Aviation News, Headlines & Alerts
Category: <span>Recap</span>

LionAir Flight Updated

On the flight prior the LionAir accident flight on the Boeing Max registered as PK-LQP, an off-duty fully-qualified Boeing 737-MAX 8 pilot was traveling home on flight JT-43. The plane encountered problems similar to the next flight that crashed it (i.e. the LionAir accident flight from Denpasar to Jakarta.) The crew aboard the earlier flight managed to land the aircraft at the destination. Based on the crew’s entry in the AFML, the engineer at Jakarta flushed the left Pitot Air Data Module (ADM) and static ADM to rectify the reported IAS and ALT disagree and cleaned the electrical connector plug of the elevator feel computer. The aircraft was subsequently released to carry out flight JT610.(A different crew manned the fatal flight.) The pilot was interviewed by the Kantor Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi–Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia (KNKT). The KNKT committee is responsible for investigating and reporting air transportation system accidents, serious incidents and safety deficiencies involving air transportation system operations in Indonesia.

The KNKT estimates that the release of the final report for Lion B38M in August or September 2019.

The KNKT is cooperating with Ethiopian Authorities but will make no official comment. News media reports suggest that on the earlier LionAir flight, a third pilot had occupied the observer’s seat in the cockpit of flight JT-43 and that this pilot identified the automatic trim runaway issue at hand and initiated that the trim cut out switches be used.

The preliminary report on the LionAir crash is located HERE.

Egyptair Flight MS804 Almost A Year Later

Elements of this image are furnished by NASA

Egyptair Flight MS804 (AKA EgyptAir Flight 804) was a Paris to Cairo flight that ended in the Mediterranean on May 19, 2016. Sixty-six people lost their lives: three security crew, fifty-six passengers, seven crew.

Egyptian authorities published a progress report on 28/06/16 that the BEA repaired the recorders. On 17/06 that the Technical Investigation Committee of the A320 accident studied FDR data as well as performing time correlation between FDR and CVR data and cockpit voice recordings before the occurrence of the accident where the existence of a “fire” was mentioned. That report did not determine the reason or location where that fire occurred. Smoke was reported during the flight in the bathroom and the avionics bay.

The investigation has been fraught with controversy. On 22 May, 2016, M6 (French TV) reported that a pilot told Cairo air traffic control about smoke in the cabin, and the pilot consequently made an emergency descent.

On May 20th 2016 The Aviation Herald received information from three independent channels, that ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) messages with following content were received from the aircraft:

  • 00:26Z 3044 ANTI ICE R WINDOW
  • 00:27Z 2600 AVIONICS SMOKE
  • 00:28Z 561100 R FIXED WINDOW SENSOR
  • 00:29Z 2200 AUTO FLT FCU 2 FAULT
  • 00:29Z 2700 F/CTL SEC 3 FAULT
  • no further ACARS messages were received.

No sooner did the report come out that the Egyptian Civil Aviation Ministry dismissed it as false.

One truism I have found in accident investigation is that it takes time to find the truth. Another is that facts can be misleading. Reportage from official sources moves slowly; reportage from commercial, so-called “news,” or social sources is frequently speculative, unsourced, or purely imaginary. Sometimes it is actually correct. It is difficult to tell the difference. Contradictions are a frequent finding, such as this:

  • Le Figaro reported that no explosives were found on Egyptair flight MS804 French victims’ bodies. The flight crashed in the Mediterranean in 2016.
  • On Dec 15th 2016 Egypt’s Civil Aviation Authority announced that forensic examination on behalf of the Accident Investigation Commission found traces of explosives with some of the human remains recovered. In accordance with Egypt law, the states prosecutor was informed, and a technical commission formed by the prosecution office opened their investigation into the crime.

How does a close reader respond to a statement that “traces of explosives were found WITH human remains?” A close reader finds more questions. With the remains is not ON the remains. But it could be either way since we are dealing with languages. In English, WITH the remains could mean a bomb was floating in the water near the bodies, or ashes, or gasoline or TNT residue. And what constitutes near? Inches? Miles? It all is relative. Or if the original report is loosely translated, did the original document use a preposition such as ON the remains? And then, there are the forensic questions. Were explosive remains washed off of bodies that were submerged in the ocean?

If the case goes to court, the court will want to know if something failed on the plane, and if so, what it was. Manufacturers of failed components are considered responsible parties. No matter what the cause, international treaty determines carrier responsibility to the victims of the crash.

The determination of failed components provides additional responsible parties. The discovery of a bomb would make airport security one of the potential responsible parties. In addition, international treaty provides guidelines for what carriers owe to the families. (Which treaty is involved depends on which treaty/treaties the involved country/countries are signatory to. If it sounds like it can get complicated, you are correct.)

It has been nearly a year since the accident, and though some things may be believed in the court of public opinion to be one way or another, questions remain unanswered. How grievous and how difficult for the families that must wait so long to find out what brought about this tragedy that took their loved ones.

MH17: Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 Still Unresolved

Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 (Flight MH17) was a passenger flight that flew over a war torn region and was shot down by a Buk surface-to-air missile system in the East Ukraine. The plane was en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, and its destruction killed the 298 people aboard. What remained of that plane rained down on Hrabove village in the Donetsk region.

The flight had two copilots: Ahmad Hakimi Hanapi and Muhd Firdaus Abdul Rahim, and two captains: Wan Amran Wan Hussin from Kuala Kangsar and Eugene Choo Jin Leong from Seremban.

The Russian government blamed the Ukrainian government because the incident happened in Ukrainian airspace. The Ukraine says Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade shot down MH17. Russians and Russian separatists continue finger pointing at each other for the responsibility for the crash. The Dutch, who control the investigation, involved 24 experts from Russia, Ukraine, Malaysia, Australia, Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom.

The Dutch Safety Board’s subsequent report that came out in July 2015 left many questions; it concluded that the crash was caused by a Buk surface-to-air 9M38-series missile with 9N314M warhead; that the missile struck the left of the cockpit killing the flight crew; impact tore off the cockpit, suffocating the passengers. The board also concluded that the 61 planes which flew in the air zone should have been warned it was not a good route. The UN security tried to establish an international tribunal to investigate, but the attempt was vetoed by Russia. Did Russia deploy this BUK into Ukrainian territory controlled by the outlaw rebels? Did the separatists deploy the BUK mistakenly (or not) into this commercial vessel flying over a war zone?

On 9 April 2015,the Dutch released 569 documents (with personal information redacted) concerning the incident. The Public Prosecution Service of Dutch Ministry of Justice is leading the (ongoing) criminal investigation.

What can the rest of the world do but feel empathy for the families of those who were aboard? Two hundred and eighty-three people, eighty of whom who were under eighteen years old. These people, these fathers, mothers, wives, husbands, sons, daughters, sibling, boarded the plane, crew and passenger alike, with no thought but to reach their destination. They never did. Their remains came home in boxes, and some not at all. Now, two years later, the families are still without answers, without resolution.

Tragedy and loss are unspeakable. No humane being can assign a degree to the depth of the loss. Condolences can be offered, and all measures can be taken, but all the money, concern, sympathy and well wishes can ever make a dent in the damage done.

Homeowner Survived Plane Crashing into Her Home

What: Superior Pallet Co. Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee Six
Where: Jackson, Miss
When: Nov 13, 2012, 5:00pm
Who: 3 fatalities, 1 injured
Why: Three people aboard the Piper that crashed in Jackson Mississippi died at the scene.

When the plane struck their house, everything Loretta and Roosevelt Jamison owned, including two pets, went up in flames.

Ms Jamison was in her bedroom when the plane struck; first she heard a boom, then voices of someone inside the plane before it exploded. The repercussion knocked her off her feet. As fire engulfed the house, she climbed out of a second story window and was helped down by neighbors.

See Video

Read More

Revisiting Ethiopia Flight 409

We’ve been studying Ethiopia Flight 409 for a while, and now that the official investigation Progress Report is out, we have looked at it with quite some interest. The 28 page report is attached as a pdf at the end of this editorial, so if you haven’t seen it yet, we have it handy–

In some places, we find that the report corroborates some of the the points we made (or discovered in our research.)

According to the report:

“Instruments meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, and the flight was on an instrument flight plan. The accident occurred at night in dark lighting conditions with reported isolated cumulonimbus clouds and thunderstorms in the area.”

Their report also states:
The Lebanese Civil Aviation Authority reviewed the data from the Lebanese Meteorological Services that was collected on 25 January, 2010 after the accident. Meteorological data revealed some significant meteorological conditions in the area at the time of the accident. Relevant meteorological documents are included in the investigation file and will be analyzed during the investigation.

1.7.1 General meteorological situation
At the time of the accident, there was thunderstorms activity southwest and west of the field, as well as to the northwest on the localizer path for runway 16.

We had found a satellite photo of the area at the time in question and found something more turbulent than isolated cumulonumbus clouds. Here are the details we turned up
(thanks to Prof. Robert H. Holzworth
Departments of Earth and Space Sciences, and Physics
Director, World Wide Lightning Location Network )

WWLLN lightning strokes between (45,35.2) and (33.6, 35.7) coordinates on25 Jan 2010 between 00 and 06 UTC
2010/01/25,00:26:01.675091, 33.7925,  35.3157, 18.6, 15 2010/01/25,00:32:36.535404, 33.6762,  35.3223,  2.6,  5 2010/01/25,00:35:33.147928, 33.8152,  35.3989, 17.1,  9 2010/01/25,00:36:46.386409, 33.7880,  35.4182,  6.3,  6 2010/01/25,00:37:57.880969, 33.7473,  35.4083, 12.9,  8 2010/01/25,00:38:56.307703, 33.8144,  35.4480,  6.7,  5 2010/01/25,00:39:52.170965, 33.8098,  35.4486, 22.5, 1 02010/01/25,00:47:07.877656, 33.7658,  35.5138, 16.3,  7 2010/01/25,00:47:08.129640, 33.7532,  35.5187,  6.8,  5 2010/01/25,00:51:28.917459, 33.7313,  35.4897, 15.8,  8 2010/01/25,00:57:16.994854, 33.7712,  35.5668,  6.2,  5 2010/01/25,00:57:17.172976, 33.8877,  35.6009,  3.1,  5 2010/01/25,00:57:16.970924, 33.8230,  35.5664,  9.2,  5 2010/01/25,01:05:02.878083, 33.6379,  35.5348, 10.9,  5 2010/01/25,02:58:51.961652, 33.6073,  35.3703,  2.3,  5 2010/01/25,03:00:31.235850, 33.6450,  35.3881,  5.8,  7 2010/01/25,03:02:45.342786, 33.6157,  35.3553,  4.5,  7 2010/01/25,03:30:07.101084, 33.6511,  35.3185, 17.5,  7 2010/01/25,04:06:25.411422, 33.8432,  35.3648, 10.9,  5 2010/01/25,04:07:31.723296, 33.9087,  35.3844,  7.0,  5 2010/01/25,04:13:12.295902, 33.9543,  35.4151, 17.0, 10 2010/01/25,04:29:17.203911, 33.9865,  35.4613, 20.7, 10 2010/01/25,04:33:22.703869, 33.9637,  35.3229,  7.6,  6 2010/01/25,04:35:07.805894, 33.8709,  35.3297, 13.3,  8 2010/01/25,04:46:45.611497, 33.9634,  35.4145, 12.9,  6 2010/01/25,05:19:51.913652, 33.6442,  35.4520, 19.5,  8 2010/01/25,05:35:10.788571, 33.9139,  35.2087,  9.5,  7 2010/01/25,05:56:25.149281, 33.6332,  35.6535, 14.0,  7

and the satellite photo:

The plane’s on board radar would have normally registered this unacceptable massive super cell in the area where the airplane hit the ocean and the pilot would have adjusted the flight path accordingly. This makes us question if the on board radar was intact and operable. The weather system pictured in the satellite photo is not weather a pilot would voluntarily fly into. So we were not surprised to see this included in the report: Procedure for use of on-board Weather Radar
ET provided its SOP and Boeing procedure for the operation of the weather radar during departure. The procedure will be addressed during the analysis phase.

Our investigation pointed out that when an aircraft fails, it is a crucial part of the research to look at timely Airworthiness Directives (issued before and after) on the type of plane involved and indeed, this has become part of the ongoing research: Removal and Analysis of the Trim Tab section:
ADs were issued (Emergency AD, AD 2010-09-05, AD 2010-17-19) by the FAA respectively on March and August 2010 regarding trim tab control mechanism and this airplane (with serial number 29935) was found affected by these ADs.
Therefore, and in accordance with the Airworthiness Group recommendation, the Investigation Committee decided the removal of the trim tab control mechanism for further test and research.

This is not the final report. The final report is due out this summer. We are looking forward to seeing if it answers some of our questions.

The Official Report

Boeing Analyzes the Numbers Game

Commercial Aviation Accident Summary

  • 1959-2008 582 Fatal accidents (36% of total) 1048 non-fatal accidents
    91 fatal accidents (25% of total) 279 non-fatal accidents (75% of total)

  • 57% of all aviation accidents occur while cruising
  • 24% of accidents take place because of technical or human error while landing
  • 12% of accidents take place on takeoff
  • 12% of accidents occur between climb and cruise
  • 12% of accidents occur between taxi and towing at the airport

* Please note that the percentage of WHEN accidents occur will not add up with the percentages of WHY accidents occur.



National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594



The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the
captain of Colgan Air flight 3407 inappropriately responded
to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an
aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
In a report adopted today in a public Board meeting in
Washington, additional flight crew failures were noted as
causal to the accident.

On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight
3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara
International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed
into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5
nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2
flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane
were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the
airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash
fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey.
Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
time of the accident.

The report states that, when the stick shaker activated to
warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the
captain should have responded correctly to the situation by
pushing forward on the control column. However, the
captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and
placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall.

Contributing to the cause of the accident were the
Crewmembers’ failure to recognize the position of the
low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that
the stick shaker was about to activate, and their failure to
adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other contributing
factors were the captain’s failure to effectively manage the
flight and Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed
selection and management during approaches in icing

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board
issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) regarding strategies to prevent flight
crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue,
remedial training, pilot records, stall training, and
airspeed selection procedures. Additional recommendations
address FAA’s oversight and use of safety alerts for
operators to transmit safety-critical information, flight
operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs, use of
personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, and
weather information provided to pilots.

At today’s meeting, the Board announced that two issues that
had been encountered in the Colgan Air investigation would
be studied at greater length in proceedings later this year.
The Board will hold a public forum this Spring exploring
pilot and air traffic control high standards. This
accident was one in a series of incidents investigated by
the Board in recent years – including a mid-air collision
over the Hudson River that raised questions of air traffic
control vigilance, and the Northwest Airlines incident last
year where the airliner overflew its destination airport in
Minneapolis because the pilots were distracted by non-flying
activities – that have involved air transportation
professionals deviating from expected levels of performance.
In addition, this Fall the Board will hold a public forum
on code sharing, the practice of airlines marketing their
services to the public while using other companies to
actually perform the transportation. For example, this
accident occurred on a Continental Connection flight,
although the transportation was provided by Colgan Air.

A summary of the findings of the Board’s report are
available on the NTSB’s website at:

Ethiopian Crash Update

The wife to the French ambassador to Lebanon is confirmed to have been aboard Ethiopian Flight 409 that took off from Beirut and crashed within minutes in the Mediterranean sea. This BBC news report says 92 were aboard. Other sources claim 90. Reference in this video is made to people being pulled from the sea, but no survivors have been found.

Comair Crash: Kentucky 2006-Findings

Lexington: U.S. District Judge Karl Forester ruled that two pilots who took off on the wrong runway were negligent in the August 2006 Comair crash.

A jury is deciding if punitive damages will apply.

On August 27, 2006, about 0606:35 eastern daylight time, Comair flight 5191, a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N431CA, crashed during takeoff from Blue Grass Airport, Lexington, Kentucky. The flight crew was instructed to take off from runway 22 but instead lined up the airplane on runway 26 and began the takeoff roll. The airplane ran off the end of the runway and impacted the airport perimeter fence, trees, and terrain. The captain, flight attendant, and 47 passengers were killed, and the first officer received serious injuries. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and postcrash fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and was en route to Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, Atlanta, Georgia. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed.


1) The captain and the first officer were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. There was no evidence of any medical or behavioral conditions that might have adversely affected their performance during the accident flight. Before reporting for the accident flight, the flight crewmembers had rest periods that were longer than those required by Federal regulations and company policy.

2) The accident airplane was properly certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with Federal regulations. The recovered components showed no evidence of any structural, engine, or system failures.

3) Weather was not a factor in this accident. No restrictions to visibility occurred during the airplane’s taxi to the runway and the attempted takeoff. The taxi and the attempted takeoff occurred about 1 hour before sunrise during night visual meteorological conditions and with no illumination from the moon.

4) The captain and the first officer believed that the airplane was on runway 22 when they taxied onto runway 26 and initiated the takeoff roll.

5) The flight crew recognized that something was wrong with the takeoff beyond the point from which the airplane could be stopped on the remaining available runway.

6) Because the accident airplane had taxied onto and taken off from runway 26 without a clearance to do so, this accident was a runway incursion.

7) Adequate cues existed on the airport surface and available resources were present in the cockpit to allow the flight crew to successfully navigate from the air carrier ramp to the runway 22 threshold.

8) The flight crewmembers’ nonpertinent conversation during the taxi, which was not in compliance with Federal regulations and company policy, likely contributed to their loss of positional awareness.

9) The flight crewmembers failed to recognize that they were initiating a takeoff on the wrong runway because they did not cross-check and confirm the airplane’s position on the runway before takeoff and they were likely influenced by confirmation bias.

10) Even though the flight crewmembers made some errors during their preflight activities and the taxi to the runway, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether fatigue affected their performance.

11) The flight crew’s noncompliance with standard operating procedures, including the captain’s abbreviated taxi briefing and both pilots’ nonpertinent conversation, most likely created an atmosphere in the cockpit that enabled the crew’s errors.

12) The controller did not notice that the flight crew had stopped the airplane short of the wrong runway because he did not anticipate any problems with the airplane’s taxi to the correct runway and thus was paying more attention to his radar responsibilities than his tower responsibilities.

13) The controller did not detect the flight crew’s attempt to take off on the wrong runway because, instead of monitoring the airplane’s departure, he performed a lower-priority administrative task that could have waited until he transferred responsibility for the airplane to the next air traffic control facility.

14) The controller was most likely fatigued at the time of the accident, but the extent that fatigue affected his decision not to monitor the airplane’s departure could not be determined in part because his routine practices did not consistently include the monitoring of takeoffs.

15) The Federal Aviation Administration’s operational policies and procedures at the time of the accident were deficient because they did not promote optimal controller monitoring of aircraft surface operations.

16) The first officer’s survival was directly attributable to the prompt arrival of the first responders; their ability to extricate him from the cockpit wreckage; and his rapid transport to the hospital, where he received immediate treatment.

17) The emergency response for this accident was timely and well coordinated.

18) A standard procedure requiring 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K, 121, and 135 pilots to confirm and cross-check that their airplane is positioned at the correct runway before crossing the hold short line and initiating a takeoff would help to improve the pilots’ positional awareness during surface operations.

19) The implementation of cockpit moving map displays or cockpit runway alerting systems on air carrier aircraft would enhance flight safety by providing pilots with improved positional awareness during surface navigation.

20) Enhanced taxiway centerline markings and surface painted holding position signs provide pilots with additional awareness about the runway and taxiway environment.

21) This accident demonstrates that 14 Code of Federal Regulations 91.129(i) might result in mistakes that have catastrophic consequences because the regulation allows an airplane to cross a runway during taxi without a pilot request for a specific clearance to do so.

22) If controllers were required to delay a takeoff clearance until confirming that an airplane has crossed all intersecting runways to a departure runway, the increased monitoring of the flight crew’s surface navigation would reduce the likelihood of wrong runway takeoff events.

23) If controllers were to focus on monitoring tasks instead of administrative tasks when aircraft are in the controller’s area of operations, the additional monitoring would increase the probability of detecting flight crew errors.

24) Even though the air traffic manager’s decision to staff midnight shifts at Blue Grass Airport with one controller was contrary to Federal Aviation Administration verbal guidance indicating that two controllers were needed, it cannot be determined if this decision contributed to the circumstances of this accident.

25) Because of an ongoing construction project at Blue Grass Airport, the taxiway identifiers represented in the airport chart available to the flight crew were inaccurate, and the information contained in a local notice to airmen about the closure of taxiway A was not made available to the crew via automatic terminal information service broadcast or the flight release paperwork.

26) The controller’s failure to ensure that the flight crew was aware of the altered taxiway A configuration was likely not a factor in the crew’s inability to navigate to the correct runway.

27) Because the information in the local notice to airmen (NOTAM) about the altered taxiway A configuration was not needed for the pilots’ wayfinding task, the absence of the local NOTAM from the flight release paperwork was not a factor in this accident.

28) The presence of the extended taxiway centerline to taxiway A north of runway 8/26 was not a factor in this accident.

Air Traffic Controllers Audio Released

4 Marine Corps officers have lost their jobs. 9 individuals are being disciplined. The audio is damning, but who does it damn?

What: F/A-18 Military Jet from the carrier Abraham Lincoln landing at Marine Corps Air Station Miramir
Where: San Diego neighborhood
When: DEC 8
Who: the pilot, who was part of a training squadron, ejected. He had been aiming the plane at a deserted canyon to avoid homes and the 805 Freeway. 4 Individuals in the house are dead. The pilot has been transported to Balboa Naval Hospital
Update: F/A-18 Crash in San Diego

Tallahassee: Update on Plane Cockpit Fire

What: Delta Connection carrier Canadian Regional Jet 200 Flight 5563 Registration 830AS Destination Atlanta
Where: Tallahassee Regional Airport
When: 02/28/2009
Who: 47 passengers
Why: At the Tallahassee Regional airport at the gate, the pilot reported a fire in the cockpit.

Delta Cockpit Fire

Update: Turkish Boeing Crash at Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport

Minutes before the Turkish Airlines Boeing crashed at at 10:26 am, a Northwest Airlines Boeing 757 landed, leaving behind a trail of “wake turbulence.” Just as a speedboat moving in water leaves a dramatic ripple of water, a jet leaves a deadly invisible “wake” behind. If this is indeed what happened to the Turkish Airlines jet, then the control tower is at fault for scheduling the flights too close together. (The Turkish Airlines jet was following only four miles behind.) Records show that the Northwest flight landed at 10:24 a.m.

Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Joop Stroes – Global Aviation Photography
What: Turkish Airlines Boeing 737-800 (TC-JGE) Flight 1951 en route from Istanbul to Amsterdam.
Where: Amsterdam’s Schiphol Airport
When: 10:40 a.m. Wednesday Feb 25
Who: 135 passengers on board; eight crew members. (numbers vary)
Why: The plane crashed as it approached the runway to land. Witnesses say the approach was too low and the pilot tried to go higher to avoid crashing into the A-19 (hwy.) The wreckage is in three pieces lying in a field next to the runway; emergency crews are tending injured passengers on site. The cockpit was intact, adn the fuselage broke at the wings.There was an immediate report of one fatality which was later denied. There were at least 20 injured and at least 50 survivors. Another report estimated the majority of the passengers are injured. (Sorry the numbers don’t mesh, but this is the news as it came in–) There was no fire. Fights to and from Schiphol were suspended temporarily after the crash.

The number of deceased has been increased to 9.

More than 80 suffered injury.

25 suffered “serious” injury.
6 are hospitalized in critical condition.

Numbers corrected (again): 127 passengers 7 crew.

According to various passenger accounts, prior to the crash, twelve minutes to the scheduled landing, the plane was flying low, and an announcement was made that the plane was landing. (No announcement was made that the plane was in an emergency.) Immediately on landing, those who were able left the plane, and when there was no fire, they went back in and pulled the others out, especially in the front of the plane, where there was screaming. Outside help arrived within 20-25 minutes.

See the Original Post

Home Owners Associations-Just Gotta Hate ‘Em

Remember July 10, 2007 when we all heard about the plane falling out of the sky and demolishing a house and killing some of the residents? It was the Woodard house, and Joe Woodard’s wife Janise and her infant son, Joseph were killed in the fireball.

So now he is in the process of rebuilding–with changes because he could not bear the house to be the same.

Now his Home Owner’s Association has put him on notice, saying that his shingles don’t match the neighbors and they don’t like his new home’s elevation. He has to fix the inconsistencies or risk litigation, He says he’s tried to reach them, but can’t get thru.

They must be some real first class gems. Do you think they had their eyes on poor Joe’s Nashcar settlement?

Memorials, etc.

Most of the time we only post the crash as it happens, unless there’s an event that happens that really needs more dissemination. Usually the mailbox is full of news and reports, requests, pleas for attention and the occasional argument. I suppose because we’re in the process of moving the blog–and because last week was a really busy week–and because I’m fighting off an infection–this week’s mailbox is full of things that didn’t just happen and can’t be easily put into a file.

So the way it goes today…there’s a two-seater Vans RV light aircraft that flipped over in the North Weald airfield in Essex in the UK. The pilot hurt his neck and back. (In these cases, I always feel like it’s a miracle if they get out of a crash alive, so some bumps and bruises are like getting out of a coffin scot– free–particularly when the pilot is in his seventies.)

And of course, we’ve already talked about the Piper Navajo Chieftain that fell out of the sky into a North Las Vegas house. Five people in the house got out–one died. Its eerily like the same crash that happened also in Vegas, also this week. Apparently in this case, when his engine was running roughly, the pilot decided to go back to the airport and when he did, he hit trees and power lines, crashed on the house and died. Is there a pattern here? Anyway, they’re investigating.

There’s a memorial service at Southern Utah University to remember the nine people from Cedar City clinic Southwest Skin and Cancer Inc who died in the crash along with the pilot. The Air Force is remembering 9 men who died in the Davao crash. There were actually 11 lost–but they apparently didn’t know two of them were on the plane; and they will be remembered separately. I almost posted the details but really, I’m overwhelmed by all those names. I don’t have any idea where Davao is, but grief is grief, and I am sure we all mourn with them. And I will mourn twice for the two men they forgot to mourn the first time around.

In fact, the only new news looks like it is the 1976 Rockwell International 112A whose pilot got pulled out of the water off of Gasparilla Island. 69-year-old Glen Koedding took a trip to the hospital but he’s ok. They don’t say if the plane survived.

Maybe if we’re really lucky, a day will go by and we won’t have any crash reports. Wouldn’t that be something?

Wildfire Crash Update

While on it’s third run from Helispot 44, at an elevation 5,935 feet, to Helispot 36, at an elevation of 2,516 feet, ferrying firefighters from a remote mountain site in the Shasta-Trinity forest, the Sikorsky S-61N helicopter crashed killing 9.

Fortunately, the voice-data recorder was determined to be intact despite fire damage. The investigation so far has found that the chopper’s main rotor lost power during takeoff. After the rotor malfunction, witnesses say the helicopter struck trees and slammed into the hillside. Four of the thirteen passengers–three fire fighters and the co-pilot–survived. The co-pilot remains hospitalized.

Read profiles of the victims here

Recent Airline Accidents since the Tam Air Crash in Sao Paulo

30 November 2007; Atlasjet MD83; near Keciborlu, Turkey:
Domestic flight from Istanbul to Isparta disappeared from radar screens. The crew had requested permission to land and subsequently crashed in mountainous terrain near the town of Keciborlu 7.5 miles from the Isparta airport. All seven crew members and 50 passengers were killed.

16 September 2007; One-Two-Go Airlines MD82; Phuket, Thailand:
Scheduled domestic flight from Bangkok (DMK) to Phuket (HKT). After landing heavy rain and poor visibility , the aircraft skidded off the runway, impacted trees, and caught fire. At least 89 deaths, including 85 of the 123 passengers and five of the seven crew members.

20 August 2007; China Airlines 737-800; Naha, Japan:
After landing at Naha on the island of Okinawa, the left engine caught fire and the crew initiated an emergency evacuation. All 157 passengers (including two toddlers) and eight crew members survived. This event did not result in a passenger death.

9 August 2007; Air Moorea Twin Otter; Moorea, Frech Polynesia:
Scheduled domestic flight from Moorea (MOZ) to Tahiti (PPT) crashed into the ocean shortly after takeoff. The single crew member and all 19 passengers were killed.

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