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- Air Safety | IATA | Speech
IATA Says Last year was the safest in aviation history
In a speech at the AVSEC World in New York, the director of IATA, International Air Transport Association, Tony Tyler, said “The industry’s 2012 record safety performance was the best in history. Each day approximately 100,000 flights arrive safely at their destination.3 billion passengers flew in 2012. There were six crashes and 75 accidents, with the lowest accident rate on record in the west.”
The rate is not the same all over the world, however.
In S. Africa, a plane is ten times more likely to crash than in Latin America.
The speech is located here: http://ht.ly/io0S4
DOT: Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, A340-300
[Federal Register: March 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 57)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 13148-13152]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26mr09-30]———————————————————————–
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 Series AirplanesAGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
———————————————————————–
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)[[Page 13149]]
originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and
correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as:One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
* * * The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result
in the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.* * * * *
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions
that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI.DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 27, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Airbus SAS–Airworthiness Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61
93 45 80, e-mail airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://
www.airbus.com. You may review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0264;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD” at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008 (referred to
after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.Relevant Service Information
Airbus has issued the service information described in the
following table. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A330-27A3154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 02……………. March 2, 2007.
3110.
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A340-27A4154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- 01……………. March 2, 2007.
4115.
————————————————————————[[Page 13150]]
FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect 16 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it
would take between 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed
AD on U.S. operators to be $1,280, or $80 per product.Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
“Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-
174-AD.Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by April 27, 2009.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 series airplanes; certificated in any category, except
those identified in paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airbus Model A330-301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, –
342, and -343 airplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs) up to
and including MSN 588, except those on which Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110 has been embodied in service.
(2) Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313
airplanes, MSNs up to and including MSN 598, except those on which
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115 has been embodied in service.Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight
controls.Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane.Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 8,500 total
flight cycles since first flight as of the effective date of this
AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (f)(1)(ii)
of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD:
Identify the part number of spoiler servo-controls installed on the
airplane at all positions in order to determine the number of
affected hydraulic circuits in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154,
Revision 01; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154,
Revision 01; both dated July 25, 2008, as applicable. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number[[Page 13151]]
identified in Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by
this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD, do all applicable actions
required by paragraph (f)(2), (f)(3), or (f)(4) of this AD.Table 1–Spoiler Servo-Control Part Numbers
————————————————————————
Position 1 Positions 2 through 6
————————————————————————
MZ4339390-01X……………………….. MZ4306000-01X.
MZ4339390-02X……………………….. MZ4306000-02X.
MZ4339390-10X……………………….. MZ4306000-10X.
————————————————————————(2) If three affected hydraulic circuits are identified during
the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(ii), and
(f)(2)(iii) of this AD, at the time specified.
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,400 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 3 months after accomplishing the
requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on the second
hydraulic circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(iii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(3) If two affected hydraulic circuits are identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the actions
required by paragraphs (f)(3)(i) and (f)(3)(ii) of this AD, at the
time specified:
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(4) If one affected hydraulic circuit is identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 18 months
after the effective date of this AD, modify the affected spoiler
servo-controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(5) For airplanes that have accumulated less than or equal to
8,500 total flight cycles since first flight as of the effective
date of this AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(5)(i) and
(f)(5)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 9 months after the effective date of this AD: Do the
actions specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number identified in
Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD: Within 18 months after the
effective date of this AD, modify all the affected spoiler servo-
controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(6) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install
any spoiler servo-control with a part number identified in Table 1
of this AD on any aircraft as a replacement part, unless the part
has been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(7) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service bulletins specified in Table 2 of this
AD are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of this AD.Table 2–Credit Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 01……………. March 26, 2004.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
4115.
————————————————————————FAA AD Differences
Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN:
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.Related Information
(h) Refer to European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness
Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008, and the service
bulletins specified in Table 3 of this AD, for related information.Table 3–Service Information
—————————————————————————————————————-
Revision
Service Bulletin level Date
—————————————————————————————————————-
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154. 01 July 25, 2008.[[Page 13152]]
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110……….. 02 March 2, 2007.
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154. 01 July 25, 2008.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115……….. 01 March 2, 2007.
—————————————————————————————————————-Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 18, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-6734 Filed 3-25-09; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Blacklisted by the EU: Air Madagascar
According to a unanimous decision by the European Commission’s Air Safety Committee, Air Madagascar is the latest Airline blacklisted by the EU. The decision was made during the 5 – 7 April meeting. In some areas, 98 per cent of ICAO safety standards were not met. All airlines from Mozambique have been added because of persistent, significant safety deficiencies in operation and supervision. Three carriers are banned: Blue Wing Airlines, Meridian Airways, and Silverback Cargo Freighters.Russia was warned to “ensure” compliance of their aircraft.
Mozambique Airlines twice weekly flights from Maputo to Lisbon which are operated under a “wet lease” agreement with a Portuguese company, EuroAtlantic Airways will continue. EuroAtlantic provides the Boeing 767-300, the crew and the maintenance.
The Mozambican Civil Aviation Institute implemented an inadequate plan for improvement; but Portugal will be assisting the country to overcome safety problems.
Maintenance or Magic?
George’s Point of View
The NTSB conducted a hearing investigating when American Flight 1400’s left engine caught fire during departure from Lambert-St. Louis International Airport. The Sept. 28, 2007 incident is blamed on aircraft maintenance, or more properly, the lack of aircraft maintenance.
Ten days before the incident
After the left engine would not start, six times the “start valve” was replaced. Now, after the fire, the issue is judged to be the fault of mechanics who failed to properly maintain a metal air filter that disintegrated. Filter loss led to a bent pin, which led to the valves being replaced, which caused the engine fire. So the kingdom falls for lack of a horse. Or a filter, in this case.Maintenance workers who don’t follow procedure can cause serious problems. In this case, the 143 passengers were unhurt.
Yes, this is a maintenance issue. However, aircraft mechanics are not magicians. Is the real question here actually one of maintenance, or is it an overly optimistic assessment of mechanical life? Is management thinking that replacement cost is so prohibitive that planes must literally be run until they fall apart? Is it possible that the mechanics in this place would have recommended to replace that engine rather than repair what may not have been repairable?
There is a real question here whether the maintenance crew is guilty of substandard work–or if they are simply at the bottom of the food chain, and destined to be the fall guys for someone at the top. In this tight economy, do airlines have irrational expectations of squeezing mileage out of exhausted equipment?
The original incident:
NTSB Identification: DCA07MA310
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of AMERICAN AIRLINES
Accident occurred Friday, September 28, 2007 in St. Louis, MO
Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), registration: N454AA
Injuries: 143 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.On September 28, 2007, at 1316 central daylight time, a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), N454AA, operated by American Airlines as flight 1400, executed an emergeny landing at Lambert-St Louis International Airport (STL), St. Louis, Missouri, after the flight crew received a left engine fire warning during departure climb from the airport. The airplane sustained substantial damage. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 121 scheduled domestic flight. After landing, the 2 flight crew, 3 flight attendants, and 138 passengers deplaned via airstairs and no occupant injuries were reported. The intended destination of the flight was Chicago O’Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois.
Upon receiving the left engine fire warning during climb, the flight crew discharged the aircraft engine fire bottles into the affected engine. During the visual return and single-engine approach to the airport, the nose landing gear did not extend. The flight crew then extended the nose landing gear using the emergency landing gear extension procedure. The airplane returned and then landed on runway 30L (11,019 feet by 200 feet, grooved concrete) and was met by STL Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting Vehicles
The NTSB identification number for this investigation was administratively changed from CHI07MA310 to DCA07MA310 on April 2, 2008.
src: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20071005X01522&key=1EU Banned List updated: Official Press Release

Commission updates the list of airlines banned from the European airspace
The European Commission has adopted the thirteenth update of the Community’s list of airlines banned in the European Union to include all air carriers of two additional countries: Sudan and the Philippines, on the basis of safety assessments by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). With this update, restrictions placed on Air Koryo from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and TAAG from Angola are partially lifted under certain conditions, while the operations of Iran Air will be restricted.Commission Vice-President Siim Kallas, responsible for Transport, said: “Safety comes first. We are ready to support countries that need to build up technical and administrative capacity to guarantee the necessary standards in civil aviation. But we cannot accept that airlines fly into the EU if they do not fully comply with international safety standards.”
With this update, the Air Koryo licensed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, subject to an operating ban since March 2006, is allowed to resume operations into the EU with two aircraft which are fitted with the necessary equipment to comply with mandatory international standards and following appropriate oversight by its authority. The rest of its fleet remains barred from operating into the EU.
The Commission recognises the improvements in the operations of TAAG Angola Airlines by allowing the air carrier to operate under certain strict conditions with specific aircraft to all destinations in the EU, not only to Lisbon.
The civil aviation authority of Angola is urged to intensify its oversight in relation to all carriers and continue the recertification of the other Angolan air carriers which remain banned from operating into the EU.
The Commission imposes an operating ban on all operations of Sudanese air carriers, due to a poor safety performance of the civil aviation authority of Sudan resulting from persistent non-compliance with international standards in the area of oversight.
The Commission acknowledges the recent efforts launched by the competent authorities to reform the civil aviation system in the Philippines and steps taken to address safety deficiencies reported by the FAA and ICAO and measures taken by two carriers – Philippines Airlines and Cebu Airlines – to ensure safety of operations. It is ready to support the Philippines to overcome serious safety deficiencies.
In view of the significant safety concerns identified by ICAO in relation to the authorities, the Commission with the unanimous support of the Air Safety Committee is forced to follow the principle of precaution and impose an operating ban on all air carriers licensed in the Philippines. The Commission is ready to support the Philippine authorities and conduct a visit to the country.
Following an examination of the safety of Iran Air’s operations into the EU through ramp checks of its aircraft in the Community, evidence of serious incidents and accidents suffered by the carrier and insufficient oversight from the authority over the past year, the Air Safety Committee concluded unanimously that the operations of Iran Air to the EU should be restricted. The carrier will only be allowed to use certain aircraft for flights to Europe. The Commission will visit Iran over the next months to verify the oversight of the Iranian civil aviation organisation and the safety situation of Iran Air.
The results of a recent visit by the European Aviation Safety Agency to Albania indicate that the competent authority needs to strengthen its capabilities to ensure the oversight of the air carriers it licences. The authorities have been urged by the Commission to take prompt action to address these issues. The Commission will closely monitor the situation.
The Commission follows closely the performance of Egyptian air carriers. A visit to Egypt to verify the oversight functions of the civil aviation authority and the performance of certain air carriers showed that this authority is carrying out its responsibilities correctly. The Commission will continue to cooperate closely with this authority to ensure that proposed improvements can be implemented.
Today, the Community’s list has three carriers whose operations are fully banned in the European Union – Ariana Afghan Airlines from Afghanistan, Siem reap Airways International from Cambodia and Silverback Cargo Freighters from Rwanda.
All carriers from 17 countries – 278 companies in total – are banned: Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, (with the exception of three carriers which operate under restrictions and conditions), Indonesia, Kazakhstan (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia. 10 air carriers are allowed to operate under restrictions and conditions – Air Koryo from the Democratic People Republic of Korea, TAAG Angola Airlines, Air Astana from Kazakhstan, Iran Air from Iran Gabon Airlines, Afrijet and SN2AG from Gabon, Air Bangladesh, Air Service Comores and Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines from Ukraine.
Aviation Oriented Jobs Projections
Food for Sequestration thoughts:
- Closing small airports.
- Cut FAA Funding.
- Cut 168 contractor-staffed air traffic control towers nationwide on April 1
- Cut 21 (more) towers by Sept. 30.
- Cut passenger and cargo capacity.
- Cut Up to 132,000 aviation jobs.
- Cut $80 billion a year from the nation’s gross domestic product
- Cut two billion pounds of freight capacity
Aviation Jobs are still in demand, but expect inevitable cuts especially with new hires.
American Airlines advertising vacancies for 1,500 flight attendants and got 22,000 applications. US Airways got about 20,000 applications for 420 vacancies. Delta announced an opening for some four hundred flight attendants. Over 50,000 people applied for the job. According to AVjobs, a flight attendant makes between $14.50 and $20.49 per hour. An A & P Mechanic makes between $16.47 and $30 per hour. A mechanical engineer makes between $45,000 and $90,000 per year. A member of the flight crew makes between $24,000.00 and $100,000 per year. *

United Airlines Extends SF International Maintenance Op Center Lease
United Airlines is now committed for ten years to the San Francisco Airport area. UA and the San Francisco Airport Commission signed a ten year extension on the airline’s existing Maintenance Operations Center at San Francisco International Airport. The 130-acre San Francisco Maintenance Operations Center employs about 3,500 maintenance workers. According to United’s senior VP of tech, “The lease extension on our San Francisco Maintenance Operations Center benefits our people, our customers and the Bay Area. United’s investment underscores our commitment to San Francisco, the Maintenance Operations Center and its role in supporting the industry’s premier trans-Pacific hub.”In George’s Point of View
I agree with Harrison Ford.Harrison Ford said “Accidents are going to happen.”
Accidents have been happening all along. Expect more of them.



