Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD;
Amendment 39-15942; AD 2009-13-03]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Series Engines

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2009.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2009.
We must receive comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

We received a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff on a Boeing Model 747-400 airplane powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524G/H engines. The automatic retraction was due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. In order to prevent impingement of efflux air from the thrust reversers during landing rollout, the FCU is designed to automatically retract the Group A leading edge flaps when a REV Amber signal is received from either both inboard or both outboard thrust reversers, and the airplane is on the ground. In this event, the first REV amber signal was received prior to V1 (takeoff decision speed). The second REV amber signal was received several seconds later, after takeoff decision speed. At that time, the FCU performed as designed and retracted the Group A leading edge flaps. At rotation the flight crew reported buffeting and stick shaker activation. After liftoff, a signal from the air/ground logic system caused the FCU to send a command to the Group A leading edge flaps to re-deploy after a five-second time delay. Re-deployment of the flaps takes approximately ten to fifteen additional seconds; during re-deployment, the flightcrew again reported buffeting and momentary stick shaker activation. The airplane jettisoned fuel and was landed safely; all four of the thrust reversers deployed and stowed normally after landing.
In addition, one operator reported 12 single-engine REV indications during takeoff over the past three years, leading to seven rejected takeoffs. The incident described above was the first known simultaneous two- engine event.
These conditions, if not corrected, could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009. The service information describes procedures for modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels. The modification includes re-routing and re- terminating one wire for each engine, and replacing the wire if necessary.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

No airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as described under “Difference Between the AD and the Service Information.”

Difference Between the AD and the Service Information

Operators should note that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, recommends that the modification be completed within 90 days (after the issue date of the service bulletin). This AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days. In developing this compliance time, we considered the manufacturer’s recommended 90-day compliance time (after June 8, 2009, which is the service bulletin issue date), a risk assessment of the unsafe condition, the scope of work required, and the number of affected airplanes, as well as the time normally required for the rulemaking process to be completed (approximately 30 days). In consideration of both of these factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of this AD will fall approximately at the same time (calendar date) as the compliance time recommended by the manufacturer, and represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. By adjusting the compliance time interval in this way:
1. Operators will get a full 60 days in which to complete the modification; and
2. The modification can be done within an interval of time that parallels normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators.
This difference has been coordinated with Boeing.

FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

Automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff. Such a restriction could result in failure to achieve a minimum rate of climb, and consequent collision with terrain or obstacles or forced landing of the airplane. Because of our requirement to promote safe flight of civil aircraft and thus, the critical need to assure the proper functioning of the FCU and the short compliance time involved with this action, this AD must be issued immediately.
Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, and because no airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are both impracticable and unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Regulatory Information

2009-13-03 Boeing: Amendment 39-15942. Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 series engines.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78: Engine.

Unsafe Condition

(e) This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

Compliance

(f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

Modification

(g) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Modify the thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM- 140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590. Or, e-mail information to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- Requests@faa.gov.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
(3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind, Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
(4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.

Footer Information
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 12, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15255 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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  • General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Airworthiness Directive

    Federal Register Information

    Header Information
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration

    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD;
    Amendment 39-15958; AD 2009-14-08]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/ shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit. This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on February 20, 2009 (74 FR 7831). That action proposed to require removing certain P/N HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We have considered the comment received. The commenter supports the proposal.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect one engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that the actions would require no work-hours per engine. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate there is no cost of this AD to U.S. operators.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-08 General Electric Company: Amendment 39-15958. Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines with a high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/shaft, part number (P/N) 1703M74G03, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 747 series airplanes.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    New Reduced Life Limit for the HPCR Stages 11-14 Spool/Shaft

    (f) Remove any CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, before the spool/shaft meets or exceeds the new, reduced life cycle limit of 19,500 cycles.

    Installation Prohibition

    (g) After the effective date of this AD, do not install any CF6- 80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, that meets or exceeds 19,500 cycles.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Special Flight Permits

    (i) Under 14 CFR part 39.23, we are prohibiting special flight permits for this AD.

    Related Information

    (j) Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (k) None.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 25, 2009.
    Peter A. White,
    Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15513 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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    Airworthiness Directive: Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 Helicopters

    Published: 09/30/2010
    Subject: Hydraulic pump
    Effective: 10/15/2010
    Summary: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This action requires replacing each affected hydraulic pump with an airworthy hydraulic pump. This amendment is prompted by the loss of the proper functioning of a hydraulic pump because of the deterioration of the pump seals and the loss of hydraulic fluid caused by incorrect positioning of the piston liner. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of hydraulic power and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to correct an unsafe condition for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. EASA advises of the loss of the right-hand (RH) hydraulic power system on an AS332L2 helicopter. The pilot saw the hydraulic system “low level” warning light come on during the approach phase. Investigation revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing due to deterioration of the pump seals resulting from an incorrectly positioned compensating piston liner. EASA states that this non- compliant repair process was used by the following repair stations: HELIKOPTER SERVICE, ASTEC HELICOPTER SERVICE, and HELI-ONE. They further state that if this condition occurs on both pumps of a helicopter, it could result in loss of the RH and left-hand (LH) hydraulic power systems and consequently may lead to the loss of helicopter controllability.

    Related Service Information

    Eurocopter has issued an Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB) with two numbers (01.00.78 and 01.00.43), dated March 11, 2010. EASB No. 01.00.78 applies to United States type-certificated Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 helicopters; civil Model AS332C1 not type-certificated in the United States; and military Model AS332B, B1, M, M1, and F1 helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. EASB No. 01.00.43 applies to military Model AS532A2, U2, UC, AC, UL, AL, SC, and UE helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. The EASB specifies identifying affected hydraulic pumps, prohibiting flights for all helicopters fitted with two of the affected hydraulic pumps until at least one of the affected pumps is replaced, replacing all affected hydraulic pumps with airworthy pumps within 10 months, and returning any affected hydraulic pump to have it checked and, where necessary, reconditioned.
    EASA classified this EASB as mandatory and issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters.

    FAA’s Evaluation and Unsafe Condition Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, their technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

    Differences Between This AD and the EASA AD

    We refer to flight hours as hours time-in-service (TIS). We require each affected hydraulic pump be replaced with an airworthy pump within 15 hours TIS. We do not use the calendar date used in the EASA AD because that date has already passed.

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    Airbus A318-A321 Hydraulic Power System Airworthiness Bulletin


    This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises registered owners and operators, repair stations, and mechanics holding inspection authorizations, of all Airbus Model A318, A319, A320 and A321 series airplanes of an airworthiness concern regarding overheating of the power transfer unit (PTU) of the hydraulic system.

    Hydraulic Power System: Power Transfer Unit
    There have been several reports of loss of a single hydraulic system due to leakage, and subsequent failure of a second hydraulic system from overheating. Airbus determined that overheating of the second hydraulic system is caused when the PTU is not de-activated by the flight crew within two minutes after the fault annunciation (AMBER CAUTION) alert on the electronic centralized aircraft monitoring (ECAM) system. Consequently the airplane is left with only one functional hydraulic system. The subject airplanes require at least one functional hydraulic system for continuous safe flight and landing.
    Read More

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    Boeing: New Airworthiness Directives

    A new airworthiness directive effective January 4, 2010 is being adopted regarding certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the skin along lap joints, butt joints, certain external doublers, and the large cargo door hinges; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The AD results from reports of scribe lines found at lap joints and butt joints, around external doublers, and at locations where external decals had been removed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.

    Also effective January 4 is another new directive regarding the landing gear of certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive lubrications of the right and left main landing gear (MLG) forward trunnion pins. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies of the transition radius of the MLG forward trunnion pins, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies (including finish damage, corrosion, pitting, and base metal scratches) of the transition radius of the left and right MLG trunnion pins, and corrective action if necessary. Replacing or overhauling the trunnion pins terminates the actions required by this AD. This AD results from a report that the protective finishes on the forward trunnion pins for the left and right MLG might have been damaged during final assembly. This AD is intented to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the forward trunnion pins, which could result in fracture of the pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.

    http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/index.cfm/go/document.list/display/new

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    FHA ISSUES Airbus Directive

    George’s Point of View

    Did the FAA consider grounding the affected planes and avoiding the chance that all “three” could fail and the pilot could lose control of the airplane?

    I’m not a pilot but come on, it’s just common sense.

    Bravo for taking action, but, is it safe to keep the affected planes in the air?

    Regarding the directive and a couple of loose valves:

    “The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. ”

    ——

    An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose[ning] of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances.
    A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves.
    Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event.
    Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation.
    The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane.
    * * * * *

    The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

    Read the directive:

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  • | | | | |

    FAA Fine Proposals against United Airlines and US Airways

    $3.8 million fine
    The FAA says United Airlines:

    • Boeing 737 flew in over 200 flights not in airworthy condition (two shop towels in the engine’s oil sump area)

    $5.4 million fine
    The FAA says US Airways:

    • Embraer ERJ-190s on 19 flights in AD violation (open cargo door Directive)
    • Airbus A320s on 26 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • A320 on 17 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • Airbus A320 on 855 flights in maintenance violation (engine repair)
    • Boeing 757 on 505 flights in maintenance violation(missed engine work inspections)
    • Boeing 757 on 121 in maintenance violation
    • Boeing 767 on 53 flights without weekly inspection
    • Boeing 767 on 51 flights without inspections, tests and sampling
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