George’s Point of View
INDIA-The Director General of Civil Aviation has been inactive, unresponsive to Indian aviation statistics of the past few years, which reflect cockpit crew fatigue, relaxed aircraft maintenance norms in India, dearth of DGCA flight safety inspectors, pilots put under pressure by airlines to operate flights even in difficult conditions, and poor training.
I guess problems like this are all over the world.
The DCGA, like the United States NTSB National Transport and Safety Board, is an authority over general transportation; India has no agency like the FAA, dedicated exclusively to aviation. India does have a recently formed (and woefully inadequate) board of various government and individual concerns that is supposed to meet four times yearly. Apparently there is an inadequate store of safe, well thought-out policies, forcing pilots and air traffic control to act on the spur of the moment in dangerous situations, instead of having an encyclopedia of safe procedures on hand to increase the safety factor.
We can only hope that the Indian government does not drag its feet, so that this time at some future date, we will not be looking back at future Indian Aviation tragedies saying to ourselves “We should have known this would happen. We should have done something about it while we had the chance.”
You have the chance, now.
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Buffalo: Haunting Questions
George’s Point of View
When it is all over, after the crash, after the investigation, after the finger-pointing, after all the intangible blame has been assigned to corporeal cause, and the reproachable have been reproached, it is important to remember that one of the objectives of a crash investigation is prevention.
Accidents happen. It is a fact of life. Because accidents happen no matter what we do, it is crucial that we do everything possible to reduce their likelihood. When we hear contributing factors of the Buffalo New York crash included that one pilot’s training lacked the procedure of how to handle the particular crisis (how to “respond to a warning system designed to prevent the plane from going into a stall”), and that the co-pilot was sick, we need to look at every factor. We should recognize opportunities to make procedural changes that reduce the accident factor.
I am sure that inclusion of this training is going to be the most obvious solution.
Regardless of training, is anyone is considering that sending those pilots flying under the weather conditions of that night is a reckless policy that dumps administrative blame on pilots who can no longer defend themselves, and whose jobs are simply to follow orders?
Happy Fourth
It is the Fourth of July.
Without naming names, I save a corner of my happiness for those countries in turmoil, and peoples of all nations and beliefs–I pray whatever their unhappiness is that it will pass, and they too will know some happiness in their own lifetime, in their own back yards.
Today, most of the USA will be grilling with friends and family.
Today we will share the heat, the plenty, the sunshine, the smoke, the food and the fireworks.
Today from sea to shining sea, we will celebrate our independence—another day, another precious year of this miracle of democracy in this land of unparalleled beauty and diversity. We may argue amongst ourselves, but I hope we can always remember, together, warts and all, we are beautiful. Our lives are the embodiment of a beautiful idea.
Today I will not think about the pundits who bring us bad news, and focus instead on the story of our country, the miracle that continues. As our lives inscribe another fourth of July into our own history books, let there be another unique page in our story.
This year, maybe we can invite a few more people to sit at our tables, so more of us can look forward to a well fed today, and a better, stronger, brighter future for our children.
Today we are still the United States of America, and this is our Independence day.
I have to reflect on my love of this holiday, but not too long because my family is waiting.
It’s not the flag waving, it’s what the flag represents.
I love this holiday because it celebrates our lives. It is a simple thing, really. America is families. Families in our parks, or in our own backyards. A hot dog, a hamburger, a chicken on every grill.
I love this holiday because this is where our kids play, where they grow strong and free, and spit watermelon seeds. I love this country because my children are free to argue their own opinions, not just about recycling and vegetarianism, but subjects like abortion and political theory. My children are free to be who they are. They are free to dream of who they can be. They are free to reach out and become the dream. Here sons and daughters can both play spontaneous games of touch football, or soccer or tennis or baseball, or compete in potato-sack races or lie on towels in the grass and stare up to count the leaves that twinkle in the sunlight, or the stars peeking out at dusk.
Tonight I will love this country even more when the babies that cried over fireworks last year will this year gaze at them in wonder.
Happy Birthday America from sea to shining sea. Have a happy fourth of July.
* all credit to whoever made this amazing photo found on the internet. You are an artist and an inspiration, whoever you are.
Why is Yemenia Airlines not on the EU Banned List?
A number of audit visits have also been requested by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to evaluate the safety situation of authorities and companies in Albania, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan and Yemen.
Why only an audit? How many second chances did the 153 passengers on Yemenia Airlines flight have? I ask why Yemenia Airlines is not on the banned list, after the terrible crash in the Comoros? The EU is displaying a terrible, unforgivable unconcern for human life.
Inspections in Germany and Italy had shown up “deficiencies” with the airline, and in July last year the EU commission had insisted Yemenia provide an “action plan” to address safety concerns. A year before that, “SOS voyage aux Comores” (SOS Travel to Comoros) began protesting shoddy aviation service, and called on French authorities to act. According to SOS spokesman Farid Soilihi, “Flights between Sanaa and Moroni are carried out by cowboy operators. The accident was predictable, these are planes that do not meet international standards. Yemenia was the cheapest of all the ‘rubbish companies’ with a near-monopoly on this destination”
Yemenia Airlines is presently owned by the Government of Yemen (51%) and the government of Saudi Arabia (49%).
–GH–
The ban list announcement is here:
The European Commission published today (27/11/2009) the twelfth update of the Community’s list of airlines banned in the European Union which comprises those of three additional countries following safety deficiencies highlighted by audits. With this update the ban imposed upon three airlines is lifted and one airline is allowed to resume operations under conditions given satisfactory improvements in safety.
“We cannot afford any compromises in air safety. Citizens have the right to fly safely in Europe and anywhere else in the world”, said Commission Vice-President Antonio Tajani. “Our aim is not just to create a list of airlines that are dangerous. We are ready to help those countries to build up their technical and administrative capacity to guarantee the safety of civil aviation in their countries. We will step up our cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organisation to ensure that our efforts are better coordinated to grant assistance where it is most needed. We cannot, however, accept that airlines fly while not complying with international safety standards. This endangers all of us who unknowingly could be on an unsafe plane. This is why the list is necessary”.
The new list replaces the previous one and can already be consulted on the Commission’s website .
The rationale of the rules governing the list of banned airlines is two-fold:
a) The list serves as a preventive instrument for safeguarding aviation safety. This is illustrated by the numerous instances where the Community has successfully addressed potential safety threats well ahead of resorting to the ultimate measure of imposing restrictions.
b) The list also acts as a last resort when serious safety problems persist by imposing restrictions or banning access to European airspace; . Such measures give a strong incentive to remedy safety deficiencies;
With this update three carriers licensed in Ukraine have been removed from the list: Ukraine Cargo Airways and Volare have both lost their Air Operator Certificates; following the receipt of certain information from the Ukrainian authorities, the carrier Motor Sich is also removed from the list. A fourth carrier, Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines is allowed to resume operations with one aircraft. This is the result of a successful visit lead by the European Aviation Safety Agency with the participation of two Member States in Ukraine to verify improvements achieved by the companies.
In the same vein, the significant progress made by the civil aviation authority of Angola and the air carrier TAAG Angola Airlines to resolve progressively any safety deficiencies are recognised. TAAG is therefore allowed to increase the number of aircraft it uses for its flights to Portugal.
This update also highlights the continuous dialogue with certain States regarding the safety of their carriers. Strengthened cooperation and progress was noted with Albania, Angola, Egypt, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. A number of audit visits have also been requested by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to evaluate the safety situation of authorities and companies in Albania, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan and Yemen.
At the same time, the list was extended to include all air carriers certified in Djibouti, Republic of Congo and Sao Tome and Principe because of safety deficiencies identified in the system of oversight by the aviation authorities of these countries.
All carriers covered by this and previous updates continue to be subject to prioritised ramp inspections at Community airports in order to ensure their consistent adherence to the international safety standards.
Today, the Community’s list has five individual carriers whose operations are fully banned in the European Union – Air Koryo from the Democratic People Republic of Korea, Air West from Sudan, Ariana Afghan Airlines from Afghanistan, Siem Reap Airways International from Cambodia and Silverback Cargo Freighters from Rwanda. All carriers from 15 countries – 228 companies in total – are banned: Angola (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, (with the exception of three carriers which operate under restrictions and conditions), Indonesia, Kazakhstan (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland and Zambia. There are eight air carriers allowed to operate under restrictions and conditions – TAAG Angola Airlines, Air Astana from Kazakhstan, Gabon Airlines, Afrijet and SN2AG from Gabon, Air Bangladesh, Air Service Comores and Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines from Ukraine.
When Lady Luck Turns Away
Incidents and Accidents.
Behind every accident, there are many incidents. Accidents may be defined as involving fatalities and incidents as those many smaller events seemingly unconnected from any others. The importance of incidents has gotten little respect but for two obscure references. The industry recognized Heinrich Pyramid says “…. for every accident that causes a major injury, there are 29 accidents that cause minor injuries and 300 accidents that cause no injuries.”
A 2005 Rand Report drawing attention to NTSB databases said “…(there is) poor control of information, part of resolving more complex accidents depends upon a thorough knowledge of prior incidents, the number of major airline incidents the FAA reported in 1997 was ten times the number of major accidents, (there is) neither oversight nor an emphasis on accuracy in the collection and maintenance of NTSB records, as a result, the accuracy of most of the NTSB data sources was rated as “poor” and although the NTSB does examine a significant number of major incidents, only a small portion of the NTSB’s aviation resources are focused on incident events.”
Rand report Link >
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1122.pdf
See page 38 –40.
Key Public Databases – NTSB and FAA. Gaps Compromising Safety Assessments.
The NTSB’s most public source of records is the accident/incident database.
It is cited in the FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), Airworthiness Directives (ADs), risk/analysis studies, and in DOT/GAO Reports to congress.
In my various surveys along major safety issues (uncontained engine explosions, un-commanded rudder movements, shutdowns due to engine main bearing failures, or smoke/fire incidents, the NTSB data contains about 20 % of what is found in SDR data or other counterpart investigative agencies.
Gaps in NTSB data are further compounded by similar gaps in SDR data. From
1992 to 2002 four NTSB Safety Reccommendation Letters and the GAO had complained of such gaps. In 2010 and regarding data on windshield fires, an article said the “FAA said it was aware of 11 cases of fires in the planes over the past 20 years. However, Boeing has said it is aware of 29 incidents involving fire or smoke over the past eight years.’ Source link >
http://www.news24.com/World/News/FAA-orders-Boeing-inspection-20100710 – bottom of article.
1994. In 1994, The Department of Transportation Inspector General reported that between “46 and 98 percent of the data fields of inflight ‘service difficulty’ records are missing data.” From GAO/AIMD-95-27. 02/08/95. Data
Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety Analysis
Source Link >
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai9527.pdf
From the House Hearing Electrical Safety. (Ref report 106-112, Thursday, October 5, 2000, Testimony of Alexis M. Stefani, assistant IG for auditing), said; “Third, of most concern to us is the health of this SDR system, itself. While the new rule (coding for wire issues) was intended to improve the data in the system, FAA must also insure that the reports that are provided to it are timely, and follow the guidance. We found, however, that the SDR system is not robust, and over the years, it has suffered from budget cuts with staffing going from twelve full-time to three full-time people. Weakness in this system reduces the reliability and usefulness of the data, and can impact FAA’s ability to do trend analysis.”
Source Link >
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpw106-112.000/hpw106-112_1.HTM
Page 47
From a June 8, 2006 U.S./Europe International Aviation Safety Conference, FAA’s Flight Standards Service, Jim Ballough.spoke of “FAA’s growing concern over numerous reports of smoke/fumes in cockpit/cabin and that FAA data analysis indicates numerous events not being reported.” Source Link >
http://www.faa.gov/news/conferences/2006_us_europe_conference/ See ‘Presentation
’ by Jim Ballough.
650 Records Of “Smoke In The Cockpit” A Lack of Concern.
Gary Stoller at USA Today did a good piece on “smoke in the cockpit”
reports. Of some 650 records, the FAA/NTSB has but a fraction. The story highlights included; (that the) “issue happens roughly four times a month.
Some experts say the problem is under-reported. FAA says there is “no safety benefit” to requiring systems to remove cockpit smoke. Smoke in a plane’s cockpit from electrical or other failures is reported an average of four times each month, a USA TODAY analysis finds.” Further that “In-flight fires left unattended “may lead to catastrophic failure and have resulted in the complete loss of airplanes,” the FAA warned. A flight crew “may have as few as 15-20 minutes to get an aircraft on the ground if the crew allows a hidden fire to progress without intervention.” USA Today
Source http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/30/cockpit-smoke-airline-faa/3316429/
33 records Of Insulation Blankets Fires. – How They Start.
From my catalog of 78 Records of fire from 1983 to 2012 sourced from the NTSB, AAIB (Danish & UK), French BEA, FAA’s SDR databases, and a few media reports of records of accidents and incidents of fire. There is no central repository. There are 33 records where acoustic insulation (blankets) were specifically mentioned are listed. The issues of self-igniting and flammable wire insulations and of flammable blankets were now are co-mingled.
Three modes of ignition are seen here: wire shorting/arcing, molten metal sprayed from faulting electrical relays and heating tapes. Most reports lack necessary detail, but seven incidents were seen from wires shorting/arcing.
Some involved only a few wires; one powering coal closet lights. Molten Metal (spatter) comprised another 8. More importantly, within those reports were references to another 19 (but without details) and that the NTSB said; the relays involved were not “substantially different from the receptacles used on other transport-category airplanes.”
Ignition from faulting heating tapes/ribbons was seen in another 4 reports – but there were more. In a November 14, 2002 Letter to the FAA, the Canadian Transport Safety Board (TSB) advised that; “heater ribbons are used extensively in transport category aircraft, including Boeing 707, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767 series and Boeing (Douglas) DC-9, DC-10, and MD-11 aircraft. ” From a TSB report of such fires on 747s and a 767, four other reports were disclosed. The TSB added; “The standard Boeing 767 incorporates 26 heater ribbons. Between June 1985 and June 2002, operators of Boeing aircraft made a total of 67 reports to Boeing of heater ribbon failures where thermal degradation was evident.” From one Delta MD-88 fire in 1999, the NTSB said; “DAL conducted a fleet wide examination of their MD-88/MD-90 fleet to ascertain the condition of their static port heaters. Eight heaters were found with evidence of thermal damage on their wires and or connectors.” There are 8 ADs, and 24 additional SDRs describing burn marks or fire damage. (ref King Survey ‘History Heater Blanket/Tape Fires’.)
In 2002, the FAA concluded that “in-flight Fires In Hidden Areas are a risk to aviation safety – most hidden fires are caused by electrical problems – non-compliance with Safety Regulations have been uncovered. Fire safety problems and improvements are in various stages of correction and study” and that “it is impossible to predict the relative risk of serious fires occurring in Hidden Areas or Locations”. Source Link >
http://www.caasd.org/atsrac/meeting_minutes/2002/2002_01_Fire-Safety-in-Hidden-Inaccessible-Areas.pdf
Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit.
In June 2013 a GAO Report to Congress cited but one record of ‘Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit’ (in 1973). The input came from the NTSB and the FAA. Contrary to that, a Specialist Paper by the Royal Aeronautical Society detailed seven. Only two were in the NTSB databases – but with no mention of ‘continuous smoke.’
Links > GAO-13-551R, Jun 4, 2013. FAA Oversight of Procedures and Technologies to Prevent and Mitigate the Effects of Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit.
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-551R
Link > Royal Aeronautical Society – Smoke, Fire and Fumes in Transport Aircraft. Second Edition 2013, Part 1, Past History, Current Risk, And Recommended Mitigations. A Specialist Paper prepared by the Flight
Operations Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. March 2013
http://flightsafety.org/files/RAESSFF.pdf
In Lady Luck We Trust ? – Those ‘Lucky’ Ground Incidents.
Often heard whenever the safety of our air transportation system is questioned is that we have an enviable safety record due to the industry, the FAA and the NTSB’s efforts. That is true if only actual deaths are counted.
This boiler-plate response comes whenever issues of safety are raised, but something else is left unspoken: its conditional nature. It includes just the U.S. carriers, and is based on the records kept. However, there have been no less than 6 events where fires occurred on the ground and caused significant damage, or loss of the airframes. Fire departments intervened in five.
What if, instead, over 900 lives had been lost over the past 12 years ?
For example:
(1) Aug 8, 2000, AirTran DC-9-32 – fire and blistering of aircraft skin, 63 on board.
(2) Nov 29, 2000, a DC-9-32 by AirTran (97 on board).
(3) Same Day, Nov 29, 2000, a DC-9-82, American Airlines (66 on board) ,
blankets burned, emergency evacuation on taxiways – 97 on board”.
(4) June 28, 2008, ABX 767 freighter burned through the fuselage and was destroyed at the gate, (“The risk of an in-flight fire and the propagation of a fire in those areas is essentially the same whether the airplane is equipped to fly passengers or cargo” says the FAA). Approximate 767 capacity is 190 people.
(5) July 29 2011, Egypt Air 777, fire erupted and burned a cockpit-widow
sized hole through the fuselage. Emergency services put the fire out – 291 passengers were evacuated.
(6) On October 14, 2012, a Corendon Airlines 737-800 had “substantial damage” from fire in the cockpit on the gate. 196 on board were evacuated. Had these fires broken at altitude or during the trans-oceanic crossing, all on board may have been lost.
For the sum each of these fires found in the NTSB’s accident/incident database, over 900 lives were not lost. A more honest assessment and the credit for this remarkable safety record of no fatalities was not the FAA and industry abilities to manage and ‘mitigate risks’ – but rather the kindness of Lady Luck. But what can happen when lady Luck turns away ?
Aviation Industry: Time for a Black Box Upgrade
Woodland Hills, CA — (ReleaseWire) — 07/07/2016 –No one is saying that aircraft tracking doesn’t need an overhaul. It does. Examination of plane crash events demands it.
Aviation experts have been asking for pinger battery improvements since a month after the crash of Air France 447 on 1 June 2009, when the pinger battery ran down in July. Air France 447 was not recovered from the ocean floor until May 2011, nearly two years after it was lost. Debris from the accident was recovered in the interim, but if the pinger had been louder, or the battery designed to last longer, then there’s a good chance that the plane would have been discovered sooner. One of the outcomes of this terrible event was a determination to design a pinger system with longer lasting batteries. EASA amended requirements for flight recorders and underwater locating devices in its 2013-26 amendment(RMT.0400 & RMT.0401 (OPS.090(A) & OPS.090(B)) — 20.12.2013) but implementing these requirements takes a prohibitively long time.
Aviation experts have been asking for better tracking technology since Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 disappeared on 8 March 2014 while flying from Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia, to Beijing Capital International Airport in China. Because this plane departed from its planned route, finding where it came down has been a unique challenge. Inmarsat’s satellite communications network concluded that the flight continued until at least 08:19 and flew south into the southern Indian Ocean. Triangulation of Inmarsat’s satellite communications has been the only credible source searchers depend on to develop the search area.
Aviation experts have been suggesting the blackbox be water-activated (or have water-activated duplicates) with flotation of some kind so the blackbox can be found faster. More recently, aviation experts have wondered about EgyptAir Flight 804 which crashed into the Mediterranean Sea on 19 May 2016. It was known fairly precisely where it came down, and yet salvage and rescue units were unable to be on the scene in time to help any survivors—if survivors there had been. We will never know because no one was there. And while tracking the location of the blackbox fell within the thirty day battery limit, if the technology had more power, it could have been located sooner. Finding the wreckage sooner means less money spent on the search, and a shorter time for the families agonizing over their losses.
So here is what is new: Inmarsat provides SwiftBroadband service for plane’s inflight Wi-Fi on many aircraft. Immarsat is developing a streaming system described as a “blackbox in the cloud.” This streaming system they are working on will allow crucial data to be streamed off a plane on the occasion of specified trigger events like a course deviation or disappearance from radar.
One only need consider a few factors to realize that a cloud-based system is a crucial development that current technology can easily handle. We need only to look at the cost of the search for a missing plane. According to France and Brazil, those two countries spent more than $40 million over two years to recover the black boxes from Air France Flight 447. Bloomberg reported the recovery cost of Air France 447 was $100 million. According to the South China Post, the cost of the (as yet unfound) MH370 will be as much as ten times more than AF447. Like the expense of MH370’s search, the cost of finding EgyptAir Flight 804 is still ongoing.
Even when Inmarsat’s streaming system will be available, the aviation industry is going to be resistant, mostly because it is going to be costly. Is this a cost that we must afford? I think it is.
Let me know your thoughts on this crucial topic at https://twitter.com/GeorgeHatcher
A Disgraceful Attitude
Here are a couple of facts:
– Yemenia Flight 626 was an International Airbus A310-324 from Sana’a, Yemen, to Moroni, Comoros, that crashed on 30 June 2009 killing 152.
–French authorities charged Yemenia Airways with manslaughter over the Yemenia Airways crash.
–A judicial source said that Yemenia’s Airbus A310 “should not have been allowed to fly”.
–152 people died in the crash.
In spite of this, Yemenia announced they are “ready to challenge any allegation regarding the pilot’s competence, or the plane’s maintenance.”
They kept on flying a plane which was judged unsafe. Now Yemenia Airways is denying responsibility for the crash, which in all likelihood was a consequence of flying an unsafe plane.
Any way you look at it, no matter how vehemently they dismiss it, no matter how many times they make an “official” statement, in refusing responsibility for a plane crash on their watch —a plane crash which killed 152 people who trusted the airline to deliver them safely and which is clearly their responsibility—Yemenia Airways has displayed a disgraceful attitude.