George’s Point of View
INDIA-The Director General of Civil Aviation has been inactive, unresponsive to Indian aviation statistics of the past few years, which reflect cockpit crew fatigue, relaxed aircraft maintenance norms in India, dearth of DGCA flight safety inspectors, pilots put under pressure by airlines to operate flights even in difficult conditions, and poor training.
I guess problems like this are all over the world.
The DCGA, like the United States NTSB National Transport and Safety Board, is an authority over general transportation; India has no agency like the FAA, dedicated exclusively to aviation. India does have a recently formed (and woefully inadequate) board of various government and individual concerns that is supposed to meet four times yearly. Apparently there is an inadequate store of safe, well thought-out policies, forcing pilots and air traffic control to act on the spur of the moment in dangerous situations, instead of having an encyclopedia of safe procedures on hand to increase the safety factor.
We can only hope that the Indian government does not drag its feet, so that this time at some future date, we will not be looking back at future Indian Aviation tragedies saying to ourselves “We should have known this would happen. We should have done something about it while we had the chance.”
You have the chance, now.
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Questioning Compliance and Public “solutions”
I’m not an expert but there are aspects to this Lithium Ion battery story which concern me. I completely understand why these planes are grounded as this battery situation is examined, and applaud that solutions are being considered even as I write this. I cannot help but wonder what the actual time-frame will be. When I start wondering, I start asking —and quoting—the experts available to me and my company.
The FAA maintains a database of Service Difficulty Reports (SDR’s) for US Registered airlines. There’s a long ignominious history recorded of fire and smoke events previously examined by the FAA in the unique category that the fires are hidden, i.e. in locations inaccessible or unknown to crew: mundane items the public never heard of–such as the built-in Halon 1301 trash receptacle extinguishers that failed to extinguish trash fires– were found and fixed or replaced. Battery ground cables have been known to arc (Northwest Airlines DC-10, March 1988), insulation blankets to burn (April of 1988, a Continental 737), overheated fluorescent light ballasts smoked (115 incidents way back in 1991).
Here’s an example of why I am concerned:
At least twenty-nine fires have been identified as being ignited by electrical short circuits in/from flammable acoustic blankets. One of these flammable circuit types that was identified back in a 1991 report is permitted in Boeing products until 2016.When the solution to the battery problem is determined, what time frame will the Airworthiness Directives require? Will compliance be to exchange, replace or modify the battery system or to put it off till later? ADs are issued with overly generous compliance times in years.
Will a temporary measure be taken along with a compliance date set years from now?
Regardless of whether the bottom-line business of aviation is wrestling with the expense of safety, a dicey potential fire starter component is a problem that should be addressed.
If the Dreamliner is going to be in service for the next 40 years, an issue causing a component to cause a fire should not be covered with 40 years of bandaids. It should be fixed now.
Fly Nigera? Maybe Walk.
George’s Point of View
Air Consult International recently audited the safety factors of Nigerian Airlines.
Only Aero Contractor’s aircraft were all okayed.
Virgin Nigeria Boeing 767-300 aircraft and Arik Air’s Hawker HS-125 planes were judged to be at risk. In fact, the executive jet charter business is deemed to be a risky business which has not kept up with general aviation safety standards, according to 234Next which somehow obtained the confidential report.
The report says also that “The operating environment in Nigeria is still a difficult one. Vast areas of the country’s airspace do not have radar coverage and air traffic control is provided by radio and procedural means.”
Of course, it is public knowledge that many African air carriers are on the European Banned list Non-EU air carriers are vetted against internationally binding safety standards established by the 1944 Chicago Convention and its annexes. Failing criteria include poorly maintained, antiquated or obsolete aircraft and the inability of the airlines involved to rectify their shortcomings and respect safety standards.
Virgin Nigeria has deteriorated since its original audit, and is now operating with fewer employees and deteriorating standards. Also, HS-125 Executive jets operated by Arik Air got a Category 0 rating in the audit.
Fast News; Slow Conclusions
George’s Point of View
On this blog here, we are in the practice of posting quick news as we find it–the who, what, where, when, why of it all. Details are compressed so that we can present that quick notification of what just happened; and frequently, even the (minimum of two) news sources behind our reports do not agree.
Technically, the reality of any event could be compressed into such a quick format, because there is an ultimate truth which exists. But, it takes years for investigators to get to that ultimate truth. And when it does happen, the “why” is not going to be a single line or paragraph. It is going to be composed of hundreds of pages of documentation of all the facts that are revealed in the course of investigation.
Investigation is a painstaking process at best even if the accidents occur with witnesses and are recorded on video tape and multiple media perspectives such as the the black boxes. (And many times those records do not exist or are lost.) The investigative teams look at the obvious records, and then they go through the wreckage with a fine-toothed comb, examining concrete evidence, and use this evidence to put together the most accurate reconstruction of events possible. And frequently there are opposing perspectives of how something happened. Sometimes of the actual facts of the incident, only a partial percentage of concrete evidence is found; and sometimes it takes months or years to surface. When a new piece of evidence does surface, the entire conclusion may end up revised. (Think of the of the Titanic disaster which occurred in 1912 whose initial investigation closed that same year; and whose rediscovery in 1985, lead to a reinvestigation which actually begun in 1994, and salvage beginning in 1995.) Thus the investigative process can take an indeterminate length of time.
So we do apologize to our readers for putting anything at all in the “why” area of our records, because we well know that the why and how of what happened is simply not going to be concluded for a long, long time. We hope that it is understood that our presentation of the “why” is a cursory summary at best, but that the final conclusion that will be years in coming is the result of conscientious, painstaking, scrupulous investigation by seasoned experts.
Door Switch Oops Rolls Nippon Flight

Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Andrew BowdenWhat: All Nippon Airways Boeing 737-700 en route from Okinawa to Tokyo Haneda
Where: Hamamatsu
When: Sep 6th 2011
Who: 2 crew injured
Why: While en route, the co-pilot accidentally activated the rudder trim switch instead of the door mechanism.The plane descended 6000 feet and rolled, injuring a couple of flight attendants. The first officer—2400 hours— leveled off, and was able to admit the captain who was stuck outside the cockpit, waiting to get in.
The flight continued without incident.
In George’s Point of View
If there is a problem, it comes out, eventually. My pilots tell me that after there is some kind of incident, we need to keep an eye on new incidents, reports, recalls, and especially advisories, directives and safety alerts. There can always be a relationship, no matter how obscure it seems at first glance.
You know how everyone has been looking at Air France Flight 447 with a new eye, ever since examination into the Air France Flight 471 on July 22 apparently fooled the autopilot into quitting with a swift descent. And Airbus investigators looked at this event twice because you have two the same plane types doing something similar?
Well, on the surface, this Nippon incident reminds me of Ethiopia Flight 409. It only reminds me because I saw a line drawing of the route of the plane as it spiraled out of control. It also was a 737.
I’m not calling the situation identical. Certainly if one of the pilots were locked out on a bathroom break—not that a pilot would do this on takeoff!—it would turn up on the voice recorder.
What if on Ethiopia Flight 409, someone had needed admission into the cabin?
It just makes me wonder if it is possible that the cabin crew accidentally activated the rudder trim switch. The Ethiopian Airlines plane had just taken off; it would not have been high enough to drop 6000 feet before recovery.
I know this thought is right out of the blue, and probably has no basis in anything but my wild imagination, but I am told by my pilots that although the switches are dissimilar, the door unlock switch is right next to the rudder trim. So, is it possible the trim switch could have been inappropriately engaged by accident on Flight 409?
Some airlines rectify this by requiring a third party to open the door if someone leaves the cockpit, but I have to wonder if this could be a design problem.
Boeing 787 Smokes Battery in Boston

On January 7, 2013, a Japan Airlines Boeing 787 Dreamliner Japan-Boston had already landed in Boston, and all 184 passengers had safely disembarked when smoke filled the cabin.A fire was found in a battery aboard the plane. Boston Firefighters arrived at 10:40 a.m. and put out the fire.
Passengers were provided alternative transportation and overnight accommodations.
Electrical issues in the avionics bay where the battery is located are a known issue in this type of plane, which uses electrical motors instead of hydraulics in certain areas. The auxiliary battery in the compartment kicks in after the engine kicks off. That’s what happened on test flights, and from what I have heard, that is what happened here.
In George’s Point of View
Let’s slow down with this great plane. Let’s get the kinks out of it before we put humans on too many of these Dreamliners. Let them stay Dreamliner and not become Nightmareliners. United is starting service but are these planes really ready? There have been engine problems and some spooky events. We don’t read too much about them, but I know they have occurred. I love this plane, I want to fly all over the world in it, and if I live long enough, I will, but, is it ready?According to the NTSB report below, the NTSB seems to agree with me that incidents like this warrant investigation.
Press Release
WASHINGTON– Investigators with the National Transportation Safety Board are gathering information regarding reports of smoke aboard a Boeing 787 at Boston’s Logan Airport today.The Japan Airlines 787 was on the ground and empty of passengers at the time of the incident.
The NTSB has dispatched an investigator to Boston. Based on a review of the factual information gathered, the NTSB will determine the extent of its investigation.
Video Below- Air India Express | airliners.net | Boeing | Crash | Editorial | India | Mangalore | update
INDIA’s DGCA Asserts Co-Pilot Assertiveness
George’s Point of View
Following the Air India Express tragedy in Mangalore India (and definitely in response to it), the DGCA (India’s Directorate-General of Civil Aviation) has been trying to shut the gate after the horses are out. They’re still pointing their fingers at the pilot.
The tape of the crash records the co-pilot Capt H S Ahluwalia (*i.e. the pnf) insisting to Commander Capt Zlatko Glusica to initiate a go-around. The Captain (**i.e. the pf) did not, and the plane landed too far down the runway, clipped an antenna, crashed thru the end of the runway, off the edge of the runway plateau. We can only assume the captain ignored his co-pilot, as no go-around was initiated.
Apparently the pilot was in error and the co-pilot knew it. It must have been obvious to Ahluwalia that they were landing at the wrong angle too far down (the middle) of the runway–but he did not act on his knowledge. At any rate, he was in disagreement with his superior officer.
Consequently, the DCGA has issued an operations circular highlighting procedural assertiveness for the co-pilot when he knows the pilot is wrong. The Mangalore tragedy is not mentioned by name, but it is certainly the silent subtext.
Did the crash occur because the co-pilot did not take the controls? What exactly will this circular accomplish? Had this circular been public already, would the pilot and co-pilot have ended up in a wrestling match over controls of the airplane?
It will be interesting to hear from pilots about what they think the consequences of this directive might be, and if they think a cultural context may play a part.
I always turn to the experts. Right now, before the full investigation is out, I am hearing a lot of speculative “pilot error” but it is all speculation. But is it all pilot error?
My experts remind me that “Every incident is linked to a chain of events. Each event alone is not sufficient reason to provoke an accident although when they link together the chances are multiplied and sometimes the accident occurs.” ( I am quoting a pilot.)
For example, if pilot fatigue were a contributing factor (landing at dawn after a long tiring duty cycle), isn’t the carrier’s policy on pilot fatigue a contributory factor?
The Boeing 737 landed midway on runway 24, and then overshot it, crashing into a gorge. Initial reports on the civil aviation website showed runway 27 mislabeled as runway 24. The actual crash site was not even pictured, a mistake that certainly casts doubt on the quality of the investigation, and possibly even the quality of the resources available to pilots at the time they were negotiating a landing. What did their map say? Is a pilot alone in error if the resources provided him are in error? I know I am digressing, but the point I want to make is this:
I don’t have years of flight school, or engineering training but I do have opinion. And in my opinion, pilot error alone does not cause a crash like this.
Terminology
*pnf – pilot not flying
**pf – pilot flying
—

Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer WTWhat: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 en route from Dubai to Mangalore
Where: Mangalore airport
When: 6:00 a.m May 22 2010
Who: 160 (?) passengers including 23 children, 6 crew= 158 fatalities and 8 survivors
Why: Air India Express flight 812 attempted touch down was around the middle marker. (Conflicting) reports are that it overshot the runway, and that the pilot intended a go round (tapes reveal the co pilot was urging a go-round) but the plane hit the localizer antenna at the runway’s end, plowed through the perimeter losing part of a wing, and went down 75 feet into a ravine, and broke into pieces and burst into flames. On touchdown, there was a reported “bang” which may have been a tire bursting. A drizzle started after the accident. From 5 to 10 people have been hospitalized, but according to reports there are possibly 3 survivors.Survivor Abdul Puttur suffered burns. He was seated near the wing exit and said that the pilot had announced the landing, then there was a thud. He saw huge flames after the plane fell into the ravine and then he jumped out from the back entrance. Another passenger said the pilot made no announcement.
The Serbian pilot was Zlatko Glusica, first officer was S.S. Ahluwalia.
According to DGCA rules, Mangalore International Airport is deemed a “critical airfield” which means that “supervised take offs and landings” are prohibited. Only the captain (not the first officer) can pilot take-offs and landings. Mangalore International Airport has a controversial table top runway and which forces pilots to make a precision landing. The airport has no buffer zone, and pilots landing planes must fly precisely or risk hurtling off the edge.
