This month’s poster child for how not to run your commuter airline:

Trans States Holdings Inc.

After two incidents in the last four months, there’s now a $2.5 million civil penalty in the offing for Trans States Holdings Inc. from the FAA. But more crucial than the last two incidents, the problem really comes down to hundreds of safety violations on 320 flights over the past two years, all related to maintenance, after repeated warnings and reoccurring violations.

What is it I always say?

Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance.

See Below:

FAA Proposes $2.5 Million in Civil Penalties Against Trans States, GoJet

WASHINGTON — The Federal Aviation Administration is proposing $2,476,075 in civil penalties against Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines of Bridgeton, Mo., for violation of various maintenance procedures and operating nine jets on 320 revenue passenger flights when the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines are both owned and operated by Trans States Holdings. Trans States Airlines performs maintenance and training on GoJet aircraft.

The proposed civil penalties involve seven GoJet+ Canadair Regional Jets and two Trans States Embraer 145 regional jets. The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet operated aircraft when maintenance had been carried out incorrectly, and that the company failed to complete required maintenance record-keeping.

The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet violated a number of maintenance regulations and procedures, including use of outdated manufacturers’ maintenance instructions to perform repairs; failure to connect a wing flap actuator to its torque tube, rendering the flaps inoperative; failure to document an inspection after an aircraft was damaged by severe turbulence; failure to document and carry out proper repairs after aircraft warning systems identified problems; improper repair of an engine oil leak and failure to comply with minimum equipment list regulations.

“Air carriers cannot ignore maintenance requirements or allow employees to take a pass on following regulations,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Safety depends not only on maintenance work being done correctly, but also being recorded properly.”

Trans States and GoJet have 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letters to respond to the agency.

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Boeing Statement on IAM 837 Contract Ratification

ST. LOUIS, June 27, 2010 — The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) 837, which represents about 2,500 employees in the St. Louis area, voted 1,237-838 today to ratify the adjusted best-and-final contract offer that The Boeing Company presented last week. Boeing responded with the following statement:
“We are very pleased that our employees represented by IAM 837 voted today to ratify the contract we have been discussing over the past several weeks. When we began negotiations, our goal was to produce a contract that recognizes both the significant contributions of our employees and the competitive environment in which we must compete to keep jobs here in St. Louis. This contract does both. The vote by our employees allows us to keep delivering on our commitments to our customers.

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NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
July 30, 2010

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Conduct research into and document the effects of mountain wave and downslope conditions at airports, such as Denver International Airport, that are located downwind of
mountainous terrain (including, for example, airports in or near Colorado Springs, Colorado; Anchorage, Alaska; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Reno, Nevada), identify potential
mountain-wave-related hazards to ground operations at those airports, and disseminate the results to pilots and airport air traffic control personnel to allow for more informed
runway selection decisions. (A-10-105)

Archive all low-level windshear alert system (LLWAS) data obtained from Denver International Airport and other airports that experience similar wind conditions and make these data available for additional research and the potential future development of an improved LLWAS algorithm for crosswind and gusty wind alerts on air traffic control tower ribbon display terminals. (A-10-106)

Modify Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65 to require air traffic controllers at airports with multiple sources of wind information to provide pilots with the maximum wind component, including gusts, that the flight could encounter. (A-10-107)

Review the required documentation for all low-level windshear alert system (LLWAS)-equipped air traffic control towers to ensure that a letter to airmen has been published
and is easily accessible describing the location and designation of the remote sensors, the capabilities and limitations of the system, and the availability of current LLWAS remote sensor wind information on the request of a pilot, in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3. (A-10-108)

Require air traffic control towers to locally develop and implement written runway selection programs that proactively consider current and developing wind conditions and include clearly defined crosswind components, including wind gusts, when considering operational advantage with respect to runway selection. (A-10-109)

Gather data on surface winds at a sample of major U.S. airports (including Denver International Airport) when high wind conditions and significant gusts are present and use these data to develop realistic, gusty crosswind profiles for use in pilot simulator training programs. (A-10-110)

Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to incorporate the realistic, gusty crosswind profiles developed as a result of Safety Recommendation A- 10-110 into their pilot simulator training programs. (A-10-111)

Once realistic, gusty crosswind profiles as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-110 are developed, develop a standard methodology, including pilot-in-the-loop testing, for transport-category airplane manufacturers to establish empirically based, type-specific maximum-gusting-crosswind limitations for transport-category airplanes that account for wind gusts. (A-10-112)

Once a methodology as asked for in Safety Recommendation A- 10-112 has been developed, require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes to develop type-specific, maximum-crosswind takeoff limitations that account for wind gusts. (A-10-113)

Until the actions described in Safety Recommendation A-10-113 are accomplished, require manufacturers of transport- category airplanes to provide operators with interim crosswind takeoff guidelines that account for wind gusts. (A-10-114)

Work with U.S. airline operators to review and analyze operational flight data to identify factors that contribute to encounters with excessive winds and use this information to develop and implement additional strategies for reducing the likelihood of wind-related runway excursions. (A-10-115)

Require cockpit crew seats installed in newly manufactured airplanes that were type certificated before 1988 to meet the crashworthiness standards contained in 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.562. (A-10-116)

Require operators to perform periodic inspections on the Burns Aerospace model 2501-5 jumpseats for fatigue cracks within the jumpseat structure and replace the jumpseat if fatigue cracks are found. (A-10-117)

Require that operators of transport-category airplanes that use galley latches or latch plates secured solely by adhesives that may degrade over time modify the latches to include mechanical fasteners. (A-10-118)

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NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON JACKSON HOLE B-757 RUNWAY OVERRUN INCIDENT

NTSB Advisory
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
December 31, 2010

In its continuing investigation of the runway overrun of a jetliner in Jackson Hole, Wyo., the National Transportation Safety Board has developed the following factual information:

At about 11:38 am MT on Wednesday, December 29, American Airlines flight 2253, a B-757-200 (N668AA) inbound from Chicago O’Hare International Airport, ran off the end of runway 19 in snowy conditions while landing at Jackson Hole Airport. No injuries were reported among the 181 passengers and crew on board.

The aircraft came to rest in hard packed snow about 350 feet beyond the runway overrun area. An initial inspection did not reveal any structural damage to the aircraft. Shortly after the aircraft came to a stop, in accordance with American Airlines’ procedures, the pilots pulled the circuit breaker to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to preserve all of the recorded information for investigators.

The CVR and DFDR (digital flight data recorder) arrived at the Safety Board’s recorder laboratory on Thursday evening, Dec. 30, where investigators were standing by to download the contents of both recorders. The CVR provided a two-hour recording of excellent quality audio; the voices of each of the pilots on the flight deck were clearly audible. The DFDR provided 1200 recorded parameters of flight data and captured the entire incident.

The crew, who were interviewed on Thursday evening, indicated that they saw the runway prior to reaching the minimum descent altitude before touchdown. Both crewmembers characterized the flight and approach to landing as uneventful prior to the runway overrun. The first officer was the flying pilot.

The accident docket, which will contain additional factual information, is expected to be opened in 60-90 days. It will be available on the docket section of the NTSB website at http://go.usa.gov/rjR

PROTOCALS FOR TRANSPORTING AIRCRAFT RECORDERS IN INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS

The Safety Board has long-established protocols for the handling and transportation of CVRs and DFDRs that contain recorded information from a commercial aviation incident, which by definition is one where no serious injuries or substantial damage to the aircraft or other property has occurred.

In such incident investigations, the Safety Board frequently asks the airline involved to transport the recorders on their own aircraft as such an arrangement often provides the most expeditious means of conveying the devices to Safety Board labs in Washington. The airline is instructed to transport the recorders without delay and without accessing the information contained within them by any means. This practice has worked efficiently and without complication for more than 40 years.

During this incident investigation, the Safety Board learned that the recorders were flown to Tulsa, Okla., where American Airlines technicians downloaded information from the DFDR; the CVR was not accessed by American.

“Although a thorough examination by our investigators determined that no information from the DFDR was missing or altered in any way, the breach of protocol by American Airlines personnel violates the Safety Board’s standards of conduct for any organization granted party status in an NTSB investigation,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “Because maintaining and enforcing strict investigative protocols and procedures is vital to the integrity of our investigative processes, we have revoked the party status of American Airlines and excused them from further participation in this incident investigation.”

American Airlines has assured the Safety Board that a full review of proper procedures and internal controls would be undertaken to ensure that such an occurrence is not repeated.

Despite their removal from party standing, the NTSB will provide American Airlines with any and all information needed to ensure a timely response to operational safety deficiencies identified in the course of the investigation.

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Goodyear Expert Cites Tips for Proper Aircraft Tire Maintenance

AKRON, Ohio, Nov. 10, 2010 /PRNewswire/ — When it comes to aircraft tire maintenance, few people in the industry have visited more hangars and seen all manner of service work and maintenance procedures than Goodyear Aviation’s Rob Robson.

Robson is a Product Support Manager for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (NYSE: GT), and for more than 10 years he’s been immersed in aircraft tire product support for everything from piston singles to helicopters and fighter jets.

By his own count, Robson has witnessed numerous aircraft tire maintenance procedures and has inspected hundreds of worn tires. He has seen firsthand the ill effects of improper maintenance. As a result, Robson can offer valuable advice for those who wish to better understand how proper aircraft tire maintenance can help to deliver more landings.

The most important factor of any aircraft tire maintenance program is maintaining proper inflation pressure. According to Robson, the problems created by incorrect inflation can be severe. Over inflation often leads to uneven tread wear and reduced traction, makes the tread more susceptible to cutting, and places greater stress on aircraft wheels. Under inflation creates faster tread wear on the shoulders, damages the tire’s innerliner, and greatly increases the stress and flex heating in the tire that can lead to tire failure.

“Because aircraft tire/wheel assemblies can lose up to 5 percent of their pressure each day, they need to be checked daily, or before each flight, with a calibrated pressure gauge when the tire is at ambient temperature (not heated by taxiing). Any tire that’s been run more than 10 percent underinflated should be removed from service,” Robson said. The industry veteran also recommends filling tubeless assemblies with nitrogen instead of air because it’s dry and non-combustible.

Another key area of aircraft tire maintenance is making sure no harmful chemicals are used or spilled on the tires. Keep hangar floors clean of all debris to avoid foreign object damage to the tires. It is also important to inspect the tires closely, in addition to checking tire pressure, during pre-flights to check for any damage to the tires from service.

These tips and more are covered in detail in Goodyear’s Tire Care & Maintenance Manual (PDF). For information about Goodyear aviation tires and dealer locations, visit www.goodyearaviation.com.

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Worldwide Alert on Failed Airline Computer System

A computer fault on a Qantas Airways Ltd. flight switched off the autopilot and generated false data, causing the jet to nosedive. This failure in the onboard computer system caused the violent drop in altitude on the Qantas Airbus A330-300. The flight control system was supplied by Litton Industries, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corp., Airbus issued a telex late yesterday to airlines that fly A330s and A340s. The fault originated in the main on board computer system which caused other system failure. Airbus has now issued guidelines in case the incident happens again.

Preliminary analysis of the Qantas incident revealed the error occurred in one of the jet’s three air data inertial reference units, which caused the autopilot to disconnect.

The crew flew the aircraft manually to the end of the flight,

On 14 October 2008, Mr Julian Walsh, Director, Aviation Safety Investigation, discussed factual information known to the investigation team in a media conference in Canberra City discussing the progress of the investigation.

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1.9 Million Civil Penalty Proposed against Colgan Air
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1.9 Million Civil Penalty Proposed against Colgan Air

Formerly Colgan Air was under fire for long-distance commuting, crew-room sleeping and other fatigue-related factors that came to light after the crash of Continental Connection Flight 3407. Now the Federal Aviation Administration proposed a $1,892,000 civil penalty against Colgan Air of Manassas, Va. a subsidiary of Pinnacle Airlines, for allowing flight attendants to work on 172 revenue passenger flights when they were not properly trained to use the planes’ cabin fire extinguisher system.

“FAA rules on flight crew training are designed to help ensure the safety of passengers,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We require carriers to comply with all of our safety rules, and we will not hesitate to take enforcement action when they do not.”

The 84 newly-hired flight attendants worked flights on the Bombardier Dash 8-Q400 twin turbo-prop aircraft between Nov. 3 and Nov. 9, 2009 after the FAA told Colgan the flight attendants had not completed the required training.

The FAA inspected the carrier’s new-hire flight attendant training for the Q400 on Nov. 2, 2009. The FAA alleges the new Colgan flight attendants were trained with fire extinguishers used on the airline’s Saab 340s, which operate differently than those used on the Q400.
“The airlines have to properly train crewmembers on the use of emergency equipment,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “The flight attendants’ primary responsibility is to know exactly how to handle emergency situations, and they can’t carry out that responsibility if they’re not properly trained.”

Colgan has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the agency.

According to Colgan, “Colgan Air was using the same type extinguisher for both the Saab 340B and Q400 training, although the Q400 extinguisher has a hose. This occurred in November 2009, and all flights during this period were completed safely and Colgan remains in compliance with these requirements today.

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