Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the probable cause of the crash of a Maryland State Police (MSP) helicopter emergency medical services flight was the pilot’s attempt to regain visual conditions by performing a rapid descent and his failure to arrest the descent at the minimum descent altitude during a nonprecision approach.

On September 27, 2008, an Aerospatiale (Eurocopter), call sign Trooper 2 (N92MD), registered to and operated by the MSP as a public medical evacuation (medevac) flight, impacted terrain in District Heights, Maryland while on approach to Andrews Air Force Base (ADW). The pilot, one flight paramedic, one field provider, and one of two automobile accident patients being transported were killed. The other patient being transported survived with serious injuries from the helicopter accident and was taken to a local hospital.

The Board found that the pilot failed to adhere to instrument approach procedures when he did not prevent the helicopter’s descent at the MDA. The flight was cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach. After the initial call to the ADW tower, the pilot reported that he could not capture the glideslope and was on a localizer approach. The controller responded that her ILS equipment status display was indicating no anomalies with the equipment. Post accident tests confirmed no anomalies with the instrument approach equipment and testing of the helicopter’s navigation equipment did not find any deficiencies that would have precluded the pilot from capturing the glideslope.

Furthermore, the Board concluded that although the descent rate and altitude information were readily available through cockpit instruments which the pilot had access to, he likely became preoccupied with looking for the ground, which he could not identify before impact because of the lack of external visual cues. Since there were no recorders on board the accident helicopter, the Safety Board could not determine why the pilot did not use other options available to conduct a safe landing in instrument conditions.

Several contributing factors to the cause of the accident, the Board noted, were the pilot’s limited recent instrument flight experience, the lack of adherence to effective risk management procedures by the Maryland State Police, the pilot’s inadequate assessment of the weather, which led to his decision to accept the flight, the failure of the Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar Approach Control (PCT) controller to provide the current Andrews Air Force Base weather observation to the pilot, and the increased workload on the pilot due to inadequate Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control handling by the Ronald Reagan National Airport Tower and PCT controllers.

As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration, the MSP, Prince George’s County, and all public Helicopter Emergency Medical Service operators regarding pilot performance and training, air traffic control deficiencies, patient transport decisions, emergency response and FAA oversight.

A summary of the findings of the Board’s report will be available on the NTSB’s website at: http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm

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Media Contact: Keith Holloway (202) 314-6100
hollowk@ntsb.gov

In its continuing investigation of an Airbus A320 that overflew the Minneapolis-St Paul International/Wold-Chamberlain Airport (MSP), the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information: On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 5:56 pm mountain daylight time, an Airbus A320, operating as Northwest Airlines (NWA) flight 188, became a NORDO (no radio communications) flight at 37,000 feet. The flight was operating as a Part 121 flight from San Diego International Airport, San Diego, California (SAN) to MSP with 144 passengers, 2 pilots and 3 flight attendants.

Both pilots were interviewed separately by NTSB investigators yesterday in Minnesota. The following is an overview of the interviews:

The first officer and the captain were interviewed for over 5 hours combined.
The Captain, 53 years old, was hired in 1985. His total flight time is about 20,000 hours, about 10,000 hours of A-320 time of which about 7,000 was as pilot in command.
The First Officer, 54 years old, was hired in 1997. His total flight time is about 11,000 hours, and has about 5,000 hours on the A-320.
Both pilots said they had never had an accident, incident or violation.
Neither pilot reported any ongoing medical conditions.
Both pilots stated that they were not fatigued. They were both commuters, but they had a 19-hour layover in San Diego just prior to the incident flight. Both said they did not fall asleep or doze during the flight.
Both said there was no heated argument.
Both stated there was a distraction in the cockpit. The pilots said there was a concentrated period of discussion where they did not monitor the airplane or calls from ATC even though both stated they heard conversation on the radio. Also, neither pilot noticed messages that were sent by company dispatchers. They were discussing the new monthly crew flight scheduling system that was now in place as a result of the merger. The discussion began at cruise altitude.
Both said they lost track of time.
Each pilot accessed and used his personal laptop computer while they discussed the airline crew flight scheduling procedure. The first officer, who was more familiar with the procedure was providing instruction to the captain. The use of personal computers on the flight deck is prohibited by company policy.
Neither pilot was aware of the airplane’s position until a flight attendant called about 5 minutes before they were scheduled to land and asked what was their estimated time of arrival (ETA). The captain said, at that point, he looked at his primary flight display for an ETA and realized that they had passed MSP. They made contact with ATC and were given vectors back to MSP.
At cruise altitude – the pilots stated they were using cockpit speakers to listen to radio communications, not their headsets.
When asked by ATC what the problem was, they replied “just cockpit distraction” and “dealing with company issues”.
Both pilots said there are no procedures for the flight attendants to check on the pilots during flight.
The Safety Board is interviewing the flight attendants and other company personnel today. Air traffic control communications have been obtained and are being analyzed. Preliminary data from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed the following:

The CVR recording was 1/2 hour in length.
The cockpit area microphone channel was not working during this recording. However, the crew’s headset microphones recorded their conversations.
The CVR recording began during final approach, and continued while the aircraft was at the gate.
During the hours immediately following the incident flight, routine aircraft maintenance provided power to the CVR for a few minutes on several occasions, likely recording over several minutes of the flight.
The FDR captured the entire flight which contained several hundred aircraft parameters including the portion of flight where there was no radio communication from the flight crew. Investigators are examining the recorded parameters to see if any information regarding crew activity during the portion of flight where radio contact was lost can be obtained.

The Safety Board’s investigation continues.

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NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway
hollowk@ntsb.gov
(202) 314-6100

Geneva – The International Air Transport Association (IATA) reported international scheduled traffic results for September 2009. Passenger demand was essentially unchanged, increasing 0.3% compared to September 2008. Demand for international cargo was 5.4% below September 2008 levels. Load factors for passenger and cargo have returned to pre-crisis levels of 77.1% and 50.8%, respectively.

The apparent year-over-year improvement in demand is misleading. It is largely due to comparisons with an exceptionally weak September 2008 when traffic fell sharply (-2.9% for passenger and -7.7% for cargo). Seasonally adjusted statistics show a 0.3% drop in passenger volumes and a 1.4% fall in cargo volumes for September 2009 compared with August 2009. This reflects the pause seen in the economic recovery in the US and elsewhere in the past few months.

“It is far too early to call this a recovery. The worst may be over in terms of the fall in demand, but yields continue to be a disaster and costs are rising. The airline industry remains firmly in the red with a fragile business environment,” said Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s Director General and CEO.

Airlines continue to carefully manage capacity. Seasonally adjusted passenger capacity has remained unchanged throughout the year while cargo capacity has edged up only slightly in the last two months. Load factors have risen to pre-crisis levels which should help to correct the precipitous fall in yields (-14% for economy, -18% for premium and –20% in cargo).

Rising costs are a concern. As airlines adjust capacity to match demand, aircraft are flying fewer hours (-3% for some aircraft types). This is raising non-fuel unit costs. At the same time, oil prices have risen to above US$75 per barrel (Brent) considerably higher than the US$43 per barrel level at the start of the year.

International Scheduled Passenger Demand

Passenger demand is now 5% better than the low point reached in March 2009, but 6% below the peak recorded in early 2008.
Asia-Pacific carriers recorded the most significant improvement, from -1.6% in August to +2.1% in September. Bucking the global trend, seasonally adjusted passenger volumes grew almost 1% from August to September. Three factors are influencing this relative strength. Government stimulus packages in the major economies are driving production increases, the region’s banking system is relatively strong and the region’s consumers are not as burdened by debt as those in Europe and the US.
By contrast, European carriers saw a deterioration in demand from -2.8% in August to -4.2% in September. This partly reflects a loss of market share by network carriers on short-haul routes to low-cost carriers. More significantly, there has been a deterioration in demand on long-haul routes. For routes to Asia, this appears to be the influence of “home-carrier-bias” which has seen Asia-Pacific carriers reap the benefit of stronger regional economies. On routes to North America, lower demand in general is related to the dip in consumer and business confidence in economies on both sides of the North Atlantic.
North American carriers saw demand largely unchanged (-2.4% in September compared to -2.5% in August). This flattening-out is related to a dip in consumer and business confidence.
Middle Eastern carriers experienced an 18.2% year-on-year increase in September. This was distorted by the shifting of the Ramadan period, which started in August 2009, compared with September last year. Growth is driven primarily by market share gains on long-haul routes via Middle Eastern hubs. Weaker oil revenues continue to depress economic growth and travel within the region.
Latin American carriers experienced a jump in demand from -2.3% in August to +3.4% in September based on relatively robust regional economies.
African carriers also saw a marginal improvement from -4.9% in August to -4.2% in September. While African economies have been relatively resilient in the recession, the region’s carriers continue to struggle to maintain market share.
International Scheduled Cargo Demand

Cargo traffic is 12% above the December 2008 low point, but remains 17% below the early 2008 peak.
Middle Eastern carriers showed the strongest performance of any region with a 3.6% year-on-year improvement.
Latin American carriers also reported growth of 1.8%, but this was a decline from the previous month’s growth of 3.9%.
Carriers in Asia-Pacific, Europe and North America recorded improvements over August performance, but remained in negative territory at -3.1%, -13% and -5.0% respectively. Improvements were broadly in line with improved economic activity in each region.
African carriers’ cargo operations declined further into negative territory from -5.1% in August to -6.9% in September.
The UK Air Passenger Duty hike is the wrong response to the industry trauma. “The policies of some governments in light of the industry’s trauma are disappointing. The UK is a case in point of a government detached from reality. The global economic crisis makes cost reduction a matter of survival. And the upcoming Copenhagen meeting on climate change demands attention on measures to reduce emissions. What is the UK government doing? From 1 November it is increasing its Air Passenger Duty (APD) to collect GBP 2.5 billion annually from air travelers in the name of the environment. They have it all wrong. Taxes won’t reduce emissions. And making travel more expensive will not stimulate the economy,” said Bisignani.

The GBP 2.5 billion APD is completely disproportionate to the GBP572 million that it would cost to offset the entire carbon footprint of UK aviation. “Charging travelers over four times for their emissions makes absolutely no sense. Instead of raising taxes, the UK government should get behind the aviation industry’s ambitious targets to fight climate change, namely (1) improving fuel efficiency by an average of 1.5% annually to 2020, (2) stabilizing emissions from 2020 with carbon neutral growth and (3) cutting net emissions in half by 2050 compared to 2005 levels,” said Bisignani.

View full September traffic results

For more information, please contact:

Anthony Concil
Director Corporate Communications
Tel: +41 22 770 2967
Email: corpcomms@iata.org