Airworthiness Directive: Life

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    Singapore Airlines Emergency Landing

    The Singapore Airlines Airbus A330-300 en route from Singapore Dhaka with 105 passengers and 12 crew aboard diverted to Bangkok when they got an internal flight warning. There were no injuries.

    In spite of the cargo fire suppression system, there was a burning smell and a fire.

    The plane made a safe landing in Bangkok. The plane taxied to the gate, and passengers disembarked and were provided hotel accommodations, meals and transferred to another airline.

    An investigation is underway.

    Singapore Airlines’ spokesman, Nicholas Ionides said that “Flight SQ446 operating between Singapore and Dhaka diverted to Bangkok as a result of indications of smoke from the aircraft’s rear cargo hold.”

    When Thai authorities clear the Airbus, it will be flown back to Singapore.

    In George’s Point of View


    It has been well documented that Airbus and Boeing are taking different paths regarding their approach on batteries.

    But still, it is one of my least favorite things to read (especially while I’m halfway to Singapore) that there has been yet another cargo fire at all, regardless of what kind of plane it is on.

    At least I had time to jot down some thoughts.

    I hope that the media shines as bright a light on this airbus cargo fire as it has recently on the Dreamliner battery situation. Sure, the Dreamliner is developing new technology and Boeing is responsible for going the distance to keep new developments safe. The Dreamliner battery issue is new. But the fact that Boeing is developing new technologies and new solutions does not provide Airbus and an established plane like a A330-300 a free ticket when it comes to combustion.

    Hopefully Airbus is paying attention to all problems and not getting too cocky. It should remember and respect that a plane is still an air-filled bubble hundreds of feet in the air. Until people develop their own wings, random combustion situations like cargo fires on an Airbus A330 are just as potentially hazardous situation–if not more so–than any battery incident that actually occurred on the ground.

    Let us please see a fix for this problem.

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    Joy Flight Steals Joy

    Before the Sukhoi Superjet smashed into a ledge on Wednesday, killing 45 people and raining debris down the slopes of Mount Salak, I had never heard the term “joy flight.”

    The “joy flight” is the airline equivalent of you going down to the Ferrari dealership and taking a test drive. Or it would be if you were being driven in the Ferrari for fifty minutes or so, in a party atmosphere courted along with a bunch of other potential buyers.

    The “joy flight” is a selling tool for the manufacturer. They host this ride for potential buyers to show off the features and quality/qualities of a new plane they are trying to sell.

    Until the black box is recovered (we hope one was on the plane!), we won’t have any idea if the pilots had been asked to “buzz” the mountain, or if their request to fly low was a response to the heavy cloud cover. United Aircraft Corporation which built the Superjet says that pilot Alexander Yablontsev (who had logged 10,000 hours in Sukhoi prototypes) was their best test pilot, and had overseen “everything from the designing of the aircraft to its certification.”

    Buzzing mountains renowned as an airline graveyard would not be the smartest thing to do, but everyone does wonder why the pilots requested to lower their altitude right over Mount Salak. Family members are already protesting the hazardous route that had been planned for the demonstration flight.

    There were 35 Indonesians, 8 Russian crew members, 1 French and 1 American.

    The American, Peter Adler was a consultant for Sriwijaya Air, a domestic Indonesian carrier. Adler had been born in São Paulo, Brazil to Auschwitz survivors, grew up in Los Angeles and leaves behind a wife Randi, and family.

    Joy flight is a cruelly ironic term. In catastrophic loss of life cases, loss of joy can be considered part of the damages, as families inevitably remain haunted by the loss of their loved ones.

    We offer our condolences, but we know how insufficient that is, as relatives are only beginning the harsh journey of grief that begins with shock and a sense of immeasurable loss.

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  • Safe But Not Safe Enough: Helicopter Crash Reduction

    International Helicopter Safety Team is a task force composed of American and European government agencies–an international safety team–forecasts to reduce the rate of helicopter crashes 80 percent within eight years, no doubt a good idea as helicopters crash three times more frequently than commercial airliners

    Seventy percent of helicopter crashes are determined to be the result of human error (training, overwork or poor design)

    Partial list of Fatal crashes in 2008
    Date ——– Location ——– Craft ——–#

    12/27/2008 Honiara, PO HUGHES 369 N104BN Fatal(1)
    12/11/2008 Sabine Pass, TX BELL 206 N180AL Fatal(5)
    11/16/2008 Lingen, Germany Rotorway PH-NTL Fatal(1)
    11/16/2008 Quitman, AR BELL OH-58C N153GF Fatal(1)
    11/2/2008 Gallatin, TN Robinson R-44 N300FX Fatal(1)
    10/16/2008 Dryden, NY Robinson R22 N943MH Fatal(1)
    10/15/2008 Aurora, IL BELL 222 N992AA Fatal(4)
    10/13/2008 Conroe, TX BELL 206 N6ZV Fatal(2)
    10/13/2008 Sedona, AZ BELL 407 N42AZ Fatal(1)
    9/27/2008 Forestville, MD AEROSPATIALE AS365 N92MD Fatal(4) 0
    9/21/2008 Kenosha, WI Robinson R44 II N999ZD Fatal(2)
    9/6/2008 Muzino Village, Russia Robinson R-44 RA-04180 Fatal(2)
    9/3/2008 Persian Gulf, United Arab Emirates Bell 212 A6-AVL Fatal(7)
    8/31/2008 Greensburg, IN Bell 206L-1 N37AE Fatal(3)
    8/29/2008 Ridgedale, MO Robinson R44 II N41411 Fatal(2)
    8/17/2008 Olalla, WA Robinson R-22 N301MA Fatal(1)
    8/6/2008 Alice Arm, Canada Hughes 369D C-GZIO Fatal(3)
    8/5/2008 Weaverville, CA Sikorsky S-61N N612AZ Fatal(9)
    7/19/2008 Price, UT Hughes 369D N400BE Fatal(3)
    7/15/2008 Salesville, AR Hughes 269B N469E Fatal(2)
    7/4/2008 Sunol, CA Schweizer 269 C-1 N2011A Fatal(2)
    6/29/2008 Flagstaff, AZ Bell 407 N407GA Fatal(7)
    6/29/2008 Flagstaff, AZ Bell 407 N407MJ Fatal(7)
    6/8/2008 Huntsville, TX Bell 407 N416PH Fatal(4)
    5/29/2008 Panama City, Panama Bell UH-1N SAN-100 Fatal(11)
    5/25/2008 Sunrise Beach, MO McDonnell Douglas 500-E N686F Fatal(1)
    5/24/2008 Avalon, CA Aerospatiale AS-350-D N67GE Fatal(3)
    5/16/2008 Comstock, MI Fairchild Hiller FH-1100 N5049F Fatal(1)
    5/10/2008 La Crosse, WI Eurocopter Deutschland EC 135 T2+ N135UW Fatal(3)
    5/9/2008 Muanda, Congo Bell 206 L-1 N5014V Fatal(1)
    4/30/2008 Paraty, Brazil Agusta/Westland A109S PR-IPO Fatal(2)
    4/28/2008 Bartlett, TX Robinson R44 N477SH Fatal(1)
    4/15/2008 Chickaloon, AK Eurocopter France AS350B2 N213EH Fatal(4)
    3/13/2008 Wilmington, NC Robinson R22 Beta II N2215R Fatal(1)
    3/11/2008 Santa Cruz, Peru Bell 412EP N417EV Fatal(10)
    3/2/2008 Nizhnevartovsk, Russia Robinson R-44 II RA-04223 Fatal(2)
    2/13/2008 Gascoyne Junc, Australia Robinson R44 VH-ZDP Fatal(2)
    2/8/2008 Totes Gebirge, Austria Bell 206B OE-XRH Fatal(2)
    2/5/2008 S. Padre Island, TX Eurocopter France AS350B2 N911VA Fatal(3)
    1/25/2008 Los Angeles, CA Robinson R22 N705JJ Fatal(1)
    1/22/2008 Ochopee, FL Robinson R44 N18HB Fatal(2)
    1/11/2008 Puebla, Mexico Bell 412HP XC-JCD Fatal(8)
    1/7/2008 Zuzenhausen, Germany Bell 206B D-HJET Fatal(1)

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    When Lady Luck Turns Away

    Incidents and Accidents.

    Behind every accident, there are many incidents. Accidents may be defined as involving fatalities and incidents as those many smaller events seemingly unconnected from any others. The importance of incidents has gotten little respect but for two obscure references. The industry recognized Heinrich Pyramid says “…. for every accident that causes a major injury, there are 29 accidents that cause minor injuries and 300 accidents that cause no injuries.”

    A 2005 Rand Report drawing attention to NTSB databases said “…(there is) poor control of information, part of resolving more complex accidents depends upon a thorough knowledge of prior incidents, the number of major airline incidents the FAA reported in 1997 was ten times the number of major accidents, (there is) neither oversight nor an emphasis on accuracy in the collection and maintenance of NTSB records, as a result, the accuracy of most of the NTSB data sources was rated as “poor” and although the NTSB does examine a significant number of major incidents, only a small portion of the NTSB’s aviation resources are focused on incident events.”

    Rand report Link >
    http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1122.pdf

    See page 38 –40.

    Key Public Databases – NTSB and FAA. Gaps Compromising Safety Assessments.

    The NTSB’s most public source of records is the accident/incident database.

    It is cited in the FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS), Airworthiness Directives (ADs), risk/analysis studies, and in DOT/GAO Reports to congress.

    In my various surveys along major safety issues (uncontained engine explosions, un-commanded rudder movements, shutdowns due to engine main bearing failures, or smoke/fire incidents, the NTSB data contains about 20 % of what is found in SDR data or other counterpart investigative agencies.

    Gaps in NTSB data are further compounded by similar gaps in SDR data. From
    1992 to 2002 four NTSB Safety Reccommendation Letters and the GAO had complained of such gaps. In 2010 and regarding data on windshield fires, an article said the “FAA said it was aware of 11 cases of fires in the planes over the past 20 years. However, Boeing has said it is aware of 29 incidents involving fire or smoke over the past eight years.’ Source link >
    http://www.news24.com/World/News/FAA-orders-Boeing-inspection-20100710 – bottom of article.

    1994. In 1994, The Department of Transportation Inspector General reported that between “46 and 98 percent of the data fields of inflight ‘service difficulty’ records are missing data.” From GAO/AIMD-95-27. 02/08/95. Data
    Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety Analysis
    Source Link >
    http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/ai9527.pdf

    From the House Hearing Electrical Safety. (Ref report 106-112, Thursday, October 5, 2000, Testimony of Alexis M. Stefani, assistant IG for auditing), said; “Third, of most concern to us is the health of this SDR system, itself. While the new rule (coding for wire issues) was intended to improve the data in the system, FAA must also insure that the reports that are provided to it are timely, and follow the guidance. We found, however, that the SDR system is not robust, and over the years, it has suffered from budget cuts with staffing going from twelve full-time to three full-time people. Weakness in this system reduces the reliability and usefulness of the data, and can impact FAA’s ability to do trend analysis.”
    Source Link >
    http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpw106-112.000/hpw106-112_1.HTM
    Page 47

    From a June 8, 2006 U.S./Europe International Aviation Safety Conference, FAA’s Flight Standards Service, Jim Ballough.spoke of “FAA’s growing concern over numerous reports of smoke/fumes in cockpit/cabin and that FAA data analysis indicates numerous events not being reported.” Source Link >
    http://www.faa.gov/news/conferences/2006_us_europe_conference/ See ‘Presentation
    ’ by Jim Ballough.
    650 Records Of “Smoke In The Cockpit” A Lack of Concern.

    Gary Stoller at USA Today did a good piece on “smoke in the cockpit”
    reports. Of some 650 records, the FAA/NTSB has but a fraction. The story highlights included; (that the) “issue happens roughly four times a month.

    Some experts say the problem is under-reported. FAA says there is “no safety benefit” to requiring systems to remove cockpit smoke. Smoke in a plane’s cockpit from electrical or other failures is reported an average of four times each month, a USA TODAY analysis finds.” Further that “In-flight fires left unattended “may lead to catastrophic failure and have resulted in the complete loss of airplanes,” the FAA warned. A flight crew “may have as few as 15-20 minutes to get an aircraft on the ground if the crew allows a hidden fire to progress without intervention.” USA Today

    Source http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/30/cockpit-smoke-airline-faa/3316429/

    33 records Of Insulation Blankets Fires. – How They Start.

    From my catalog of 78 Records of fire from 1983 to 2012 sourced from the NTSB, AAIB (Danish & UK), French BEA, FAA’s SDR databases, and a few media reports of records of accidents and incidents of fire. There is no central repository. There are 33 records where acoustic insulation (blankets) were specifically mentioned are listed. The issues of self-igniting and flammable wire insulations and of flammable blankets were now are co-mingled.

    Three modes of ignition are seen here: wire shorting/arcing, molten metal sprayed from faulting electrical relays and heating tapes. Most reports lack necessary detail, but seven incidents were seen from wires shorting/arcing.
    Some involved only a few wires; one powering coal closet lights. Molten Metal (spatter) comprised another 8. More importantly, within those reports were references to another 19 (but without details) and that the NTSB said; the relays involved were not “substantially different from the receptacles used on other transport-category airplanes.”

    Ignition from faulting heating tapes/ribbons was seen in another 4 reports – but there were more. In a November 14, 2002 Letter to the FAA, the Canadian Transport Safety Board (TSB) advised that; “heater ribbons are used extensively in transport category aircraft, including Boeing 707, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 767 series and Boeing (Douglas) DC-9, DC-10, and MD-11 aircraft. ” From a TSB report of such fires on 747s and a 767, four other reports were disclosed. The TSB added; “The standard Boeing 767 incorporates 26 heater ribbons. Between June 1985 and June 2002, operators of Boeing aircraft made a total of 67 reports to Boeing of heater ribbon failures where thermal degradation was evident.” From one Delta MD-88 fire in 1999, the NTSB said; “DAL conducted a fleet wide examination of their MD-88/MD-90 fleet to ascertain the condition of their static port heaters. Eight heaters were found with evidence of thermal damage on their wires and or connectors.” There are 8 ADs, and 24 additional SDRs describing burn marks or fire damage. (ref King Survey ‘History Heater Blanket/Tape Fires’.)

    In 2002, the FAA concluded that “in-flight Fires In Hidden Areas are a risk to aviation safety – most hidden fires are caused by electrical problems – non-compliance with Safety Regulations have been uncovered. Fire safety problems and improvements are in various stages of correction and study” and that “it is impossible to predict the relative risk of serious fires occurring in Hidden Areas or Locations”. Source Link >
    http://www.caasd.org/atsrac/meeting_minutes/2002/2002_01_Fire-Safety-in-Hidden-Inaccessible-Areas.pdf

    Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit.

    In June 2013 a GAO Report to Congress cited but one record of ‘Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit’ (in 1973). The input came from the NTSB and the FAA. Contrary to that, a Specialist Paper by the Royal Aeronautical Society detailed seven. Only two were in the NTSB databases – but with no mention of ‘continuous smoke.’

    Links > GAO-13-551R, Jun 4, 2013. FAA Oversight of Procedures and Technologies to Prevent and Mitigate the Effects of Dense, Continuous Smoke in the Cockpit.
    http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-551R

    Link > Royal Aeronautical Society – Smoke, Fire and Fumes in Transport Aircraft. Second Edition 2013, Part 1, Past History, Current Risk, And Recommended Mitigations. A Specialist Paper prepared by the Flight
    Operations Group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. March 2013

    http://flightsafety.org/files/RAESSFF.pdf

    In Lady Luck We Trust ? – Those ‘Lucky’ Ground Incidents.
    Often heard whenever the safety of our air transportation system is questioned is that we have an enviable safety record due to the industry, the FAA and the NTSB’s efforts. That is true if only actual deaths are counted.

    This boiler-plate response comes whenever issues of safety are raised, but something else is left unspoken: its conditional nature. It includes just the U.S. carriers, and is based on the records kept. However, there have been no less than 6 events where fires occurred on the ground and caused significant damage, or loss of the airframes. Fire departments intervened in five.

    What if, instead, over 900 lives had been lost over the past 12 years ?
    For example:

    (1) Aug 8, 2000, AirTran DC-9-32 – fire and blistering of aircraft skin, 63 on board.

    (2) Nov 29, 2000, a DC-9-32 by AirTran (97 on board).

    (3) Same Day, Nov 29, 2000, a DC-9-82, American Airlines (66 on board) ,
    blankets burned, emergency evacuation on taxiways – 97 on board”.

    (4) June 28, 2008, ABX 767 freighter burned through the fuselage and was destroyed at the gate, (“The risk of an in-flight fire and the propagation of a fire in those areas is essentially the same whether the airplane is equipped to fly passengers or cargo” says the FAA). Approximate 767 capacity is 190 people.

    (5) July 29 2011, Egypt Air 777, fire erupted and burned a cockpit-widow
    sized hole through the fuselage. Emergency services put the fire out – 291 passengers were evacuated.

    (6) On October 14, 2012, a Corendon Airlines 737-800 had “substantial damage” from fire in the cockpit on the gate. 196 on board were evacuated. Had these fires broken at altitude or during the trans-oceanic crossing, all on board may have been lost.

    For the sum each of these fires found in the NTSB’s accident/incident database, over 900 lives were not lost. A more honest assessment and the credit for this remarkable safety record of no fatalities was not the FAA and industry abilities to manage and ‘mitigate risks’ – but rather the kindness of Lady Luck. But what can happen when lady Luck turns away ?

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  • Creaky Old News Leak

    George’s Point of View

    An out-of-date (circa May 2008) 93-page Transportation Security Administration federal airport screeners manual that tells U.S. airport screeners how to do their jobs was posted on a government jobs site. The government document had been edited in Adobe, but the edits were removable. Of course, the manual has been updated half a dozen times since that date.

    On the other hand, if you consider over time the number of ex-airport security screeners, the contents of that (out of date) manual is probably not exactly a national secret.

    Here’s an idea: maybe the Transportation Security Administration should leak some more old manuals to get seriously useless misinformation out there.

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    The Airbus “No Major Malfunction” Malfunction

    Rumors are multiplying. Now there is an unconfirmed rumor that the captain was absent from the cockpit at the time of the event.

    In NOT a Flight of Imagination , we did not go into depth about the false-rumor buzz initially created by the French publication “Le Figaro” which is owned by Dassault Group. (i.e. vested interest.) It has already been released that an Airbus rep who is in on the AF 447 black box decoding had obtained permission to send out a telex indicating:

    …no immediate action is required as a result of preliminary data from the Air France Airbus A330 accident.

    Of course this is what Airbus is going to say. For all we know, they had that statement ready before they even looked at the tapes. Airbus is laying the groundwork. Don’t forget that this is a criminal case in the French court. One does not need a crystal ball to see that this is going to be very expensive for Thales and Airbus and Air France. And of course, the size of compensation payouts for the victim’s families be determined by the extent of blame of the involved parties.

    From this quote, a thousand rumors sprang, based on every possible interpretation of that one statement. Although the initial Airbus statement was approved by the BEA, the interpretations were disapproved of by the BEA who followed up saying that Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories.

    The telex does not rule out pitot tube icing, currently a suspected factor in the crash. But Airbus is positioning itself already to blame dead pilots who cannot defend themselves. They want to take the court of public opinion as far as possible away from potential design flaws, manufacturing shortcuts, etc. However, this is not a wise move if they really consider it. The entire bastion of Airbus Fly By Wire theory is that they make “pilot proof” planes.

    So, how in the same breath, can they say their planes are pilot-proof and that they crashed due to pilot error? According to their own hype, If the plane itself is pilot-proof, then it can not crash due to pilot error. It HAD to crash due to “other than pilot” error.

    As I understand it, no matter what happens on this fly-by-wire model, if there is a problem, the pilots are shut out of being able to fix it anyway.

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