Editorial

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    AirBlue in Defiance of Court

    Although the court has ordered compensation, a spokesman of victims told the Peshawar High Court that “AirBlue has communicated to petitioners that compensation will be given to them once they step down and cases are withdrawn from court.” AirBlue also asked for a “universal relief agreement” release form for the 152 companies potentially responsible banning victims from suing.

    The chief justice advised the victims rep to file an application of contempt of court, and promised to continue the case until every heir is compensated.

    In George’s Point of View


    AirBlue should be taking the high road on this, and stop dragging their feet. The tragedy brought to a halt the lives of too many, robbed families of their futures. How can any of these families affected ever have any peace? Why—after already causing the ultimate harm to the victims, and the families of victims—must the airline do everything in their power to make the situation even worse?

    From the moment we are infants who learn to trust our feet to carry us, standing at the sides of our cribs, toddling across our parent’s floors into schools, and adulthood and life beyond, we are only able to stand on our own feet, to walk on our own feet, to negotiate the ground beneath us because we learn a sense of control. We know where the ground is, which way is up. We learn where we can place our feet just so, how to move, to balance, and how to negotiate the rules and laws and physics of the real world so that we can take the next step in our lives, and the next, and the next. All of this occurs because we learn to trust our environment, to trust ourselves in it.

    A tragic event like a plane crash turns our perceptions, our world, our lives inside out. It turns the ground to the ceiling. Our perception of reality is instantly distorted, turning peace and family into an ongoing horror. How can we take the next step when the ground beneath us has been stolen away?

    A tragedy like this shocks everyone–not just the families, but everyone who learns of the event–we are all left with the sense of being a boat unmoored, with the knowledge of a loss of control of the setting and circumstance of our lives. Everyone who learns of a crash like that of Air Blue faces a realization of the frailty of life. The word “shock” is appropriate, for the sensation is not unlike a zap of electricity that sizzles our nerve endings. For those of us who did not lose anyone, we may have an instant jolt, an instant awareness an instant empathy of the depth of grief, horror, pain suffered by survivors; but for survivors that jolt is no instant. It stretches on indefinitely into a future rendered bleak and dead.

    Healing may come; a sense of life may return, or even a sense of carpe diem. But even with healing, there is a loss of innocence, a loss of trust in life, in belief of “the future” because, after all, how grim the future is without our loved ones in it.

    For the families, reparation can never be made. How can they truly be “repaired” if the loved ones they lost can never be returned? The sense of the wholeness of their lives is forever a shattered glass. It is the responsibility for Jet Blue (and even for any of the 152 companies who are indeed partially responsible) to deliver promise instead of excuse, blessing instead of denial, empowerment instead of refusal, expedition instead of delay.

    There is a lot of guilt and responsibility sitting squarely in the lap of Air Blue.

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    Air India Responsible for May 2010 Crash

    In George’s Point of View


    Crew Resource management (AKA Cockpit Resource Management) came about as a resource for competent pilots with deficient people skills. This is crucial because a pilot does not fly in a vacuum but as part of a team. CRM teaches pilots how to improve communication, a crucial supplement to normal training. CRM helps a crew avoid potentially antagonistic work environments, such as the one that occurred in Mangalore, on May 2010, the Air India Crash which killed 158.

    It has come to light that Air India did not provide mandatory CRM training. This deficit is clearly reflected in pilot behavior, and violates international norms. The court of inquiry is considering inadequate CRM as a key factor in the Mangalore crash.

    Anyone reading or hearing the transcript knows that leadership and decision making on this flight was not up to standard. The Captain failed to discontinue the ‘unstabilised approach’ after touching down halfway down the runway, and persisted in continuing with the landing, despite three calls from the First Officer to ‘go around’ and a number of warnings from EGPWS. If there had been adequate CRM training, the captain would have known to listen to the first officer and warnings; and barring that, the F.O would have known to follow his own (correct) judgement.

    Air India Express did not even have a CRM safety training division.

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    FAA Focuses on Fixes to Aircraft Collision-Warning Systems

    After looking back at near-collision data the FAA collected, the FAA has given U.S. airlines three years to install software changes to collision-warning systems, saying that the warning devices that have been installed in commercial airliners as well as private businesses need to be fixed.

    The FAA has known since 2009 that systems have been known to fail to monitor and track all the nearby planes, resulting in monitoring errors, a fact which could and may have already caused problems in 7000 commercial planes and 1800 business planes in the US.

    If a warning system fails, and is known to fail, why is a crash which may have been the result of a warning system failure being attributed to air traffic controller error or pilot error? That’s what I’d like to know. Do we need to be looking more closely at L-3 Communications?

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    Fatigue or not-fatigue? That is the Question


    After the crash of the Colgan Air flight in Buffalo, the new fatigue regulations hold the promise of increased safety for commercial pilots now that they are scheduled travel time plus 8 hours of sleep time (ten hours) sandwiched between flights.

    But the fatigue regulations do not apply to cargo pilots.

    The discrepancy has to do with the expense of insurance covering the lives of hundreds of passengers vs. the lives of a couple of pilots on a cargo flight; but the NTSB isn’t buying it. Cargo pilots, many of whom fly at night, are just as likely to get fatigued as commercial pilots.

    Should cargo pilots, who fly largely at night and who don’t have to maintain the same kind of scheduling as commercial passenger airlines be entitled to the same kind of fatigue protections?

    What do you think?

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    The Delaminating 787: Causing Problems and Recalls


    The Boeing 787’s composite skin is under the eye now, with the carbon fiber structure deconstructing after improperly joined structural stiffeners fail. Longerons are installed on a wound carbon fibre barrel, frames and longerons are secured to the skin to strengthen the structure, and reinforced by shims. Without shims making a tight fit, damage incurs to the carbon fiber.

    The problem has been located on an All Nippon Airways (56), and two Qatar Airways airframes (57 and 58), all of which originate in Everett Washington.

    More 787s are expected to turn up with the same problem.

    The structural stiffeners are failing in the location of the Alenia Aeronotica-built horizontal stabiliser.

    Boeing confirms that the problem is a “straightforward repair that should cause no short-term safety concern.”

    Inspections are already underway, and strategic plans for repairs are on the drawing board. A 2010 problem involved the teardown and reinstallation of some Alenia Aeronautica-built horizontal stabilisers which had been assembled without adequate shims.

    In George’s Point of View

    updated


    According to a Reuters article, Boeing is saying publicly that this will not affect production.

    It SHOULD affect production.

    Boeing needs to slow down and get it right. Thousands of souls will fly in these “things.” Boeing’s got to have it right. Instead of ramping up, slow down production. What good is an ambitious target rate if the planes come out needing SAFOs (Safety Alerts for Operators)?

    Too fast reminds me of Airbus.

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    Policy Changes

    In George’s Point of View


    What does it mean that the Indian Civil Aviation Ministry is formulating new policies?

    The existing policies are not working, but we wonder if the new policies are being rewritten to fit in better with the workings of business and the status quo. Will the changes begin to address safety issues, pilot training, and crucial concerns of passengers rather than stakeholders in the business end?

    Will the policies be conceived and written by people involved in the mechanics of planes and technology, or will they reflect an infrastructure concerned only about maintaining a “bottom line?”

    The current perspective has resulted in dangerous new rest rules. (Pilots are not allowed to get fatigued till they have completed 10 hours of flying during the night; and the airline’s director of operations can extend that time another hour and a half.) The work ceiling for Indian pilots is 25% higher than that set for US or British pilots.

    Committees of experts should be based on expertise in successful operations, have proper credentials and their input should reflect current legitimate data and scientific findings. Otherwise, the changes will be reflected inevitably in more fatal crashes.

    So we wonder what does it mean? We have to wait until February when results are released.

  • To Family and Friends

    Now we lay 2011 to rest, a year to be thankful for.

    They are all years to be thankful for, even when they are times that try our souls. Our lives are the testing grounds that reveal our mettle. Of course life changes us; life is the crucible that forges the metal of which we are formed. So even if it has been an uphill challenge, it is a path we have climbed successfully; it has been another year to thank God for. We climbed to the summit to plant the flag of 2011 at the topmost peak. Join me while I shout, “Wahoo! We made it!” A year of turmoil; a year of deliverance and grace, of salvation.

    So now we can pause and note the passing of 2011. Life chips away at us, smoothes the edges. When I think of how the passing year changed me, the changes are real but ephemeral, as hard to pin down and hold on to as a note of music, or a beam of light. I hope this year has made me a little kinder, a little stronger, a little more patient, a little more of a better man. It is easier to imagine time as a flowing river, with each moment being a unique sip of the water of life. I cannot let the year fade into history without acknowledging my gratitude and wonder. God is the source of the river of life. I can nod and smile at the scientists as they argue their big bangs (or some other competing cosmological paradigm). I am ok with science. God made scientists too; and if there was a bang, God was behind it. Einstein talked about life as a vast library we are born into; like preverbal infants, we can see the books in the library, and order in the universe, even if we cannot read the words. I do not need to hold the pencil of God to know the hand that wrote the book of life.

    For another year, Molly and I wish you the very best New Year’s Day, and a 2012 filled with great health, and an overabundance of love and happiness.

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    Airbus Design Flaws Forced Pilots into Bad Decisions


    In George’s Point of View

    In the operation of the Airbus 330, a percentage of man-made decisions are taken away from humans in the cockpit. When you closely consider the Air France Airbus Flight 447 crash, it is easy to see that bad pilot decisions occurred when the pilots were not getting accurate feedback about what was happening. In old programmer lingo, this is “garbage in-garbage out.” And, unfortunately, when the data comes out of a computer, people tend to believe it, especially pilots in a falling plane, whose lives rely on that particular “garbage.”

    Sure, mistakes were made. The pilot retired, leaving the cockpit to the copilots. If he had stayed in the cockpit, none of this would have happened.

    Of the two remaining co-pilots, one still should have realized the other’s mistaken attitude (flying at a nose-up attitude with falling speeds.) Even something as basic as tandem cockpit control (where the flight controls move in tandem in the left and right cockpit), would have revealed to the second co-pilot what the other pilot was doing. But cockpit controls in the A330 are asymmetrical, and move independently.

    If one co-pilot had caught that the junior co-pilot was flying at the nose-up attitude while the speed was dropping, none of this would have happened.

    Not only did the failure of pitot tubes (the malfunctioning equipment that reads/relays airspeed) occur when they iced up, any failsafes that should have kicked in, didn’t. Thales Pitot tube icing was a known factor prior and considered by Airbus an “optional” fix. Because these tubes were frozen (iced over) airspeed data was incorrect.

    If Airbus had demanded that the flawed Thales pitot tubes be replaced, the airspeed data would have been correct, and none of this would have happened.

    The plane flew for a while with falling speeds, nose up. Then, the idiosyncrasy of the stall warning alarm system kicked in. When airspeed slowed too much, the warning went off, but when it slowed even more, it stopped. The pilots were in a feedback deadzone. Flying at a crawl, the warning quit. Speeding up from a crawl to slow turned set the warning off again. So when they tried to increase to the proper speed, the stall system went off.


    If the stall warning system had been calibrated to go off at dangerously low speeds and keep going off until proper flight speed was attained instead of indicating to the pilots that they were wrong to increase the speed, then none of this would have happened.

    It is a given that correct data and feedback are essential to a pilot. In the Airbus 330, the underlying design failed to provide accurate data and feedback. Could any pilots fly a plane if they did not know what is happening? It all comes down to a whole integration of synchronicity: a coetaneous concurrence of problems and failures converged on the pilots at once. Pilot error alone does not a crash make. Not even on an A-330.

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    Indian Pilots: One bad seed


    What: Air India Express en route from Cochin-Salalah
    Where: Salalah
    When: Nov 3, 2011 9:45
    Who: 87 passengers

    In George’s Point of View


    India has made noises in the press about cleaning house regarding some of the bad pilots that skated through a flawed and corrupt school and accrediting system.

    In this event, the pilot of an Air India Express COK-Salalah (Oman) flight, made three attempts to land. A cumulation of numerous small errors threatened passenger safety and defied standard operating procedures and included mis-entering data into the system.

    The pilot forced the B737 to land using “autoland” in high cross-winds.

    Wind speed on the ground was 25 knot (46 kmph) gusting to 35 knot (65 kmph.) Operating procedure allows landing when winds are no higher than 25 knots. The Boeing FCOM lists 35 knots as the max permissible crosswind landing component on a 45m wide. The pilot would have been correct to divert to another airport. There was adequate fuel to do so (if he had realized the numbers entered into the system were incorrect). Ground conditions were at the top of what Boeing allows and would be a challenge. Instead of diverting to Abu Dhabi, the pilot landed in defiance of safety norms.

    The pilot attempted to land twice, and then decided to divert. Having been entered with incorrect data, the FMC (Flight Management Computer) incorrectly concluded there was only six minutes of flight time left. This was incorrect, as the plane had 4.7 tons of fuel, more than enough to reach Abu Dhabi, 75 minutes away.

    On the pilot’s third attempt, the pilot autolanded (without having trained for autolanding.) It was a safe, if hard landing, and one that damaged the plane and nearly went off the runway. Two tires burst, and the landing gear was damaged.

    Maybe this pilot is a fool, or maybe just careless. The plane did land with no loss of life. You know they always say “the devil is in the details.” I don’t know verifiable particulars. We don’t have available first hand data to analyze, but Air India and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation does.

    But when we see evidence of problems like this, we wonder if India has gone far enough in raising the bar.

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    Warsaw: An opinion

    What: LOT Polish Airlines Boeing 767-300 en route from Newark,NJ (USA) to Warsaw (Poland) with 220 passengers and 11 crew
    Where: Warsaw
    When: Nov 1st 2011
    Who: 220 passengers and 11 crew

    Belly landings happen frequently enough that there is a checklist of procedures. What makes it difficult? Visualize how a match works. Then think about that plane landing, full of fuel, scraping on the runway. That’s what makes it difficult.

    There are basic procedures that are performed. Consider that a 767-300ER has a total of 24,140 gallons, or 161,800 pounds in two wing tanks at 6,070 gallons (or 40,700 pounds), and a center tank at 12,000 gallons, or 80,400 pounds. ( Landing heavy on wheels would cause a wheel or brake fire.) In a gear up landing, the pilot has to lighten the plane by burning off and/or dumping fuel; and in the meantime, the crew does their best to get the gear to work. If they do not, they have to land with the nose up, on a long runway on fire retardant foam. Of course nothing is certain till the investigation is complete, but in my opinion, the crew did a stellar job. And everyone survived, which is what most matters.

    Dumping fuel and spending eighty minutes circling Warsaw would not have been enough to completely burn off fuel. There was still the danger of fire as the flight was landing. Flight and cabin crew took every precaution. The landing appeared picture perfect, sliding smoothy on the fuselage. Inside the plane, the passengers were quietly terrified.

    It may be that the pilot’s glider experience was a help. Between you and me, it looks a lot smoother if you watch the videos with the sound off, so you don’t hear metal screaming against pavement.

    The airport was well prepared, and crews foamed the runway with flame retardant in advance, and stopped any fires from spreading. There is plenty of footage of sparks and flames from the friction of the weight and force of the fuselage driving forward, and yet it came to rest with remarkably little damage.

    The emergency crews did their job. So did the pilots, and so did the flight crew. The flight crew secured the stairs in place as soon as the plane was at a standstill. Passengers could not have moved out of the jet and on to the runway any faster.

    It isn’t that common for all the gears to fail, but less common for all of them to fail at the same time. . My pilot-experts tell me that the most likely way for the hydraulics of all three landing gear to fail is total loss of fluid. There’s an alternate system; the alternate system for landing gear performs as a combination of electricity and gravity. You release the electronic locks, and gravity kicks in. I don’t think I have seen a reason given why the alternative system failed, but that would seem to be an electrical problem.

    But enough speculation–the investigation will reveal everything. For now it certainly appears that even if the gear system failed, the human system did not.

    We hear so many bad things about pilots, and airlines, about the entire industry. Aviation watchdogs were badmouthing the industry yesterday, and will be doing so again tomorrow, but for today, it is refreshing to hear something good. What I am hearing about the expertise of the Polish flight crew and airport is all commendable. LOT, you did well. First Officer Jerzy Szwarc and Captain Wrona, you have made your mark in history with the lives you saved today. The Polish media has been hungry for heroes to balance the April 2010 disaster, and now they have you.

    Already there is already a polish jingle that is a play on the pilot’s name, Captain Wrona. Wrona means “crow.”

    “Lataj jak orze?, l?duj jak Wrona”
    This translates to:
    “Fly like an eagle, land like a Crow”

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    British Airways: Take This Class and Please Don’t Die on Our Plane

    Take This Class and Please Don’t Die on Our Plane. That will be £125. Thank you for not dying on British Airways.

    British Airways has a problem.

    It seems that they developed a class for British Petroleum. You see, BP sends their staff to remote locations which are only served by airlines on the EU banned list. As we described it on the last article the last time we talked about it, these poor BA employees ended up on flights on planes that skydivers wouldn’t touch with a ten foot parachute.

    Anyway, this class they worked up must now be like a friday night paycheck burning a hole in their pocket. You see, they keep trying to market this class as a product. Like the guy who gets stuck with a warehouse full of Widgets. The first time we heard this, the class was being offered for purchase, and the purpose of the class was to teach aviation safety and how to behave during a crash to increase your likelihood of not dying on their plane.

    We think the whole thing is kind of fishy, since the plane is not supposed to crash. Landing safety is the airline’s responsibility, not an option. I wouldn’t keep writing about this but I keep getting notices about this class.

    So they’re now looking for a new market, and they’ve found it. They announced that the£125 four hour class on how to survive a plane crash will be available for FREE. Or actually, only free to passengers who want to pay in mileage points, i.e. rich people. So. Rich people can pay in points (or perks) to get a lesson on how not to die. If anyone else wants to be safe, you’re going to have to ante up the cash.

    We are not really arguing against the class, if they want to provide it. Maybe it will make some people feel safer. (Though probably not. Why would you take a course in how to crash if you thought you were going to land safely? It’s probably going to be full of white-knuckled flyers anyway.) We just believe that, since arriving safely is the responsibility of the airline, that the class should be for free. After all, we don’t charge school students for fire drills.

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    Hawaii, Cleveland, etc…

    I should note at some point that every day there are dozens of small events that occur that we don’t talk about. For example, there was the event on the 7th when a 65 year old pilot beached his Cessna 310 (flying out of Monteray) in the ocean when he ran out of gas. He had notified authorities of his fuel situation, so the Coast Guard was on hand to rescue him…

    Or the fiasco 22 year old Jason Laurence Delta University student (Cleveland Mississippi) survived when the 1972 Cessna 150 he was flying failed, and flipped during an emergency landing in a groove in a cotton field, rolling end over end.

    Or the Piper PA-32 Saratoga went missing heading to Johnstown, Pa, and in which Michael Garrone of Allegheny Township, Pa., 52-year-old Chas Armitage Jr. of Parks Township, Pa., and his girlfriend, 49-year-old Laura Stettmier lost their lives when it crashed 12 miles southeast of the Grant County Airport in Petersburg.

    Or the United Express flight from Chicago to Omaha which landed in Des Moines on Friday with an undesignated engine problem.

    Or Thursday’s Pia birdstrike in Pakistan that ended with an engine shut down and a return to Islamabad.

    Or the fatal crash thursday of an experimental Rand Robinson KR-2 which took off from Mountain Empire Airport and killed the pilot a mile north of the airport at 1:10 pm.

    Or the experimental Quickie Q200 which crashed and burned when 60-year-old Gerald Brinkerhuff from Gobles was practicing touch and goes in Holland Michigan. Brinkerhuff did not survive.

    Every day there are numerous events that happen, and sometimes there’s just not enough detail available, or sometimes conflicting accounts make it difficult to determine what happened.

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    Selling Safety Classes for Sitting Ducks


    In George’s Point of View


    When I get on a plane, I plan on being safe. I don’t fly “unsafe” airways.

    If I didn’t believe I was going to be safe on a plane, I wouldn’t get on it. It should go without saying. Most people probably feel that way, except for the ones stuck in countries whose airlines are on the EU banned list.

    But apparently, British Airways isn’t so confident. They are offering a four hour class in how to crash. That is, they are going to charge passengers to teach them how they want passengers to behave in a crash, to increase their likelihood of survival.

    Excuse me? This is not like a Drunk Driving class where the driver, the one in control of the vehicle, is being taught something. These are passengers, stuck in a flying sardine can, strapped into their seats. There’s not a whole lot passengers can do but sit there. Beyond that little sideshow performance by the attendants before every flight, other than avoiding hysteria, what else can passengers do? Flap their wings?

    I am on the fence about whether or not such a course is a good idea. On one hand, I can picture a poll taken by airline patrons who have written in their own question, asking what to do in case of a crash.

    Pray.

    Maybe flight attendants just get tired of answering that question, “What can we really do to survive, if we crash?” They probably hear it frequently. Maybe someone asked Sully, and Sully said, “Be calm.”

    In most cases who survives a plane crash has a lot to do with age. When there is one single survivor, it is usually a child, and I don’t think there’s anything that a class offered by British Airways can teach to make anyone younger. There are seats that may be marginally safer depending on how the plane crashes, but everyone can’t sit in them. That would cause a plane crash. (It reminds me of a recent crash of a plane where some smuggled creatures escaped their confines, scared everyone from one side of a small plane to the other, and of course, it got off balance and crashed.)

    I can also picture a boardroom with a bunch of accounting types trying to figure out new revenue streams. They ask themselves what do passengers want?

    The answer? To get to their destination in one piece.

    But they’re already selling them tickets. What else can they do to squeeze the market? I mean, what else can they do to make the passengers happy?

    “Eureka!” one of them shouts, “Let’s offer plane crash safety classes.” Maybe this one means well at the time. Maybe when he suggests it, he thinks it should be free. Or maybe he is just hoping his shiftless out-of-work brother-in-law could get hired by British Airlines to teach the classes, so he’ll move out of the spare bedroom.

    So in that imaginary planning meeting I referenced before, the British Airways guy with the calculator says “And charge them for it!”

    Their documentation says that British Airways believes a class will “make passengers safer…by giving additional skills and information.”

    Does this mean they are withholding information that would make passengers safer?

    If there’s something new or special that should be taught about living through a flight, (people, consider that I am writing this article while ON a slow plane from China,) then this is something EVERY passenger must know, and it must be included in the price of the ticket.

    The whole scheme of this class seems problematic to me. We passengers are already buying your tickets. Charging us to make us safer on your flight…that seems not only hypocritical, it seems like the ultimate in avariciousness.

    What are you going to do next if a plane crashes? Make the people who didn’t take the class leave the plane last? Do they get to die first?

    The announcement indicates that this program was developed for BP staff who regularly end up on EU banned list flights on planes that skydivers wouldn’t touch with a ten foot parachute. Maybe the class really just scares people off of those banned airlines, and onto British Airways planes, which are more expensive but a heck of a lot more likely to get you there intact than an airline that doesn’t pass the EU safety criteria.

    Anyway, British Airways, if you’re listening, this is not just a product that you got stuck with to make some money from. This is something you should be offering to all your passengers, for free. Have some stars (Tom Cruise reprising his Top Gun role, Meg Ryan reprising her aerophobic character in French Kiss, or maybe the cast of that new Pan Am series.)

    Record the class. Give it out as a DVD with the tickets. Sometimes you have to put away the calculator.

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    Guam Route Emergencies Reflecting Vigilance or Roulette?

    After four emergency landings in Guam in the past couple of weeks, Continental/United made a statement to the press.

    Actually, four emergency landings…that’s not that unusual, is it? Of course, they were all at the same airport, with the same airline. I’ve written here recently about shabby looking, poorly maintained commercial airlines. As frequently as I fly, I really do not want to worry about whether or not a plane is capable of staying in the air. I don’t want to worry about a crew with a crippling pecking order, or pilots who don’t know how to fly. I really don’t want to worry about a broken plane.

    I am always pointing out the need for maintenance to keep a plane in peak running order. Maintenance is important; and also, the pilots tell me that it is crucial to keep an eye on safety directives, and concurrent events which may reveal crucial matters affecting entire fleets, such as operating parts nearing the end of their lifespan, faulty parts, etc…

    So someone should maybe look closely at those flights, and see if there is some factor that applies. Better to have prevention now, beforehand, than have a disaster happen, and lawyers looking into it after it is too late. Have these Guam flights been problematic in the past? Why are there problems now?I might ask how necessary are those flights?

    About those 4 landings, Koji Nagata Director of Corporate Communications said that:

    “We treat any issue aboard our aircraft seriously and our pilots will not hesitate to declare an emergency, when the situation warrants, in ensuring landing priority and returning our passengers and crew safely to the ground as quickly as possible. Typically a declaration of an emergency is precautionary in nature, as was true with both cases in question, and the situations were effectively managed without incident.”

    Sure it would be great to never have emergencies. However. The time to handle an emergency IS BEFORE it turns tragic. Being able to handle emergencies is one safety skill at the top of the list of pilot skills, and one that can not be separated from the other skill that is becoming alarming among pilots (pilots who are losing the ability to fly due to automation.)

    Sometimes factors are not clear. For example, it is true that in some recent tragic situations like the RusAir jet crash I talked about yesterday, there was a problem in the cockpit that prevented the crew from coping with the emergency. Bad flying? Primitive Airport? Insubordinate navigator and Inexperienced pilot? But it all came down to one conclusion: together or not, at that date and time, they were unable to cope with their emergency-bad weather, foggy landing, a plane that is a flying behemoth landing in a primitive airport, and they took down a whole plane full of people with them.

    And as for the four emergency landings Continental/United experienced recently:
    -the air speed indicator (PITOT tubes? like in AF447),
    – -two landing gear situations
    -and in the Guam flight CO-117, altitude equipment failure (another tube?)

    The landing gear situations could reflect bad tires, hydraulics, landing at too fast, or even runway conditions; altitude and airspeed problems could be anything on the system, from the tubes to the electronics. Only detailed examination will reveal if there is some common cause

    The planes landed safely. An emergency landing, a precautionary landing (whatever they want to call it), they handled the emergencies proactively, and landed safely. It is a whole lot better than the alternative.

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    Door Switch Oops Rolls Nippon Flight


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Andrew Bowden

    What: All Nippon Airways Boeing 737-700 en route from Okinawa to Tokyo Haneda
    Where: Hamamatsu
    When: Sep 6th 2011
    Who: 2 crew injured
    Why: While en route, the co-pilot accidentally activated the rudder trim switch instead of the door mechanism.

    The plane descended 6000 feet and rolled, injuring a couple of flight attendants. The first officer—2400 hours— leveled off, and was able to admit the captain who was stuck outside the cockpit, waiting to get in.

    The flight continued without incident.

    In George’s Point of View

    If there is a problem, it comes out, eventually. My pilots tell me that after there is some kind of incident, we need to keep an eye on new incidents, reports, recalls, and especially advisories, directives and safety alerts. There can always be a relationship, no matter how obscure it seems at first glance.

    You know how everyone has been looking at Air France Flight 447 with a new eye, ever since examination into the Air France Flight 471 on July 22 apparently fooled the autopilot into quitting with a swift descent. And Airbus investigators looked at this event twice because you have two the same plane types doing something similar?

    Well, on the surface, this Nippon incident reminds me of Ethiopia Flight 409. It only reminds me because I saw a line drawing of the route of the plane as it spiraled out of control. It also was a 737.

    I’m not calling the situation identical. Certainly if one of the pilots were locked out on a bathroom break—not that a pilot would do this on takeoff!—it would turn up on the voice recorder.

    What if on Ethiopia Flight 409, someone had needed admission into the cabin?

    It just makes me wonder if it is possible that the cabin crew accidentally activated the rudder trim switch. The Ethiopian Airlines plane had just taken off; it would not have been high enough to drop 6000 feet before recovery.

    I know this thought is right out of the blue, and probably has no basis in anything but my wild imagination, but I am told by my pilots that although the switches are dissimilar, the door unlock switch is right next to the rudder trim. So, is it possible the trim switch could have been inappropriately engaged by accident on Flight 409?

    Some airlines rectify this by requiring a third party to open the door if someone leaves the cockpit, but I have to wonder if this could be a design problem.

  • | |

    Kerala High Court Reverses on Mangalore Crash

    In George’s Point of View


    The Kerala High Court ruled that the Air India need not pay the compensation amount of Rs 75 lakhs each to the victims of the Mangalore plane crash. The Division Bench gave the order in the appeal given by the Air India against the earlier Single Bench rule to pay the amount. The order references the Montreal Treaty.

    I am not surprised. When I first heard the original judgement, it was my layperson opinion that the high court would not let stand the order of the lower court to pass out 75 lakhs to each passenger.

    In my personal opinion the Judge who made that order didn’t read the Montreal treaty very well. In order for the family to collect the equivalent of 100,000 SDRS (about $160,000 U.S.), they must present provable damages and if they do, under the treaty, Tier I, the operator (Air India) cannot dispute or contest paying that amount. The Judge must have overlooked that the 100,000 SDRS is not the minimum required under the treaty, it is the maximum. So when the Judge ordered 75 lakhs to be paid, his order basically was overruling the treaty requirement of proving the damages.

    No, I was not surprised and neither were the attorneys I consult with. If no treaty existed limiting the liability of the operator, then the order from a Judge would have probably stayed in place.

    But that was not the case.

    The Montreal Treaty has two tiers. The above discussion explains tier one. The Tier II provision almost certainly removes the cap entirely, because of where the burden of proof lies.

    As long as the Montreal Treaty is being held as a rule, families should know that in most cases as per the treaty, the value of the case could be much higher than 75 lakhs, pursuant to Tier II of the Montreal Treaty. I know, I know….I’m not a lawyer but I know how it works from experience over the many years I have been working with wrongful death cases, and based on the experience my aviation experts have graciously passed on to me.

    Here is the explanation, as simply as I can explain it:

    If you can prove provable damages, then Tier II (referred to in Article 21(2) of the Montreal Convention) Air India Express is liable to families/passengers for all personal injury or wrongful death damages exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), unless the carrier(s) can prove that the injuries or deaths were not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or it servants or agents. OR the injuries or deaths were solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.

    The carrier will never prove this and the burden of proof is on them. If I am correct, and know the experts who have taught me, are correct…

    Air India Express is liable to the victims families for all damages under the applicable law, including but not limited to, pain & suffering of loved ones prior to death.

    Air India Express is liable for pain and suffering of the survivors and heirs of the victims.

    Air India Express is liable for the loss of support, i.e., money.

    Air India is liable for the loss and enjoyment of life of the victim.

    I could go on but I will stop here, and caution the families to please be very careful. The families should not give up all that there may be coming in return for even a payment of the 75 lakhs that this new ruling states the company no longer has to pay. If they actually get around to offering it, to get it, it means the families have to give up all rights to future claims.

    I would tell the families this:

    Put up a fight. Your loved one is never coming back, no matter how much they pay you, but, I’m sure he/she would want you to collect the absolute maximum possible. As a passenger, your loved one paid a fare, and no matter what caused that crash, your loved one is FAULT FREE. Legally, the operator must pay.

    Consult a lawyer, an expert in aviation, I beg you to please do not try to do it yourself.

    I fly over 250,000 miles a year, and I wouldn’t want my family to try and do it alone if I were a victim.

    * I am not a lawyer, and this is not legal advice.

    http://twocircles.net

  • | | | | |

    Cerritos: Aeromexico Shattered Lives

    In George’s Point of View

    It is a strange, sad phenomenon how tragedies live on.

    On August 31, 1986, a Piper and a Douglas DC-9-32 collided over Cerritos California. The Piper, carrying the pilot and two passengers was going from Torrence to Big Bear. They departed Torrence at 11:46. The DC-9 from Mexico City was approaching Los Angeles with 58 passengers and 6 crew aboard. At 11:52 am, the DC-9’s left horizontal stabilizer sheared through the Piper’s cockpit like a can-opener.

    The Piper crashed in the Cerritos Elementary School playground; the DC-9 in a Cerritos neighborhood destroying five houses, damaging seven more and killing an additional 15 on the ground.

    Descriptions of the collision still fill me with horror.

    The accident predates some of the precautionary measures we have now. Now, the Piper would have a Mode C transponder, which would indicate that it was too high, breeching LAX Terminal Control area; LAX was not at that time equipped with automatic warning systems.

    It has been twenty-five years since that accident happened. A memorial ceremony now is being held commemorating the tragedy in the Cerritos Sculpture Garden, and another in Loreto, Mexico. The tragedy is being remembered by at least 30 US families, 20 Mexican families, in at least one home in Colombia, and one in El Salvador. It is being remembered in the neighborhood the wreckage demolished, where families neither need nor want a plaque to remind them of their loss.

    There is a reminder of this crash in every light plane, and every jet. In fact, everyone who flies now, everyone who has flown and not died in a crash owes a debt to the victims of this senseless tragedy, because this was the event that spurred the FAA to require “Mode C” transponders that could report three-dimensional positioning on light aircraft. This was the event that spurred the FAA to require TCAS on airliners.

    I still live to breathe the smoggy air of Los Angeles. And as long as I still have the breath of life, I will remember the day when these 82 souls breathed their last.

    Aviation tragedies shatters lives like broken glass, and there is no lawsuit, no settlement, no “all the kings horses, nor all the kings men” who can ever put families back together again.

  • New Mexico Following Alaska’s Financial Precedent


    Think of all of the agencies maintaining their own fleets.

    Sarah Palin sold Alaska’s state jet. Florida sold a Cessa Citation Bravo, and Michigan sold three planes. Now New Mexico Gov. Susana Martinez fulfilled her campaign promise to sell the New Mexico’s business jet.

    New Mexico purchased the Cessna Citation Bravo in 2005 for 5.5 million and now sold it to a couple in Alaska, trading an annual $500,000 bill for 2.51 million in one-time income. New Mexico still has two planes: a 2006 Beechcraft King Air and a 1983 Gulfstream Turbo Commander, both five-seat turboprops.

    We suspect pilots are on the fence about this, as a state-owned “personal air taxi” offers some kind of part or full-time employment for maintainers and pilots. The jet cost New Mexico $500,000 annually in maintenance and fuel. How much will alternatives cost? (The state’s twin-engine King Air costs half as much to operate as the jet.)

    Not maintaining a state business jet (at $2,852 per hour) does leave cost effective alternatives such as commercial flight, chartered flight or alternative transport via automobile or rail.

    Are there agencies which have their own State Bus? or perhaps a Nissan LEAF, ForTwo, or Prius?

  • | | | | |

    ATC Catches Runway Incursion, China Airbus Possible Collision


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer K.H.Yim

    What: China Airlines Airbus A330-300 en route from Taipei to Hong Kong
    Where: Taipei
    When: Aug 19th 201
    Who: 288 passengers
    Why: As the China Airlines Airbus was accelerating for takeoff, a private jet was also taxiing on to the same runway after landing. ATC caught the runway incursion and prevented an inevitable collision, and held the China Airlines Airbus flight, delaying the takeoff by an hour.

    The pilots of the South Africa registered aircraft reported they had been instructed to taxi taxiway NC to the end. At a crossing, they requested direction and were told to turn right onto taxiway NC. They made an error based on unclear signage turning back on to the runway instead of to the taxiway.

    In George’s Point of View


    Heya

    Just another everyday incursion.

    Ok, someone needs to commend Taipei ATC on a pretty stupendous catch. From this side of the screen, it looks like this was a practically inevitable disaster.

    And do I have to say that someone needs to fix the signs? Something needs to be amended there so that even pilots unfamiliar with the airport can see which is the on ramp and which is the off ramp.

    I’m just saying.

    Good job, ATC.

    Satellite view:

    View airport PDF

  • |

    Is Air India Passing the Buck?

    In George’s Point of View

    Russi Mody who ran Air India in 1993 resigned because his grand plan for Air India was strangled by red-tape and government intervention. Mody’s famous last words condemn Air India’s “lack of talent and the complete absence of an incentive and accountability culture. There is no punishment, no reward, no participation and the horse and the donkey are treated alike.”

    The more things change, the more they stay the same.

    It looks like the Air India tradition is continuing. Air India has booted out Chairman and Managing Director Arvind Jadhav, and booted in Rohit Nandan. Jadhav had only been there since May 2009, his tenure lasting a year before and after the May 22 Air India Express Flight 812 crash in Mangalore, where the plane touched down 300 feet past the touch down zone on a “tabletop” runway which demands a very precise approach. One might say that Air India Express Flight 812 did not make a precise approach.

    Hopefully Rohit Nandan will be able to assist Air India to straighten out its troubled finances, with debt over 42570 crore, and losses of 22,000 crore. They say he’s there for damage control, because the damage has already happened.

    Air India paid its April and May wages on June 28 and incentive pay has yet to be paid. The Indian government is infusing money into the airline (currently a 5,000 bailout with more to come.)

    Nandan is hoping to turn around the airline and make it profitable, with the government’s help.

    We’re skeptical, but we hope he can fix things, because we’re concerned for the victims of the Mangalore crash back in May 22 2010.

    The Kerala High Court upheld the rules of the Montreal Convention, and directed Air India to pay 75 lakhs as compensation to the families victim of that crash, but the airline has not abided by the directive and is considering a fight in court.

    I know that no one has gotten anything yet; but families should know that in most cases the value of the case is much higher than 75 lakhs, pursuant to Tier II of the Montreal Treaty. I’m not a lawyer but I know how it works from experience over the many years I have been working with wrongful death cases, and based on the experience my aviation experts have graciously passed on to me. If you can prove provable damages then Tier II (referred to in Article 21(2) of the Montreal Convention) Air India Express is liable to families/passengers for all personal injury or wrongful death damages exceeding 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), unless the carrier(s) can prove that the injuries or deaths were not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or it servants or agents. OR the injuries or deaths were solely due to the negligence or other wrongful act or omission of a third party.

    My guess is that the carrier will never prove this and the burden of proof is on them. If I am correct, and know the experts who have taught me, are correct…

    Air India Express is liable to the victims families for all damages under the applicable law, including but not limited to, pain & suffering of your loved one prior to death.

    They are liable for pain and suffering of the survivors and heirs of the victims.

    Air India Express is liable for the loss of support, i.e., money.

    Air India is liable for the loss and enjoyment of life of the victim.

    I could go on but I will stop here, and caution the families to please be very careful. Don’t give up all that you may have coming in return for even a payment of the 75 lakhs that at this point, the company is appealing. If they actually get around to offering it to you, to get it, it means you have to give up all your rights to future claims.

    This is not a cold corporate issue. These are families involved, the struggling families of the 158 people killed aboard the death-bound Mangalore Air India Express Flight. Families struggling now to make ends meet, and dealing with the loss of fathers, mothers, children. Let us hope these once broken homes are not twice made victims by being taken advantage of, instead of getting the support that anyone with a heart knows they deserve.

    Air India’s lack of talent lost a whole lot more than money. It lost 158 lives, and seems to be doing its best to destroy the families, first with the crash, now by neglect, and maybe soon by legislation. The families are now floundering for a year in grief, wrestling to keep their head above water, while corporate heads are pinching pennies, playing corporate musical chairs, and playing a blame game over disastrous policies. They deserve better.

  • | | |

    Protestations of Bias in Official BEA Report

    In George’s Point of View


    Like the pilot association, we wonder how blaming the victims will improve the state of aviation.

    The pilots of Air France Flight 447 had already lost valid data before the Airbus A330 stalled. Fell for three minutes down into the Atlantic in June of 2009, carrying the 228 people aboard to their death. Fell, with pilots flying blind. Fell, with only erroneous data available. Fell with the warning system squawking confused messages. Yet the Bea report says this was was the pilot’s fault.

    We want to know if this investigation will turn out to be deliberate persecution of the pilots instead of legitimate prosecution of Airbus flawed design?

    It is no wonder that the families of the victims are crying foul that the report criticizes pilot performance but not the faulty stall alarms.
    It is no wonder that pilot associations all over the world are protesting.
    It is no wonder that the BEA is being accused of protecting Airbus.

    Why would the recommendation to improve the warning system be removed from the report?
    Why, if not to protect Airbus, scheming to avoid the legal and financial consequences of the crash?

    Pilots say that the stall alarm tends to sound while simultaneously messaging the pilots to ignore the “superfluous” warning. Airbus denies this ever happens.

    How valid can the report be if it is being skewed to protect Airbus and blame the pilots? Should the BEA be placed under criminal investigation alongside with Air France and Airbus?

  • | |

    Remembering Air Blue Flight 202: July 28


    In George’s Point of View


    Sometimes all we do is listen. We listen to the families speak of their loved ones, listen to the little ones cry, the child who loves snowflakes because that is what her father called her. The wife and children with no means of support and feeding themselves with empty spoons. Knowing that no matter what we do, we cannot bring them back, nor fill that empty place. Still we do what we can on behalf of the families.

    This will be the first July 28 in history when these 152 people will not be living on this earth. We want to remember these people who lost their lives in such a tragic and unnecessary way. They deserve to be remembered.

    Some remember those who are no longer with us by using symbols. Memorials like the one promised. There are other symbols, like the bird in flight that symbolizes a soul, or a chain with a broken link.

    There is a tradition dating back to ancient times of placing rosemary by the graves of loved ones. “There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance; pray, love, remember;” Hamlet, (V.iv.124)

    I was going to talk about more ways that people remember, but I must pause here. In ancient times they put rosemary by the graves of loved ones. Some people still do. But we cannot lay sprigs of rosemary for remembrance at the feet of our loved ones, because there are families still waiting for a memorial promised before the first anniversary of the crash. Waiting a year to lay their flowers and their grief.

    Instead of a bouquet of flowers, we have a bouquet of broken promises. Shall we count them?

    A broken promise to share the final investigative report.
    A broken promise over the Monument at the crash site (they want it elsewhere); and a broken promise over the 72 unmarked graves.
    A broken promise over Airblue being grounded for negligence, malpractice, manslaughter.
    A broken promise to assist the families.
    Or maybe we can call this a pending promise, as we wait for an independent inquiry board and a pending promise of greater safety in the skies over Pakistan.
    We have our Rosemary for remembrance, but it is bittersweet.

    CDA is constructing a memorial for the Air Blue Flight 202 just a few miles from Damn-e-Koh, Islamabad
    CDA is constructing a memorial for the Air Blue Flight 202 just a few miles from Damn-e-Koh, Islamabad
  • |

    Never Forget

    Lives have been shattered by the events I record.

    I know you could drive a mid-seventies Cadillac Fleetwood through the gaps in these records, but that is partly because I generally write about an event only once, partly because my content is based on a couple of randomly gathered secondhand observations, partly because I do not follow up, and partly because I am not an expert. (I never claim to be an expert in anything but my own life experience.) How could I be? The actual investigations take years, and are based on combined expert opinions of a whole boatload of bona fide experts. I am only a bystander, a bystander of second-hand bystanders, in fact. The reporters who inform me frequently misstate, interpret or misinterpret the facts, or add little imaginary flourishes. I still do my best to get the facts out as accurately as I can.

    Official final reports are the result of the combined knowledge and experience of experts (some of whom have agendas and bias) in “air traffic control, operations, meteorology, human performance, structures, systems, powerplants, maintenance records, survival factors, aircraft performance, cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, and material factors,” interviewers, rescue observers and specialists as needed. Sometimes the reports are obfuscated by agenda, bias or politics.

    I am just another pair of eyes, and untrained eyes, at that.

    I never, or hardly ever, write about what happens in the seats. Ironically, this is what I write now as I sit in one of those seats myself. Picture me in the cabin of a flight to Argentina. A young family is also on this flight, with hyperactive children running up and down the aisle whenever possible. Picture an infant or two, their safety seats empty as their mothers rock them to still their tears, to the relief of the couple across the aisle, and the irritation of one of the flight attendants. Picture a couple of newlyweds off on their honeymoon, and another couple of newlyweds returning from their honeymoon. Students flying home for the holidays, others returning after. Vacationers in Hawaiianwear. Nearer to me, an assortment of business people in summer suits appropriate for Argentina in July. This accidental ensemble of humankind is engaged in various activities: thumbing through magazines, cloud gazing through the windows, watching movies, listening to music, reading, studying paperwork, connecting intimately in intense whispers (or avoiding) a seatmate, sleeping.

    Just as all around me are engaged in making it through the flight, in a moment precisely like this one, other lives were interrupted. Maybe it was an instant, maybe a four minute fall. Maybe there was no time to process what was happening, or enough time to feel horrible bone-deep terror, and to endure for long moments the fight-flight reflex while belted into a seat. The detail of each event through individual eyes is simultaneously unique and identical.

    I don’t write about these moments. It is too horrible to contemplate except in cases like when Chesley Burnett Sullenberger is making a miracle happen.

    Out of the generous experiences of the decades of a whole, full life, families want to remember their loved ones in their entirety. They don’t want or need to be haunted by the torment of that single moment of horror, a final dark exclamation point.

    So when I write about these terrible crashes, I talk about system failures, or spatial disorientation, ATC schedules, fumes, pressurization, sleepy pilots, malfunctioning radar, stick shakers or a couple hundred other possible causes I have seen frequently enough for them to become familiar even to a layman like me.
    But it is not about the machine. It is about those who boarded that flight in perfect trust, expecting to disembark and fill more decades with passion and life. It is always and only about the passenger.

    I don’t mention them.

    But not an article is written, not a character is typed that I forget that the only matter is the passenger and the family.

  • | |

    Spatial Disorientation-in the pilot, or in the head of the investigator

    Donald Estell attempted to land the 21-year-old, single-engine Piper aircraft in challenging conditions, (on its second approach to St. Louis Downtown Airport in Cahokia) but instead, struck a house. The crash that ended the life of 65-year-old Estell of Clayton, Mo., and Robert Clarkson, 77, of Belleville has been attributed to pilot error by a June 27 report by the NTSB. The crash occurred on Feb 21, 2010, and it happened (according to the NTSB) because of spatial disorientation.

    A pilot who loses his orientation, and whose proprioception (perception of direction) is compromised is described as suffering from spatial disorientation. Most useful for maintaining orientation is an external visual horizon, which helps maintain the sense of “up and down.”

    We know that spatial disorientation is a real condition. It is also one of several “pilot error” causes that officials point to when they can not figure out why an otherwise airworthy (or supposedly airworthy) plane crashes.

    There are cases rightly or wrongly attributed to spatial disorientation, for example, the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 that spiraled into the sea off Beiruit; the May 12 2010 Afriqiyah Airlines Flight 771 crash where the pilot undershot the runway on approach to Tripoli; and the July 28 2010 Airblue Flight 202 which crashed in the Margalla Hills on an ILS approach to the opposite runway 30.* There are events attributed to spatial disorientation when it may or may not be a factor, and may or may not be the only cause. Even when it does occur, it is usually in combination with something else, such as foggy weather which obliterates the horizon, radar failure, cabin pressure loss (the sudden loss of pressure can cause a pilot to lose consciousness.)

    Families who have lost loved ones in airline crashes rely on investigations to determine what systems failed, and what went wrong that caused the crash. It is the solemn duty of investigators (like those in the NTSB) to sort through the wreckage, and analyze the black boxes to determine to the best of their ability what went wrong. The final report is usually the result of a year or several years of intensive study and research. It is usually the more responsible or determined investigators who do not settle for a spatial disorientation cause blaming the pilot, but who look beyond it to find the underlying factor—the radar failure, or system failure, or pressure leak or faulty automatic pilot—that instigated the disorientation.

    *See Comment

  • Putting Aviation Out of Biz, Breaking the Camels Back: Walk Softly and Build a Massive Deficit

    We don’t usually talk about politics here, but it is hard to completely ignore Obama’s proposal to eliminate a tax break for business-jet owners. (The proposal extends the tax-depreciation schedule for business jets to seven years from five years.) I am not anti-Obama, at all, but it is what it is.

    We believe the consequences of that tax break will not make much money for the government, but it will have repercussions in the aviation industry. Catch phrases have cropped up, terms like “demonizing private aviation” and “engaging in class warfare.” Obama does not seem to be aware of that (to use an old catch-phrase) “trickle down” economics. The tax break is incentive for corporations and private owners to purchase new jets. The proposal does attack aviation, which * employs 1.2 million people and generate $150 billion in economic activity.

    How can a depreciation allowance for private jets prevent the rich from paying enough taxes to finance government child safety programs? Where is the logic behind the theory? It is obvious if you look at the results: what is actually involved is a politician courting public opinion, because the majority of Americans can’t afford jets, and will gladly agree to a tax on rich folks, i.e. them. Most Americans aren’t going to take a long view of how a tax will affect an entire industry. They’re just relieved that there are taxes coming out of some other guy’s pocket.

    But the tax will affect an entire industry, those 1.2 million people working in aviation, building planes and buying them. Those unbought private jets don’t get built, don’t get sold, don’t get flown, don’t get maintained, don’t get stored in aviation hangers. That means a lot of jobs for a lot of pilots, a lot of small charter lines, mechanics and support crews.

    With tax proposals like this one, one wonders if Obama’s long range goal is gunning for the aviation industry to look like Detroit after the exodus of the automotive industry.

    How can business owners stay in business and create jobs when the government is steadily chipping away at the foundations of business?

    *Statistics according to General Aviation Manufacturers The General Aviation Manufacturers Association represents over 65 of the world’s leading manufacturers of fixed-wing general aviation airplanes, engines, avionics, and components. In addition to building nearly all of the general aviation airplanes flying today, GAMA member companies also operate aircraft fleets, airport fixed-based operations, pilot training, and maintenance facilities worldwide