Editorial

  • Foreign Aviation Tragedies, Thoughts on Compensation

    Lives have value. It doesn’t matter if a man makes $10,000 a day, or 10 cents. If he dies in a plane crash, he’s irreplaceable. Maybe his boss can put a dollar figure on what it would cost him to lose that worker; maybe his banker can come up a specific value to subtract from the family’s credit rating.

    But to his wife
    to his son
    to his daughter
    to his parents
    to his friends
    to all those his life touched daily—
    he’s irreplaceable.

    His loss leaves a hole in a family that money can never fill.

    And then the attorneys for insurance companies will “try” to get by with compensation offers that are equal amounts for each passenger, that in some cases, equal to “peanuts” — I don’t see that too much, but ‘they’ try, especially if the laws in the country have established maximum low-values for the loss of life in aviation accidents. Even with Warsaw and Montreal the compensation I’ve seen is seldom governed by the caps provided for in these treaties.

    Instead, the compensation is based on the profile of the decedent. Age, Occupation, Family, etc. With this said, each seat on that plane is occupied by an individual and the family of the victim should be compensated accordingly, and in addition, the family should be paid non-pecuniary damages for pain and suffering, etc. In a perfect case, that’s how it works.

    Whether he makes $10,000 a day, or 10 cents will not affect a man’s pain and suffering. In fact, his pain may be worse, knowing his ten cents is all that lies between his family and ruin.

    PEANUTS is not acceptable.

  • What Would EASA Do?

    IF the European Aviation Safety Agency is going to uphold its own mission “to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation,” it must take strong action when it receives the French Accident Investigators results.

    There’s so much speculation out there regarding what this account will be, it just seems better to wait and see what it says before second-guessing it. You know the report is going to talk about 1. lightning and weather 2. pitot tubes. They may also talk about computer issues, composites and the stabilizer/tail fin/rudder also.

    The only thing I don’t understand is why Airbus 330’s have not already been grounded pending the results of the investigation. With several recorded incidents of Airbus 330’s suffering near-disastrous incidents and generating data similar to what was received from the AF447 flight, it makes more sense to ground these planes now before another accident occurs. Why are they letting people fly around in a plane that is an accident waiting to happen?

    Or are all of these paying passengers just guinea pigs for Airbus to test their craft on until they get it right?

  • A Whole New Meaning to Gold-Finger

    In the old days—the really old days— the castle was surrounded by a moat; and that moat was full of nasty noxious stuff that no one wanted to get on their skin. As a deterrent. Emptying into the moat was the contents of the garderobe. That is, the castle toilet. Yes, it too emptied into the moat, most of the time. Though usually with some kind of sewage system linking to it. A most unpleasant way to enter the castle.

    This was the first thing I thought of when I heard todays news of the Air Antilles theft. If you haven’t heard this story yet, well, it’s a doozy. Male passenger on the Air Antilles Avion de Transport Regional ATR 42 500 flight 3S-3672 is sick to his stomach, spends most of the trip in the bathroom. Comes out when they arrive, walks through the door, and out of the airport, free as a bird. Come to find out, he tunneled through the bathroom to get some cash out of the hold.

    Of course, if one actually tunneled out of a plane’s bathroom, they’d be heading earthbound really fast. He didn’t really tunnel (though tunneling into the sewage system is what I pictured when I read about this story.} He just dismantled his way to a storage area and pillaged 172000 Euros. And walked out with it.

    So all we have left are the questions: How did he get past customs? How did he get past the bathroom? How did he know about the money? Where did he disappear to?

  • | | | | | | | | | | |

    Family Charges Bombardier with Negligence

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s decision on the Colgan Air Flight 407 crash is that the pilot responded inappropriately to the stick shaker, which led to an aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover. The stick shaker only comes into play when the plane is already slow enough to stall. The plane fell 800 feet before crashing pointing northeast, away from the airport

    The family of Ellyce Kausner has filed a lawsuit against Bombardier. Bombardier is the manufacturer of the plane involved in the crash. The suit charges that Bombardier was “negligent and careless” in the design of the plane by not providing more efficient internal mechanical warning systems.

    Kausner was a 24 year old Jacksonville law student traveling to NY to visit family.

    At least 19 other families have filed suits.

    At the time of the crash, the automated “stick-pusher,” pushes the control column down in order to send the aircraft into a temporary dive so it can regain speed and recover from a stall but Capt. Renslow yanked back on the controls while adding thrust, manually overriding the stick-pusher.

    Colgan Air, Clarence Center, NY, Accident Dockets

    George’s Point of View

    Time for Bombardier to step up to the plate. Although this has little to do with the pilot, who had flunked numerous flight tests during his career and was never adequately taught how to respond to the emergency that led to the airplane’s fatal descent. Maybe Ellyce would still be here if the warning systems on the Bombardier were simply better.

    When the plane slowed down to a dangerous level, it set off the stall-prevention system, and the pilot performed the opposite of the proper procedure. So there were hiring and training issues involved too. And Captain Renslow had about 109 hours of experience, hardly enough to be pilot.

    Even if procedures seem counter-intuitive, shouldn’t the pilot be aware of them?

    Barring the inefficiency of an ill-prepared pilot, shouldn’t Bombardier have some kind of way to limit ineffective pilot responses?

    When the hiring and training fails, and when the pilot fails, shouldn’t there be some kind of fail-safe within the plane? Even a copy of the Complete Idiot’s Guide to Not Crashing your Bombardier for pilots who flunked their last check write 16 months before and who apparently didn’t read the real manual?

  • | | |

    Ethiopia Flight 409: The Questions Keep Coming


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Alastair T. Gardiner

    Newspaper reports talk about traces of black soot on the Auxiliary Power Unit. The APU is like your computer backup—similar in theory to the battery backup you may have at home hooked to your computer.

    The APU is an auxiliary engine that provided electric power and air to the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 until the main engines began to run.

    We ourselves haven’t seen soot, or proof of fire–but we haven’t seen much proof at all, since the report that we keep hearing whispers of has not been made public.

    Some facts are known We know, for example, that…

    —…the APU is located in the rudder section.

    —…the weather was bad.
    OLBA 250300Z 06004KT 030V090 5000 VCTS RA FEW020CB BKN026 10/06 Q1014 NOSIG

    We have heard rumors which may or may not be unfounded:
    —Statements made anonymously by Lebanese airport sources report that Captain Habtamu Benti, the pilot in command (PIC) of the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800 encountered engine problems, perhaps a flame out, during takeoff, and requested permission to abort the flight and return to Beirut. He was given clearance to do so, but another aircraft, a Etihad Airlines flight from Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates was in the process of landing and could have interfered with his emergency maneuvers. *

    But some information has been made public.

    —The rudder found at the plane’s tail was reported to have been sent to France. *

    —“One of the five cockpit voice recorders which has a damaged segment will be sent from France’s BEA to a Seattle-based company [Honeywell] to recover that lost segment.” *

    So we have even more questions. Where, for example, are the statements of the witnesses? What has France said about the rudder? Has the APU been found, and if so, what is its condition?

    Even if ATC sent pilot in to a storm, the pilot also has radar and should have seen the storm and refused the order to take off and/or the heading issued to him. Did his radar fail? Did the APU fail? It might well be that the pilot was misled by a radar system in the plane that was not operating correctly. Unlikely, but, possible. There are still a lot of possibilities we can not rule out. The captain had too many hours logged to take off in to a storm with a plane that he knew was not built to withstand the forces of a cell ahead of him.

    Even if there is no immediate report available yet, we look forward to the promised release in March/July. (They say that data collection will continue until March 15 2011, in April the data will be verified/validated by Ethiopian and Lebanese authorities, officials of Boeing and the US National Transport Safety Board by May 30th, with a tentative public release date in July.) When more official information is released, it will help to rule out all gross speculation, so we can focus on possible culpable parties in the chain of events that caused this tragedy.

    We shall see.


    What: Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 en route from Beirut to Addis Ababa
    Where: 2 miles west of the coastal village of Na’ameh.
    When: Jan 25 2010
    Who: 7 crew 83 passengers
    Why: Shortly after taking off in stormy weather and heavy lightning, Lebanese ATC lost contact. The plane disappeared from radar 45 minutes after leaving Beirut. Witnesses on the coast saw the plane as it crashed into the sea. So far 9 bodies have been found by members of the Lebanese army .
    Update
    Initial reports of 7 survivors, became 9 bodies, and now the count has reached 21 bodies.

    The site of the crash is 2 miles west of the coastal village of Na’ameh.

    Fifty-four passengers were Lebanese, 22 Ethiopian, two were British and there were also Canadian, Russian, French, Iraqi and Syrian nationals.

    A Cypriot police helicopter has joined the Lebanese army in the search for survivors, and two U.N. helicopters are on the scene.

    Ethiopian Airlines is state owned, and has a standing order of 10 of Boeing’s Next-Generation 737-800s
    —

    ET-409 Incident – 25 January, 2010

    Ethiopian flight ET-409 was scheduled to operate from Beirut to Addis Ababa on January 25th lost contact with the Lebanese air controllers shortly after take off. The flight departed at 02:35 Lebanese time from Beirut International Airport.

    Flight ET-409 carried 82 passenger plus 8 Ethiopian Crew members. Out of the total passengers 23 were Ethiopian, 51 Lebanese, 1 Turkish, 1 French, 2 British, 1 Russian, 1 Canadian, 1 Syrian, 1 Iraqi nationals.


    Strobe flashes

  • Advice from Good “Friends”

    So I’m drinking my coffee this morning in London, and look what Bloomberg’s headline says that Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy said…

    Boeing 747-8 Needs Passenger Evacuation Tests, Airbus Says
    http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-16/boeing-747-8-should-run-passenger-evacuation-tests-airbus-says.html

    So it is news that Boeing should do more tests on the basis of a rival’s comment that “I intend to fly in that airplane one of these days and I’d like to know you can get out of it.” Well. I guess it is news. Who knew. If I were Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy, I wouldn’t want to fly Airbus either, but I don’t know that I’d tell a newspaper reporter that.

    Certainly Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy’s advice in the article is kindly meant. Surely Airbus Chief Operating Officer John Leahy would not be wishing problems on a rival company, especially looking back on Airbus’s own evacuation problems: “They evacuated 873 people from its A380 in 80 seconds, 10 seconds faster than its goal. One person broke a leg in the exercise, which was carried out in a dark hangar at an Airbus factory in Hamburg.”

    Let’s get real.

    As if Airbus doesn’t have a vested interest in causing Boeing further delay.

  • |

    Define Irrational

    Dear George,

    Irrational could be changing, now, what was had claimed before.

    Like the NTSB saying in the 1989 NTSB Sioux City Final Report, the ‘probable cause’ to their references in their earlier National Airlines Final Report. That National Report found no probable cause but suggested ‘not understood vibrations’. That Report also drew in three earlier fan explosions as references and citing these as so similar, they were used for “comparison purposes”. That Report also expressly ruled out engine over speed as “pure conjecture”.

    But now, in the Sioux City Report, and where the probable cause was a metallurgical defect, the NTSB listed just the National accident, and relabeled the National’s probable cause to be “engine over speed”. Daring not to also re-label those three other references, they now were simply left out. Presto ! – by doing so, the NTSB could now present the Sioux City accident as a ‘once-off’ (only happened once) when – in fact – it was 5th fan disk uncontained explosion (National, and the three others there having ‘no probable cause’ were now not relevant, separated and with no connection to Sioux City).#Irrational could be claiming as factual what scientific testing had ruled out.

    In the NTSB’s ValuJet 592 Report, the NTSB claims “one or more” of the oxygen canisters carried in the cargo hold self-ignited and flooded the compartment with oxygen and thus started, and made that fire possible. They didn’t test their theories of self-ignition and the quantities of oxygen released, they had the FAA Technical Center do it. Contrary to all of this, the Tech Center tests said that, even if self-ignited, the canisters heat was only 400 degrees (525 degrees is needed to ignite the packing materials said to have ignited) and that the actual oxygen released is ‘insignificant’ (“local hot spot”). Lest they discredit the NTSB theory, neither of these FAA findings found their way into the NTSB’s Report. The Report also ignored another letter buried in the Docket, a oxygen manufacture’s statement that such self-ignition was unheard of, and “highly unlikely”, and thus the NTSB’s probable cause holds. Lost too was that four months after the loss of ValuJet, the aircraft manufacturer (Douglas) issued a warning to remove the fuselage insulation blankets (keeps the cabin areas warm) because of two earlier Douglas product (MD-88, MD-11) fires and that because of this, the Douglas method for fire testing was now deemed invalid. Four years later the FAA issued an airworthiness directive (AD) saying to check for burning below the cargo area (electric heaters for the static pressure sensors) and then issued yet another saying what Douglas said four year earlier – to remove the (acoustic) insulation blankets because of in-service fires and that the earlier flammability tests were invalid. Simply, ValuJet flight 592 was the precursor and warning to the coming loss of Swissair flight 111 in 1998 but the NTSB’s probable cause with ValuJet served to obscure, or hide, the long-known problems of insulation blankets that failed the flammability tests. Whose tests were these ? – Douglas and Boeing’s – the FAA had taken the manufactures’ word for it all. Now, and years after these two horrific losses, the FAA has just created it’s own flammability standards – ones that none of these two most used insulation blankets could pass. Oh yes ! – the FAA is giving the industry to 2016 to get these flammable materials out because, as they said, ‘of cost considerations to the industry’.

    Irrational could be claiming a scenario as unique when dozens of other reports exist.

    In the NTSB’s Report on the loss of American Airlines flight 587, the NTSB blamed the American Airline’s pilots aggressive use of the rudder pedals in American’s A-300 model aircraft. But the Report doesn’t address 20 other rudder incidents (largely from the SDR database) where the pedals and rudder where reported to be moving on their own (uncommanded rudder). A few reports called the movements ‘sudden’, and another “violent”. The words “violent” seen in the SDR and also in a Aviation Safety Report filed by pilots was missing in the NTSB in their Accident/Incident database report. “Sudden ” and ‘Violent’ described the scene as the American pilots fought with the aircraft for seconds and then losing all control. Worst yet, 3/4th of these other 20 reports weren’t on American Airline or on the A-300s but rather four other carriers including United, Fed Ex, America West, Air Canada and on different models, A-319s and A-320s.

    Irrationally yours,

    ANON

  • |

    Fatigue for one-Fatigue for all

    George’s Point of View

    Remember that old Herodotus misquote inscribed on the James A Farley Post Office Building: “Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.“?

    The iconic postman is viewed as being the superman of civil servants, intrepid deliverers, come what may. (For those of you born after 1997, the mythos of the intrepid postal carrier predates the movie. Bless Kevin Costner’s heart)

    That iconoclastic perspective will stand unchallenged by pilots if the FAA goes ahead in its move to impose stringent regulations limiting pilot flight time. The bill includes some $8 billion for airport construction and pilot scheduling limitations designed to lessen the incidence of accidents related to pilot fatigue.

    However the effectiveness of this bill may be challenged by an amendment exempting some pilots (those flying for nonscheduled carriers and charter flights carrying commercial cargo) from the amendments intended “fatigue protection.”

    Are cargo pilots and charter pilots built of sterner stuff? Are they eating their Wheaties and consuming super-charged vitamins? Are they really supermen who are not affected by the debilitating fatigue of lesser men? Is the biology of this select group of pilots different from all other pilots so that they are immune?

    What do you think?

    Maybe, just maybe, this new amendment is designed to sacrifice safety concerns in favor of profit.

    No kidding.

    There is no place for exemptions in this bill.

    However, that said, one hopes common sense will be applied in military situations. Say, for example, it is wartime. Can you see some 2011 era John Wayne pilot watching the second hand on his stopwatch and scrubbing a mission based on a peacetime standard? Is some squad somewhere going to have to stop in mid-mission due to a peacetime regulation? How doubly stupid would it be to give any faction opposing us the foreknowledge of such controlling factors. It’s the 2011 equivalent of the British sending their troops out in formation, to be picked off by guerilla fighting Americans. Are we the stupid ones with targets on our chests now?

    Let pilots flying commercial aviation have their reasonable hours, and leave the heroism and exemptions up to the military.

    And to mailmen too, of course—long may they be by snow, rain, heat and gloom of night, “unstayed.”

  • Caps

    Airlines are well protected by international treaties with a cap of about $150k U.S. Dollars for the death of a human being.

    Airlines tend to skip over the part where they should be helping passengers deal with trauma, and go straight for the bottom line: rebooking. I don’t expect that passengers will be compensated for a near death or frightening experience any time soon. But airlines don’t want the bad press from a noisy disgruntled passenger. If you complain loud enough, you may get some miles. After a night time emergency landing in Brazil, I complained pretty loud and received a $300 certificate.

  • | |

    Air France Moving Forward: Obfuscating the Issue and Consumer Politics

    George’s Point of View

    While we are waiting for news of where Air France Flight 447 disappeared to, somewhere in the ocean (and no one can really say with any great specificity anything more specific than somewhere between Rio de Janeiro and Paris France because everywhere they apparently believe it was, they looked, and it wasn’t) Air France is coming out with a report.

    An Air France assessment initiated by Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta in 2009 and performed by an international panel of eight aviation experts dubbed the Independent Safety Review Team is due to be released Jan 24, 2011.

    Its inception was timed, not too surprisingly, six months after the fatal crash, and although officially having nothing to do with the fatal event, its timing alone suggests an optimistic attempt on the part of Air France’s media team to counterbalance the lack of consumer confidence in the airline after they lost a whole plane and 228 lives.

    The report will cover training, technical and flight-safety issues, though the not-too-hidden agenda may be to reflect changes made since the crash of Air France Flight 447, (whose wreckage we all know has still not been located.) The report is a beginning of the “New Transparancy” proposed by Air France. There are people who would like to see that transparency extend to some old news, such as what is going on with the search for the wreckage of the worst accident in French aviation history.

    The last (02:10) ACARS transmission from Flight 477 contained a set of coordinates indicating the location as 2°59?N 30°35?W officially the last known position, (when the twelve warning messages with the same time code indicated autopilot and auto-thrust system had disengaged, TCAS was in fault mode, and flight mode changed from ‘normal law’ to ‘alternate law’) but one wonders if the instrumentation was already in disagreement at that point, i.e. if that location data could be as faulty as the frozen pitot tubes.

    So the report will be out today. The Assessment of Air France training, technical and flight-safety issues is bound to be a big event, but as the media and airline waves these initiatives in the public face, there are a lot of people still staring out to sea, looking for that lost wreckage, who won’t be distracted by any (see-here-look-at-this-news-see-how-much-we-are-improving) sleight of hand.

  • |

    Severe Weather Disrupting Travel

    George’s Point of View

    The weather in Los Angeles may be a gray, drizzly 56 degrees today, but much of Europe is suffering travel-suspending ice and snow. Snow on the forecast, snowplows on the runways, chains on the cars and weather delays on the calendar. And who is embroiled in all of this? Pilgrims and passengers, wayfarers, tourists and businessmen, travelers all.

    And these brave folk out going where many have gone before are complaining about “unnecessary” delays in their travel plans. They are getting all wound up.

    Listen, when you fly in winter, delays are going to happen. Need I say it is better to be safe than sorry? Believe me, I know. And my feet have been in your cold, wet, uncomfortable, transient shoes all too many times. But waiting is better than crashing.

    I understand firsthand the griping of the thousands of travelers stranded overnight in hundreds of airports all over the world. Truly, I feel your pain. But it reminds me of butter. No, it reminds me of chiffon. (Forgettable margarine. Memorable cosmos.)

    Remember that 1970’s commercial….

    If you’re going to try to fly when there’s five inches of snow on the runway at Heathrow, delays are going to happen. You’re going to get a message like “Due to the continuing bad weather, further flight delays and cancellations are likely over the coming days and beyond. We are operating a reduced schedule until 06:00 on Wednesday, 22 December.”

    If you’re going to take off from Charles de Gaulle Airport in December, delays will happen. Look at Rouen in the snow. (Livecam) Airports are chaotic enough around the holidays but when you throw this kind of weather in the mix, you’re relying on the airport who is relying on every contractor they can get their hands on to get runways clear in an uphill battle; and you’re relying on planes that don’t function at their best in freezing conditions; and you’re relying on an industry that is hamstrung by untenable weather.

    This weather will pass. Enjoy the scenery. Fly safe. I hope that there will be one less aviation-related accident for me to hear about.

    So where ever you are this holiday season, take your cup of cocoa with marshmallows, or coffee, or whatever is your cuppa tea, and cozy up somewhere warm. You can’t fool (with) Mother Nature. It’s going to be a long winter.

  • |

    Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire. Where There’s Fire, Will There Be Passengers?

    George’s Point of View

    The biggest consequence in this Trent 900 engine brouhaha may be the Rolls Royce reputation.

    While the company’s engineering skills have not suddenly degraded overnight, confidence in Rolls Royce certainly has. If, as the Australian Transport Safety Bureau says, the internal fire in the notorious (Qantas owned) Trent 900 engine is the result of an internal engine oil leak at 1,000°C at high pressure, the endangerment of 440 passengers and 26 crew may have been preventible, given that there seems to have been fore-knowlege (by Rolls Royce) of a 1st generation manufacturing defect in a pipe coupling. As the 3rd generation versions of the engine no longer sport the same problem, the issue was recognized prior to the explosion, and dealt with.

    The failure to communicate a potential problem to Qantas before the engine fire, and for that matter, to owners of all affected 1st and 2nd generation products (Singapore Airlines and Lufthansa), goes beyond a communications failure and inches toward negligence. And the practical concern now is that irregardless of whether the specific factor was a manufacturing defect or fatigue, how swift and responsible will Rolls Royce be in corrective action, aggressive inspection schedules and reconfiguring a maintenance paradigm that gets A380s back on track?

    Time will tell. Also, only time will tell if this engine explosion will be contained within the auspices of Rolls Royce; Qantas, Singapore Airlines and Lufthansa. In fact, Rolls Royce is not alone in its sub-culture of secrecy and non-reportage and disclosure. Will the teetering public confidence in aviation safety will be irrevocably compromised in the days to come?

  • |

    Wrongheaded Industry Reassessing Vulnerable Pitot Tubes vs Ice Procedures instead of Brainstorming Next Generation

    Pitot tubes use external air temperature and pressure to calculate changes in speed. Ice crystals that get caught in pitot tubes are considered a contributing factor in a dozen significant events, and the crash of Air France flight 447. As a result of ice crystal accumulation, air temp and pressure readings are false, autopilots shut off, pilots lose altitude readings and receive false warnings. In a fly by wire plane, this is disastrous. In Air France Flight 447, it killed everyone aboard the plane.

    Today’s news is full of aviation-safety experts looking for changes in procedures and more-precise checklists. There’s a lot of buzz out there about a new study. I hope that the study, as it has been explained, is not just about adapting to broken technology. I hope this is not the only study out there.

    Air France and Boeing are now examining how these ice crystals function (or more correctly, malfunction.) That seems wise.

    But one questions why the next step of the anti-icing drive will be to get consensus on how pilots should respond to pitot tube failure.

    George’s Point of View

    This is like figuring out the best way to drive on a flat tire, instead of making a tire that doesn’t go flat. Sure, pilots should have procedures, but shouldn’t a study be designed with the ultimate goal being to give the pilots a dependable speed sensor, not methods how to mitigate an oncoming disaster? Are designers afraid to trade a known quantity, even though it is flawed, for something unaffected by ice crystals? Even if it is cheaper for airlines to figure out how to muddle on with existing systems than to devise an alternative technology to pitot tubes, shouldn’t the focus of studies be on creating technology that is not disabled by ice crystals?

    Not being an engineer myself, I have no ideas on the subject—but somewhere there’s an aviation engineer with a brilliant idea of either a safe design of reconfigured pitot tubes or a completely different system. Let us hope that engineer is able to step up, and be recognized. But it may not be so simple. Apparently Airbus and Air France had been aware of chronic pitot tube problems for years and were content to continue using the same design anyway.

    Come on engineers. It’s time for a better mousetrap.

  • A Conceit of Accountability

    George’s Point of View

    Let me present you with a theoretical construct. Let me present you with a horse, and his rider. Let me introduce the horse, who at the beginning of this construct, is already dead. The horse in our fabrication, sadly, has already been ridden to death. And having fallen, the horse is reviled. His good reputation is being fouled, and he is no longer able to defend himself.

    And here is the question I mean to ask you:

    When you ride a horse to death, whose fault is it? Is it the fault of the horse, who has no choice but to do what he does? Is it the fault of the rider who drives the horse on? Any reasonable person would blame the rider, and rightly so. It is the rider who wields the crop, that drives the horse on when it would rest. The horse is just being a horse. Perhaps we might wonder why: why is the rider such a taskmaster? Is there some great cause involved? Is there some life or lives at stake? Is there a just cause that forces the rider to set such grueling standards?

    But I am getting ahead of myself. Putting the cart before the horse, if you’ll pardon the pun.

    Let me explain something unique about our horse. Our horse is not an ordinary horse; he is in a unique situation. He had a certain degree of choice. He had other options. He could, perhaps, have chosen to be a cow, or a rabbit. But his essential nature, his learning, his history, his hopes and dreams–they were the learning, history, hopes and dreams of a horse–a whole life lived to one pursuit of being a horse. This horse is a horse, I should say WAS a horse, because he wanted to be. So when he was asked to perform as a horse, he did. Even though the demands that were put on him were exhausting. Even though the scheduling was unreasonable. He was a horse working longer hours, with less rest than he needed, and he paid the price.

    So let us turn back to the rider. Why did the rider push so hard? Why is it the horse’s fault for falling to exhaustion, and not the rider’s fault, for driving him to it?

    In fact, look at the rider now—he’s back on another horse, riding this one just as hard. In fact, riding many horses, all driven to the same point of exhaustion. And there will be more horses falling, failing. It is inevitable.

    So, why is this rider pushing so hard?

    It always comes down to money. For the rider, having fewer horses is more cost effective. For the rider, horses are cheap. If one drops, who cares? There are many more where he came from. Why should the rider cater to the demands of the horse–so what if the horse would like shorter hours, better pay? If he wants to be a horse, he has to work like a horse, period.

    In fact, the rider could sponsor many more pilots, I mean, horses, divide the work load so that the ratio of work to worker was a reasonable load. But that option is not in the picture.

    I am guessing that you have figured out that I am not speaking about horses at all. I am speaking of fallen pilots. In fact, one pilot in particular, Zlatko Glusica, the Air India pilot who was in the cockpit of the Air India Express flight that crashed and killed 158 passengers. Reputations—his and that of his copilot—are being tarred, feathered and dragged through the mud. But the pilots were not alone in that fatal cockpit. There was a third seat, occupied by fatigue, and that third seat was put there by Air India policy.

  • | | | | | | |

    Engine Failure; Delta Boeing Diverts to Ireland


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Paul Markman

    What: Delta Airlines Boeing 757-200 Philadelphia to Paris
    Where: Shannon Ireland
    When: November 20, 2010, 6:30 am
    Who: 152 passengers 7 crew
    Why: While over the Atlantic, the right engine developed problems. Pilots shut it down, and diverted to Shannon where they made a safe landing. Passengers were provided an alternative flight.

    George’s Point of View

    I usually try just to get the facts. But when people read these alerts, it is not just the plane. Like on this flight. Can you imagine being aboard this flight, over the Atlantic—as on the infamous Air France Flight 447—and losing an engine? Can you picture your feelings at the moment you realize the failure, and every moment thereafter, until you were safely on the ground? Even with a capable functioning plane, and competent crew. Even with the knowledge that the plane could afford to shut down an engine. Having to sit politely in your row, and believing on some level, that you were placidly waiting to die while strapped in like a trapped like a Chilean Miner in a snow globe hurtling through space toward who knows what fate? Even if I do not write it, behind these lines, there is always a human element.

  • |

    Regarding Boeings New Generation Take on Old (Persistent?) Problems. Maybe. Maybe not.

    George’s Point of View

    The 787: Dreamliner test flight suffered from extensive smoke, fire and structural damage originating in the P100′ electrical panel, a key component that distributes power from the left generator to power vital systems

    The 777: United electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire. This was initially reported as smoke. Thus no reason for the FAA to go there. And the full narrative said only “electrical fire” but did not elucidate beyond “electrical fire” to explain the electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire.

    The AAIB conclusions 4,5, and 6, were:

    • “The RGCB and Right Bus Tie Breaker (RBTB) suffered from severe internal arcing and short circuits which generated temperatures in excess of 1,000°C, and resulted in uncontained failures. The RGCB was probably the first to fail.”
    • “ Molten copper and silver droplets from the failed contactors dropped down through the open base of the P200 panel and ignited the insulation blankets below.”
    • “The insulation blanket fire spread underneath a floor panel to the opposite P205 power panel, causing heat and fire damage to structure, cooling ducts and wiring.”

    The three requirements for a fire: oxygen, ignition source and fuel.

    From 2000 to 2008, over 22 ADs are directed at insulation blankets that burn. Before that, from 1988 to 2010, 8 FAA Tech Center reports and 2 FAA Safety Conference Papers are directed at electrical induced fires or the insulation blankets that give fuel to the fire.

    When was the latest AD ?
    2008-23-09. REMOVE PET (AN-26). Boeing Model 727-200s, 737-200s, 737-300s, and 737-400, 747s, 757s, 767s Series Airplanes.from the fuselage. Such insulation blankets could ignite and propagate a fire that is the result of electrical arcing or sparking.
    DATES; Issued Oct 24, 2008 -effective Dec 15, 2008 – Comply by     2014. If you read the AD, you can note that the compliance date is actually set beyond the affected planes anticipated passenger service-life. Compliance is put off until the planes will likely be converted from passenger to cargo.

    2002 FAA ASTRAC Conference Conclusions

    • In-flight Fires In Hidden Areas are a risk to aviation safety.
    • Most hidden fires are caused by electrical problems.
    • Non-compliance with Safety Regulations have been uncovered.
    • Fire Safety Problems and Improvements are in various stages of correction and study.
    • It is impossible to predict the relative risk of serious fires occurring in Hidden Areas or Locations.

    Without being too critical or belaboring the obvious, I do have to say that the 2002 conclusions are overly obvious and simplistic. These same points will probably be as true in 2002 and 2011 as in 3011. Point by point? Consider this:

    • In-flight fires are a risk to safety, whether they’re hidden or not. Certainly if one doesn’t know where they are, they have more time to be destructive before they are found. And as for being predictable-there probably is a random statistical probability that can come pretty close; but translating theory back to real life situations perfectly only happens on tv.
    • Electrical problems are certainly a broad umbrella-one might even say the current problems with rogue batteries to be a form of electrical problem.
    • Non compliance regarding safety is hardly an issue when a plane is in the testing phase; in fact, that is when the manufacturer is are troubleshooting to get rid of potential safety issues. The 777 electrical panel issue may or may not have a common cause; and if it does have a common cause, then, isn’t that splendid for Boeing? The detective job (i.e. finding the cause) is half of the problem already solved. What luck! But in real life, are the causes that easy to find? And in practice, how many times are non-compliance with Safety Regulations due to poor operator maintenance versus to unsafe parts?
    • Fire Safety Improvements are an ongoing process. It’s the nature of the beast.

    So here is the problem as it should possibly be stated:

    -We need compliance now because people are on these planes now, not at some random future date. Pushing back solutions puts more people are at risk. We need feasible compliance that doesn’t put good companies out of business but still maintains the highest possible safety standards NOT the lowest possible cost. Putting off compliance over a combustible insulation blanket until 2014? Really? How is this safe?

    -The lowest common denominator should not be lowest possible cost-to-the- industry. It should be the highest possible safety for the passenger. These things are not always mutually exclusive.

    -If the root problem is less than ideal materials used across many manufacturer and model applications, then quit pussyfooting around.
    If the boy is going to cry wolf, let it be for a real wolf. If the wolf is real, then act. If inadequate materials, composites, etc are the problem, then don’t point the finger and do nothing. Questionable materials have no place in an industry that lives under guidelines advocating and promoting safety over all.

    Like Yoda said, “Do or do not. There is no try.”

    Raise the standards.

  • | |

    Qantas A380 Engine Disintegration Far More Serious

    Rolls said in a statement that the failure was confined to a specific component in the turbine area of the engine. This caused an oil fire. The British company added that it would replace the faulty part. Safety continues to be Rolls-Royce’s highest priority. See their statement

    Qantas is grounding its Airbus A380 superjumbos until further notice, and Singapore Airlines is grounding 3 of its A380s. EASA is calling for inspections. See the directive.

    What Happened
    The cause of the Rolls Royce engine failure has been pinned down to a faulty bearing box, the underlying cause of the oil leak. The bearings allow the drive shaft to move. The leaking bearing box dripped oil into the QANTAS A380 whose engine exploded (uncontained) into the wing, and dropping its turbine onto a house in Batam. The wing damage included electrical cables and hydraulic lines inside the wing, so that pilots were dealing with hydraulic damage (inability to close the landing gear doors), and electrical damage (trouble shutting down the engine beside the damaged one.)

    The Qantas meltdown is one of at least five documented A380 engine malfunctions.

    • Qantas A388 near Singapore on Nov 4th 2010
    • Lufthansa A388 near Frankfurt on Aug 6th 2010, engine shut down in flight
    • Emirates A388 near Zurich on Jul 13th 2010, engine shut down in flight
    • Singapore A388 near Krakow on Sep 27th 2009, engine shut down in flight
    • Singapore A388 near London on May 25th 2009, engine failure

    Newer Trent 900 engines have a different bearing box. Although the new box promises to eliminate the problem, newer models also have system software to shut down the engine before the leak causes a meltdown similar to the QANTAS A380 event over Singapore.

    George’s Point of View

    Although one might say that regulators did not adequately check the engine before approving it for commercial use, I think of Boeing’s response to its recent 787 test flight, and I point out that no one made Boeing step back and pull the 787 back on to the drawing board for more tests and adjustments. Boeing did that, because such remediation is what testing is all about. It is part and parcel of the paradigm of safety in design. It is up to each manufacturer that every item off of their assembly lines be as well designed and as safe as humanly possible. This includes fixing design flaws as soon as they are known. So I wonder, if newer Trent 900 engines have an improved bearing box, this of course begs the question why the older ones were not replaced.

  • | | | |

    Deflated Freight Flight Shuts Down Runway


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Marcelo Magalhaes

    What: Varig Logistica Boeing 757-200 freighter en route from Manaus to Sao Paulo
    Where: Manaus
    When: Nov 10th 2010
    Who: 2 crew
    Why: While lining up for departure, a freighter loaded with 30 tons of goods to Sao Paulo got stuck on the runway when two main gear tires deflated. Rain and the beached plane effectively disabled most of the runway for several hours.

    George’s Point of View

    Maintenance, Maintenance, Maintenance
    I find the timing of this incident extremely ironic, when noticing that today we have also received and published a press release highlighting how the “Goodyear Expert Cites Tips for Proper Aircraft Tire Maintenance,” a press release showcasing a Goodyear Tires Product Support Manager’s Tire maintenance manual. It even has photo sections for aviation “tire whisperers” who want to recognize what happened to a tire by the visible damage.

    You would think that we would know tires get flat by now, if only from our experience of all the cars on the road.

  • | | | | |

    Maintenance, Smoke Grounds UA Flight to Shanghai

    What: United Airlines Boeing 777 en route from Chicago to Shanghai
    Where: Winnipeg
    When: Oct 25, 2010 1:40 pm
    Who: 194 passengers
    Why: While en route, the plane developed smoke in the cabin. The nearest place to land a 777 (requiring a long runway) was Winnipeg, so the pilot diverted to Winnipeg and made a safe landing with emergency crews on standby on the tarmac. Monday afternoon, a UA crew was assessing the plane; but a replacement plan is scheduled to arrive Tuesday to take the passengers to Shanghai.

    George’s Point of View

    Sometimes it seems as if it takes an emergency for a plane to get maintenance.

    Airliners never stop; they land, unload passengers, cleanup, fuel up, load more passengers and they are off again.

    When do planes get maintenance? After they see smoke?

    It’s not just United.

    Look at our posts: Engine failures, engine fires, cracked windshields, no oil pressure, low air pressure, breaking landing gear, non-working nose gear, shredding tires, smokey cabins…

    When do they stop a plane long enough for it to truly get a little TLC?

    I knew a former navy mechanic who said he would never fly on a commercial plane. Before AND After every flight, the crew checks every plane from nose to tail, ensuring everything is in perfect working order. It seems like a commercial plane only gets a good once over once it’s too late.

    We don’t do that with our cars. You know once the car’s warning light comes on, it’s already too late, and damage has already happened. So we get timely oil changes, and basic care because every dollar spent on maintenance is a hundred dollars not spent on repair.

    Sure, flight 835 plane is getting a once over now, but for that to happen, a plane full of passengers had to be put at risk.

  • | | | | |

    Update: CRJ Gear Foulup at JFK, Atlanta, Philadelphia, O’Hare, et al.

    What: Atlantic Southeast/Delta Airlines Canadair CRJ-900 en route from Atlanta to White Plains, New York
    Where: New York
    When: Sept 25 2010 8:20 pm
    Who: 60 passengers 4 crew

    The fifth + landing gear failure in the US in five years has launched an engineering investigation of Bombardier’s CRJ landing gear. The objective of the investigation is to determine if there is a connection between all of the gear failures.

    • SkyWest CRJ200, operating under a code-share with AirTran as Flight 3074 from Omaha, Neb., made an emergency landing with one gear retracted at Milwaukee General Mitchell International Airport (Sept 28 2010)
    • Atlantic Southeast Airlines Bombardier CRJ900 at JFK landing gear up (September 25 2010)
    • SkyWest Airlines Flight 6467 CRJ200 couldn’t extend its nose landing gear on approach to Ontario (Calif.) International Airport. (May 23 2010)
    • Atlantic Southeast jet–a 50-seat CRJ200–couldn’t fully extend its left main landing gear, but again, managed to land safely at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport. (June 11 2009)
    • Air Wisconsin CRJ200 on a flight from Norfolk, Virginia landed at Philadelphia International Airport with its left main gear retracted. (Dec 14 2008) The prelim. NTSB indicates that mechanics attached the upper attachment bolt for the left main landing gear uplock assembly to the airplane structure only, rather than both the structure and the uplock mechanism as called for in the design
    • CRJ700 operated by Mesa Airlines received an unsafe gear indication for the left main gear as it approached for landing in South Bend, Ind. The crew declared an emergency and returned to land with the left main gear still retracted on Runway 28 at O’Hare. (Dec 15 2008) The investigation found that improper positioning of the inboard main landing gear door during rigging caused premature wear of parts that eventually restricted the movement of the door during its extension.
    • South Africa Express CRJ200 gear up landing on flight from Cape Town to Windhoek, Namibia( April 17 2010).

    Saturday the landing gear of a CRJ failed, resulting in a dramatic landing at JFK. The dragging wing created a “shower of sparks” during the landing.

    George’s Point of View

    How many times is enough?

  • | |

    NTSB: No Rush to Judge

    George’s Point of View

    As urgent as the idea of an NTSB recommendation sounds, there is apparently no rush. The latest NTSB safety recommendation to EASA is rooted in a 2001 crash: American Airlines Airbus Flight 587. (see narrative below)

    Probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. (i.e. The pilot used the rudder and it fell off.)

    (To put this into simplistic car terms, your car just skidded on some ice. You did some fancy and extreme steering which may or may not have been necessary. And the steering wheel just came off in your hands. Pretty much all you can do now is spectate and die.)

    The pilot’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal input was based on a violent wake turbulence encounter. The pilot’s “unnecessary and excessive” rudder pedal input broke the rudder.

    Isn’t this a dubious conclusion? Isn’t this like blaming a car crash on a driver hitting brakes too hard? The airbus had just taken off and encountered turbulence. Since when do flight controls not handle “aggressive input”?

    Initial suggestions included pilot retraining. (I.E. don’t fix the problem, train the pilots to work around it.) This month, the NTSB encouraged modification of European certification standards. In other words, the NTSB wants to physically limit the rudder movement to what the design can safely manage. Maybe that makes more sense than expecting a pilot engaged in a desperate struggle to save a failing plane to have to make accommodations for flighty flight controls.

    Some take the angle that the problem lies in the rudder design and/or composition. In 2001, the FAA was one of those so inclined.

    On November 16, 2001, the FAA issued emergency AD 2001-23-51 warning of failure of the vertical stabilizer-to-fuselage attachment fittings, transverse (side) load fittings, or rudder-to-vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, if not corrected, could result in loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or rudder and consequent loss of control of the airplane. The FAA considers that, before structural failure, it may be possible to detect indications of possible failure modes that could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane. These indications include edge delaminations, cracked paint, surface distortions, other surface damage, and failure of the transverse (side) load fittings. Similarly, indications of failure of the rudder assembly, which could lead to failure of the vertical stabilizer, may also be detectable with such an inspection.

    This failure has happened more than once.

    In the Air Transat flight 961 incident (also a 300 series Airbus) out of Varadero, Cuba, the rudder disintegrated. The pilot in that flight questions the integrity of the rudder design and composition.

    Here another point that has been commonly made. Aircraft have had rudders made of aluminum for 70 years without them disintegrating. With high tech composites, planes are falling out of the sky.

    In March 2006, US safety investigators recommended rudder inspections on Airbus A300-600 jets because a FedEx A300-600 rudder damaged during maintenance.

    Tested on the ground by Fed Ex engineers, in the Fed-Ex A300 cargo plane, the hydraulic system which actuates the rudder tore a hole around the hinges exactly where the rudders of both flight 961 and flight 587 did. Coincidence? I think not.

    Does the certification process need an overhaul? I think so.

    Have a couple of dead pilots again become convenient scapegoats for/by using the very computer controlled flight control system that they believed protected them? I bet I know what the pilots think.

    Flight 587, Official NTSB narrative of the crash
    On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful.

    Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700.

    About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

    Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes.

    The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, “your leg, you check the rudders.” (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, “rudders check.” The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

    About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

    About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, “you have the airplane.”

    About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, “you happy with that [separation] distance?” About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, “we’ll be all right once we get rollin’. He’s supposed to be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s the idea.” About 0913:46, the first officer said, “so you’re happy.”

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220º. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain’s statement “clean machine,” indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

    About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a 0.04 G drop in longitudinal load factor, a 0.07 G shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a 0.3 G drop in normal (vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0º (neutral) to 2º nose up, 2º nose down, and back to 0º; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18º right, 30º left, 37º right, 34º left, 5º left, 21º left, and 23º right, before moving to between 5º and 6º left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0º (neutral) to about 2º left, about 0.6º right, and back to 0º.

    During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane’s pitch angle increased from 9º to 11.5º, decreased to about 10º, and increased again to 11º. The airplane’s bank angle moved from 0º (wings level) to 17º left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to
    the WAVEY navigation intersection.

    At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, “little wake turbulence, huh?” to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, “yeah.” At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

    At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, “max power.” At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, “you all right?” to which the first officer replied, “yeah, I’m fine.” One second later, the captain stated, “hang onto it. Hang onto it.” The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer’s statement “let’s go for power please” at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer’s right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

    According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64º to the right at 0915:51.5, 78º (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64º to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78º to the left at 0915:56.5.

    The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11º to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane’s center of gravity (cg) was about 4º to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5º to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2º to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7º to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10º and 11º to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11º and 12º to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

    The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer’s statement, “holy [expletive].” At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, “what the hell are we into…we’re stuck in it.” At 0916:12.8, the captain stated, “get out of it, get out of it.” The CVR recording ended 2 seconds later. The airplane was located at 40º 34′ 37.59″ north latitude and 73º 51′ 01.31″ west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight.

  • | |

    Chinese Pilots Flying with False Records

    George’s Point of View

    Apparently false flying records are part of a known underground Chinese pilot subculture. All Chinese pilots know about it. Now the CAA does too. Just google this phrase: false pilot certification surname Xu

    192 Chinese pilots with falsified flight records are now under the eye of China’s Civil Aviation Authority; some of them have conditionally been allowed to continue flying pending re-application for pilot certificates after undergoing additional training under strict supervision. Some of the pilots involved had their licenses revoked. Here’s the big question that hit me, and the reason I posted this as an editorial and not just news:

    Should the pilots be allowed to earn their certification after falsifying their records?

    The US FDA would never let Chinese goods pass uninspected, especially since recent history has proven that if Chinese imports can somehow be adulterated (by melamine, or toxins in drywall, hook or crook, shame, fines, bribery, guilt, flattery or whatever), then it will be. So products are not to be trusted but must be inspected. This is not the sole dominion of Chinese exports, but all of all countries products.

    But what of the long-standing Chinese obsession with honor? Has honor decayed in the face of rapid economic and social change?

    The honor thing in China is very real. Zheng Xiaoyu, head of the Chinese FDA from 1998 to 2005, approved untested medicine in exchange for cash. In punishment, China executed him.

    Should China, which for centuries has set high standards for honor, now let these values erode because of a pilot shortage? Shouldn’t the ethics, honor and sense of responsibility of someone who is daily responsible for hundreds of lives be impeccable? Is someone who is willing to falsify their flying history an individual of impeccable honor, one responsible enough to bear the burden of all of those lives? Perhaps I should not bring this up, as the oriental concept of honor is not identical to the non-oriental perception. Perhaps saving face in this case is a matter of equating “honor” with the “Soprano-like” keeping of the false-paper pilot cult secret. Even so, the issue is not only the question of how one can be solidly qualified if the foundation of ones qualification is a tissue of lies, but also if a pilot is shady and unreliable enough to pretend to be qualified, how can that so-called pilot actually be reliable enough, trained enough, expert enough to safeguard the lives of planeloads of passengers who trust there is solid experience in the cockpit? It is a violation of the public trust.

    One of these falsely certified pilots was manning the Henan Airlines jet crash. His fake credentials and lack of experience caused the deaths of more than 40 people. How much more of a wake-up call does China need?

    But it is not unreasonable to allow testing to verify qualifications. It is more humane than applying the Chinese FDA solution. Perhaps the very existence of 192 known falsifications indicates some need of a fast-track solution for former military pilots who wanted to transition into commercial positions.

    I have personally flown within China in their planes. I felt safe. The flights had no incidents, and believe me, unlike many passengers whose lives do not revolve around aviation, I am always on the lookout.  So, let’s not put down the many for the few who have taken the course of this criminal act. Let us, rather, respect that China ferreted out the falsified records, and are proceeding in a modern and reasonable fashion to make amends. I personally love China, and travel there often. I will continue to do so, even if it is on a Chinese plane.

  • |

    Airborne Cell Phones In Legal Eye

    To phone or not to phone, that is the question. Or to update it a little:
    Do radio signals from cell phones disrupt key airplane functions?

    OR

    Are current U.S. cell phone bans outdated and useless at promoting air safety?
    That is today’s question.

    In U.S. air space, cell phones are banned, but all European carriers do not ban cell phone use.

    The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration says cell phones may emit signals that can affect aircraft communications, navigation, and flight control.

    There’s some piggyback legislation in the FAA reauthorization bill that would prohibit cell phone use on planes by anyone other than flight crews or law enforcement. Currently once planes reaches 10,000 feet it is up to the carrier to allow or disallow passengers to turn on most portable electronic devices except cell phones.

    Boeing, for example, prohibits the use.

  • Seat Belts: Airplanes AND BUSES

    George’s Point of View

    Yesterday we posted the NTSB’s safety recommendation that each person who is less than 2 years of age to be restrained in a separate seat position by an appropriate child restraint system during takeoff, landing, and turbulence.

    It does make sense that infants not be held during dangerous turbulence in a plane, but kept securely in a seat, just as it is required by law when in a car.

    With all of the accidents we see on buses, I would like to know why the NTSB has not mandated seatbelts aboard all buses. Not just for infants, of course, but for everyone.

    Out of NTSB’s own reports, “42% of the total (fatalities) are from side impact or non-collision (typically rollover) accidents. It is for this 42% of fatal accidents that seat belts have their greatest life saving potential”

    NTSB should also demand seat belts on all passenger buses and school buses.

  • Aviation’s New Ride-Em Cowboy Poster-Child

    George’s Point of View

    Americans are always looking for new anti-heroes, and Steven Slater has slipped into that role for a number of groups, especially those who have to deal with a surly public, who always have to be polite for the sake of their jobs and bite back their equally surly response.

    With the job shortage being what it is, people are feeling the weight of their bills and putting up with their need to take this job and shove it–

    But in a more specific sense, he also stands as a symbol of problems in the aviation industry, inside and out. Air travel means discomfort, the bother, the fuss, and a hundred goading needling annoyances: the rude attendant or passenger, hot plane, lost luggage, uncomfortable airline seat, on top of putting up with being too hot, too cold, too miserable. Steven Slater has a whole world of people out there who applaud him for not being “too polite.”

    Slater is one cowboy who would have never had his ten seconds of fame if Jet Blue had provided what every cowboy needs: a side kick. Where was the in-house support? While you’re on that plane, what an airline attendant says is law. (Just ask the Feds.) If the machine had been working properly, it would be that unruly passenger who would be behind bars. Whoever should have been backing up Slater, wasn’t. Instead of one lone cowboy taking it on the chin, Jet Blue needs to step forward and take care of their own.

    When Steven Slater decided he just wasn’t going to take it any more, and slid off the Jet Blue plane with a couple of beers, he became the poster child for dissatisfied people everywhere, who suddenly put themselves in his rebellious shoes and liked the feeling.

    What is more American than the pursuit of happiness?

    After all, we’re all cowboys.