty against Colgan Air of Manassas, Va. a subsidiary of Pinnacle Airlines, for allowing flight attendants to work on 172 revenue passenger flights when they were not properly trained to use the planes’ cabin fire extinguisher system.

“FAA rules on flight crew training are designed to help ensure the safety of passengers,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We require carriers to comply with all of our safety rules, and we will not hesitate to take enforcement action when they do not.”

The 84 newly-hired flight attendants worked flights on the Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 twin turbo-prop aircraft between Nov. 3 and Nov. 9, 2009 after the FAA told Colgan the flight attendants had not completed the required training.

The FAA inspected the carrier’s new-hire flight attendant training for the Q400 on Nov. 2, 2009. The FAA alleges the new Colgan flight attendants were trained with fire extinguishers used on the airline’s Saab 340s, which operate differently than those used on the Q400.
“The airlines have to properly train crewmembers on the use of emergency equipment,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “The flight attendants’ primary responsibility is to know exactly how to handle emergency situations, and they can’t carry out that responsibility if they’re not properly trained.”

Colgan has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the agency.

According to Colgan, “Colgan Air was using the same type extinguisher for both the Saab 340B and Q400 training, although the Q400 extinguisher has a hose. This occurred in November 2009, and all flights during this period were completed safely and Colgan remains in compliance with these requirements today.


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Flight Attendant injured in Turbulence


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Nino Buda-CYYZ Aviation Photography

What: Continental Airlines/Colgan Air de Havilland Dash 8-400 en route from Newark to Washington DC
Where: Washington
When: May 16th 2011
Who: Flight attendant
Why: While en route, the plane encountered turbulence in which a flight attendant experienced injury. The plane did not divert, but continued to make a safe landing.

Paramedics dealt with the flight attendant’s injuries


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Colgan Air Engine Fire, Belly Landing in Pittsburgh


Pictured: Not N339NG but another DHC-8-402Q Dash 8
Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Nino Buda-CYYZ Aviation Photography

What: Colgan Air de Havilland Dash 8-400 on behalf of Continental Airlines en route from Cleveland,OH to Baltimore,MD
Where: Pittsburgh
When: Mar 17th 2011
Who: not available
Why: While en route, left engine indicated a fire.

The crew shut down the engine and diverted to Pittsburgh where they made a safe landing 30 minutes after the initial alert. There were no injuries.

Family Charges Bombardier with Negligence

The National Transportation Safety Board’s decision on the Colgan Air Flight 407 crash is that the pilot responded inappropriately to the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. The stick shaker only comes into play when the plane is already slow enough to stall. The plane fell 800 feet before crashing pointing northeast, away from the airport

The family of Ellyce Kausner has filed a lawsuit against Bombardier. Bombardier is the manufacturer of the plane involved in the crash. The suit charges that Bombardier was “negligent and careless” in the design of the plane by not providing more efficient internal mechanical warning systems.

Kausner was a 24 year old Jacksonville law student traveling to NY to visit family.

At least 19 other families have filed suits.

At the time of the crash, the automated “stick-pusher,” pushes the control column down in order to send the aircraft into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall but Capt. Renslow yanked back on the controls while adding thrust, manually overriding the stick-pusher.

Colgan Air, Clarence Center, NY, Accident Dockets

George’s Point of View

Time for Bombardier to step up to the plate. Although this has little to do with the pilot, who had flunked numerous flight tests during his career and was never adequately taught how to respond to the emergency that led to the airplane’s fatal descent. Maybe Ellyce would still be here if the warning systems on the Bombardier were simply better.

When the plane slowed down to a dangerous level, it set off the stall-prevention system, and the pilot performed the opposite of the proper procedure. So there were hiring and training issues involved too. And Captain Renslow had about 109 hours of experience, hardly enough to be pilot.

Even if procedures seem counter-intuitive, shouldn’t the pilot be aware of them?

Barring the inefficiency of an ill-prepared pilot, shouldn’t Bombardier have some kind of way to limit ineffective pilot responses?

When the hiring and training fails, and when the pilot fails, shouldn’t there be some kind of fail-safe within the plane? Even a copy of the Complete Idiot’s Guide to Not Crashing your Bombardier for pilots who flunked their last check write 16 months before and who apparently didn’t read the real manual?


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Binghampton Emergency Landing

What: United Airlines/Colgan Air Saab 340B en route from Binghampton to Washington DC
Where: Binghampton
When: Nov 24 2010
Who: 33 passengers
Why: On takeoff, the flight developed an indication of a fire in the left engine. The pilot returned to Binghampton, and made a safe landing. After passengers evacuated, the problem was discovered to be due to a sensor fault.


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Testimony: Colgan Air

Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety: One Year After The Crash of Flight 3407

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. There is no question that the FAA’s job is to ensure that we have the safest aviation system in the world. The aviation safety record in the United States reflects the dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including the FAA’s inspector workforce. In an agency dedicated to aviation safety, any failure in the system, especially one that causes loss of life, is keenly felt. When accidents do happen, they reveal risks, including the tragic Colgan Air accident. Consequently, it is incumbent on all parties in the system to identify the risks in order to eliminate or mitigate them. As Administrator Babbitt noted when he appeared before you in December, history has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed upon solutions. The fastest way to implement a solution is for it to be done voluntarily, and that is what the Call to Action was intended to facilitate. On January 27, the FAA issued a report that describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the Call to Action and offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation safety. I would like to use this opportunity to review the issues the Administrator identified in December and let you know where we stand on them.

Pilot Flight Time, Rest and Fatigue: When Administrator Babbitt was last here he told you that the aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) he convened for the purpose of making recommendations on flight time, rest and fatigue, consisting of representatives from the FAA, industry and labor organizations, provided him with recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management in early September. While we were extremely pleased with the product provided, the ARC did not reach a consensus agreement on all areas and was not charged with doing any type of economic analysis. Consequently, in spite of the Administrator’s direction for a very aggressive timeline in which to develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), his hope that a rulemaking proposal could be issued by the end of last year was not realized. The complexities involved with these issues are part of the reason why the FAA has struggled to finalize proposed regulations on fatigue and duty time that were issued in the mid-1990s. However, with the Administrator’s continued emphasis on this topic, we hope to issue an NPRM this spring. Although this is slightly later that we originally hoped, it is still an extremely expedited schedule, and I can assure you the FAA team working on this is committed to meeting the target.

One of the issues contributing to fatigue that I know is of interest to many of you is that of pilots who commute by air to their job. I would like to describe some of the emails and letters the Administrator has been receiving on the issue of commuting from pilots who choose to commute by air to their job. As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. It is important to keep in mind these personal accounts because, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on. So we want to emphasize these issues are complex and, depending on how they are addressed, could have significant impacts on people’s lives.

Focused Inspection Initiative: From June 24, 2009 to September 30, 2009, FAA inspectors conducted a two-part, focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices. The FAA inspected 85 air carriers to determine if they had systems to provide remedial training for pilots. The FAA did not inspect the 14 carriers that have FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP) because AQP includes such a system. Seventy-six air carriers, including AQP carriers, have remedial training programs. An additional 15 air carriers had some part of a remedial training program. There were eight air carriers that lacked any component of a remedial training program that received additional scrutiny and have since instituted some component of a remedial training system. Since we started, all carriers have implemented some component of a remedial training program. The FAA inspectors also observed 2,419 training and checking events during the evaluation. In the few instances we observed regulatory non-compliance, we took corrective action.

Training Program Review Guidance: Based on the information from last summer’s inspections, the FAA is drafting a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) with guidance material on how to conduct a comprehensive training program review in the context of a safety management system (SMS). A complementary Notice to FAA inspectors will provide guidance on how to conduct surveillance. SMS aims to integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable, proactive systems. SMS programs emphasize safety management as a fundamental business process in the same manner as other aspects of business management. Now that we have completed our data evaluation and drafting, both guidance documents are in internal coordination.

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at the Call to Action, Administrator Babbitt sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards. Many airlines are now taking steps to promote the larger airline’s most effective safety practices at their smaller partner airlines. The Air Transport Association’s Safety Council is now including safety directors from the National Air Carrier Association and the Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. Several large air carriers are conducting periodic meetings with those with whom they have contract agreements to review safety information and we are encouraged by these efforts.

In addition, I am pleased to say that since July 2009, after the Call to Action, the FAA approved 12 new Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs. Three air carriers that had no Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) have now established them. Four more air carriers have established new ASAP programs for additional employee groups. All of this supports the contention that the Call to Action did make a difference.

Professionalism and Mentoring: Last week, the FAA met with labor organizations to discuss further developing and improving professionalism and transfer of pilot experience. In the interim, these organizations have answered the Call to Action and support the establishment or professional standards and ethics committees, a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings between the FAA and major and regional air carriers. We also believe that labor organizations can explore some of the ideas raised in the Call to Action road shows, such as establishing joint strategic councils within a “family of carriers,” use of professional standards committee safety conferences, and mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs, with the goal of coming up with concrete ideas on mentoring. These ideas merit further discussion and the FAA looks forward to continuing to work with these organizations on these concepts.

Crew Training Requirements: As the Administrator explained during his last appearance before this Committee, the FAA issued a rulemaking proposal in January 2009 to enhance training programs by requiring the use of simulation devices for pilots. More than 3,000 pages of comments were received. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued in the coming months to allow the public to comment on the revisions that were made based on the comments that were submitted.

One of the things that the Call Action has shone a light on is the issue of varying pilot experience. The FAA is attempting to address this issue with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in which we can consider possible alternative requirements, such as an endorsement on a commercial license to indicate specific qualifications. We know some people believe that simply increasing the minimum number of hours required for a pilot to fly in commercial aviation is appropriate. As Administrator Babbitt has stated repeatedly, he does not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations.

The ANPRM requests recommendations from the public to improve pilot performance and professionalism; specifically on whether existing flight crew eligibility, training and qualification requirements should be increased for commercial pilots engaged in part 121 operations. The FAA is requesting comments and recommendations on four concepts for the purpose of reviewing current pilot certification regulations. The four concepts are: (1) requirement for all pilots employed in part 121 air carrier operations to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with the appropriate aircraft category, class and type rating, or meet the aeronautical experience requirements of an ATP certificate; (2) academic training as a substitute for flight hours experience; (3) endorsement for air carrier operations; and, (4) new additional authorization on an existing pilot certificate. The FAA has also asked for recommendations from industry and the public on any other concepts they may wish to offer. The ANPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 8.

Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends its guidance to airlines, Administrator Babbitt asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. The airlines agreed to use this best practice for pilot record checks to allow for a more expansive review of records created over the course a pilot’s career. The expanded review would include all the records the FAA maintains on pilots in addition to the records airlines already receive from past employers. Of the 80 air carriers that responded to the FAA on this issue, 53 air carriers, or 66 percent, reported that they already require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15 percent reported that they plan to implement the same policy.

As the Administrator stated when he appeared before you in December, the core of many of the issues facing the air carrier industry today is professionalism. It is the duty of the flight crew to arrive for work rested and ready to perform their jobs, regardless of whether they live down the street from the airport or a thousand miles away. Professionalism is not something we can regulate, but it is something to which we must encourage and urge pilots and flight crews to aspire. The conversations we have been having, in part because of the Call to Action, help emphasize the importance of professionalism in aviation safety.

In conclusion, our efforts will not stop or even slow down just because the final report on the Call to Action was issued. We have been gratified with the response to this effort. We believe that the collective efforts of FAA, the airlines, labor unions and, of course, Congress, will continue to result in implementing best practices, transferring pilot experience, and achieving an overall improvement in safety. Safety is at the core of the FAA’s mission, and we will always strive to make a safe system safer.

Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.


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Colgan Air Reports Lack of Speed Warning

Colgan’s Dec. 7 report to the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board said last February’s crash was probably caused by pilots’ “loss of situational awareness,” failure to follow the training and procedures, but pointed out contributing factors:

  • the cockpit warning system failed to adequately advise pilots when the speed is set below the calculated stall warning speed.
  • the lack of an adequate warning in the turboprop’s flight and operating manual regarding the effect of setting a non-ice reference speed during approach and landing
  • the crew’s failure to follow procedures regarding the proper response to a “stick shaker”
  • the crew’s failure to follow procedures regarding “non-pertinent conversation” by the flight crew during the descent and approach.

Although Bombardier is withholding comment until the NTSB completes its investigation, a spokesman pointed out that the existing avionics are reliable and certified; and there are currently no requirements for systems to report abnormally low air speed.


Click to view large photo at Airliners.net
Contact Photographer Frank Robitaille

What: Continental Airlines Flight 3407, Bombardier Q400 turboprop operated by regional carrier Colgan Air en route from Newark, New Jersey to Buffalo Niagara International Airport
Where: Clarence Center, New York.
When: Thursday Feb 12 struck a house at 10: 10 pm. Two homes were affected.
Who: 44 passengers and four crew members, 1 off-duty pilot, 1 person on the ground, all fatalities. The passenger manifest has not officially been released.
Why: The New Jersey-to-Buffalo flight was cleared to land on a runway pointing to the southwest. But the plane crashed with its nose pointed to the northeast. Seconds after two automatic warnings to the pilots that the plane was not moving fast enough to stay aloft, the twin turboprop aircraft went through a “severe pitch and roll” after positioning its flaps for a landing. It did not dive into the house, as initially thought, but landed flat on the house. Icing is emerging as the possible cause for why flight 3047 fell from the sky. The flight data recorder has been collected and is currently being examined.


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Turbulence Injures 3 over Dulles


Pictured: A United Express (Colgan Air) Saab 340B at Washington – Dulles International
Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer AviaStar

What: United Airlines Express / Pinnacle Airlines / Colgan Airlines two-engine SAAB 340 en route from Parkersburg, WV
Where: Dulles International Airport
When: 3:35pm Oct 24 2009
Who: 11 passengers
Why: While en route from West Virginia, the flight suffered turbulence, injuring a flight attendant and a passenger. Both struck their heads.

The plane made an emergency landing amid heavy rain and with gusty winds at Dulles; and both injured women were taken by ambulance to the hospital. An injured male passenger was treated at the airport.


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FAA Investigating Buffalo NY Crash


Click to view large photo at Airliners.net
Contact Photographer Frank Robitaille

What: Continental Airlines Flight 3407, Bombardier Q400 turboprop operated by regional carrier Colgan Air en route from Newark, New Jersey to Buffalo Niagara International Airport
Where: Clarence Center, New York.
When: Thursday Feb 12 2009 10 pm.
Who: 44 passengers and four crew members, 1 off-duty pilot, 1 person on the ground, all fatalities. The passenger manifest has not officially been released.
Why: The New Jersey-to-Buffalo flight was cleared to land on a runway pointing to the southwest. But the plane crashed with its nose pointed to the northeast. Seconds after two automatic warnings to the pilots that the plane was not moving fast enough to stay aloft, the twin turboprop aircraft went through a “severe pitch and roll” after positioning its flaps for a landing. It did not dive into the house, as initially thought, but landed flat on the house.

Although Icing is emerged as a factor for why flight 3047 fell, it has been found that the flight’s captain had lied on his job application to Colgan Air and only reported one of three failed FAA check rides. The co-pilot who could not afford to live in NY on her salary had flight-hopped across the country from Seattle and is recorded mentioning “a couch with her name on it.” The FAA investigators believe pilots made errors that contributed to the crash.


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Colgan Air 2x in 3 days

What: Colgan Air /US Airways Saab SF-340B en route from Hyannis to Nantucket
Where: Hyannis
When: Sep 10th 2009
Who: 3 crew on board
Why: The crew reported a problem with the engine compressor and returned to the airport


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact Photographer Tom Turner

What: Colgan Air Saab 340B
Where: Washington Dulles
When: Sep 7th 2009
Who: 20 passengers and 3 crew
Why: The flight rejected takeoff when a warning light came on in the cockpit. The flight was cancelled while maintenance repaired (presumably) a sensor.

George’s Point of View

There is no indication that both incidents were the same plane; but that Chicago plane doesn’t much look like a UA plane, does it? So, 2 different planes and both times maintenance to the rescue. But then we should rethink this…maintenance needs to try to catch this stuff before take-off. Has Colgan Air cut its maintenance budget lately?


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Colgan Air Flat Delays Return Flight


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact Photographer Marty McGuire

What: Colgan Air Saab 340B (US Airways) en route from New York La Guardia to Manchester New Hampshire
Where: Manchester
When: Aug 12th 2009
Who: 19 passengers and 3 crew
Why: On takeoff from New York, the right main gear tire was damaged. The flight continued on schedule and landed safely on a tire without tread.

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