Partial summary of what is included

  • incorporate in Aircraft Flight Manuals a committed-to-stop point in the landing sequence
  • subpart K operators and Part 142 training schools to incorporate the information
  • establish, and ensure that pilots adhere to, standard operating procedures.
  • principal operations inspectors ensure that pilots use the same checklists in operations that they used during training for normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions.
  • require manufacturers to revise existing, checklists to require pilots to clearly call out and respond with the actual flap position
  • revise/describe terms severe thunderstorms, such as “bow echo,” “derecho,” and “mesoscale convective system.”
  • revise regulations and policies to permit appropriate prescription use
  • require fatigue education (training and policy for doctors and pilots)
  • runway excursion prevention development
  • wet runway landing data information provided to pilots
  • pilot in command line checks demonstrating expertise

Safety Recommendation .pdf

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.

Similar Posts

FOUR RECENT UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE EVENTS PROMPT NTSB TO ISSUE URGENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS TO FAA

The National Transportation Safety Board today issued two
urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). The first recommendation asks that the
FAA require operators of aircraft equipped with a particular
model engine to immediately perform blade borescope
inspections (BSI) of the high pressure turbine rotor at
specific intervals until the current turbine disk can be
redesigned and replaced with one that can withstand the
unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. The
second recommendation asks the FAA to require the engine
manufacturer to immediately redesign the disk. The NTSB
issued an additional recommendation for a requirement that
operators perform a second type of inspection and another
recommendation related to the engine manufacturer regarding
the installation of the replacement disk.

All four recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine
(LPT) stage 3 (S3) rotor disk in the General Electric (GE)
CF6-45/50 series turbofan engines that can fail unexpectedly
when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance.

An uncontained engine event occurs when an engine failure
results in fragments of rotating engine parts penetrating
and exiting through the engine case. Uncontained turbine
engine disk failures within an aircraft engine present a
direct hazard to an airplane and its passengers because
high-energy disk fragments can penetrate the cabin or fuel
tanks, damage flight control surfaces, or sever flammable
fluid or hydraulic lines. Engine cases are not designed to
contain failed turbine disks. Instead, the risk of
uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks
as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine
whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the
aircraft.

In its safety recommendations to the FAA, the NTSB cited
four foreign accidents, which the NTSB is either
investigating or participating in an investigation led by
another nation, in which the aircraft experienced an
uncontained engine failure of its GE CF6-45/50 series
engine.

The date, location, and circumstances of these four events
(none had injuries or fatalities) are as follows:

On July 4, 2008, a Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) Boeing
747-300 experienced an engine failure during initial climb
after takeoff from Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This
investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

On March 26, 2009, an Arrow Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10F,
about 30 minutes after takeoff from Manaus, Brazil,
experienced loss of oil pressure in one engine. The pilots
shut down the engine and diverted to Medellin, Columbia.
This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

On December 17, 2009, a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F airplane
was passing through 7,000 feet above ground level (agl) when
the flight crewmembers heard a muffled explosion and
immediately applied left rudder. With one engine losing oil
pressure, the airplane returned to land at Changi,
Singapore. The NTSB is participating in the investigation
that is being led by the Air Accident Investigation Bureau
of Singapore.

On April 10, 2010, an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an
engine failure while accelerating for takeoff at Manama,
Bahrain. The crew declared an emergency, rejected the
takeoff, activated the fire suppression system, and
evacuated the airplane. The NTSB is participating in the
investigation that is being led by the Bahrain Ministry of
Transportation – Civil Aviation.

The four recommendations to the FAA are as follows:
1. Immediately require operators of CF6-45/50-powered
airplanes to perform high pressure turbine rotor blade
borescope inspections every 15 flight cycles until the
low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a
redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance
vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.
(Urgent)
2. Require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to
perform fluorescent penetrant inspections of CF6-45-
50- low pressure turbine stage 3 disks at every engine
shop visit until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk
is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand
the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure
rotor.
3. Immediately require General Electric Company to
redesign the CF6-45/50 low pressure turbine stage 3
disk so that it will not fail when exposed to high
pressure rotor unbalance forces. (Urgent)
4. Once General Electric Company has redesigned the CF6-
45/50 low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 disk in
accordance with Safety Recommendation [3], require all
operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to install
the newly designed LPT S3 at the next maintenance
opportunity.

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.

NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION: 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91


The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendation to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association:

Educate pilots of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight operations about the benefits of notifying passengers about the location and operation of survival and emergency communication equipment on board their airplanes.

The PDF may be viewed here:

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.

DOT: Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, A340-300

[Federal Register: March 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 57)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 13148-13152]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26mr09-30]

———————————————————————–

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

———————————————————————–

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)

[[Page 13149]]

originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and
correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as:

One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
* * * The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result
in the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.

* * * * *
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions
that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 27, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Airbus SAS–Airworthiness Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61
93 45 80, e-mail airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://
www.airbus.com. You may review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0264;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD” at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008 (referred to
after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:

One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).

Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

Airbus has issued the service information described in the
following table. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A330-27A3154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 02……………. March 2, 2007.
3110.
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A340-27A4154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- 01……………. March 2, 2007.
4115.
————————————————————————

[[Page 13150]]

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect 16 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it
would take between 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed
AD on U.S. operators to be $1,280, or $80 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
“Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-
174-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by April 27, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 series airplanes; certificated in any category, except
those identified in paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airbus Model A330-301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, –
342, and -343 airplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs) up to
and including MSN 588, except those on which Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110 has been embodied in service.
(2) Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313
airplanes, MSNs up to and including MSN 598, except those on which
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115 has been embodied in service.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight
controls.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane.

Actions and Compliance

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 8,500 total
flight cycles since first flight as of the effective date of this
AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (f)(1)(ii)
of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD:
Identify the part number of spoiler servo-controls installed on the
airplane at all positions in order to determine the number of
affected hydraulic circuits in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154,
Revision 01; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154,
Revision 01; both dated July 25, 2008, as applicable. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number

[[Page 13151]]

identified in Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by
this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD, do all applicable actions
required by paragraph (f)(2), (f)(3), or (f)(4) of this AD.

Table 1–Spoiler Servo-Control Part Numbers
————————————————————————
Position 1 Positions 2 through 6
————————————————————————
MZ4339390-01X……………………….. MZ4306000-01X.
MZ4339390-02X……………………….. MZ4306000-02X.
MZ4339390-10X……………………….. MZ4306000-10X.
————————————————————————

(2) If three affected hydraulic circuits are identified during
the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(ii), and
(f)(2)(iii) of this AD, at the time specified.
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,400 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 3 months after accomplishing the
requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on the second
hydraulic circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(iii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(3) If two affected hydraulic circuits are identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the actions
required by paragraphs (f)(3)(i) and (f)(3)(ii) of this AD, at the
time specified:
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(4) If one affected hydraulic circuit is identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 18 months
after the effective date of this AD, modify the affected spoiler
servo-controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(5) For airplanes that have accumulated less than or equal to
8,500 total flight cycles since first flight as of the effective
date of this AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(5)(i) and
(f)(5)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 9 months after the effective date of this AD: Do the
actions specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number identified in
Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD: Within 18 months after the
effective date of this AD, modify all the affected spoiler servo-
controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(6) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install
any spoiler servo-control with a part number identified in Table 1
of this AD on any aircraft as a replacement part, unless the part
has been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(7) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service bulletins specified in Table 2 of this
AD are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of this AD.

Table 2–Credit Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 01……………. March 26, 2004.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
4115.
————————————————————————

FAA AD Differences

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN:
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

(h) Refer to European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness
Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008, and the service
bulletins specified in Table 3 of this AD, for related information.

Table 3–Service Information
—————————————————————————————————————-
Revision
Service Bulletin level Date
—————————————————————————————————————-
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154. 01 July 25, 2008.

[[Page 13152]]

Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110……….. 02 March 2, 2007.
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154. 01 July 25, 2008.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115……….. 01 March 2, 2007.
—————————————————————————————————————-

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 18, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-6734 Filed 3-25-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
| | | |

NTSB ISSUES SECOND INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE ON SOUTHWEST AIRLINES ACCIDENT IN NEW YORK

August 6, 2013
WASHINGTON – In its continuing investigation of the July 22 accident in which Southwest Airlines flight 345, a B-737-700, landed hard at New York’s LaGuardia Airport (LGA), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

• The captain has been with Southwest for almost 13 years and has been a captain for six of those years. The captain has over 12,000 total flight hours, over 7,000 of which are as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the captain has over 7,900 hours, with more than 2,600 as the pilot-in-command.

• The first officer has been with Southwest for about 18 months. The pilot has about 5,200 total flight hours, with 4,000 of those as pilot-in-command. In 737s, the first officer has about 1,100 hours, none of which are as the pilot-in-command.

• This was the first trip the flight crew had flown together and it was the second leg of the trip. The first officer had previous operational experience at LGA, including six flights in 2013. The captain reported having flown into LGA twice, including the accident flight, serving as the pilot monitoring for both flights.

• The en route phase of the flight, which originated in Nashville, was characterized by the flight crew as routine. On approach into LGA, the first officer was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. SWA 345 was cleared for the ILS Runway 04 approach.

• The weather in the New York area caused the accident flight to enter a holding pattern for about 15 minutes. The crew reported that they saw the airport from about 5-10 miles out and that the airplane was on speed, course and glideslope down to about 200-400 feet.

• The crew reported that below 1,000 feet, the tailwind was about 11 knots. They also reported that the wind on the runway was a headwind of about 11 knots.

• SWA 345 proceeded on the approach when at a point below 400 feet, there was an exchange of control of the airplane and the captain became the flying pilot and made the landing.

• The jetliner touched down on the runway nose first followed by the collapse of the nose gear; the airplane was substantially damaged.

At this point in the investigation, no mechanical anomalies or malfunctions have been found. A preliminary examination of the nose gear indicated that it failed due to stress overload.

Investigators have collected five videos showing various aspects of the crash landing. The team will be analyzing these recordings in the coming months.

Parties to the investigation are the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Southwest Airlines, and the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association.

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
|

NTSB ANNOUNCES AGENDA FOR AIRLINE CODE-SHARING SYMPOSIUM

The National Transportation Safety Board has published the agenda for the symposium on airline code-sharing, which will take place on October 26-27 in the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center (429 L’Enfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC 20594). The symposium is open to all and free to attend (there is no registration). The event will also be webcast live on www.ntsb.gov.

A description of the symposium, a detailed agenda, and biographies of the presenters, panelists and moderator are all available at http://go.usa.gov/aZ6

The media advisory announcing the symposium is available athttp://go.usa.gov/aZF

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
|

Plane loses Engine; Downed Starlings Lose Nesting Area

What: Northwest Airlines Flight #5808 leaving Little Rock National Airport
Where: Little Rock National Airport
When: Tue September 23, 2008 –
Why: En route, the plane struck and killed 139 Starlings. The sheer quantity of their bodies closed a runway for 40 minutes. One of the birds flew into an engine, which is something that can easily down a plane. After striking the flock of birds, the flight returned to the airport on one engine.

The solution to the problem of birds is to remove a stand of trees at the base of the runway, and also in parking lots.

To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.