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  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39
    [Docket No. FAA-2005-22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD;
    Amendment 39-15950; AD 2009-14-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. That AD currently requires replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same repetitive replacements and would require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements. Modification Tf75 replaces the check valve piston with a piston design not requiring an O-ring. This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 3, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of August 3, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD from Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com.
    The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by superseding AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on January 22, 2009 (74 FR 3978). That action proposed to require replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals and to require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal or on the determination of the cost to the public.

    Change to the Mandatory Terminating Action Compliance Time

    Since we issued the proposed AD, we realized that there is no direct relationship between the mandatory terminating action compliance date in the proposed AD and the usage rate of the affected helicopters. We changed the AD to require the terminating action be done within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We have determined that this change will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 94 Arrius 2F turboshaft engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform an O-ring replacement, and about one work-hour to incorporate Modification Tf75. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $16 per engine for O-ring replacement, and about $20 per engine for incorporating Modification Tf75. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $18,424.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), and by adding a new airworthiness directive, Amendment 39-15950, to read as follows:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-01 Turbomeca S.A: Amendment 39-15950. Docket No. FAA-2005- 22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 3, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter EC120B helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    O-ring Replacement

    (f) Replace the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at the intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD. Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.C.(2) of Turbomeca Alert Service Bulletin No. A319 79 4802, Update No. 1, dated April 3, 2006, to replace the O-ring.

    Table 1–Compliance Times for O-ring Replacement

    If the class of oil is:
    Then replace the O-ring by the later of:
    Thereafter, replace the O-ring within:
    (1) HTS or unknown. 300 hours time-since-new (TSN) or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 300 hours time-since-last replacement (TSR).
    (2) STD. 450 hours TSN or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 500 hours TSR.

    Mandatory Terminating Action

    (g) Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, do the following mandatory terminating action to the repetitive O- ring replacements:
    (1) Incorporate Turbomeca Modification Tf75 by replacing the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, with a check valve piston requiring no O-ring.
    (2) Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.B.(1)(r) of Turbomeca Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 319 79 4075, Version B, dated May 14, 2008, to replace the check valve piston.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (i) EASA AD 2008-0170, dated September 25, 2008, also addresses the subject of this AD.
    (j) Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of the service information identified in this AD.
    (k) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238- 7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use the service information specified in the following Table 2 to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the documents listed in the following Table 2 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria-dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http:/ /www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Table 2–Incorporation by Reference

    Turbomeca Alert/MandatoryService Bulletin No.
    Page
    Update/Version
    Date
    A319 79 4802
    Total Pages: 7 ALL Update No. 1 April 3, 2006
    319 79 4075
    Total Pages: 9 ALL Version B May 14, 2008

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 19, 2009.
    Francis A. Favara,
    Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15099 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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    FAA Proposes $2.4 Million Civil Penalty Against Cessna Aircraft

    KANSAS CITY – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a $2,425,000 civil penalty against Cessna Aircraft Co., of Wichita, Kan., after carbon composite parts of the wing of one of its aircraft came apart during flight.

    On Dec. 6, 2010, an FAA test pilot performing a production audit test flight in a Cessna Corvalis experienced a failure of the skin on the left wing. About seven feet of the left wing skin separated from the forward spar and damaged a fuel tank. A spar is a beam-like structure inside the wing and is a principal load-bearing component. The pilot made an emergency landing at the Independence, Kan., airport.

    Subsequently, the FAA issued emergency airworthiness directives grounding 13 specific Corvalis aircraft that used wings and parts produced in Cessna’s Chihuahua, Mexico, plant between Dec. 17, 2009, and Dec. 16, 2010. FAA investigators determined that the wing skin separated from the spar due to excessive humidity in the factory that prevented the bonded materials from curing properly.

    The FAA alleges that Cessna failed to follow its FAA-approved quality control system when it manufactured the wings on the damaged airplane, as well as 82 additional parts, in the Chihuahua factory. The manufacturer has since made improvements to the plant.
    “Safety is our highest priority,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We want to ensure that manufacturers are vigilant when it comes to aviation safety. There can be no exceptions.”

    “Quality control is a critical part of the aircraft manufacturing process and has to detect problems before planes leave the factory,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Manufacturers have to ensure that all the details are followed all of the time.”
    The Corvalis is a high-performance four-seat single-engine general aviation aircraft. It uses a significant number of composite parts and structures.

    Cessna has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond.

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  • Easa Issues CF-2011-27 : Air Driven Generator Failure to Power Essential Buses

    From Canada, Bombardier CL-600 has been issued an airworthiness directive concerning failure of the air driven generator with an effective date: 13 August 2011

    “The aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 use the same ADG generator control unit (GCU) as models CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19. However the aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 are installed with a different hydraulic pump and do not experience the same failure due to the low threshold setting of the circuit protection. However, it was found that the same ADG GCU transformer primary winding can break due to thermal fatigue. Broken transformer primary winding can prevent the supply of power from the ADG to the essential buses. In the event of an emergency, failure for the essential buses to remain powered can prevent continued safe flight.”

    The corrective action is to replace within 10 000 hours air time or 60 months from the effective date of this directive. Whichever occurs first, remove and replace the ADG GCU Part Number (P/N) 604-90800-7 with a new ADG GCU P/N 604-90800-27.

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    Revisiting Ethiopia Flight 409

    We’ve been studying Ethiopia Flight 409 for a while, and now that the official investigation Progress Report is out, we have looked at it with quite some interest. The 28 page report is attached as a pdf at the end of this editorial, so if you haven’t seen it yet, we have it handy–

    In some places, we find that the report corroborates some of the the points we made (or discovered in our research.)

    According to the report:

    “Instruments meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and the flight was on an instrument flight plan. The accident occurred at night in dark lighting conditions with reported isolated cumulonimbus clouds and thunderstorms in the area.”

    Their report also states:
    The Lebanese Civil Aviation Authority reviewed the data from the Lebanese Meteorological Services that was collected on 25 January, 2010 after the accident. Meteorological data revealed some significant meteorological conditions in the area at the time of the accident. Relevant meteorological documents are included in the investigation file and will be analyzed during the investigation.

    1.7.1 General meteorological situation
    At the time of the accident, there was thunderstorms activity southwest and west of the field, as well as to the northwest on the localizer path for runway 16.

    We had found a satellite photo of the area at the time in question and found something more turbulent than isolated cumulonumbus clouds. Here are the details we turned up
    (thanks to Prof. Robert H. Holzworth
    Departments of Earth and Space Sciences, and Physics
    Director, World Wide Lightning Location Network )

    WWLLN lightning strokes between (45,35.2) and (33.6, 35.7) coordinates on25 Jan 2010 between 00 and 06 UTC
    .
    2010/01/25,00:26:01.675091, 33.7925,  35.3157, 18.6, 15 2010/01/25,00:32:36.535404, 33.6762,  35.3223,  2.6,  5 2010/01/25,00:35:33.147928, 33.8152,  35.3989, 17.1,  9 2010/01/25,00:36:46.386409, 33.7880,  35.4182,  6.3,  6 2010/01/25,00:37:57.880969, 33.7473,  35.4083, 12.9,  8 2010/01/25,00:38:56.307703, 33.8144,  35.4480,  6.7,  5 2010/01/25,00:39:52.170965, 33.8098,  35.4486, 22.5, 1 02010/01/25,00:47:07.877656, 33.7658,  35.5138, 16.3,  7 2010/01/25,00:47:08.129640, 33.7532,  35.5187,  6.8,  5 2010/01/25,00:51:28.917459, 33.7313,  35.4897, 15.8,  8 2010/01/25,00:57:16.994854, 33.7712,  35.5668,  6.2,  5 2010/01/25,00:57:17.172976, 33.8877,  35.6009,  3.1,  5 2010/01/25,00:57:16.970924, 33.8230,  35.5664,  9.2,  5 2010/01/25,01:05:02.878083, 33.6379,  35.5348, 10.9,  5 2010/01/25,02:58:51.961652, 33.6073,  35.3703,  2.3,  5 2010/01/25,03:00:31.235850, 33.6450,  35.3881,  5.8,  7 2010/01/25,03:02:45.342786, 33.6157,  35.3553,  4.5,  7 2010/01/25,03:30:07.101084, 33.6511,  35.3185, 17.5,  7 2010/01/25,04:06:25.411422, 33.8432,  35.3648, 10.9,  5 2010/01/25,04:07:31.723296, 33.9087,  35.3844,  7.0,  5 2010/01/25,04:13:12.295902, 33.9543,  35.4151, 17.0, 10 2010/01/25,04:29:17.203911, 33.9865,  35.4613, 20.7, 10 2010/01/25,04:33:22.703869, 33.9637,  35.3229,  7.6,  6 2010/01/25,04:35:07.805894, 33.8709,  35.3297, 13.3,  8 2010/01/25,04:46:45.611497, 33.9634,  35.4145, 12.9,  6 2010/01/25,05:19:51.913652, 33.6442,  35.4520, 19.5,  8 2010/01/25,05:35:10.788571, 33.9139,  35.2087,  9.5,  7 2010/01/25,05:56:25.149281, 33.6332,  35.6535, 14.0,  7

    and the satellite photo:

    The plane’s on board radar would have normally registered this unacceptable massive super cell in the area where the airplane hit the ocean and the pilot would have adjusted the flight path accordingly. This makes us question if the on board radar was intact and operable. The weather system pictured in the satellite photo is not weather a pilot would voluntarily fly into. So we were not surprised to see this included in the report:

    1.17.1.6 Procedure for use of on-board Weather Radar
    ET provided its SOP and Boeing procedure for the operation of the weather radar during departure. The procedure will be addressed during the analysis phase.

    OTHER POINTS
    Our investigation pointed out that when an aircraft fails, it is a crucial part of the research to look at timely Airworthiness Directives (issued before and after) on the type of plane involved and indeed, this has become part of the ongoing research:

    1.16.4.1 Removal and Analysis of the Trim Tab section:
    ADs were issued (Emergency AD, AD 2010-09-05, AD 2010-17-19) by the FAA respectively on March and August 2010 regarding trim tab control mechanism and this airplane (with serial number 29935) was found affected by these ADs.
    Therefore, and in accordance with the Airworthiness Group recommendation, the Investigation Committee decided the removal of the trim tab control mechanism for further test and research.

    This is not the final report. The final report is due out this summer. We are looking forward to seeing if it answers some of our questions.

    The Official Report

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    Air New Zealand Expands Use of Boeing 777 Component Services Program

    Long-term agreement adds Boeing 777-300ERs to coverage

    SEATTLE, Feb. 1, 2011 – Boeing Air France Industries KLM Engineering & Maintenance and Air New Zealand today said an agreement has been signed to expand the airline’s use of the 777 Component Services Program (CSP), offered jointly by Boeing and Air France Industries KLM Engineering and Maintenance. 

    After gaining experience with the CSP on its 777-200ER (extended range) fleet, Air New Zealand is expanding the support for common parts to cover its fleet of 777-300ERs. These parts will be added to the existing 777 CSP agreement. The airline accepted the first of its five 777-300ERs in December 2010.

    The program allows airlines to outsource the cost and logistical challenge of keeping important parts on hand. It significantly reduces the airline’s up-front investment in spare parts and offers a reliable supply of critical parts. They also benefit by receiving a working component more quickly, rather than having to wait for a completed repair that could ground an airplane.

    “For the past four years the 777 Component Services Program has operationally been highly successful on our 777-200ER fleet, so it is natural to expand it to include our new 777-300ERs,” said Vanessa Stoddart, group general manager, Technical Operations and People, Air New Zealand. “The -300ER’s longer range make the need for this component availability even more critical.”

    "Air New Zealand, with its unique location and route structure, requires a great airplane operating at the top of its performance capability," said Dale Wilkinson, vice president of Material Services for Commercial Aviation Services, Boeing Commercial Airplanes. “The 777 Component Services Program will help provide that edge.”

    “Air New Zealand has chosen a program that has demonstrated its relevance to customer expectations. Since it’s been launched, the 777 CSP is indeed the favorite program for 777 operators,” said Robert Anton, senior vice president, Components Services, Air France Industries.

    Thirteen 777 customer airlines participate in the CSP, with a total of 135 aircraft currently operating under the program.

    The 777 CSP program is offered jointly by Boeing and AFI KLM E&M, who also offer a similar program for Next-Generation 737 models.

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    International Boundary and Water Commission Casualties found near Tex/Mex Border.

    Update

    Senator John Cornyn–on the Judiciary Committee’s Immigration, Border Security and Refugees subcommittee and the Armed Services Committee’s Airland subcommittee, former Texas Attorney General, Texas Supreme Court Justice, and Bexar County District Judge– released a Statement regarding the International Boundary and Water Commission Plane Crash

    “Since the disappearance of this aircraft earlier in the week, all of us have been hoping and praying for a miracle. So it is with a profound sense of sadness to learn that the wreckage has been found, and that the lives of these four men have been lost. Commissioner Marin and Jake Brisbin Jr. were devoted public servants and proud Americans whose loss will be felt throughout the border region. Their hard work and commitment, along with that of Commissioner Herrera’s, reflected the spirit of goodwill and partnership that is shared by the United States and Mexico as we work together on our common goals. Their family and loved ones are in my prayers tonight as the entire border region remembers their lives and legacies, and mourns this tragic accident.”

    src=http://cornyn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=ForPress.NewsReleases&ContentRecord_id=75aeea20-802a-23ad-4b54-496c3c561d42

    What: Chartered Cessna 421
    Where: Border Patrol located the wreckage in a remote rugged section of the Sierra Madre Mountains in Mexico, about 20 miles northwest of Presidio.
    When: The plane was reported missing after it did not land on time Monday in Presidio. It was found shortly after noon Wednesday
    Who: Found deceased: leaders of the U.S. and Mexican sections of the IBWC, Carlos Marin of El Paso and Arturo Herrera, of Ciudad Juarez, Mexicom, Jake Brisbin Jr., executive director of the Rio Grande Council of Government and pilot Matthew Peter Juneau
    Why: The group had traveled to inspect flooding conditions in Presidio and Ojinaga, an aerial view of the Luis Leon Reservoir. Cause of the crash is not known but the pilot had signalled a problem after taking off Monday from El Paso, Mexico.

    AP had inadvertently listed the passengers as deceased when the plane disappeared and optimistically attempted to retract the story, hoping the passengers would be found alive. Sadly, there were no survivors

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