Friday, the Commissioner of the South African Civil Aviation Authority will be reporting the results of a SA Airlink safety audit being tendered to Transport Minister Sibusiso Ndebele due to the incident Monday when an Airlink plane overshot the runway at George Airport, allegedly due to poor pilot training. Three injuries were reported, including an ankle injury of the first officer. In another recent Airlink crash (Durban), the pilot died later of his injuries and 3 passengers were injured.
Similar Posts
Fatigue for one-Fatigue for all
George’s Point of View
Remember that old Herodotus misquote inscribed on the James A Farley Post Office Building: “Neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.“?
The iconic postman is viewed as being the superman of civil servants, intrepid deliverers, come what may. (For those of you born after 1997, the mythos of the intrepid postal carrier predates the movie. Bless Kevin Costner’s heart)
That iconoclastic perspective will stand unchallenged by pilots if the FAA goes ahead in its move to impose stringent regulations limiting pilot flight time. The bill includes some $8 billion for airport construction and pilot scheduling limitations designed to lessen the incidence of accidents related to pilot fatigue.
However the effectiveness of this bill may be challenged by an amendment exempting some pilots (those flying for nonscheduled carriers and charter flights carrying commercial cargo) from the amendments intended “fatigue protection.”
Are cargo pilots and charter pilots built of sterner stuff? Are they eating their Wheaties and consuming super-charged vitamins? Are they really supermen who are not affected by the debilitating fatigue of lesser men? Is the biology of this select group of pilots different from all other pilots so that they are immune?
What do you think?
Maybe, just maybe, this new amendment is designed to sacrifice safety concerns in favor of profit.
No kidding.
There is no place for exemptions in this bill.
However, that said, one hopes common sense will be applied in military situations. Say, for example, it is wartime. Can you see some 2011 era John Wayne pilot watching the second hand on his stopwatch and scrubbing a mission based on a peacetime standard? Is some squad somewhere going to have to stop in mid-mission due to a peacetime regulation? How doubly stupid would it be to give any faction opposing us the foreknowledge of such controlling factors. It’s the 2011 equivalent of the British sending their troops out in formation, to be picked off by guerilla fighting Americans. Are we the stupid ones with targets on our chests now?
Let pilots flying commercial aviation have their reasonable hours, and leave the heroism and exemptions up to the military.
And to mailmen too, of course—long may they be by snow, rain, heat and gloom of night, “unstayed.”
Air France Moving Forward: Obfuscating the Issue and Consumer Politics
George’s Point of View
While we are waiting for news of where Air France Flight 447 disappeared to, somewhere in the ocean (and no one can really say with any great specificity anything more specific than somewhere between Rio de Janeiro and Paris France because everywhere they apparently believe it was, they looked, and it wasn’t) Air France is coming out with a report.
An Air France assessment initiated by Chairman Jean-Cyril Spinetta in 2009 and performed by an international panel of eight aviation experts dubbed the Independent Safety Review Team is due to be released Jan 24, 2011.
Its inception was timed, not too surprisingly, six months after the fatal crash, and although officially having nothing to do with the fatal event, its timing alone suggests an optimistic attempt on the part of Air France’s media team to counterbalance the lack of consumer confidence in the airline after they lost a whole plane and 228 lives.
The report will cover training, technical and flight-safety issues, though the not-too-hidden agenda may be to reflect changes made since the crash of Air France Flight 447, (whose wreckage we all know has still not been located.) The report is a beginning of the “New Transparancy” proposed by Air France. There are people who would like to see that transparency extend to some old news, such as what is going on with the search for the wreckage of the worst accident in French aviation history.
The last (02:10) ACARS transmission from Flight 477 contained a set of coordinates indicating the location as 2°59?N 30°35?W officially the last known position, (when the twelve warning messages with the same time code indicated autopilot and auto-thrust system had disengaged, TCAS was in fault mode, and flight mode changed from ‘normal law’ to ‘alternate law’) but one wonders if the instrumentation was already in disagreement at that point, i.e. if that location data could be as faulty as the frozen pitot tubes.
So the report will be out today. The Assessment of Air France training, technical and flight-safety issues is bound to be a big event, but as the media and airline waves these initiatives in the public face, there are a lot of people still staring out to sea, looking for that lost wreckage, who won’t be distracted by any (see-here-look-at-this-news-see-how-much-we-are-improving) sleight of hand.
Airborne Cell Phones In Legal Eye
To phone or not to phone, that is the question. Or to update it a little:
Do radio signals from cell phones disrupt key airplane functions?OR
Are current U.S. cell phone bans outdated and useless at promoting air safety?
That is today’s question.In U.S. air space, cell phones are banned, but all European carriers do not ban cell phone use.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration says cell phones may emit signals that can affect aircraft communications, navigation, and flight control.
There’s some piggyback legislation in the FAA reauthorization bill that would prohibit cell phone use on planes by anyone other than flight crews or law enforcement. Currently once planes reaches 10,000 feet it is up to the carrier to allow or disallow passengers to turn on most portable electronic devices except cell phones.
Boeing, for example, prohibits the use.
DOT: Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, A340-300
[Federal Register: March 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 57)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 13148-13152]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26mr09-30]———————————————————————–
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 Series AirplanesAGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
———————————————————————–
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)[[Page 13149]]
originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and
correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as:One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
* * * The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result
in the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.* * * * *
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions
that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI.DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 27, 2009.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Airbus SAS–Airworthiness Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61
93 45 80, e-mail airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://
www.airbus.com. You may review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0264;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD” at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008 (referred to
after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.Relevant Service Information
Airbus has issued the service information described in the
following table. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A330-27A3154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 02……………. March 2, 2007.
3110.
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A340-27A4154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- 01……………. March 2, 2007.
4115.
————————————————————————[[Page 13150]]
FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect 16 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it
would take between 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed
AD on U.S. operators to be $1,280, or $80 per product.Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
“Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.Regulatory Findings
We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-
174-AD.Comments Due Date
(a) We must receive comments by April 27, 2009.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 series airplanes; certificated in any category, except
those identified in paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airbus Model A330-301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, –
342, and -343 airplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs) up to
and including MSN 588, except those on which Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110 has been embodied in service.
(2) Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313
airplanes, MSNs up to and including MSN 598, except those on which
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115 has been embodied in service.Subject
(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight
controls.Reason
(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane.Actions and Compliance
(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 8,500 total
flight cycles since first flight as of the effective date of this
AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (f)(1)(ii)
of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD:
Identify the part number of spoiler servo-controls installed on the
airplane at all positions in order to determine the number of
affected hydraulic circuits in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154,
Revision 01; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154,
Revision 01; both dated July 25, 2008, as applicable. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number[[Page 13151]]
identified in Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by
this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD, do all applicable actions
required by paragraph (f)(2), (f)(3), or (f)(4) of this AD.Table 1–Spoiler Servo-Control Part Numbers
————————————————————————
Position 1 Positions 2 through 6
————————————————————————
MZ4339390-01X……………………….. MZ4306000-01X.
MZ4339390-02X……………………….. MZ4306000-02X.
MZ4339390-10X……………………….. MZ4306000-10X.
————————————————————————(2) If three affected hydraulic circuits are identified during
the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(ii), and
(f)(2)(iii) of this AD, at the time specified.
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,400 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 3 months after accomplishing the
requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on the second
hydraulic circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(iii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(3) If two affected hydraulic circuits are identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the actions
required by paragraphs (f)(3)(i) and (f)(3)(ii) of this AD, at the
time specified:
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(4) If one affected hydraulic circuit is identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 18 months
after the effective date of this AD, modify the affected spoiler
servo-controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(5) For airplanes that have accumulated less than or equal to
8,500 total flight cycles since first flight as of the effective
date of this AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(5)(i) and
(f)(5)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 9 months after the effective date of this AD: Do the
actions specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number identified in
Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD: Within 18 months after the
effective date of this AD, modify all the affected spoiler servo-
controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(6) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install
any spoiler servo-control with a part number identified in Table 1
of this AD on any aircraft as a replacement part, unless the part
has been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(7) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service bulletins specified in Table 2 of this
AD are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of this AD.Table 2–Credit Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 01……………. March 26, 2004.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
4115.
————————————————————————FAA AD Differences
Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.Other FAA AD Provisions
(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN:
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.Related Information
(h) Refer to European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness
Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008, and the service
bulletins specified in Table 3 of this AD, for related information.Table 3–Service Information
—————————————————————————————————————-
Revision
Service Bulletin level Date
—————————————————————————————————————-
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154. 01 July 25, 2008.[[Page 13152]]
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110……….. 02 March 2, 2007.
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154. 01 July 25, 2008.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115……….. 01 March 2, 2007.
—————————————————————————————————————-Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 18, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-6734 Filed 3-25-09; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
Historic Plane Holds Key to a Safer Future in General Aviation
Piece of Aviation History Finds New Home in Turner, Maine
DURHAM, Maine, Nov. 16, 2010 /PRNewswire/ — Durham-resident and family physician Dr. Louis Hanson and his historic 1946 Stinson Voyager will be featured in an upcoming documentary film about Aviation Safety Resources (ASR) (www.aviationsafetyresources.com) a Long Island-based company founded by Dario Manfredi, the son of the Stinson’s original owner. The mini-documentary, being produced by veteran New York filmmaker Kai Simonsen, will highlight the history and promise of ASR’s patented life-saving technology and serve as the foundation of a larger feature planned for the future .
Manfredi’s father, also Dario, and his partner, Angelo Raiti, were years ahead of their time in the early 1960s when they began a quest to devise a system that would safely land a plane and its passengers in the event of a catastrophic in-flight emergency. They purchased the Stinson Model 108 Voyager 9 (Serial Number 13, Registration N39443). With the help of a parachute company and field engineers, they equipped it with special wing attachment pins, three parachutes and explosive devices that the pilot could activate to separate the fuel-bearing wings from the fuselage and bring each piece safely to earth under its own parachute.
They tested their system in an FAA-sanctioned test flight on November 9, 1967 at Lakehurst Navel Air Station in New Jersey. The system worked as planned, separating the wings and bringing the fuselage down safely with little or no damage.
Shortly after the test flight, Manfredi’s father was forced to sell his Stinson. He was in the process of retrofitting a second Stinson for further FAA tests and certification when a stroke took his life in 1984.
After many years in storage, the original Stinson was reassembled, reconditioned and purchased by Dr. Hanson in 2002. A passionate recreational pilot, Dr. Hanson now houses his plane in a small hanger at Twitchell’s Airport and Seaplane Base in Turner, where his flight instructor told him of the plane’s amazing history.“When I Iearned about the plane’s history, I did some research and contacted Dario Manfredi to get acquainted and share my experience with the aircraft that inspired his father’s invention,” said Dr. Hanson. “I feel very fortunate to own this piece of aviation history and welcomed the opportunity to participate in the filming of the documentary.”
Dario Manfredi and his sister Savia Giarraffa have been on a ten-year mission to update their father’s original concept and have assembled a blue-ribbon team of test pilots, parachute and ballistics experts, and avionics engineers bring their father’s invention to market. ASR currently has two patents pending with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office – one for the TriChute Safe Landing System and another for a complementary sensor-based Smart Recovery System (SRS).
Applying sensor systems currently available in commercial and military aircraft to General Aviation (GA), the SRS 1.0 brings all systems in GA aircraft into one black box that constantly monitors fight, alerts the pilot to problems with any device or system, and outlines corrective action. The company’s more advanced SRS 2.0 alerts the pilot, but if the pilot does not respond, it also takes action to rectify the situation by automatically deploying the appropriate safety system or device available on the aircraft.
Dario, Savia and an ASR film team traveled from New York to Maine late last summer to meet Dr. Hanson, examine the Stinson, and fly in the plane inspired the company’s technology.
“Hearing from Dr. Hanson out of the blue and reconnecting with our father’s airplane has been significant on many levels,” Manfredi said. “First, the very fact that the original airframe is structurally sound and being flown safely 40 years after it was disassembled in flight proves the validity of our company’s underlying technology. Second, is the emotional impact of reconnecting with our father through the plane that was the love of his life. It’s hard to explain the emotions we felt when we first laid eyes on it and recalled time we spent with our father as he worked day and night to make his dream of safer general aviation a reality.”Dr. Hanson calls the elder Manfredi’s efforts “inspired” and “courageous.”
“ASR’s system would add a layer of safety that’s hard to measure,” he said. “It would provide pilots like me with a new sense of confidence and calm knowing that, in the face of unanticipated weather or mechanical failures, the system would ensure that pilots and passengers can be brought down safely and unharmed. I will certainly consider retrofitting my Stinson with this system once it is commercially available.”
ASR screened a preview of the documentary for aircraft owners, pilots and aviation enthusiasts gathered at the AOPA Aviation Summit in Long Beach, CA, from November 9 – 11, 2010. The preview, produced by Simonsen and his production company Millennium HD, is posted at http://bit.ly/bC8AK5 and on the history page of the company’s website at www.aviationsafetyresources.com, where video of the Stinson’s original 1967 test flight also is available.
The company continues to seek investors who want to get in on the ground floor of its emerging technology. Individuals interested in more information about ASR’s technology and investment opportunities can call 908-771-9179 or email asrco@msn.com.
- Air Safety | Editorial | Lease | Legal | Nigeria
Foreign Airliner Leasing & Financing Un-Deserving Operators
Arik Air Ltd., and Aero Contractors Co. of Nigeria Ltd., Nigeria’s top two airlines, have been banned from getting loans by Nigeria’s Central Bank due to the massive debt they have accrued. Arik Air owes Asset Management Corp. of Nigeria more than $534 million. Aero Contractors owes more than $203 million. A bank that loans money to these airlines will face “serious fines from the government.” Air Nigeria recently collapsed owing crew a debt of four months’ pay, in addition to $175 million in loans to Nicon Investments Ltd..
Only three Nigerian airlines remain in operation. Arik Air has not published a date when it will resume flying.
Officially, according to the BBC, the carrier resumed domestic flights on Sunday Sept 24. However we did get anonymous input from Monrovia that as of Saturday, Sept 22nd, Arik Air was flying.
In George’s Point of View
Before making a loan, banks need to look past the uncertainties in airline survival, aircraft value, interest rates and the airline’s credit worthiness.This is what the aircraft leasing companies should do:
Stop leasing planes to operators that are careless in their maintenance and pilot training.
Leasing companies should not look only at credit worthiness. Yes, that is one factor, but it is only part of the picture. Leasing companies must also make judgements based on the history of the airline operator performance, and maintenance.
If credit and performance history all checks out, the oversight is not over. The leasing company should monitor every single plane they have leased out to foreign operators.
If monitoring reveals any problems whatsoever, that pilots are not being trained, that they are not getting enough sleep, that the operator or aircraft goes on a black list, that the operator is shown to be negligent in any way, then the lessor should endeavor immediately to pickup/repossess that plane.
Maintaining every aspect of the plane’s maintenance, flight operations, crew resource management, and crew training is as crucial to the contract agreement as payments. Failure to keep everything up to date is as much a breach of contract and cause for action as is failure to pay.