Aviation News, Headlines & Alerts
 
Category: <span>AirWorthiness Directive</span>

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FAA Issues Battery Statement. And Me Too…Attention, Boeing…

My experts are telling me that it looks like Boeing is all alone on these 787 battery fires. The FAA issued 31 ‘Special Conditions’ (you can read that to mean that the FAA gave Boeing a whole lot of slack) but this battery problem is not getting a free ride, or any favors.

SAFETY is the top priority. Make no mistake. The sooner the Dreamliner and its battery is grounded, the sooner the fix will be found and it will be safe to fly again. Well. While you’re at it fixing the battery problem, get that team of pilots who fly this thing to go over all areas of failure thus far, including the engines. Look at ALL of these…

  • Nov 6 2010: Boeing flight Texas: electrical problems in the aft electronics bay which disabled the primary flight displays in the cockpit.
  • Nov 6 2011: ANA Flight Okayama forced to deploy the landing gear using the alternate extension backup system, after an active warning light, which said that the wheels were not properly down.
  • July 28 2012: Boeing Flight Charleston: contained engine failure during a taxi test at Charleston International Airport PRE Delivery Taxi test. Debris fell from engine
  • Dec 4, 2012: United over Mississippi: “multiple messages” regarding flight-system errors, and diverted to New Orleans (KMSY). The problems occurred when one of the plane’s generators failed. Power was supplied to the aircraft with the five functioning generators.
  • Jan 7, 2013: JAL Boston: fire was discovered in a battery and electrical compartment of the aircraft.
  • Jan 8, 2013: JAL Boston: 40 gallons of fuel had spilled from one of its wing tanks at the gate. The plane was contacted before takeoff and it returned to the terminal without incident. Probably a case of overfilling the tank.
  • Jan 9, 2013: ANA Yamaguchi: Brake problems
  • Jan 16, 2013: ANA Takamatsu: instrument indications of smoke in the forward electrical compartment. No fire was found.

Boeing? Are you listening? I fly everywhere, all over the world but at the moment, I’m not comfortable getting on this great plane that I really want to love for future travel. I’m am confident you can do it, even if all of these wrinkles are going to mean you need to bring in the really big iron. We need all the finders and fixers on this! The world has places to go and things to do, and you’re holding their safety in the palm of your hand.

The Emergency Airworthiness Directive has been issued. Issued Jan 16, 2013
and here is their announcement:

As a result of an in-flight, Boeing 787 battery incident earlier today in Japan, the FAA will issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) to address a potential battery fire risk in the 787 and require operators to temporarily cease operations. Before further flight, operators of U.S.-registered, Boeing 787 aircraft must demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the batteries are safe.
The FAA will work with the manufacturer and carriers to develop a corrective action plan to allow the U.S. 787 fleet to resume operations as quickly and safely as possible.
The in-flight Japanese battery incident followed an earlier 787 battery incident that occurred on the ground in Boston on January 7, 2013. The AD is prompted by this second incident involving a lithium ion battery. The battery failures resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787 airplanes. The root cause of these failures is currently under investigation. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment.

Last Friday, the FAA announced a comprehensive review of the 787’s critical systems with the possibility of further action pending new data and information. In addition to the continuing review of the aircraft’s design, manufacture and assembly, the agency also will validate that 787 batteries and the battery system on the aircraft are in compliance with the special condition the agency issued as part of the aircraft’s certification.

United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. When the FAA issues an airworthiness directive, it also alerts the international aviation community to the action so other civil aviation authorities can take parallel action to cover the fleets operating in their own countries.

See Directive:

Airbus A318-A321 Hydraulic Power System Airworthiness Bulletin


This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises registered owners and operators, repair stations, and mechanics holding inspection authorizations, of all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320 and A321 series airplanes of an airworthiness concern regarding overheating of the power transfer unit (PTU) of the hydraulic system.

Hydraulic Power System: Power Transfer Unit
There have been several reports of loss of a single hydraulic system due to leakage, and subsequent failure of a second hydraulic system from overheating. Airbus determined that overheating of the second hydraulic system is caused when the PTU is not de-activated by the flight crew within two minutes after the fault annunciation (AMBER CAUTION) alert on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system. Consequently the airplane is left with only one functional hydraulic system. The subject airplanes require at least one functional hydraulic system for continuous safe flight and landing.
Read More


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Easa Proposes Airworthiness Directive for Airbus

Angle of Attack (AoA) Probes Faulty:

Testing shows that data from two different Airbus planes were found inaccurate.

Investigation conducted by Airbus and Thales on the removed probes revealed oil residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA vane position resolvers. This oil residue was the result of incorrect removal of machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise), causing delayed and/or reduced AoA vane movement. Multiple AOA probes could be simultaneously affected, providing incorrect indications of the AoA of the
aeroplane. If not corrected, this could lead to erroneous AOA information and consequent delayed or non-activation of the AoA protection systems which, if during flight at a high angle of attack, could result in reduced control of the aeroplane.

View the proposed Directive here in PDF


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Easa Issues CF-2011-27 : Air Driven Generator Failure to Power Essential Buses

From Canada, Bombardier CL-600 has been issued an airworthiness directive concerning failure of the air driven generator with an effective date: 13 August 2011

“The aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 use the same ADG generator control unit (GCU) as models CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19. However the aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 are installed with a different hydraulic pump and do not experience the same failure due to the low threshold setting of the circuit protection. However, it was found that the same ADG GCU transformer primary winding can break due to thermal fatigue. Broken transformer primary winding can prevent the supply of power from the ADG to the essential buses. In the event of an emergency, failure for the essential buses to remain powered can prevent continued safe flight.”

The corrective action is to replace within 10 000 hours air time or 60 months from the effective date of this directive. Whichever occurs first, remove and replace the ADG GCU Part Number (P/N) 604-90800-7 with a new ADG GCU P/N 604-90800-27.


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Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and – 500 Series Airplanes

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing two warning level indicator lights on the P2-2 center instrument panel in the flight compartment for certain airplanes. For a certain other airplane, this AD requires activating the cabin altitude warning and takeoff configuration warning lights. For all airplanes, this AD also requires revising the airplane flight manual to remove certain requirements included by previous AD actions, requires new pressure altitude limitations for certain airplanes, and advises the flightcrew of the following changes: revised emergency procedures to use when a cabin altitude warning or rapid depressurization occurs, and revised cabin pressurization procedures for normal operations. This AD was prompted by a design change in the cabin altitude warning system that would address the identified unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the flightcrew to recognize and react properly to a valid cabin altitude warning horn, which could result in incapacitation of the flightcrew due to hypoxia (lack of oxygen in body), and consequent loss of control of the airplane.

2011-03-14


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SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN: Main Landing Gear – Tires and Wheels

SAIB: CE-11-06 Date: December 15, 2010

Introduction

SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN

SAIB: CE-11-06 Date: December 15, 2010

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, registered owners and operators of small airplanes, to follow established safety criteria, guidance, and data when modifying your aircraft with tires that are oversized compared to the original equipment Federal Aviation Administration- (FAA-) approved type design. Oversized tires have been FAA approved by supplemental type certificates (STC) and field approvals on numerous small aircraft types for an assortment of reasons, such as maintaining ground clearance when installing larger propellers or improving landing performance for unique conditions. These oversized tires have customarily been referred to as “Tundra” tires.

At this time, the FAA has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. Investigation of a recent accident highlights the need for reminding operators of part 23 certificated airplanes that oversized tire modifications require analysis and substantiation as well as periodic inspections to prevent unsafe conditions. This SAIB reiterates the criteria to apply when evaluating the use of oversized tires and for determining the appropriate requirements to obtain necessary FAA approval.

Background

Recently, there was a non-fatal accident involving an Allied Ag Cat Productions, Inc. (Ag-Cat) (also known as Schweizer) Model G-164B airplane (Type Certificate Data Sheet 1A16) equipped with the larger 29×11-10 tires. The aircraft encountered a wheel failure that caused a wheel brake to lock up, which resulted in the aircraft departing the runway, coming to rest in a ditch.

An investigation determined the likely failure sequence of the accident was due to an initial crack of unknown origin in the inner flange. The weakened flange allowed the larger pressurized tire to fail the flange at the crack. The wheel flange broke into several pieces 360 degrees around the wheel assembly circumference. The broken flange pieces pressed inward by the existing tire/tube pressure, contacted the calipers, and caused the wheel brakes to lock up. The aircraft subsequently left the runway and came to rest in a ditch. The facts provided from the initial on-site investigation were insufficient to determine the precise failure scenario.

Some G-164B aircraft have been modified with “Geared” Pratt & Whitney R-1340 engines having larger diameter propellers. With the reduced ground clearance these propellers tended to siphon up debris on unimproved airstrips when at flight attitude during take-off, thereby damaging the propellers. To improve ground clearance, some operators replaced the standard 8.50×10 tires with the larger 29×11-10 tires on the original Cleveland Wheel and Brake wheel part number 40-101. This practice subsequently continued with the turbo propeller configured aircraft. The larger tires on the 40-101 wheels reduced the running clearance between the tire sidewalls and the wheel brake calipers.

1We have not been able to identify a documented FAA approval to install these larger tires on the G-164B aircraft. However, an STC that authorizes the larger tire approval on similar aircraft (Air Tractor) has been issued. This STC has been used by operators and repair stations as a basis for field installations for the G-164B aircraft.

Recommendations

All operators of 14 CFR part 21, section 21.25 Restricted Category and 14 CFR part 23 Normal Category certificated airplanes that are currently operating with or may modify their aircraft to operate with oversized tires different from the aircraft’s approved type design, should acquire an STC or field approval supported by FAA-approved data with similar original equipment manufacturer (OEM) restrictions for installation, pressure, etc. before doing so. The approved data should include flight test requirements and their results as well as system design and structural analysis. Guidance for replacing OEM tires with oversized tundra tires is provided in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) AC 23-17B. The AC summarizes the results of flight tests recommended by National Transportation Safety Board and conducted by the FAA for evaluation of tundra tires installed on a Piper PA-18. In addition, the AC provides information of these tires as well as testing of their installation. Although the guidance in the AC is based specifically on the Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-18, it identifies issues and guidance that can be extended to other airplane types equipped with oversized tires. The AC also identifies the possible performance effects and flight and ground handling characteristics that may be altered with the installation of the tundra tires. Potential propulsion system effects such as unusable fuel may be affected by changes in normal flying attitude. Review of all these potential effects as identified in AC 23-17B should be evaluated.

Before

installation of larger tires operators should do the following as a minimum:

1. Initially inspect wheels for cracks using an industry standard fluorescent penetrant process with annual inspections thereafter.

2. Install only approved vendor supplied tires. 3. Install new tubes. 4. Determine the appropriate tire pressure for your specific tire, aircraft, and aircraft operations

in consultation with the approved tire manufacturer and FAA Advisory Circular, AC 23-17B. 5. Check for clearance between the tire and brake components. 6. Check the tire pressure and abnormal wear at 2 week intervals or less.

Additional safety information to the public of potential problems associated with aircraft with oversized tires is also provided in Safety Alert for Operations (SAFO) 10007, dated 5/24/10. The SAFO provides recommended actions for persons interested in operating aircraft with oversized tundra tires as well as with skis, or wheel/ski installations.

Owners and operators of Restricted Category and Normal Category airplanes who intend to modify their aircraft with oversized tires should review the above documents for guidance and the issues to consider and evaluate when replacing the manufacturer’s recommended main landing gear wheels and/or tires with oversized replacements.

For Further Information Contact

Werner Koch, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Airplane Certification Office, ASW-150, 2601 Meacham Blvd, Fort Worth, TX 76137; phone: (817) 222-5133; fax: (817) 222-5960; e-mail: werner.g.koch@faa.gov.


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Airworthiness Directive: Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 Helicopters

Published: 09/30/2010
Subject: Hydraulic pump
Effective: 10/15/2010
Summary: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This action requires replacing each affected hydraulic pump with an airworthy hydraulic pump. This amendment is prompted by the loss of the proper functioning of a hydraulic pump because of the deterioration of the pump seals and the loss of hydraulic fluid caused by incorrect positioning of the piston liner. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of hydraulic power and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to correct an unsafe condition for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. EASA advises of the loss of the right-hand (RH) hydraulic power system on an AS332L2 helicopter. The pilot saw the hydraulic system “low level” warning light come on during the approach phase. Investigation revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing due to deterioration of the pump seals resulting from an incorrectly positioned compensating piston liner. EASA states that this non- compliant repair process was used by the following repair stations: HELIKOPTER SERVICE, ASTEC HELICOPTER SERVICE, and HELI-ONE. They further state that if this condition occurs on both pumps of a helicopter, it could result in loss of the RH and left-hand (LH) hydraulic power systems and consequently may lead to the loss of helicopter controllability.

Related Service Information

Eurocopter has issued an Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB) with two numbers (01.00.78 and 01.00.43), dated March 11, 2010. EASB No. 01.00.78 applies to United States type-certificated Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 helicopters; civil Model AS332C1 not type-certificated in the United States; and military Model AS332B, B1, M, M1, and F1 helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. EASB No. 01.00.43 applies to military Model AS532A2, U2, UC, AC, UL, AL, SC, and UE helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. The EASB specifies identifying affected hydraulic pumps, prohibiting flights for all helicopters fitted with two of the affected hydraulic pumps until at least one of the affected pumps is replaced, replacing all affected hydraulic pumps with airworthy pumps within 10 months, and returning any affected hydraulic pump to have it checked and, where necessary, reconditioned.
EASA classified this EASB as mandatory and issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters.

FAA’s Evaluation and Unsafe Condition Determination

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, their technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

Differences Between This AD and the EASA AD

We refer to flight hours as hours time-in-service (TIS). We require each affected hydraulic pump be replaced with an airworthy pump within 15 hours TIS. We do not use the calendar date used in the EASA AD because that date has already passed.


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Airworthiness Directives: McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model MD-11 and MD-11F Airplanes

SUMMARY: FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time
inspection to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center
upper auxiliary fuel tank and marking the location, if necessary; a
one-time inspection of all wire bundles above the center upper
auxiliary fuel tank for splices and damage; a one-time inspection for
damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center
upper auxiliary fuel tank; and corrective actions, if necessary. This
AD also requires installation of nonmetallic barrier/shield sleeving,
new clamps, new attaching hardware, and a new extruded channel. This AD
results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are
issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

For More Information…


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Flying with a Chance of Ice

The latest brouhaha in the aviation set is that the safety directive on Rolls Royce Engines–which are liable to ice up–does not ground the planes for repair, but instead has a repair date of 2011. The engines are in Boeing 777s, and have been acknowledged to be responsible for engines shutting down while in flight.

Two questionable parts do not require replacement until 2011.

Read the directive below:

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Under certain ambient conditions, ice can accumulate on the walls of the fuel pipes within the aircraft fuel system, which can then be released downstream when fuel flow demand is increased. This released ice can then collect on the fuel-to-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) front face and limit fuel flow through the FOHE.

We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from blocking the FOHE, which could result in an unacceptable engine power loss, and loss of control of the airplane.


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FHA ISSUES Airbus Directive

George’s Point of View

Did the FAA consider grounding the affected planes and avoiding the chance that all “three” could fail and the pilot could lose control of the airplane?

I’m not a pilot but come on, it’s just common sense.

Bravo for taking action, but, is it safe to keep the affected planes in the air?

Regarding the directive and a couple of loose valves:

“The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. ”

——

An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose[ning] of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances.
A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves.
Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event.
Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation.
The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane.
* * * * *

The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

Read the directive:


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Boeing: New Airworthiness Directives

A new airworthiness directive effective January 4, 2010 is being adopted regarding certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the skin along lap joints, butt joints, certain external doublers, and the large cargo door hinges; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The AD results from reports of scribe lines found at lap joints and butt joints, around external doublers, and at locations where external decals had been removed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.

Also effective January 4 is another new directive regarding the landing gear of certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive lubrications of the right and left main landing gear (MLG) forward trunnion pins. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies of the transition radius of the MLG forward trunnion pins, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies (including finish damage, corrosion, pitting, and base metal scratches) of the transition radius of the left and right MLG trunnion pins, and corrective action if necessary. Replacing or overhauling the trunnion pins terminates the actions required by this AD. This AD results from a report that the protective finishes on the forward trunnion pins for the left and right MLG might have been damaged during final assembly. This AD is intented to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the forward trunnion pins, which could result in fracture of the pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.

http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/index.cfm/go/document.list/display/new


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FAA Fine Proposals against United Airlines and US Airways

$3.8 million fine
The FAA says United Airlines:

  • Boeing 737 flew in over 200 flights not in airworthy condition (two shop towels in the engine’s oil sump area)

$5.4 million fine
The FAA says US Airways:

  • Embraer ERJ-190s on 19 flights in AD violation (open cargo door Directive)
  • Airbus A320s on 26 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
  • A320 on 17 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
  • Airbus A320 on 855 flights in maintenance violation (engine repair)
  • Boeing 757 on 505 flights in maintenance violation(missed engine work inspections)
  • Boeing 757 on 121 in maintenance violation
  • Boeing 767 on 53 flights without weekly inspection
  • Boeing 767 on 51 flights without inspections, tests and sampling

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EASA WARNS of overtorque issue with Goodrich Pitot tubes

Several reports have recently been received of loose pneumatic quickdisconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the result of mis-torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level.

Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s).

See the full report here (.pdf)

http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2009-0202-E


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General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

Airworthiness Directive

Federal Register Information

Header Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD;
Amendment 39-15958; AD 2009-14-08]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/ shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit. This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

DATES: This AD becomes effective August 5, 2009.

ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on February 20, 2009 (74 FR 7831). That action proposed to require removing certain P/N HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Comments

We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We have considered the comment received. The commenter supports the proposal.

Conclusion

We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect one engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that the actions would require no work-hours per engine. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate there is no cost of this AD to U.S. operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Regulatory Information

2009-14-08 General Electric Company: Amendment 39-15958. Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 5, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines with a high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/shaft, part number (P/N) 1703M74G03, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 747 series airplanes.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

New Reduced Life Limit for the HPCR Stages 11-14 Spool/Shaft

(f) Remove any CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, before the spool/shaft meets or exceeds the new, reduced life cycle limit of 19,500 cycles.

Installation Prohibition

(g) After the effective date of this AD, do not install any CF6- 80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, that meets or exceeds 19,500 cycles.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Special Flight Permits

(i) Under 14 CFR part 39.23, we are prohibiting special flight permits for this AD.

Related Information

(j) Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(k) None.

Footer Information
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 25, 2009.
Peter A. White,
Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15513 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines

Airworthiness Directive
Federal Register Information
Header Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD;
Amendment 39-15952; AD 2009-12-51]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines
PDF Copy (If Available):

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-12-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

DATES: This AD becomes effective July 15, 2009 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued on June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of July 15, 2009.
We must receive any comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to comment on this AD.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Contact Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15 for the service information identified in this AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 4, 2009, the FAA issued emergency AD 2009-12-51, that applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This condition, if not corrected, could result in uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed and approved the technical contents of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, that describes procedures for visual inspections of affected reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, we issued emergency AD 2009- 12-51 to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. You must use the service information described previously to perform the actions required by this AD.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we have found that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable, and that good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately on June 4, 2009, to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. These conditions still exist, and we are publishing the AD in the Federal Register as an amendment to Section 39.13 of part 39 of the Code Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to make it effective to all persons.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send us any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD” in the subject line of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify it.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of the Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including, if provided, the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is the same as the Mail address provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Regulatory Information

2009-12-51 Turbomeca S.A.: Amendment 39-15952. Docket No. FAA-2009- 0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 15, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines if modified by Turbomeca Modification TU332 and fitted with modules M05 as listed by serial number in Figure 1 of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter France AS350B, AS350BA, AS365N, AS350B1, AS350B2, Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK117-C1, Agusta A109K2, and Sikorsky S-76A+, S-76A++ and S-76C helicopters.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of the lubrication duct plug, followed by a rapid draining of the oil tank, without indication to the cockpit through low oil pressure warning. This condition can lead to uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

Initial Visual Inspection Before Further Flight

(f) Before further flight:
(1) Visually inspect the module M05 lubrication duct for oil leakage. Use paragraph 1.C.(1)(a), paragraph 2.A., and Figure 2 of Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the inspection.
(2) If oil leakage is found, repair the module M05 lubrication duct. Use paragraph 2.B.1, Figure 3, and Figure 4 in Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the repair.

Repetitive Visual Inspections

(g) If no oil leakage is found, repeat the visual inspection every four flight hours, or after the last flight of each day, whichever comes first.
(h) The actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD may be performed by the owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate, and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v).

Optional Terminating Action

(i) As optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections in paragraph (g) of this AD, repair the affected modules M05 as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(j) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Related Information

(k) European Aviation Safety Agency emergency airworthiness directive 2009-0117-E, dated June 2, 2009, also addresses the subject of this AD.

Contact Information

(l) For further information, contact: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e- mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199, for more information about this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(m) You must use Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to identify the serial numbers of modules M05 affected by this AD, and to perform the inspections and repairs required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You can get a copy from Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202- 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html.

Footer Information
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 22, 2009.
Peter A. White,
Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15277 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD;
Amendment 39-15942; AD 2009-13-03]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Series Engines

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2009.
We must receive comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We received a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff on a Boeing Model 747-400 airplane powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524G/H engines. The automatic retraction was due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. In order to prevent impingement of efflux air from the thrust reversers during landing rollout, the FCU is designed to automatically retract the Group A leading edge flaps when a REV Amber signal is received from either both inboard or both outboard thrust reversers, and the airplane is on the ground. In this event, the first REV amber signal was received prior to V1 (takeoff decision speed). The second REV amber signal was received several seconds later, after takeoff decision speed. At that time, the FCU performed as designed and retracted the Group A leading edge flaps. At rotation the flight crew reported buffeting and stick shaker activation. After liftoff, a signal from the air/ground logic system caused the FCU to send a command to the Group A leading edge flaps to re-deploy after a five-second time delay. Re-deployment of the flaps takes approximately ten to fifteen additional seconds; during re-deployment, the flightcrew again reported buffeting and momentary stick shaker activation. The airplane jettisoned fuel and was landed safely; all four of the thrust reversers deployed and stowed normally after landing.
In addition, one operator reported 12 single-engine REV indications during takeoff over the past three years, leading to seven rejected takeoffs. The incident described above was the first known simultaneous two- engine event.
These conditions, if not corrected, could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009. The service information describes procedures for modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels. The modification includes re-routing and re- terminating one wire for each engine, and replacing the wire if necessary.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

No airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as described under “Difference Between the AD and the Service Information.”

Difference Between the AD and the Service Information

Operators should note that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, recommends that the modification be completed within 90 days (after the issue date of the service bulletin). This AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days. In developing this compliance time, we considered the manufacturer’s recommended 90-day compliance time (after June 8, 2009, which is the service bulletin issue date), a risk assessment of the unsafe condition, the scope of work required, and the number of affected airplanes, as well as the time normally required for the rulemaking process to be completed (approximately 30 days). In consideration of both of these factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of this AD will fall approximately at the same time (calendar date) as the compliance time recommended by the manufacturer, and represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. By adjusting the compliance time interval in this way:
1. Operators will get a full 60 days in which to complete the modification; and
2. The modification can be done within an interval of time that parallels normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators.
This difference has been coordinated with Boeing.

FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

Automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff. Such a restriction could result in failure to achieve a minimum rate of climb, and consequent collision with terrain or obstacles or forced landing of the airplane. Because of our requirement to promote safe flight of civil aircraft and thus, the critical need to assure the proper functioning of the FCU and the short compliance time involved with this action, this AD must be issued immediately.
Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, and because no airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are both impracticable and unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Regulatory Information

2009-13-03 Boeing: Amendment 39-15942. Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 series engines.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78: Engine.

Unsafe Condition

(e) This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

Compliance

(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Modification

(g) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Modify the thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM- 140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590. Or, e-mail information to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- Requests@faa.gov.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind, Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.

Footer Information
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 12, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15255 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2005-22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD;
Amendment 39-15950; AD 2009-14-01]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. That AD currently requires replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same repetitive replacements and would require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements. Modification Tf75 replaces the check valve piston with a piston design not requiring an O-ring. This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

DATES: This AD becomes effective August 3, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of August 3, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD from Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com.
The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by superseding AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on January 22, 2009 (74 FR 3978). That action proposed to require replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals and to require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Comments

We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal or on the determination of the cost to the public.

Change to the Mandatory Terminating Action Compliance Time

Since we issued the proposed AD, we realized that there is no direct relationship between the mandatory terminating action compliance date in the proposed AD and the usage rate of the affected helicopters. We changed the AD to require the terminating action be done within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD.

Conclusion

We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We have determined that this change will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

We estimate that this AD will affect 94 Arrius 2F turboshaft engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform an O-ring replacement, and about one work-hour to incorporate Modification Tf75. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $16 per engine for O-ring replacement, and about $20 per engine for incorporating Modification Tf75. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $18,424.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), and by adding a new airworthiness directive, Amendment 39-15950, to read as follows:

Regulatory Information

2009-14-01 Turbomeca S.A: Amendment 39-15950. Docket No. FAA-2005- 22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 3, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) This AD supersedes AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter EC120B helicopters.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

O-ring Replacement

(f) Replace the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at the intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD. Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.C.(2) of Turbomeca Alert Service Bulletin No. A319 79 4802, Update No. 1, dated April 3, 2006, to replace the O-ring.

Table 1–Compliance Times for O-ring Replacement

If the class of oil is:
Then replace the O-ring by the later of:
Thereafter, replace the O-ring within:
(1) HTS or unknown. 300 hours time-since-new (TSN) or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 300 hours time-since-last replacement (TSR).
(2) STD. 450 hours TSN or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 500 hours TSR.

Mandatory Terminating Action

(g) Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, do the following mandatory terminating action to the repetitive O- ring replacements:
(1) Incorporate Turbomeca Modification Tf75 by replacing the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, with a check valve piston requiring no O-ring.
(2) Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.B.(1)(r) of Turbomeca Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 319 79 4075, Version B, dated May 14, 2008, to replace the check valve piston.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Related Information

(i) EASA AD 2008-0170, dated September 25, 2008, also addresses the subject of this AD.
(j) Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of the service information identified in this AD.
(k) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238- 7199, for more information about this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(l) You must use the service information specified in the following Table 2 to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the documents listed in the following Table 2 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria-dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http:/ /www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

Table 2–Incorporation by Reference

Turbomeca Alert/MandatoryService Bulletin No.
Page
Update/Version
Date
A319 79 4802
Total Pages: 7 ALL Update No. 1 April 3, 2006
319 79 4075
Total Pages: 9 ALL Version B May 14, 2008

Footer Information
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 19, 2009.
Francis A. Favara,
Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15099 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P


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Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD;
Amendment 39-15940; AD 2009-13-01]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

Hide details for Preamble InformationPreamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. That AD currently requires removing all main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium studs (titanium studs) and replacing them with steel studs. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD as well as changes to the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This amendment is prompted by an accident, by recent RFM changes made by the manufacturer that were not available when we issued the existing AD, and by our determination that certain MGB Normal and Emergency procedures in the RFM are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 pounds per square inch (psi).
Replacing the titanium studs is intended to prevent their failure, which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Changing the RFM procedures is intended to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions.

DATES: Effective July 1, 2009.
The incorporation by reference of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, was approved previously for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009).
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before August 17, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
You may get the service information identified in this AD from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or at http:// www.sikorsky.com.
Examining the Docket: You may examine the docket that contains the AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is located in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John M. Coffey, Flight Test Engineer, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 23, 2009, we issued Emergency AD 2009-07-53 for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, which requires, before further flight, removing all titanium studs that attach the MGB filter bowl assembly to the MGB and replacing them with steel studs. That action was prompted by the failure of 2 studs that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Before the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of MGB oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs. That emergency AD was published as Amendment 39-15886 on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977). This AD continues to require removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs.
Since the fatal accident and since issuing AD 2009-07-53, Sikorsky has issued revisions to the Normal and Emergency procedures of the RFM. We have determined that these revisions are necessary because the existing procedures are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 psi. This action does not mandate the procedures the pilot must perform in an emergency, but requires making changes to the RFM to clarify and emphasize the Normal and Emergency procedures addressing specified MGB malfunctions, thus giving the pilot the necessary information to make an informed decision. We are superseding the existing AD to include the most recent RFM revisions because the revisions were not available when we originally issued AD 2009-07-53.
We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), which describes procedures for removing titanium studs and replacing them with steel suds. We have also reviewed the RFM revisions and, after full coordination with Sikorsky, approved them on May 13, 2009. Sikorsky has since assured us that they have provided the revised RFM procedures to all affected operators. The RFM revisions are as follows:

SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

In addition to the RFM revisions, we have also reviewed associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, that provide corrections to those RFM revisions; however, we are not mandating that they be incorporated.
Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters of the same type design, this AD supersedes AD 2009-07-53 to require, before further flight, removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs. These actions must be accomplished by following the specified portions of the ASB described previously. Because the critical unsafe condition can adversely affect the structural integrity and controllability of the helicopter, AD 2009-07-53 remains in full effect until the effective date of this AD.
Making the Normal and Emergency RFM revisions that were not available when we issued AD 2009-07-53 is required within 10 hours time-in-service. The short compliance time is required because certain procedures in the existing RFM may be misleading, presenting an unacceptable level of risk, and because the required RFM revisions are already approved by the FAA and available to operators, imposing a minimal burden. Therefore, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are unnecessary and contrary to the public interest, and that good cause also exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
We estimate that this AD will affect 35 helicopters of U.S. registry. Replacing the studs will take approximately 6 work hours per helicopter to accomplish at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. In accordance with the ASB, required parts and tooling are available at no cost. Making the changes to the RFM will take a minimal amount of time and cost. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators to be $16,800, assuming there are no parts and tooling costs.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any written data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include "Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the AD in light of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of our docket Web site, you can find and read the comments to any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment. You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
1. Is not a "significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a "significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the AD docket to examine the economic evaluation.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-15886 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009), and by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD), Amendment 39-15940, to read as follows:

Hide details for Regulatory InformationRegulatory Information

2009-13-01 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-15940. Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD. Supersedes AD 2009-07-53, Amendment 39-15886, Docket No. FAA-2009-0351, Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.

Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
To prevent failure of a main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium stud (titanium stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter; and to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions, accomplish the following:
(a) Before further flight, for all Model S-92A helicopters with a MGB housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with "TS-062-01” near the P/N:
(1) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev.

A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.

Note 1: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.
(2) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the MGB housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the MGB housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.
(3) Install steel studs and mark the MGB housing as "TS-062- 01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.
(b) Within 10 hours time-in-service, for all helicopters regardless of MGB housing assembly P/N:
(1) Revise the Normal and Emergency procedures sections of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) by making the following changes, approved May 13, 2009:

RFM Remove Remove Insert
SA S92A-RFM-000 Part I Temporary Revision (T-Rev)No. 1., Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-000, Revision No. 4.
SA S92A-RFM-002 Part I T-Rev No. 5, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 Gear Box Malfunctions from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-002, Revision No. 10.
SA S92A-RFM-003 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-003, Revision No. 10.
SA S92A-RFM-004 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-004, Revision No. 8.
SA S92A-RFM-005 Part I T-Rev No. 3, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-005, Revision No. 7.
SA S92A-RFM-006 Part I T-Rev No. 2, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-006, Revision No. 8.
S92A-RFMS No. 3 N/A Sub-Section 7 “Gearbox Malfunctions” from Section III Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.
All paragraphs of subsection 7 "Gear Box Malfunctions” starting with paragraph 7.0 are affected.

Note 2: Inserting the following revisions, approved on May 13, 2009, and their associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, into the RFM, as applicable, satisfies the requirements of this AD:
(i) SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
(ii) SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
(iii) SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
(iv) SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
(v) SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
(vi) SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
(vii) S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

(c) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Attn: John M. Coffey, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
(d) Special flight permits will not be issued.
(e) Remove and replace the titanium studs by following the specified portions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of this information on April 27, 2009 under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009. Copies may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com or at http:// www.sikorsky.com. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.
(f) This amendment becomes effective on July 1, 2009.

Hide details for Footer InformationFooter Information
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 9, 2009.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-14081 Filed 6-15-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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