Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

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    Easa Proposes Airworthiness Directive for Airbus

    Angle of Attack (AoA) Probes Faulty:

    Testing shows that data from two different Airbus planes were found inaccurate.

    Investigation conducted by Airbus and Thales on the removed probes revealed oil residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA vane position resolvers. This oil residue was the result of incorrect removal of machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise), causing delayed and/or reduced AoA vane movement. Multiple AOA probes could be simultaneously affected, providing incorrect indications of the AoA of the
    aeroplane. If not corrected, this could lead to erroneous AOA information and consequent delayed or non-activation of the AoA protection systems which, if during flight at a high angle of attack, could result in reduced control of the aeroplane.

    View the proposed Directive here in PDF

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  • General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Airworthiness Directive

    Federal Register Information

    Header Information
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration

    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD;
    Amendment 39-15958; AD 2009-14-08]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/ shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit. This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on February 20, 2009 (74 FR 7831). That action proposed to require removing certain P/N HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We have considered the comment received. The commenter supports the proposal.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect one engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that the actions would require no work-hours per engine. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate there is no cost of this AD to U.S. operators.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-08 General Electric Company: Amendment 39-15958. Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines with a high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/shaft, part number (P/N) 1703M74G03, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 747 series airplanes.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    New Reduced Life Limit for the HPCR Stages 11-14 Spool/Shaft

    (f) Remove any CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, before the spool/shaft meets or exceeds the new, reduced life cycle limit of 19,500 cycles.

    Installation Prohibition

    (g) After the effective date of this AD, do not install any CF6- 80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, that meets or exceeds 19,500 cycles.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Special Flight Permits

    (i) Under 14 CFR part 39.23, we are prohibiting special flight permits for this AD.

    Related Information

    (j) Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (k) None.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 25, 2009.
    Peter A. White,
    Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15513 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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    FHA ISSUES Airbus Directive

    George’s Point of View

    Did the FAA consider grounding the affected planes and avoiding the chance that all “three” could fail and the pilot could lose control of the airplane?

    I’m not a pilot but come on, it’s just common sense.

    Bravo for taking action, but, is it safe to keep the affected planes in the air?

    Regarding the directive and a couple of loose valves:

    “The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. ”

    ——

    An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose[ning] of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances.
    A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves.
    Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event.
    Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation.
    The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane.
    * * * * *

    The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

    Read the directive:

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    FAA Issues Battery Statement. And Me Too…Attention, Boeing…

    My experts are telling me that it looks like Boeing is all alone on these 787 battery fires. The FAA issued 31 ‘Special Conditions’ (you can read that to mean that the FAA gave Boeing a whole lot of slack) but this battery problem is not getting a free ride, or any favors.

    SAFETY is the top priority. Make no mistake. The sooner the Dreamliner and its battery is grounded, the sooner the fix will be found and it will be safe to fly again. Well. While you’re at it fixing the battery problem, get that team of pilots who fly this thing to go over all areas of failure thus far, including the engines. Look at ALL of these…

    • Nov 6 2010: Boeing flight Texas: electrical problems in the aft electronics bay which disabled the primary flight displays in the cockpit.
    • Nov 6 2011: ANA Flight Okayama forced to deploy the landing gear using the alternate extension backup system, after an active warning light, which said that the wheels were not properly down.
    • July 28 2012: Boeing Flight Charleston: contained engine failure during a taxi test at Charleston International Airport PRE Delivery Taxi test. Debris fell from engine
    • Dec 4, 2012: United over Mississippi: “multiple messages” regarding flight-system errors, and diverted to New Orleans (KMSY). The problems occurred when one of the plane’s generators failed. Power was supplied to the aircraft with the five functioning generators.
    • Jan 7, 2013: JAL Boston: fire was discovered in a battery and electrical compartment of the aircraft.
    • Jan 8, 2013: JAL Boston: 40 gallons of fuel had spilled from one of its wing tanks at the gate. The plane was contacted before takeoff and it returned to the terminal without incident. Probably a case of overfilling the tank.
    • Jan 9, 2013: ANA Yamaguchi: Brake problems
    • Jan 16, 2013: ANA Takamatsu: instrument indications of smoke in the forward electrical compartment. No fire was found.

    Boeing? Are you listening? I fly everywhere, all over the world but at the moment, I’m not comfortable getting on this great plane that I really want to love for future travel. I’m am confident you can do it, even if all of these wrinkles are going to mean you need to bring in the really big iron. We need all the finders and fixers on this! The world has places to go and things to do, and you’re holding their safety in the palm of your hand.

    The Emergency Airworthiness Directive has been issued. Issued Jan 16, 2013
    and here is their announcement:

    As a result of an in-flight, Boeing 787 battery incident earlier today in Japan, the FAA will issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) to address a potential battery fire risk in the 787 and require operators to temporarily cease operations. Before further flight, operators of U.S.-registered, Boeing 787 aircraft must demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the batteries are safe.
    The FAA will work with the manufacturer and carriers to develop a corrective action plan to allow the U.S. 787 fleet to resume operations as quickly and safely as possible.
    The in-flight Japanese battery incident followed an earlier 787 battery incident that occurred on the ground in Boston on January 7, 2013. The AD is prompted by this second incident involving a lithium ion battery. The battery failures resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787 airplanes. The root cause of these failures is currently under investigation. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment.

    Last Friday, the FAA announced a comprehensive review of the 787’s critical systems with the possibility of further action pending new data and information. In addition to the continuing review of the aircraft’s design, manufacture and assembly, the agency also will validate that 787 batteries and the battery system on the aircraft are in compliance with the special condition the agency issued as part of the aircraft’s certification.

    United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. When the FAA issues an airworthiness directive, it also alerts the international aviation community to the action so other civil aviation authorities can take parallel action to cover the fleets operating in their own countries.

    See Directive:

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    EASA WARNS of overtorque issue with Goodrich Pitot tubes

    Several reports have recently been received of loose pneumatic quickdisconnect unions on Goodrich pitot probes P/N 0851HL. These may be the result of mis-torque of the affected unions at equipment manufacturing level.

    Investigations are still on-going to determine the root cause(s).

    See the full report here (.pdf)

    http://ad.easa.europa.eu/ad/2009-0202-E

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    FAA Fine Proposals against United Airlines and US Airways

    $3.8 million fine
    The FAA says United Airlines:

    • Boeing 737 flew in over 200 flights not in airworthy condition (two shop towels in the engine’s oil sump area)

    $5.4 million fine
    The FAA says US Airways:

    • Embraer ERJ-190s on 19 flights in AD violation (open cargo door Directive)
    • Airbus A320s on 26 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • A320 on 17 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • Airbus A320 on 855 flights in maintenance violation (engine repair)
    • Boeing 757 on 505 flights in maintenance violation(missed engine work inspections)
    • Boeing 757 on 121 in maintenance violation
    • Boeing 767 on 53 flights without weekly inspection
    • Boeing 767 on 51 flights without inspections, tests and sampling
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