Airworthiness Directive
Federal Register Information
Header Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD;
Amendment 39-15952; AD 2009-12-51]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines
PDF Copy (If Available):

Preamble Information
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-12-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

DATES: This AD becomes effective July 15, 2009 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued on June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of July 15, 2009.
We must receive any comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to comment on this AD.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Contact Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15 for the service information identified in this AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 4, 2009, the FAA issued emergency AD 2009-12-51, that applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This condition, if not corrected, could result in uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

Relevant Service Information

We have reviewed and approved the technical contents of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, that describes procedures for visual inspections of affected reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections.

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, we issued emergency AD 2009- 12-51 to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. You must use the service information described previously to perform the actions required by this AD.

FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we have found that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable, and that good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately on June 4, 2009, to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. These conditions still exist, and we are publishing the AD in the Federal Register as an amendment to Section 39.13 of part 39 of the Code Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to make it effective to all persons.

Comments Invited

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send us any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD” in the subject line of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify it.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of the Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including, if provided, the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is the same as the Mail address provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

Under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

Regulatory Information

2009-12-51 Turbomeca S.A.: Amendment 39-15952. Docket No. FAA-2009- 0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD.

Effective Date

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 15, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines if modified by Turbomeca Modification TU332 and fitted with modules M05 as listed by serial number in Figure 1 of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter France AS350B, AS350BA, AS365N, AS350B1, AS350B2, Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK117-C1, Agusta A109K2, and Sikorsky S-76A+, S-76A++ and S-76C helicopters.

Unsafe Condition

(d) This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of the lubrication duct plug, followed by a rapid draining of the oil tank, without indication to the cockpit through low oil pressure warning. This condition can lead to uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

Compliance

(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

Initial Visual Inspection Before Further Flight

(f) Before further flight:
(1) Visually inspect the module M05 lubrication duct for oil leakage. Use paragraph 1.C.(1)(a), paragraph 2.A., and Figure 2 of Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the inspection.
(2) If oil leakage is found, repair the module M05 lubrication duct. Use paragraph 2.B.1, Figure 3, and Figure 4 in Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the repair.

Repetitive Visual Inspections

(g) If no oil leakage is found, repeat the visual inspection every four flight hours, or after the last flight of each day, whichever comes first.
(h) The actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD may be performed by the owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate, and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v).

Optional Terminating Action

(i) As optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections in paragraph (g) of this AD, repair the affected modules M05 as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

Alternative Methods of Compliance

(j) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

Related Information

(k) European Aviation Safety Agency emergency airworthiness directive 2009-0117-E, dated June 2, 2009, also addresses the subject of this AD.

Contact Information

(l) For further information, contact: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e- mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199, for more information about this AD.

Material Incorporated by Reference

(m) You must use Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to identify the serial numbers of modules M05 affected by this AD, and to perform the inspections and repairs required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You can get a copy from Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202- 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html.

Footer Information
Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 22, 2009.
Peter A. White,
Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E9-15277 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

From Canada, Bombardier CL-600 has been issued an airworthiness directive concerning failure of the air driven generator with an effective date: 13 August 2011

“The aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 use the same ADG generator control unit (GCU) as models CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19. However the aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 are installed with a different hydraulic pump and do not experience the same failure due to the low threshold setting of the circuit protection. However, it was found that the same ADG GCU transformer primary winding can break due to thermal fatigue. Broken transformer primary winding can prevent the supply of power from the ADG to the essential buses. In the event of an emergency, failure for the essential buses to remain powered can prevent continued safe flight.”

The corrective action is to replace within 10 000 hours air time or 60 months from the effective date of this directive. Whichever occurs first, remove and replace the ADG GCU Part Number (P/N) 604-90800-7 with a new ADG GCU P/N 604-90800-27.

SAIB: CE-11-06 Date: December 15, 2010

Introduction

SAIB: CE-11-06 Date: December 15, 2010

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, registered owners and operators of small airplanes, to follow established safety criteria, guidance, and data when modifying your aircraft with tires that are oversized compared to the original equipment Federal Aviation Administration- (FAA-) approved type design. Oversized tires have been FAA approved by supplemental type certificates (STC) and field approvals on numerous small aircraft types for an assortment of reasons, such as maintaining ground clearance when installing larger propellers or improving landing performance for unique conditions. These oversized tires have customarily been referred to as “Tundra” tires.

At this time, the FAA has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. Investigation of a recent accident highlights the need for reminding operators of part 23 certificated airplanes that oversized tire modifications require analysis and substantiation as well as periodic inspections to prevent unsafe conditions. This SAIB reiterates the criteria to apply when evaluating the use of oversized tires and for determining the appropriate requirements to obtain necessary FAA approval.

Background

Recently, there was a non-fatal accident involving an Allied Ag Cat Productions, Inc. (Ag-Cat) (also known as Schweizer) Model G-164B airplane (Type Certificate Data Sheet 1A16) equipped with the larger 29×11-10 tires. The aircraft encountered a wheel failure that caused a wheel brake to lock up, which resulted in the aircraft departing the runway, coming to rest in a ditch.

An investigation determined the likely failure sequence of the accident was due to an initial crack of unknown origin in the inner flange. The weakened flange allowed the larger pressurized tire to fail the flange at the crack. The wheel flange broke into several pieces 360 degrees around the wheel assembly circumference. The broken flange pieces pressed inward by the existing tire/tube pressure, contacted the calipers, and caused the wheel brakes to lock up. The aircraft subsequently left the runway and came to rest in a ditch. The facts provided from the initial on-site investigation were insufficient to determine the precise failure scenario.

Some G-164B aircraft have been modified with “Geared” Pratt & Whitney R-1340 engines having larger diameter propellers. With the reduced ground clearance these propellers tended to siphon up debris on unimproved airstrips when at flight attitude during take-off, thereby damaging the propellers. To improve ground clearance, some operators replaced the standard 8.50×10 tires with the larger 29×11-10 tires on the original Cleveland Wheel and Brake wheel part number 40-101. This practice subsequently continued with the turbo propeller configured aircraft. The larger tires on the 40-101 wheels reduced the running clearance between the tire sidewalls and the wheel brake calipers.

1We have not been able to identify a documented FAA approval to install these larger tires on the G-164B aircraft. However, an STC that authorizes the larger tire approval on similar aircraft (Air Tractor) has been issued. This STC has been used by operators and repair stations as a basis for field installations for the G-164B aircraft.

Recommendations

All operators of 14 CFR part 21, section 21.25 Restricted Category and 14 CFR part 23 Normal Category certificated airplanes that are currently operating with or may modify their aircraft to operate with oversized tires different from the aircraft’s approved type design, should acquire an STC or field approval supported by FAA-approved data with similar original equipment manufacturer (OEM) restrictions for installation, pressure, etc. before doing so. The approved data should include flight test requirements and their results as well as system design and structural analysis. Guidance for replacing OEM tires with oversized tundra tires is provided in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) AC 23-17B. The AC summarizes the results of flight tests recommended by National Transportation Safety Board and conducted by the FAA for evaluation of tundra tires installed on a Piper PA-18. In addition, the AC provides information of these tires as well as testing of their installation. Although the guidance in the AC is based specifically on the Piper Aircraft, Inc. PA-18, it identifies issues and guidance that can be extended to other airplane types equipped with oversized tires. The AC also identifies the possible performance effects and flight and ground handling characteristics that may be altered with the installation of the tundra tires. Potential propulsion system effects such as unusable fuel may be affected by changes in normal flying attitude. Review of all these potential effects as identified in AC 23-17B should be evaluated.

Before

installation of larger tires operators should do the following as a minimum:

1. Initially inspect wheels for cracks using an industry standard fluorescent penetrant process with annual inspections thereafter.

2. Install only approved vendor supplied tires. 3. Install new tubes. 4. Determine the appropriate tire pressure for your specific tire, aircraft, and aircraft operations

in consultation with the approved tire manufacturer and FAA Advisory Circular, AC 23-17B. 5. Check for clearance between the tire and brake components. 6. Check the tire pressure and abnormal wear at 2 week intervals or less.

Additional safety information to the public of potential problems associated with aircraft with oversized tires is also provided in Safety Alert for Operations (SAFO) 10007, dated 5/24/10. The SAFO provides recommended actions for persons interested in operating aircraft with oversized tundra tires as well as with skis, or wheel/ski installations.

Owners and operators of Restricted Category and Normal Category airplanes who intend to modify their aircraft with oversized tires should review the above documents for guidance and the issues to consider and evaluate when replacing the manufacturer’s recommended main landing gear wheels and/or tires with oversized replacements.

For Further Information Contact

Werner Koch, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Airplane Certification Office, ASW-150, 2601 Meacham Blvd, Fort Worth, TX 76137; phone: (817) 222-5133; fax: (817) 222-5960; e-mail: werner.g.koch@faa.gov.