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  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39
    [Docket No. FAA-2005-22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD;
    Amendment 39-15950; AD 2009-14-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. That AD currently requires replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same repetitive replacements and would require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements. Modification Tf75 replaces the check valve piston with a piston design not requiring an O-ring. This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 3, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of August 3, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD from Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com.
    The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by superseding AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on January 22, 2009 (74 FR 3978). That action proposed to require replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals and to require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal or on the determination of the cost to the public.

    Change to the Mandatory Terminating Action Compliance Time

    Since we issued the proposed AD, we realized that there is no direct relationship between the mandatory terminating action compliance date in the proposed AD and the usage rate of the affected helicopters. We changed the AD to require the terminating action be done within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We have determined that this change will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 94 Arrius 2F turboshaft engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform an O-ring replacement, and about one work-hour to incorporate Modification Tf75. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $16 per engine for O-ring replacement, and about $20 per engine for incorporating Modification Tf75. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $18,424.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), and by adding a new airworthiness directive, Amendment 39-15950, to read as follows:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-01 Turbomeca S.A: Amendment 39-15950. Docket No. FAA-2005- 22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 3, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter EC120B helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    O-ring Replacement

    (f) Replace the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at the intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD. Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.C.(2) of Turbomeca Alert Service Bulletin No. A319 79 4802, Update No. 1, dated April 3, 2006, to replace the O-ring.

    Table 1–Compliance Times for O-ring Replacement

    If the class of oil is:
    Then replace the O-ring by the later of:
    Thereafter, replace the O-ring within:
    (1) HTS or unknown. 300 hours time-since-new (TSN) or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 300 hours time-since-last replacement (TSR).
    (2) STD. 450 hours TSN or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 500 hours TSR.

    Mandatory Terminating Action

    (g) Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, do the following mandatory terminating action to the repetitive O- ring replacements:
    (1) Incorporate Turbomeca Modification Tf75 by replacing the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, with a check valve piston requiring no O-ring.
    (2) Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.B.(1)(r) of Turbomeca Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 319 79 4075, Version B, dated May 14, 2008, to replace the check valve piston.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (i) EASA AD 2008-0170, dated September 25, 2008, also addresses the subject of this AD.
    (j) Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of the service information identified in this AD.
    (k) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238- 7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use the service information specified in the following Table 2 to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the documents listed in the following Table 2 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria-dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http:/ /www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Table 2–Incorporation by Reference

    Turbomeca Alert/MandatoryService Bulletin No.
    Page
    Update/Version
    Date
    A319 79 4802
    Total Pages: 7 ALL Update No. 1 April 3, 2006
    319 79 4075
    Total Pages: 9 ALL Version B May 14, 2008

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 19, 2009.
    Francis A. Favara,
    Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15099 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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    Flying with a Chance of Ice

    The latest brouhaha in the aviation set is that the safety directive on Rolls Royce Engines–which are liable to ice up–does not ground the planes for repair, but instead has a repair date of 2011. The engines are in Boeing 777s, and have been acknowledged to be responsible for engines shutting down while in flight.

    Two questionable parts do not require replacement until 2011.

    Read the directive below:

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    Under certain ambient conditions, ice can accumulate on the walls of the fuel pipes within the aircraft fuel system, which can then be released downstream when fuel flow demand is increased. This released ice can then collect on the fuel-to-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) front face and limit fuel flow through the FOHE.

    We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from blocking the FOHE, which could result in an unacceptable engine power loss, and loss of control of the airplane.

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    FAA Issues Battery Statement. And Me Too…Attention, Boeing…

    My experts are telling me that it looks like Boeing is all alone on these 787 battery fires. The FAA issued 31 ‘Special Conditions’ (you can read that to mean that the FAA gave Boeing a whole lot of slack) but this battery problem is not getting a free ride, or any favors.

    SAFETY is the top priority. Make no mistake. The sooner the Dreamliner and its battery is grounded, the sooner the fix will be found and it will be safe to fly again. Well. While you’re at it fixing the battery problem, get that team of pilots who fly this thing to go over all areas of failure thus far, including the engines. Look at ALL of these…

    • Nov 6 2010: Boeing flight Texas: electrical problems in the aft electronics bay which disabled the primary flight displays in the cockpit.
    • Nov 6 2011: ANA Flight Okayama forced to deploy the landing gear using the alternate extension backup system, after an active warning light, which said that the wheels were not properly down.
    • July 28 2012: Boeing Flight Charleston: contained engine failure during a taxi test at Charleston International Airport PRE Delivery Taxi test. Debris fell from engine
    • Dec 4, 2012: United over Mississippi: “multiple messages” regarding flight-system errors, and diverted to New Orleans (KMSY). The problems occurred when one of the plane’s generators failed. Power was supplied to the aircraft with the five functioning generators.
    • Jan 7, 2013: JAL Boston: fire was discovered in a battery and electrical compartment of the aircraft.
    • Jan 8, 2013: JAL Boston: 40 gallons of fuel had spilled from one of its wing tanks at the gate. The plane was contacted before takeoff and it returned to the terminal without incident. Probably a case of overfilling the tank.
    • Jan 9, 2013: ANA Yamaguchi: Brake problems
    • Jan 16, 2013: ANA Takamatsu: instrument indications of smoke in the forward electrical compartment. No fire was found.

    Boeing? Are you listening? I fly everywhere, all over the world but at the moment, I’m not comfortable getting on this great plane that I really want to love for future travel. I’m am confident you can do it, even if all of these wrinkles are going to mean you need to bring in the really big iron. We need all the finders and fixers on this! The world has places to go and things to do, and you’re holding their safety in the palm of your hand.

    The Emergency Airworthiness Directive has been issued. Issued Jan 16, 2013
    and here is their announcement:

    As a result of an in-flight, Boeing 787 battery incident earlier today in Japan, the FAA will issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) to address a potential battery fire risk in the 787 and require operators to temporarily cease operations. Before further flight, operators of U.S.-registered, Boeing 787 aircraft must demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the batteries are safe.
    The FAA will work with the manufacturer and carriers to develop a corrective action plan to allow the U.S. 787 fleet to resume operations as quickly and safely as possible.
    The in-flight Japanese battery incident followed an earlier 787 battery incident that occurred on the ground in Boston on January 7, 2013. The AD is prompted by this second incident involving a lithium ion battery. The battery failures resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787 airplanes. The root cause of these failures is currently under investigation. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment.

    Last Friday, the FAA announced a comprehensive review of the 787’s critical systems with the possibility of further action pending new data and information. In addition to the continuing review of the aircraft’s design, manufacture and assembly, the agency also will validate that 787 batteries and the battery system on the aircraft are in compliance with the special condition the agency issued as part of the aircraft’s certification.

    United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. When the FAA issues an airworthiness directive, it also alerts the international aviation community to the action so other civil aviation authorities can take parallel action to cover the fleets operating in their own countries.

    See Directive:

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    Boeing: New Airworthiness Directives

    A new airworthiness directive effective January 4, 2010 is being adopted regarding certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the skin along lap joints, butt joints, certain external doublers, and the large cargo door hinges; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The AD results from reports of scribe lines found at lap joints and butt joints, around external doublers, and at locations where external decals had been removed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.

    Also effective January 4 is another new directive regarding the landing gear of certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive lubrications of the right and left main landing gear (MLG) forward trunnion pins. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies of the transition radius of the MLG forward trunnion pins, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies (including finish damage, corrosion, pitting, and base metal scratches) of the transition radius of the left and right MLG trunnion pins, and corrective action if necessary. Replacing or overhauling the trunnion pins terminates the actions required by this AD. This AD results from a report that the protective finishes on the forward trunnion pins for the left and right MLG might have been damaged during final assembly. This AD is intented to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the forward trunnion pins, which could result in fracture of the pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.

    http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/index.cfm/go/document.list/display/new

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    Airworthiness Directive: Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 Helicopters

    Published: 09/30/2010
    Subject: Hydraulic pump
    Effective: 10/15/2010
    Summary: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. This action requires replacing each affected hydraulic pump with an airworthy hydraulic pump. This amendment is prompted by the loss of the proper functioning of a hydraulic pump because of the deterioration of the pump seals and the loss of hydraulic fluid caused by incorrect positioning of the piston liner. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of hydraulic power and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Discussion

    The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to correct an unsafe condition for the specified Eurocopter model helicopters. EASA advises of the loss of the right-hand (RH) hydraulic power system on an AS332L2 helicopter. The pilot saw the hydraulic system “low level” warning light come on during the approach phase. Investigation revealed a hydraulic fluid leak from the hydraulic pump casing due to deterioration of the pump seals resulting from an incorrectly positioned compensating piston liner. EASA states that this non- compliant repair process was used by the following repair stations: HELIKOPTER SERVICE, ASTEC HELICOPTER SERVICE, and HELI-ONE. They further state that if this condition occurs on both pumps of a helicopter, it could result in loss of the RH and left-hand (LH) hydraulic power systems and consequently may lead to the loss of helicopter controllability.

    Related Service Information

    Eurocopter has issued an Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB) with two numbers (01.00.78 and 01.00.43), dated March 11, 2010. EASB No. 01.00.78 applies to United States type-certificated Model AS332C, L, L1, and L2 helicopters; civil Model AS332C1 not type-certificated in the United States; and military Model AS332B, B1, M, M1, and F1 helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. EASB No. 01.00.43 applies to military Model AS532A2, U2, UC, AC, UL, AL, SC, and UE helicopters that are not type-certificated in the United States. The EASB specifies identifying affected hydraulic pumps, prohibiting flights for all helicopters fitted with two of the affected hydraulic pumps until at least one of the affected pumps is replaced, replacing all affected hydraulic pumps with airworthy pumps within 10 months, and returning any affected hydraulic pump to have it checked and, where necessary, reconditioned.
    EASA classified this EASB as mandatory and issued EASA Emergency AD No. 2010-0043R1-E, dated March 26, 2010, to ensure the continued airworthiness of these helicopters.

    FAA’s Evaluation and Unsafe Condition Determination

    These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, their technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

    Differences Between This AD and the EASA AD

    We refer to flight hours as hours time-in-service (TIS). We require each affected hydraulic pump be replaced with an airworthy pump within 15 hours TIS. We do not use the calendar date used in the EASA AD because that date has already passed.

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    Airworthiness Directives: McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model MD-11 and MD-11F Airplanes

    SUMMARY: FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
    Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time
    inspection to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center
    upper auxiliary fuel tank and marking the location, if necessary; a
    one-time inspection of all wire bundles above the center upper
    auxiliary fuel tank for splices and damage; a one-time inspection for
    damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center
    upper auxiliary fuel tank; and corrective actions, if necessary. This
    AD also requires installation of nonmetallic barrier/shield sleeving,
    new clamps, new attaching hardware, and a new extruded channel. This AD
    results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are
    issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
    tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
    in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

    For More Information…

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