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Pulling A Slater, Round Two

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  • Businessmen Beware the Air

    George’s Point of View

    Most business jet fatal accidents happen on approach. I suppose this means that it is fine for businessmen to fly but not to land. (Conclusions like this are why they never have me on any study committees.)

    But seriously, the latest Aviation study came out with these figures:

    • The fatal accident rate for air taxis is 3.49 per million flying hours
    • For corporate operations it is 0.24 per million
    • For owner-operated business jets it is 1.28 per million
    • The overall figure for all business jets flying civil operations is 1.45 per million flying hours.

      The fifty-nine fatal accidents under study show twenty-one occurred on ferry flights, seventeen on “private/business”, six carried cargo, five carried passengers, four were air ambulance flights, and three were training.

      Whether the problem is fatigue, pilot (or crew) training, plane maintenance, air traffic control, bureaucratic red tape, or gas-squeezing political policies, when the consensus is that more than half of these accidents are preventable, this is an indication that something is seriously wrong with Business Aviation.

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    Is Oxygen Hose Length an Issue?

    We talked about the May 16 cockpit fire on a United Boeing 757 (New York to Los Angeles) that made an emergency diversion to Dulles. That event involved an airborne cockpit fire so extreme that the pilot reached for the fire extinguishers to put out flames coming from his windshield—but he was brought up short by the length of the oxygen hose. In the smokey situation, it must have been a special concern to have the oxygen mask rip away from the pilot’s face. I can only assume there is other essential gear stored and unreachable due to the length of the hose, because I haven’t seen anyone talk about solving the hose length issue by moving the extinguishers closer.

    In fact, on some Boeing 757 and 767s the length of the hose attached to the pilot’s oxygen mask and smoke goggles is under scrutiny now by the FAA for being too short to reach the fire extinguishers. Apparently Boeing has resisted lengthening the hose because of the danger of the pilot getting tangled in the hose.

    Since the FAA is looking into the issue of the possibility of the hoses being too short, one can not help but wonder if this problem were a factor in the May 22 – Air India Express Flight 812 Boeing 737-800 crash at Mangalore International Airport, or the Jan 25 Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409 Boeing 737-800 that crashed into the Mediterranean Sea shortly after take-off from Beirut. How do we know that too-short hoses did not contribute to those tragic events?

    Conversely, if the 737 hose length is not too short and allows the pilot to reach where it essential for the pilot to reach, and there is no hose problem on the 737, then why has Boeing not corrected this problem on 757s and 767s?

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    United Airlines Airbus Emergency Landing in Newark


    Pictured: A United Airlines Airbus A319-131
    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer David J Transier

    What: United Airlines Airbus 319 en route from Chicago to Newark
    Where: Newark NJ
    When: Jan 10, 2010, 9:30 a.m.
    Who: 48 passengers 5 crew
    Why: On landing, the plane’s right gear failed to properly deploy. After maintaining a holding pattern attempting to extend the landing gear (etc), the pilot landed. It was, apparently a safe landing, causing airport delays but no reported injuries, not even during the slide evacuation.

    On landing, the plane lurched to one side; and the airport was closed down for safety concerns.

    George’s Point of View

    We have emergency landings all the time all over the world. This website attests to that. But after the year Airbus has had, whenever I hear there’s an Airbus incident, even if it is only a small one, my hair—what little I have—stands on end. I can’t help believing that they should take this plane back to the drawing board and start over.

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  • A Conceit of Accountability

    George’s Point of View

    Let me present you with a theoretical construct. Let me present you with a horse, and his rider. Let me introduce the horse, who at the beginning of this construct, is already dead. The horse in our fabrication, sadly, has already been ridden to death. And having fallen, the horse is reviled. His good reputation is being fouled, and he is no longer able to defend himself.

    And here is the question I mean to ask you:

    When you ride a horse to death, whose fault is it? Is it the fault of the horse, who has no choice but to do what he does? Is it the fault of the rider who drives the horse on? Any reasonable person would blame the rider, and rightly so. It is the rider who wields the crop, that drives the horse on when it would rest. The horse is just being a horse. Perhaps we might wonder why: why is the rider such a taskmaster? Is there some great cause involved? Is there some life or lives at stake? Is there a just cause that forces the rider to set such grueling standards?

    But I am getting ahead of myself. Putting the cart before the horse, if you’ll pardon the pun.

    Let me explain something unique about our horse. Our horse is not an ordinary horse; he is in a unique situation. He had a certain degree of choice. He had other options. He could, perhaps, have chosen to be a cow, or a rabbit. But his essential nature, his learning, his history, his hopes and dreams–they were the learning, history, hopes and dreams of a horse–a whole life lived to one pursuit of being a horse. This horse is a horse, I should say WAS a horse, because he wanted to be. So when he was asked to perform as a horse, he did. Even though the demands that were put on him were exhausting. Even though the scheduling was unreasonable. He was a horse working longer hours, with less rest than he needed, and he paid the price.

    So let us turn back to the rider. Why did the rider push so hard? Why is it the horse’s fault for falling to exhaustion, and not the rider’s fault, for driving him to it?

    In fact, look at the rider now—he’s back on another horse, riding this one just as hard. In fact, riding many horses, all driven to the same point of exhaustion. And there will be more horses falling, failing. It is inevitable.

    So, why is this rider pushing so hard?

    It always comes down to money. For the rider, having fewer horses is more cost effective. For the rider, horses are cheap. If one drops, who cares? There are many more where he came from. Why should the rider cater to the demands of the horse–so what if the horse would like shorter hours, better pay? If he wants to be a horse, he has to work like a horse, period.

    In fact, the rider could sponsor many more pilots, I mean, horses, divide the work load so that the ratio of work to worker was a reasonable load. But that option is not in the picture.

    I am guessing that you have figured out that I am not speaking about horses at all. I am speaking of fallen pilots. In fact, one pilot in particular, Zlatko Glusica, the Air India pilot who was in the cockpit of the Air India Express flight that crashed and killed 158 passengers. Reputations—his and that of his copilot—are being tarred, feathered and dragged through the mud. But the pilots were not alone in that fatal cockpit. There was a third seat, occupied by fatigue, and that third seat was put there by Air India policy.

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    FAA Focuses on Fixes to Aircraft Collision-Warning Systems

    After looking back at near-collision data the FAA collected, the FAA has given U.S. airlines three years to install software changes to collision-warning systems, saying that the warning devices that have been installed in commercial airliners as well as private businesses need to be fixed.

    The FAA has known since 2009 that systems have been known to fail to monitor and track all the nearby planes, resulting in monitoring errors, a fact which could and may have already caused problems in 7000 commercial planes and 1800 business planes in the US.

    If a warning system fails, and is known to fail, why is a crash which may have been the result of a warning system failure being attributed to air traffic controller error or pilot error? That’s what I’d like to know. Do we need to be looking more closely at L-3 Communications?

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    Update on the Associated Jet Crash in Nigeria


    On Oct 3, 2013, a twenty-three year old Associated Aviation Embraer EMB-120 was en route from Lagos to Akure to carry the deceased regional governor and family to his funeral in Akure when it crashed, killing 16. Four survivors were hospitalized.

    The NCAA said the airline had coverage and the plane’s paperwork and inspections were up to date. The flight data recorder has been recovered.

    The son of the late former Governor of Ondo State, Dr. Olusegun Agagu, Feyi, was aboard the plane and survived the crash. The passengers included family members taking the body of Olusegun Agagu, a former aviation minister, to his funeral.

    Read more on the Associated Aviation Embraer EMB-120 crash.

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