Ethiopia Flight 409: Dubious Claims Circulate the Blognet

There’s a general consensus among the people who deal with terrorists that terrorists like to take credit for disasters, even when they’re not responsible for them. Ownership of violence is part of the whole extremist “psych-you-out “ ideology. To claim responsibility for an act one did not do to is to “claim” one for the malevolent gipper, to make one appear more powerful, especially when actually helpless, and/or to appease whomever one is confessing to with false collateral by churning out false confessions.

But consider this: if I say I am Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny, it does not mean I am Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny. Legally, it’s going to take more than tall talking and word of mouth to establish that claim in court. It will take heavy duty concrete proof to make that claim stand up in a court of law. The head of the Engineering Department at the BEA (France’s version of the NTSB, the Investigation and Analysis Bureau) Christophe Ménez said in an interview … that evidence shows that last month’s Ethiopian plane crash was not a result of an explosion. “The fuselage and other heavy parts, such as the engine, all sank together, and the plane’s wreckage was in close proximity, which indicates that the airliner did not explode. ”

The investigation of Ethiopia Airlines Flight 409 so far does not develop a case for terrorism having anything to do with causing the crash. But even if it were true (and we don’t think it is), the primary liability rests with the operator, Ethiopia Airlines. This is not a legal opinion, just my own opinion.

Now let’s speculate. If it were a terrorist act, it might derail a law suit against component manufacturers in the United States, but an experienced lawyer would tell us that if an act of terror downed the plane, it would not budge legal claims against Ethiopia Airlines. Under the various treaties that govern air travel, the operator has the primary responsibility for that innocent passenger who paid good money to get on that plane.

The big news services are not the source of this claim; it looks like it is coming from a blog network, so it appears to be a rumor rather than fact, or a rehash or repost of an earlier theory. There is no plausible evidence of sabotage.

But we are still hoping for more evidence, and for the families, more remains, to be discovered by the Odyssey Explorer in the ongoing marine search for definitive evidence.

The terrorism theory has already been postulated and discarded once so I don’t give much credence to it. But more than anything, I regret seeing these things crop up to stress the victims families even more. They’ve already been through too much; and the investigation is going to take a long time. They have a long way to go.

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    Registros de voz e dados, não um Voo da Imaginação.

    Ler em Inglês
    Na insistente busca pela verdade dos fatos por trás do voo 447 da Air France, não faz diferença o porquê de o “Le Figaro” ter publicado rumores e factóides como se verdades o fossem, logo após o BEA ter anunciado em paris que todos os dados (gravador e voz e gravador de dados) puderam ser recuperados.

    Não importa se o “Le Figaro” está mais interessado em aumentar a tiragem de jornais, que na veracidade, legitimidade e validade das notícias publicadas;

    Pode ser que alguém no “Le Figaro”, com grandes investimentos na Airbus, tenha a expectativa de falsamente aumentar as cotações da companhia. Nós não temos a menor ideia de quais sejam seus motivos.

    O que importam são os fatos.
    O que importa é que, com a recuperação dos dados das caixas-pretas, as informações parecem estar intactas (segundo o BEA).
    O que importa é que as equipes de recuperação de dados foram capazes de abrir, recuperar, limpar e secar os cartões de memória, recuperando os dados reais.

    Não há motivo para os dados não coincidirem com o que já foi apurado pelo sistema ACARS, o qual indica uma falha dos tubos de pitot que, dando início a uma sequência catastrófica de eventos mecânicos, inevitavelmente culminaram em uma falha total do sistema.

    Acreditamos que a aeronave entrou em estol e caiu 35.000 pés em direção ao oceano. Se o BEA tivesse levado isso em conta, eles teriam encontrado a aeronave em semanas.

    O avião enviou mensagens automatizadas, de onde se pode deduzir a sequência dos acontecimentos.

    É um FATO conhecido que os sistemas mecânicos a bordo do voo 447 da Air France eram os sistemas padrão dos Airbus A330: uma tecnologia “fly-by-wire” que é conhecida por retirar a responsabilidade e as ações das mãos dos pilotos em determinadas situações. Um sistema fly-by-wire altera os comandos dados pelo piloto conforme parâmetros internos de controle.

    Os pilotos que operam esse tipo de sistema fly-by-wire ficam impossibilitados de desligá-lo manualmente, no caso de tubos de pitot congelados começarem a transmitir dados incorretos. A teoria atual é que, durante o voo 447 da Air France, os tubos defeituosos fabricados pela Thales passaram a transmitir dados incorretos para os sistemas de bordo. Um desastre praticamente inevitável.

    (Em Setembro de 2009, a FAA emitiu uma orientação informando que “a utilização do modelo da Thales levou a relatos de discrepâncias nas indicações de velocidade quando em operação a altitudes elevadas e sob condições climáticas difíceis […], (as quais) […] poderiam resultar em limitações no controle da aeronave”.)

    Antes do recolhimento do conteúdo das caixas-pretas, os dados coletados apontavam para a seguinte série de eventos:
    Os tubos pitot da Thales são pequenos dispositivos afixados no exterior da aeronave que medem a velocidade do ar, mas que comprovadamente possuem tendência a congelar, o que embaralha os dados coletados. Em termos resumidos, o sistema da Airbus exige que a entrada de dados esteja correta para que o avião voe adequadamente. Quando os tubos congelados começaram a transmitir dados corrompidos, o sistema se tornou incapaz de controlar o voo. No modelo 330, em caso de falha, os pilotos não possuem meios para desligar manualmente os sistemas.

    Ninguém espera que as caixas pretas indiquem qualquer outra coisa. O que talvez se espere é um esclarecimento sobre os dados e uma possibilidade de se estudar os eventos, de modo a evitar que os mesmos se repitam.

    O BEA se opôs veementemente à especulação na mídia. Aliás, emitiu um comunicado especificamente apontando o “Le Figaro” como sendo o jornal sensacionalista que publicou informações inválidas. Eis o que foi dito pelo BEA:

    Segundo um artigo publicado no “Le Figaro”, na tarde do dia 16 de Maio de 2011, as “primeiras informações extraídas das caixas-pretas” estariam eximindo a Airbus no acidente com a aeronave A330, voo AF447, que vitimou 216 passageiros e 12 tripulantes em 1º de Junho de 2009.

    Publicações sensacionalistas de informações não confirmadas, enquanto que a analise dos dados recuperados mal começou, é uma desconsideração para com o respeito devido aos passageiros e tripulantes que pereceram, trazendo ainda mais sofrimento às famílias das vítimas, que já foram afligidas pelo alarde de muitas histórias sem fundamento.

    Voltamos a afirmar que, na estrutura dessa missão, na qualidade de autoridade investigativa de segurança, somente o BEA está autorizado a divulgar os progressos da investigação. Em consequência, quaisquer informações sobre a investigação de outras fontes é nula e desprovida de credibilidade, caso não tenha sido validada pelo BEA.

    A reunião de todas as informações extraídas das gravações de voz e dos parâmetros de voo nos dá agora uma certeza ainda maior de que todos os detalhes serão revelados com relação a esse acidente. Os investigadores de segurança do BEA passarão agora a analisar e validar uma grande quantidade de dados complexos. Trata-se de um trabalho longo e detalhado, e o BEA já anunciou que não divulgará nenhum relatório preliminar antes do verão.

    Nesse estágio das investigações, não é possível esboçar conclusão alguma.

    Portanto, apesar de respeitarmos nossos próprios especialistas, que seguem crendo no que já acreditavam (a partir das informações disponibilizadas sobre os tubos pitot e o sistema fly-by-wire), confiamos que a analise do BEA produzirá um sólido relatório dos dados e sabemos que o BEA não divulgou nenhuma conclusão nova até aqui.

    Reiteramos nossa posição, rejeitamos qualquer informação não validada, e concordamos que ninguém deveria se apressar a tirar conclusões, pelo menos não até que as autoridades desempenhem seu papel e comecem a analisar os dados que ninguém esperava que surgissem.

    Apesar de não descartarmos hipótese alguma nem rejeitarmos nenhuma linha de raciocínio, somos absolutamente refratários à miríade de desgostosos que, por mais que os fatos sejam absolutamente distintos em cada situação, sempre repetem o mesmo coro a cada acidente aéreo, culpando os pilotos mortos que são alvos fáceis e não podem se defender. Além disso, não vamos esquecer que quaisquer responsabilidades que recaiam sobre os pilotos são cobertas pela Convenção Internacional. Por isso, a despeito de qual tenha sido a verdadeira falha, as empresas aéreas preferem “erro do piloto”, pois isso significa menos dinheiro saindo de seus bolsos.

    A Convenção de Montreal impõe duas categorias de responsabilidades financeiras às empresas aéreas:

    – a primeira categoria prevê uma indenização automática e cobre 100.000 unidades de Direito de Saque Especial (US$ 155.000,00). A empresa aérea não pode argumentar contra reivindicações até este montante.

    – a segunda categoria lida com a parte da reivindicação que excede o limite de US$ 155.000,00. Uma empresa aérea só pode evitar a responsabilidade por essa parte se provar que não foi negligente nem cometeu qualquer outro tipo de falta. Para evitar ser responsabilizada, a empresa aérea deve provar sua isenção. Na verdade, a negligência de uma empresa aérea pode ser alegada das mais diversas formas, cabendo à empresa refutar cada alegação – um ônus quase impossível de ser cumprido.

    Se nós, analistas, podemos errar, erremos então por crer, até prova em contrário, que os pilotos eram confiáveis, honrados e absolutamente sólidos. Lembremo-nos de que eles também eram passageiros a bordo daquele voo, seres humanos que lutaram no melhor de suas habilidades contra as forças ou falhas que os derrubaram. Cremos que pilotos são homens valorosos, conhecedores do peso de seu ofício e cientes de que são responsáveis pelas vidas que transportam. E quando eles dão o melhor de si para sobreviver, mesmo diante de problemas mecânicos e de dificuldades da física, da natureza e do clima, é temerário e indigno culpá-los precipitadamente. É claro que pilotos podem errar, mas não vamos difamá-los com tais alegações sem dispor dos fatos.

    Mas ainda que consideremos um único ato, um reflexo tardio ou o enfrentamento das mais adversas condições, esses pilotos mortos, que tantas vezes recebem a culpa por serem alvos indefesos, são na verdade heróis mortos.

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    Stuttgart: Fokker Foam Landing Update


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Bernd Sturm

    What: ContactAir Fokker 100/Lufthansa en route from from Berlin Tegel to Stuttgart
    Where: Stuttgart
    When: Sep 14th 2009
    Who: 73 passengers including Franz Muentefering and 5 crew (6 injury/issues)
    Why:
    Update:
    According to news releases quoting Lufthansa, the Stuttgart emergency landing on Sept. 14 was “probably caused by a valve part that came loose and blocked the landing gear’s hydraulic system.”
    “Part of a valve came loose internally and blocked a hydraulic line…It worked like a stopper.”

    George’s Point of View

    Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance. It’s a 14 year old plane. Should I repeat “maintenance” 14 times? It’s not as if the plane were self-aware and could tighten or replace its own valves.

    The plane’s last inspection was in August, prior to Contact Air acquiring the plane. Even if Contact Air is not legally required to perform a post-purchase inspection, it seems like it would be a reasonable thing for a new owner to do.

    If this were a used car purchase, would we take it for an inspection with our own mechanics, and to get tags?

    See archives:

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    Will Boeing Switch to Electrical Inquiry?


    Here’s what is bothering me:

    It’s no secret how planes are tested before they are released, to the very extreme so how did this electrical problem issue by the testing? Is my favorite plane manufacturer taking short cuts in quality control?

    The Japan Boeing 787 Dreamliner was delivered on Dec. 20 and had only flown 169 flight hours and 22 flights when one of its two lithium ion batteries caught fire.

    Is the investigation going to turn from the battery to the problem referenced by the whistleblower?

    Battery found not at fault by Safety Investigators in JAPAN

    But is GS Yuasa really off the hook?

    Battery questions:

    • If the battery was too hot, why didn’t it burn up on hours 1-169?
    • If the battery failed, what caused it to catch fire on the 22nd flight? Why that flight?
    • If the battery (which is a backup system replacing post flight hydraulics) only operates on the ground and is only engaged on the ground, why are flights grounded? If the battery is only at use on the ground, is it an actual flight risk or a post-flight risk?
    • Is the solution going to be simply going to the other type of lithium ion battery (nickel metal-hydride technology), or will components or the whole system be replaced?
    • Was this simply a GS Yuasa quality control failure, a batch of bad batteries manufactured by GS Yuasa of Japan in September 2012?

    The entire 787 fleet is grounded. Replacing the battery system might be a “quick” fix but certification could last a year.

    A large format battery can generate heat faster than it dissipates.

    Is venting the battery and monitoring the vents a viable temporary solution that could keep the planes in the air until a system alternative has been certified within the year?

    The current batteries are “prone to spontaneous combustion due to ‘organic electrolyte which makes it volatile and flammable.'”

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  • Remembering September 11, 2011, Long May We Wave

    This day we are threatened by nature. Yesterday, the winds of Hurricane Harvey hammered Texas, and tomorrow Irma will be slamming Florida. It is a storm we will weather. We know we will, because we have lived through worse. We must remember this, because today is September tenth. And September 11, 2011 is a date no American can forget, marked as it is by four scars that will never heal. Four hijacked airliners carved the names of nearly three thousand victims into our memories, names written in blood. Three thousand names with more than three thousand families—and that is not even adding the number of injured, the number of rescuers, all losses that destroyed the innocence of our country. We were initiated on that day into a sad new world, scarred by tragedy that turned the sky from blue to red. How could we understand what was going on? The mass murder of our people, the senseless destruction, the planes crashing, buildings burning before our eyes. I’m just an ordinary guy. When it happened, I was bewildered by it all.

    On Sept 11, this day, in 2011, Flight 11 and Flight 175 hit the twin towers.

    The tragedy was filmed as it happened. We were glued to our screens, helpless, terrorized, mesmerized along with the international audience, the terrible scenes of desperate people making impossible choices: die in the burning towers, or jump to the unforgiving pavement. We cried, but we did not cry alone. The world cried with us.

    American Airlines Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, 64 aboard the plane and 125 in the impact, all fatalities.

    On Flight 93, we saw our people become heroes. We learned of Burnett, Beamer, and Bradshaw, of passengers fighting the hijackers. “Are you guys ready? Let’s roll.” They rolled into history as heroes. How many lives they saved by their actions—an incalculable number—and these were passengers who acted against the hijackers knowing they would lose their own.

    Children of today who ride airplanes are accustomed to today’s security protocols. It must be impossible for them to believe that there was a time when we simply walked aboard. There was no threat. But these days are different. We live in a world that irrevocably changed that day. It is a day we can never forget.

    We tightened our belts.
    We sharpened our defenses.
    And we are not alone in this. The whole world is a more vigilant place.

    The twin towers were a symbol of our prosperity, a couple of the world’s greatest buildings in one of the world’s greatest cities; and though the towers stand no more, our cities and our country goes on. The Pentagon was rebuilt. A Pennsylvania park commemorates the heroes of Flight 93.

    I certainly mourn those who were lost on September 11; and I feel for the families of the injured, as I believe we all do. I may mourn our loss of innocence, but I can also take pride that we stand now, scarred perhaps, but stronger because of what we have survived. We have taken measures to make our world safer, but we can never relax our vigilance. We can never such a thing to happen to us again. On the ashes of the towers, we rebuilt. Some of us are still rebuilding. On the ashes of history, we rise.

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    NTSB: No Rush to Judge

    George’s Point of View

    As urgent as the idea of an NTSB recommendation sounds, there is apparently no rush. The latest NTSB safety recommendation to EASA is rooted in a 2001 crash: American Airlines Airbus Flight 587. (see narrative below)

    Probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. (i.e. The pilot used the rudder and it fell off.)

    (To put this into simplistic car terms, your car just skidded on some ice. You did some fancy and extreme steering which may or may not have been necessary. And the steering wheel just came off in your hands. Pretty much all you can do now is spectate and die.)

    The pilot’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal input was based on a violent wake turbulence encounter. The pilot’s “unnecessary and excessive” rudder pedal input broke the rudder.

    Isn’t this a dubious conclusion? Isn’t this like blaming a car crash on a driver hitting brakes too hard? The airbus had just taken off and encountered turbulence. Since when do flight controls not handle “aggressive input”?

    Initial suggestions included pilot retraining. (I.E. don’t fix the problem, train the pilots to work around it.) This month, the NTSB encouraged modification of European certification standards. In other words, the NTSB wants to physically limit the rudder movement to what the design can safely manage. Maybe that makes more sense than expecting a pilot engaged in a desperate struggle to save a failing plane to have to make accommodations for flighty flight controls.

    Some take the angle that the problem lies in the rudder design and/or composition. In 2001, the FAA was one of those so inclined.

    On November 16, 2001, the FAA issued emergency AD 2001-23-51 warning of failure of the vertical stabilizer-to-fuselage attachment fittings, transverse (side) load fittings, or rudder-to-vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, if not corrected, could result in loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or rudder and consequent loss of control of the airplane. The FAA considers that, before structural failure, it may be possible to detect indications of possible failure modes that could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane. These indications include edge delaminations, cracked paint, surface distortions, other surface damage, and failure of the transverse (side) load fittings. Similarly, indications of failure of the rudder assembly, which could lead to failure of the vertical stabilizer, may also be detectable with such an inspection.

    This failure has happened more than once.

    In the Air Transat flight 961 incident (also a 300 series Airbus) out of Varadero, Cuba, the rudder disintegrated. The pilot in that flight questions the integrity of the rudder design and composition.

    Here another point that has been commonly made. Aircraft have had rudders made of aluminum for 70 years without them disintegrating. With high tech composites, planes are falling out of the sky.

    In March 2006, US safety investigators recommended rudder inspections on Airbus A300-600 jets because a FedEx A300-600 rudder damaged during maintenance.

    Tested on the ground by Fed Ex engineers, in the Fed-Ex A300 cargo plane, the hydraulic system which actuates the rudder tore a hole around the hinges exactly where the rudders of both flight 961 and flight 587 did. Coincidence? I think not.

    Does the certification process need an overhaul? I think so.

    Have a couple of dead pilots again become convenient scapegoats for/by using the very computer controlled flight control system that they believed protected them? I bet I know what the pilots think.

    Flight 587, Official NTSB narrative of the crash
    On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful.

    Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700.

    About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

    Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes.

    The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, “your leg, you check the rudders.” (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, “rudders check.” The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

    About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

    About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, “you have the airplane.”

    About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, “you happy with that [separation] distance?” About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, “we’ll be all right once we get rollin’. He’s supposed to be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s the idea.” About 0913:46, the first officer said, “so you’re happy.”

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220º. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain’s statement “clean machine,” indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

    About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a 0.04 G drop in longitudinal load factor, a 0.07 G shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a 0.3 G drop in normal (vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0º (neutral) to 2º nose up, 2º nose down, and back to 0º; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18º right, 30º left, 37º right, 34º left, 5º left, 21º left, and 23º right, before moving to between 5º and 6º left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0º (neutral) to about 2º left, about 0.6º right, and back to 0º.

    During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane’s pitch angle increased from 9º to 11.5º, decreased to about 10º, and increased again to 11º. The airplane’s bank angle moved from 0º (wings level) to 17º left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to
    the WAVEY navigation intersection.

    At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, “little wake turbulence, huh?” to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, “yeah.” At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

    At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, “max power.” At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, “you all right?” to which the first officer replied, “yeah, I’m fine.” One second later, the captain stated, “hang onto it. Hang onto it.” The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer’s statement “let’s go for power please” at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer’s right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

    According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64º to the right at 0915:51.5, 78º (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64º to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78º to the left at 0915:56.5.

    The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11º to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane’s center of gravity (cg) was about 4º to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5º to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2º to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7º to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10º and 11º to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11º and 12º to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

    The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer’s statement, “holy [expletive].” At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, “what the hell are we into…we’re stuck in it.” At 0916:12.8, the captain stated, “get out of it, get out of it.” The CVR recording ended 2 seconds later. The airplane was located at 40º 34′ 37.59″ north latitude and 73º 51′ 01.31″ west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight.

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    Aviation Fatigue Regulation should Obey the Law of Common Sense


    In George’s Point of View

    I noticed today that Bloomberg’s Andre Zajac posted an article referencing William Voss, chief executive officer of the Alexandria, Virginia-based Flight Safety Foundation, who said “If anyone wants to advance safety through regulation, it can’t be done without further loss of life.”

    The point he was making is in reference the peculiar mechanism of aviation safety law.

    To go into effect, an aviation safety law must pass a cost-benefit analysis. This analysis is based on how much benefits outweigh cost (i.e. the cost of human lives). Where the problem occurs the recent fatigue rules exempt freight carriers. All-cargo operations are not required to abide by part rule p. 5-6, 15, 259. This is why IPA filed a Petition for Review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in order to challenge FAA?s exclusion of cargo operations from the final flight and duty time rule.

    Although the “FAA generally acknowledges that “factors that lead to fatigue are universal” (Rule p. 259) and that night-time operations (during pilots circadian lows) and operations that cross multiple time zones warrant stricter measures to guard against fatigue” cargo carriers are exempt.”

    Surely the FAA realizes that cargo pilots get just as tired as commercial jet pilots–perhaps more so because so many cargo flights are overnight flights.

    Does it really make sense to exempt all-cargo carrier pilots from fatigue regulations for financial reasons? Shouldn’t a rule governing pilot safety cover all pilots? Is an Airbus, Fokker, Antonov, Boeing 737 or 747 less destructive if it falls from the sky if it only has a payload and crew but no passengers?

    IPA Points.pdf

    Flight Member Duty Requirements.pdf

    FRMP Checklist.pdf

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