NTSB Chairman Opens Child and Youth Transportation Safety Initiative at Safety Seat Check Event

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: January 24, 2011

National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman recently launched the agency’s initiative to promote child and youth safety across alltransportation modes, with a particular focus on educating parents and
caregivers about ways to keep children safe when traveling. The yearlong effort was first announced at the NTSB’s forum on Child Passenger Safety in the Air and in Automobiles in December.

At a child safety seat check event in Bristow, Virginia sponsored by the Prince William County Fire and Rescue, Chairman Hersman spoke about child passenger safety and her own plans to renew her certification as a CPS technician.

“These community-sponsored seat checks give parents peace of mind,” Hersman said. “Every parent wants their child to be safe, so knowing that trained and knowledgeable CPS technicians are available to make sure that their child safety seats have been installed properly is invaluable to them.”

To view the video that captured highlights of the event, please visit: www.ntsb.gov/children.

Chairman Hersman noted that not all states have adequate child passenger safety laws. “As state legislatures begin their 2011 sessions, the NTSB is calling upon legislators to pass laws that ensure that all children up to 8 years old are using child safety and booster seats.”

Florida, the most lenient in child passenger safety laws, requires child safety seats only for children age 3 years or younger. The laws in Arizona, South Dakota, American Samoa and Puerto Rico are only slightly more
protective, covering children age 4 years or younger. Twelve states (Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, and South Carolina) mandate child restraints for children age 5 or younger and six states (Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and North Dakota) only cover children age 6 or younger.

The issue of improving child occupant protection has been on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements since 1997.

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    NTSB Safety Recommendation A-11-7 through -11

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

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    Taxi and Ground Movement

    NOTICE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION N JO
    Air Traffic Organization Policy
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    Cancellation Date:
    March 10, 2011
    SUBJ: Taxi and Ground Movement Operations
    1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice amends Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-7-2, Taxi and Ground Movement Operations, by deleting the phraseology and procedure of issuing “taxi to” when authorizing an aircraft to taxi to an assigned takeoff runway, thus allowing an aircraft to cross all runways/taxiways which the taxi route intersects except the assigned runway.

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    3. Where Can I Find This Notice? This notice is available on the MYFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications.

    4. Explanation of Policy Change. This change establishes the requirement that an explicit runway crossing clearance be issued for each runway (active/inactive or closed) crossing and requires an aircraft/vehicle to have crossed the previous runway before another runway crossing clearance may be issued. At airports where the taxi route between runway centerlines is less than 1,000 feet apart, multiple runway crossings may be issued after receiving approval by the Terminal Services Director of Operations.

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    06/30/10 N JO 7110.528
    2
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    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    NTSB PRESS RELEASE

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 2, 2010
    SB-10-02

    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the
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    On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
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    -30-

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    NTSB Issues 9 New Safety Recommendations

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    • Require all existing turbine-powered, nonexperimental, nonrestricted-category aircraft that are not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder and are operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 91, 121, or 135 to be retrofitted with a crash-resistant flight recorder system. The crash-resistant flight recorder system should record cockpit audio and images with a view of the cockpit environment to include as much of the outside view as possible, and parametric data per aircraft and system installation, all as specified in Technical Standard Order C197, “Information Collection and Monitoring Systems.” (A-13-013)

      To Air Methods Corporation:

    • Expand your policy on portable electronic devices to prohibit their nonoperational use during safety-critical ground activities, such as flight planning and preflight inspection, as well as in flight. (A-13-014)
    • Revise company procedures so that pilots are no longer solely responsible for nonroutine operational decisions but are required to consult with the Air Methods Operational Control Center for approval to accept or continue a mission when confronted with elevated risk situations, such as fuel-related issues and unplanned deviations. (A-13-015)
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