The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau of Ethiopia released the preliminary report on the crash Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, Boeing 737-8(MAX), ET-AVJ. The flight took off from Addis Ababa Bole Int. Airporten route for Nairobi, but the Angle of Attack sensor recorded value became erroneous. The crash resulted in 157 fatalities. The report is available here
On the flight prior the LionAir accident flight on the Boeing Max registered as PK-LQP, an off-duty fully-qualified Boeing 737-MAX 8 pilot was traveling home on flight JT-43. The plane encountered problems similar to the next flight that crashed it (i.e. the LionAir accident flight from Denpasar to Jakarta.) The crew aboard the earlier flight managed to land the aircraft at the destination. Based on the crew’s entry in the AFML, the engineer at Jakarta flushed the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the reported IAS and ALT disagree and cleaned the electrical connector plug of the elevator feel computer. The aircraft was subsequently released to carry out flight JT610.(A different crew manned the fatal flight.) The pilot was interviewed by the Kantor Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi–Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia (KNKT). The KNKT committee is responsible for investigating and reporting air transportation system accidents, serious incidents and safety deficiencies involving air transportation system operations in Indonesia.
The KNKT estimates that the release of the final report for Lion B38M in August or September 2019.
The KNKT is cooperating with Ethiopian Authorities but will make no official comment. News media reports suggest that on the earlier LionAir flight, a third pilot had occupied the observer’s seat in the cockpit of flight JT-43 and that this pilot identified the automatic trim runaway issue at hand and initiated that the trim cut out switches be used.
The preliminary report on the LionAir crash is located HERE.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) released data for the 2017 safety performance of the commercial airline industry showing continued strong improvements in safety.
IATA - IATA Releases 2017 Airline Safety Performance
Purpose: This publication provides operators with information related to cold temperature altitude restrictions. It contains the addition and subtraction of airports to the Cold Temperature Restricted Airports list located in the NTAP.
Background: In response to recognized safety concerns over cold weather altimetry errors, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed a risk analysis to determine if current Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 97 instrument approach procedures in the United States National Airspace System (NAS) are at risk during cold temperature operations. From this study the FAA published an NTAP providing pilots a list of airports, the affected segments and procedures needed to correct published altitudes at the restricted temperatures.
Discussion: Pilots may correct all altitudes from the initial approach fix (IAF) through the missed approach (MA) final holding altitude (All Segments Method). There will be a single temperature in Celsius (C) next to the snowflake ICON to indicate when this procedure will be required. Pilots wishing to use the All Segments Method and familiar with the NTAP procedure for applying a correction are not required to review the NTAP airport list for affected segments. Pilots wishing to continue correcting segment by segment must review the NTAP airports list for segment(s) affected (NTAP Segment(s) Method). The front matter in the FAA U.S Terminal Procedures Publication will also provide this information.
Idaho: Driggs-Reed Memorial (KDIJ) (-31C)
Maine: Greenville Muni (3B1) (-29C)
New Hampshire: Laconia Muni (KLCI) (-25C), Parlin Field (2B3) (-24C)
Pennsylvania: Washington County (KAFJ) (-27C)
South Dakota: Pine Ridge (KIEN) (-33C)
Washington: Richland (KRLD) (-19C)
Alaska: Perryville (PAPE), Togiak (PATG), Willow (PAUO), White Mountain (PAWM)
Colorado: Spanish Peaks Airfield (4V1), McElroy Airfield (20V), Walden-Jackson County (33V)
Maine: Eastern Slopes Rgnl (KIZG)
Maryland: Greater Cumberland Rgnl (KCBE)
Massachusetts: Walter J. Koladza (KGBR)
Minnesota: St Paul Downtown Holman Fld (KSTP), Tower Municipal (12D)
Montana: Cut Bank Intl (KCTB), Deer Lodge City County (38S)
Nevada: Carson (KCXP), Minden-Tahoe (KMEV)
New Hampshire: Dillant-Hopkins (KEEN)
New Mexico: Taos Rgnl (KSKX)
New York: Dansville (KDSV), Massena Intl-Richards Field (KMSS), Hamilton Muni (KVGC), Cortland County-Chase Field (N03), Randall (06N), Schenectady County (KSCH)
North Dakota: Watford City Muni (S25)
Oregon: Astoria Rgnl (KAST)
Pennsylvania: Seamans Field (9N3)
The current T-XX°C/XX°F icon will be changed to T-XX°C.
This change will be done incrementally on airport approach plates. The icon indicates a cold temperature altitude correction will be required on an approach when the reported temperature is, “at or below” the temperature specified for that airport. During this process, pilots may see temperatures on the current approach plates that are different than the temperature listed in the NTAP. The NTAP temperature is the updated temperature. Pilots may use the temperature published in the current TPP to make corrections if warmer than the NTAP listed temperature.
Pilots must understand they will be responsible for applying altitude corrections and must advise Air Traffic Control (ATC) when these corrections are to be made on any segment other than the final segment. Air Traffic Control is not responsible for making any altitude corrections and/or advising pilots that an altitude correction is required at a restricted airport.
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of UNITED AIR LINES INC
Accident occurred Friday, February 19, 2010 in Anchorage, AK
Probable Cause Approval Date: 02/23/2017
Aircraft: BOEING 747, registration: N173UA
Injuries: 1 Serious, 25 Minor, 236 Uninjured.
NTSB investigators used data provided by various entities, including, but not limited to, the Federal Aviation Administration and/or the operator and did not travel in support of this investigation to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On February 19, 2010, about 1452 Alaska standard time (AKST) (2352 UTC), United Airlines flight 897, a Boeing 747-400, N173UA, encountered severe turbulence during cruise descent between FL310 and FL300 about 100 miles west of Anchorage, Alaska. Of the 243 passengers and 19 crew members on board, 17 passengers and eight flight attendants (FA) received minor injuries and one FA received a serious injury. The airplane received minor damaged. The flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) part 121 as a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Dulles International Airport (IAD), Washington, DC, to Narita International Airport (NRT), Narita, Japan.
Prior to the turbulence encounter, the flight crew received pilot reports (PIREPs) of moderate to severe turbulence above FL340 and that it was less at FL300. According to the flight crew, about one hour late, the flight began to encounter a few “light bumps” or intermittent light “chop.” The sky conditions were clear with good visibility. The captain turned on the “fasten seat belt” sign and made a public address (PA) announcement to fasten seat belts. The flight crew requested a descent to FL300 and began to encounter moderate turbulence after starting the descent. The first officer then made a PA announcement directing the flight attendants to “take your seats.” The autopilot remained engaged throughout the turbulence encounter, which lasted less than one minute.
After encountering the turbulence, the crew assessed airplane damage and checked the number and severity of injuries to passengers and crew. The crew was assisted in assessing passenger and crew injuries by a U.S. Army Special Forces medic who stated that all of the injuries were considered minor. All the FAs indicated that they were able to perform their required emergency duties for the remainder of the flight.
After discussing the injuries and the available diversion airports with the FAs, company dispatch and the medic, the flight crew decided to continue on to NRT since there were sufficient diversion airports along the route if the situation worsened.
Upon arrival in NRT, 16 passengers and one FA were transported to hospitals for medical evaluation. All were released with only minor injuries, however, the FA was re-evaluated by her personal physician when she returned home with the further diagnosis of a fractured rib.
On Jan 9th 2014 Namibia’s Accident Investigation Commission released the preliminary report of the LAM E190 crash over Botswana/Namibia on Nov 29th 2013. The conclusion at that time was that the captain intentionally crashed the aircraft. On November 29, 2013, there were 28 passengers and 6 crew aboard the Embraer ERJ-190 flown by LAM Linhas Aereas de Mocambique, and it was enroute at FL380 over northern Botswana when the flight descended and radio contact was lost. The burned out wreckage was located by villagers in Bwabwata National Park (Sambesi Region) on Nov 30. A news article on April 15 2016 indicated that the final report was released, although we have not verified it.
The captain in charge of the aircraft, Herminio dos Santos Fernandes, was alone in the cockpit at the time of the crash. The copilot had left for the lavatory.
The unverified article says that the final report was compiled by Theo Shilongo, deputy director of the directorate of aircraft accident investigations, who was the investigator in charge, and Hafeni Mweshixwa as the co-investigator. It was signed off by works and transport minister Alpheus Naruseb. When it is available to the public, it should be available at the Directorate of Aircraft Accident Investigations Namibia (DAAI).
An interim report of the accident is below. The interim report indicates “The DAAI will provide updates on the investigation and safety recommendations as they become available until completion of the final report” in accordance with the provisions of ICAO Annex 13.2965
According to a preliminary report released by Indonesia’s National Transportation Safety Committee (NTSC), the black box from Trigana Air jet that crashed in August will be sent to France for data retrieval.
The flight TGN267 crashed after it lost contact with the ATC during a flight from Sentani airport, Jayapura, to Oksibi, Papua. There were 54 people aboard at the time; all of them were killed.
The report released on October 7 said, “The downloading process to retrieve data from the FDR was unsuccessful. For further examination, the FDR data will be downloaded at BEA facility in Paris, France.”
The report further said that the cockpit voice recorder had a 2-hour recording but it did not give any clue as to what caused the crash.
Details from the confidential MH17 report that was handed over to Australian experts on June 2nd have not been revealed. The report questions if the flight path should have routed the passenger jet over a known war zone. The report is based on conclusions drawn by experts from Australia, Malaysia, the Ukraine, the US, Russia, the UK and the Netherlands, but those conclusions have not been revealed to the public. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau, which had experts on the committee, has not made a public statement. The final report is expected in October 2015.
Report of Investigators Blocked from Investigating
MH-17: The Untold Story, a video examining the downing of MH17
Accident 24 July 2014 in Gossi, Mali to the MD-83 registered EC-LTV operated by Swiftair S.A.
Press release from the BEA and the Commission d’Enquêtes Accidents et Incidents de l’Aviation civile (Mali)
Following the publication of the Interim Report on 20 September 2014 in Bamako (Mali), investigative work has continued, based on the analysis of the accident flight parameters. Progress made in this work has led the Republic of Mali Commission of Inquiry and the BEA to communicate jointly the following information.
On 24 July 2014, the MD-83 registered EC-LTV was performing scheduled night flight AH 5017 from Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) to Algiers (Algeria). Takeoff occurred at 01h15, the climb towards the cruise altitude took place without any significant events, and the crew made several heading changes in order to fly around a storm cell. The autopilot and the autothrottle were engaged. The aeroplane reached the cruise altitude of 31,000 ft, that’s to say about 9,500 m. The autopilot then switched to the mode that maintains the altitude and the autothrottle to the mode that maintains the speed (Mach).
About two minutes after levelling off at an altitude of 31,000 ft, calculations performed by the manufacturer and validated by the investigation team indicate that the recorded EPR , the main parameter for engine power management, became erroneous on the right engine and then about 55 seconds later on the left engine. This was likely due to icing of the pressure sensors located on the engine nose cones. If the engine anti-ice protection system is activated, these pressure sensors are heated by hot air.
Analysis of the available data indicates that the crew likely did not activate the system during climb and cruise.
As a result of the icing of the pressure sensors, the erroneous information transmitted to the autothrottle meant that the latter limited the thrust delivered by the engines. Under these conditions, the thrust was insufficient to maintain cruise speed and the aeroplane slowed down. The autopilot then commanded an increase in the aeroplane’s pitch attitude in order to maintain the altitude in spite of this loss of speed.
This explains how, from the beginning of the error in measuring the EPR values, the aeroplane’s speed dropped from 290 kt to 200 kt in about 5 minutes and 35 seconds and the angle of attack increased until the aeroplane stalled.
About 20 seconds after the beginning of the aeroplane stall, the autopilot was disengaged. The aeroplane rolled suddenly to the left until it reached a bank angle of 140°, and a nose-down pitch
The recorded parameters indicate that there were no stall recovery manœuvres by
However, in the moments following the aeroplane stall, the flight control surfaces remained deflected nose-up and in a right roll.
At least two similar events occurred, in June 2002 and in June 2014, with no serious consequences.
The event in June 2002 was the subject of an NTSB investigation report. On 4 June 2002, the McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registered N823NK performing Spirit Airlines flight 970, suffered a loss of thrust on both engines, in cruise at an altitude of 33,000 ft, that is about 10,000 m. The two pressure sensors, located on the engine nose bullets, were blocked by ice crystals, leading to incorrect indications and over-estimation of the EPR. The crew noticed the drop in speed and the precursor indications of a stall just before disengagement of the autopilot and putting the aeroplane into a descent. They had not activated the engine anti-ice systems. This event occurred during the day, outside the clouds.
On 8 June 2014, the MD83 registered EC-JUG belonging to Swiftair, which was performing a passenger transport flight at flight level FL 330, suffered a drop in speed while it was flying during the daytime above the cloud layer. The crew detected the problem, put the aeroplane into a descent and activated the engine anti-ice systems without reaching a stall situation, then continued the flight.
This background, as well as the data on the accident to flight AH5017, was shared with the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and through EASA with the American authorities (FAA); they should serve as the basis for future publication of corrective measures aimed at assisting crews in identifying and responding to similar situations to those encountered at the time of this accident.
The investigative work is continuing, in particular on the analysis of:
the flight parameters to complete the scenario described above,
possible crew reactions, despite the absence of Cockpit Voice Recorder data from the accident flight, which remain unusable to this day,
the training and follow-up of Swiftair crews,
previous events and the follow-up undertaken.
The publication of the final report is planned before the end of December 2015.
Download Interim below:
Kids can call 877-HI-NORAD or email email@example.com on Christmas Eve. A volunteer checks a big-screen computer monitor and passes along Santa’s location. Updates are posted at noradsanta.org, facebook.com/noradsanta and twitter.com/NoradSanta. The volunteers will keep answering questions through 3 a.m. MST on Christmas Day.
The carrier is Flybe.
The aircraft was on a scheduled commercial air transport flight from Birmingham to Belfast
City, with the commander, in the left flight deck seat, as pilot flying. It was night, and
although there was no low cloud affecting the airport, the wind at Belfast was a strong
west?south-westerly, gusting up to 48 kt. Before the approach, the commander checked
that his prosthetic lower left arm was securely attached to the yoke clamp which he used to
fly the aircraft, with the latching device in place. But his arm came off, leading to a hard landing.
Out of 17 Embraer 190 aircraft present in the fleet, 9 had issues with the bolts which hold the aircraft’s engine in the engine pylon, attached to the wing.
The airline grounded all 9 aircrafts for repairs and informed the Brazilian manufacturing company of the issue. Embraer then issued an alert service bulletin to all the airlines operating Embraer 190 aircrafts. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority was also informed about the problem.
A statement released by Virgin Australia airlines said, “These aircraft have since undergone the necessary precautionary repairs and have since returned to service… At Virgin Australia, the safety of our aircraft is our highest priority and we have been in regular dialogue with Embraer regarding this alert.”
This Special Bulletin contains information on the progress of the investigation into a ground fire on an unoccupied Boeing 787-8, registration ET-AOP, at London Heathrow Airport on 12 July 2013.
It follows the publication of Special Bulletin S5/2013 on 18 July 2013. The AAIB are assisted in the investigation by Accredited Representatives from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (representing the State of Design and Manufacture), the Civil Aviation Authority of Ethiopia (representing the State of Registry and the Operator) and the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada (representing the State of component manufacture), with technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the operator and the aircraft and component manufacturers.
In Special Bulletin S5/2013, the AAIB reported the existence of extensive heat damage in the upper portion of the aircraft’s rear fuselage, particularly in an area coincident with the location of the Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT). The absence of any other aircraft systems in this area containing stored energy capable of initiating a fire, together with evidence from forensic examination of the ELT, led the investigation to conclude that the fire originated within the ELT battery.
Friday, May 02, 09:30 PM MYT +0800 Media Statement 30 – MH370 Incident
Malaysia Airlines wishes to make further clarification on the following matters:
1) Malaysians On Board
Malaysia Airlines confirms that 38 passengers of the 239 persons on board MH370 on 8 March 2014 were Malaysians. The names of the 38 Malaysians on board had been earlier shared in the Passenger Manifest which has been made public previously. Please see attached document for names of all Malaysian passengers onboard MH370.
2) Exchange of Signals and Aircraft in Cambodia
On the exchange of signals between ground and the aircraft soon after Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Control advised that radio contact had not been established with MH370, as carried in the recently released MH370 Preliminary Report, Malaysia Airlines clarifies that what was referred to as signals was actually the aircraft displayed on the ‘Flight Following System’ screen. This was based on the aircraft projection at that point of time and not the actual aircraft position.
When KL-ATCC (Kuala Lumpur Air Traffic Control Centre) Watch Supervisor queried Malaysia Airlines OPS (Operations) on the status of MH370, Malaysia Airlines OPS informed KL-ATCC Supervisor that MH370 was still sighted over Cambodian airspace in the Flight-Following System, which is based on a flight-projection.
The word “Cambodia” was displayed by the Flight-Following System on the screen when zoomed-in, leading Malaysia Airlines to deduce that the aircraft was flying in Cambodian airspace. The Flight-Following System did not display the name “Vietnam”, even though the aircraft was over Vietnam airspace.
The responsibility of aircraft tracking monitoring resides with Air Traffic Control Centres. For airlines, it is normal to engage flight following systems to assist its pilots to manage in weather conditions or route diversions. Such airline flight following systems are non-primary and non-positive controlling.
Flight following systems also do not trigger airlines of any abnormality. Such situations have to be pilot initiated. Unless otherwise, airlines’ operations control centres would continue to see the aircraft as flying on its normal route, based on projected or predicted positions and locations.
To make the flight-following systems work successfully and effectively, it is important to have visual depiction of the aircraft’s position, coupled with confirmation by air-to-ground communications, such as through ACARS or Satcomm or VHF or HF.
In the case of tracking MH370, Malaysia Airlines’ flight-following system indicated that the aircraft was flying, however, there was no communication from or with the pilot. Malaysia Airlines OPS attempted to communicate with MH370 after we were flag by KL-ATCC, but was never able to make contact.
3) On the Cargo Carried
About 2 tons, equivalent to 2,453kg, of cargo was declared as consolidated under one (1) Master Airway Bill (AWB). This Master AWB actually comprised 5 house AWB. Out of these 5 AWB, two (2) house AWB contained lithium ion batteries amounting to a total tonnage volume of 221kg. The balance 3 house AWB, amounting to 2,232kg, were declared as radio accessories and chargers.
Thursday, May 01, 07:00 PM MYT +0800 Media Statement 29 by Ahmad Jauhari Yahya, Group Chief Executive Officer, Malaysia Airlines
Kuala Lumpur – 55 days since Malaysia Airlines’ flight MH370’s disappearance on 8 March 2014, a multi-nation search is still ongoing for the missing aircraft, its passengers and crew.
This enormous search mission was carried out with the support from more than 20 states, firstly in the South China Sea, in the Malacca Straits, and on land along the Northern Corridor, and since mid-March when specialised assets were deployed in the air, on the sea and underwater in the southern Indian Ocean, where top experts concluded the aircraft’s last known position was.
Despite such an intensified search operations, probably the largest one in human history, we have to face the hard reality that there is still no trace of the aircraft, and the fate of the missing passengers and crew remains unknown till this day.
Malaysia Airlines is acutely conscious of, and deeply sympathetic to the continuing unimaginable anguish, distress and hardship suffered by those with loved ones on board the flight.
We share the same very feelings and have been doing whatever we can to ease the pain of the families and to provide comfort for them.
The Joint Agency Coordination Centre (JACC) in Australia has announced early this week that the search operation in the southern Indian Ocean will be moving to a new phase in the coming weeks, and it is certainly not ending.
In this new phase, the Malaysian Government, working together with Australia and Chinese governments, other international partners and specialised companies, plans to intensify the undersea search by deploying more technologically advanced assets in the search zone.
The Malaysian Government recently announced its decision to establish an international investigation team led by Malaysia. The members will include accredited representatives from the US, UK, Australia, China, France and Singapore. Also included are representatives from relevant international organisations and the civil aviation industry.
This investigation is an independent process in accordance with ICAO standards and recommended practices. Malaysia Airlines commits itself to fully support this independent investigation and provide full information and assistance as required.
From past experience, we understand the continuing search and investigation would be a prolonged process. While Malaysia Airlines is committed to continuing its support to the families during the whole process, we are adjusting the mode of services and support. Instead of staying in hotels, the families of MH370 are advised to receive information updates on the progress of the search and investigation and other support by Malaysia Airlines within the comfort of their own homes, with the support and care of their families and friends.
In line with this adjustment, Malaysia Airlines will be closing all of its Family Assistance Centres around the world by 7 May 2014.
Malaysia Airlines will keep in close touch with the families on news updates through telephone calls, messages, the Internet, and face-to-face meetings. With the support of the Malaysian Government, the airline’s Family Support Centres will be established in Kuala Lumpur and in Beijing. The detailed plan of follow-up support and services will be informed in person to the families.
Malaysia Airlines will make advanced compensation payments soonest possible to the nominated next-of-kin who are entitled to claim compensation, in order to meet their immediate economic needs.
Such advanced payments will not affect the rights of the next-of-kin to claim compensation according to the law at a later stage, and will be calculated as part of the final compensation.
Immediately after the next-of-kin have returned home, our representatives will be in touch with them at the earliest opportunity to initiate the advanced compensation payment process.
At this very difficult time, we wish to once again thank everyone for their understanding and support, especially from the families of the passengers and crew on board.
Malaysia Airlines’ thoughts and prayers remain with the families of all those onboard MH370.
Below statement and attached documents were made public and shared with NOKs at 8:27pm (Malaysia local time), 1 May 2014:
IF ANY OF THE DOCUMENTS BELOW DO NOT SHOW IMMEDIATELY, CLICK WHERE THE MESSAGE SAYS “HERE” AND THE DOCUMENT WILL LOAD TO VIEW.
Actions Taken Between 0138 and 0614
Cargo Manifest and Airway Bill
MH370 Preliminary Report
Just like it happens with cars, obscure plane parts wear out. Take for example an incident that happened in 2008, when a 747 cable burned out after the protective covering was worn off due to friction against a bolt.
Take a look at this final report on this 747 smoke event on Eva Airways Flight BR67 at Bangkok Suvarnabhumi International Airport.
Prior to this event, Boeing had sent out a service Letter to inform operators of the potential fire hazard from the arcing of a wire bundle which might result in a fire on Corrosion Inhibiting Compound (CIC) contaminated insulation blankets. They predicted it. It happened.
So as we think about Malaysia Airlines Flight 370. There is always the possibility that some small component like the one below failed, and led to something catastrophic. What if the pilots were overcome by smoke in the cabin? I am not saying that this DID happen, I am only saying there are myriad small parts that can lead to catastrophic events. It makes sense to look at any and all Boeing 777 safety advisories, in case they might predict some small event that cascaded into disaster.
Thanks to input from John King.
Here’s the question: do pilots rely too much on automation? This question has been on my mind since hearing the parallels between the UPS Cargo jet crash and the Asiana passenger jet crash. This is on my mind not only as one who works toward aviation safety but also as a very frequent flyer. You can only imagine how my work carries me into international situations. I don’t fly as frequently as a pilot, but sometimes I fly internationally several times a month. I am on these planes frequently. I rely on them.
So I find it disturbing that the NTSB’s hearing Thursday revealed parallels between the crash of UPS Flight 1354 and Asiana Filght 214. While I don’t know the answers, I can only hope the investigation shines light on ways to deal with this problem. What is the solution? Less reliance on Automation? Better training for pilots?
On the other side of the coin, some parties will want even more automation, but I am reluctant to go in that direction. The idea of even more reliance on automation is anathema to me because the engineers and advocates of reliance on even more automation will not be on those even-more automated planes. While the technology and/or training will be on the chopping block, their actual necks won’t be.
What I don’t find disturbing is the professionalism of the hearings. The webcast is well worth watching.
The hearing webcast is recorded here: http://ntsb.capitolconnection.org/022014/ntsb_archive_flv.htm
Note the NTSB cautions participants in the hearing not to engage the media and to stick to the facts.
Or the recorded captions (unformatted) are here.
The National Transportation Safety Board today released the agenda for the investigative hearing on the ongoing investigation into the Aug. 14, 2013 crash of UPS Airlines flight 1354, an Airbus A300-600, on approach to Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport in Birmingham, Ala.
The hearing will be held February 20 at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center at 429 L’Enfant Plaza SW in Washington and begins at 8:30 a.m.
Hearing witnesses, including representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration, Airbus, UPS Airlines, Independent Pilots Association and the Transport Workers Union will testify and answer questions from NTSB Board members, technical staff, and parties about non-precision approaches, human factors and flight dispatch issues. The agenda, list of panel witnesses, biographies and other related information is available at the hearing event page at http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2014/ups1354_hearing/index.html
Investigative exhibits for the hearing will be placed in the electronic docket at the start of the hearing and will also be available on the hearing event page once the hearing begins.
NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman will be available to answer questions from the media at the conclusion of the hearing. Additional details about the availability will be included in an advisory on Wednesday.
Television coverage of the proceedings will be by network pool provided by CNN. Escorted cutaway for video media will be permitted for brief periods throughout the hearing. Still photographers will be permitted in the seating area of the Board Room and by escort to areas in front of the witness panels.
Because of construction at and around L’Enfant Plaza, satellite and other media trucks will have to check in for parking and running cable through the construction zone. Please RSVP to firstname.lastname@example.org by Feb. 19. Media access to the Board Room is available beginning at 7:30 a.m.
A media room is also available with tables, chairs and an audio mult box. Generally-accepted media credentials will be required for access to the media room. In addition, a fully equipped overflow room has been established and will serve as a storage area for video equipment during the hearing.
Seating for the general public in the Board Room is on a first-come, first-served basis. The hearing will be webcast live. Access to the webcast can be found at www.ntsb.gov.
The National Transportation Safety Board has scheduled an investigative hearing on February 20 into the crash of a UPS Airbus A300-600 on approach to Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport in Birmingham, Ala., on Aug. 14, 2013.
The two flight crew members were killed and the airplane was destroyed when it impacted the ground less than a mile short of Runway 18. The cargo flight had originated from Louisville, Ky. Runway 18 was being used because the main runway at the airport was closed for repairs at the time of the airplane’s arrival.
The one-day hearing will examine:
Execution of non-precision approaches, including initial and recurrent training, adherence to standard operating procedures, and proficiency
Human factors issues associated with effective crew coordination and resource management applicable to this accident, including decision-making, communication, fatigue and fitness for duty, as well as monitoring and cross-checking, policies, standard operating procedures, guidance, and training provided to UPS crewmembers.
Dispatch procedures, including the training, evaluation, roles and responsibilities of UPS dispatchers and the limitations of dispatch-related software.
The investigation is ongoing and this hearing will develop additional facts to support the investigation. The hearing will be held in the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center in Washington, D.C. A detailed agenda and a list of attendees will be forthcoming.
Parties to the hearing will include the Federal Aviation Administration, UPS, Airbus, the Independent Pilots Association and the Transport Workers Union. The accredited representative from the French Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile (BEA) will participate on the technical panels.
The determination of the probable cause of the crash will be released when the investigation is complete. Just prior to the start of the hearing, the public docket will be opened. Included in the docket are photographs, interview transcripts and other documents.
NTSB public events are also streamed live via webcast. Webcasts are archived for a period of three months from the time of the meeting. Webcast archives are generally available by the end of the event day for public Meetings, and by the end of the next day for Technical conferences.
If you wish to obtain a copy of NTSB meetings, please contact the NTSB Records Management Division at (202) 314-6551 or 800-877-6799. You may also request this information from the NTSB web site or write the following: National Transportation Safety Board, Records Management Division (CIO-40), 490 L’Enfant Plaza, SW,Washington, DC 20594.
The gearbox is a center of controversy in the investigation of the accident where the Bond Super Puma crashed off Peterhead, killing 16 men including two crew: Capt Paul Burnham, 31, of Methlick, Aberdeenshire, and co-pilot Richard Menzies, 24, of Droitwich Spa, who worked for Bond Offshore Helicopters, KCA Deutag employees Brian Barkley, 30, of Aberdeen; Vernon Elrick, 41, of Aberdeen; Leslie Taylor, 41, of Kintore, Aberdeenshire; Nairn Ferrier, 40, of Dundee; Gareth Hughes, 53, of Angus; David Rae, 63, of Dumfries; Raymond Doyle, 57, of Cumbernauld; James John Edwards, 33, of Liverpool; Nolan Goble, 34, of Norwich, and Mihails Zuravskis, 39, of Latvia; and non employees James Costello, 24, of Aberdeen, who was contracted to Production Services Network (PSN); Alex Dallas, 62, of Aberdeen, who worked for Sparrows Offshore Services; Warren Mitchell, 38, of Oldmeldrum, Aberdeenshire, who worked for Weatherford UK; and Stuart Wood, 27, of Aberdeen, who worked for Expro North Sea Ltd.
The inquiry blames the crash on gearbox failure, but for Bond and French company Eurocopter the question remains exactly where metal particles (evidence!) were found in the gearbox.
No one is saying that the recently discovered Eurocoptor problem with the low fuel level warning system had anything to do with Clutha ——leased police Eurocopter crashed thru the roof of the Clutha pub in Glasgow killing three crew members and seven people inside the pub——but it is out there on the table and one of those things that make you go hmmm. Connection or not, the Clutha accident is causing Eurocopter to take a closer look at their helicopters.
The preliminary report on Clutha is not out yet, but there are reports that the helicopter did not run out of fuel.
The Eurocopter fuel indicator problem is that the supply-tank fuel gauge can overestimate how much fuel is in the tank. Apparently the gauge can skip amber and go straight to red (low fuel.)
Eurocopter is sending out safety notices about the issue..
In the Clutha crash, the number of fatalities has risen to ten.