Alternative to Disaster
Short runways are an unavoidable problem when there is a shortage of land and it is not possible to have the standard 1,000 feet overrun. Judging by the Tam air disaster, not all country’s airports have the technology to prevent major aircraft mishaps, technology such as EMAS. EMAS–Engineered Material Arresting Systems–was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and ESCO (Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation). EMAS acts as a buffer to slow down aircraft that overrun the length of the runway. All it takes is a bed of crushable concrete–cellular cement material that crushes under the weight of an aircraft, resulting in guaranteed deceleration of the aircraft.
Features of Engineered Material Arresting Systems
FAA-approved
Permits reduction of standard RSA
Shortens standard RSA to 600 feet
Meets FAA AC 150/5220-22
Features material customized to each runway’s aircraft fleet
After arrestment, ARFF vehicles can easily maneuver on even damaged EMAS surface
June 15, 2007
Contact: Marcia Adams
Phone: (202) 267-3488
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that commercial airports, regulated under Part 139 safety rules, have a standard Runway Safety Area (RSA) where possible. At most commercial airports the RSA is 500 feet wide and extends 1000 feet beyond each end of the runway. The FAA has this requirement in the event that an aircraft overruns, undershoots, or veers off the side of the runway. The most dangerous of these incidents are overruns, but since many airports were built before the 1000-foot RSA length was adopted some 20 years ago, the area beyond the end of the runway is where many airports cannot achieve the full standard RSA. This is due to obstacles such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, and populated areas or severe drop-off of terrain.
The FAA has a high-priority program to enhance safety by upgrading the RSAs at commercial airports and provide federal funding to support those upgrades. However, it still may not be practical for some airports to achieve the standard RSA. The FAA, knowing that it would be difficult to achieve a standard RSA at every airport, began conducting research in the 1990s to determine how to ensure maximum safety at airports where the full RSA cannot be obtained. Working in concert with the University of Dayton, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation (ESCO) of Logan Township, NJ, a new technology emerged to provide an added measure of safety. An Engineered Materials Arresting System (EMAS) uses materials of closely controlled strength and density placed at the end of a runway to stop or greatly slow an aircraft that overruns the runway. The best material found to date is a lightweight, crushable concrete. When an aircraft rolls into an EMAS arrestor bed, the tires of the aircraft sink into the lightweight concrete and the aircraft is decelerated by having to roll through the material.
The EMAS technology provides safety benefits in cases where land is not available, where it would be very expensive for the airport sponsor to buy the land off the end of the runway, or where it is otherwise not possible to have the standard 1,000-foot overrun. This technology is now in place at 18 airports with installation under contract at six additional airports. A standard EMAS installation extends 600 feet from the end of the runway. An EMAS arrestor bed can still be installed to help slow or stop an aircraft that overruns the runway, even if less than 600 feet of land is available.
The Office of Airports prepared an RSA improvement plan for the runways at approximately 575 commercial airports in 2005. This plan allows the agency to track the progress and to direct federal funds for making all practicable improvements, including the use of EMAS technology.
Presently, the EMAS system developed by ESCO using crushable concrete is the only system that meets the FAA standard. However, FAA is conducting research through the Airport Cooperative Research Program (project number 07-03) that will examine alternatives to the existing approved system. The results of this effort are expected in 2009. More information on the project can be found at the Transportation Research Board website at http://www.trb.org/CRP/ACRP/ACRP.asp.
To date, there have been four incidents where the technology has worked successfully to keep aircraft from overrunning the runway and in several cases has prevented injury to passengers and damage to the aircraft.
Currently, EMAS is installed at 24 runway ends at 19 airports in the United States. With plans to install 12 additional EMAS systems at seven more U.S. airports.
| Airport | Location | # of Systems | Installation Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| JFK International | Jamaica, NY | 1 | 1996 |
| Minneapolis St. Paul | Minneapolis, MN | 1 | 1999 |
| Little Rock | Little Rock, AR | 2 | 2000/2003 |
| Rochester International | Rochester, NY | 1 | 2001 |
| Burbank | Burbank, CA | 1 | 2002 |
| Baton Rouge Metropolitan | Baton Rouge, LA | 1 | 2002 |
| Greater Binghamton | Binghamton, NY | 2 | 2002 |
| Greenville Downtown | Greensville, SC | 1 | 2003 |
| Barnstable Municipal | Hyannis, MA | 1 | 2003 |
| Roanoke Regional | Roanoke, VA | 1 | 2004 |
| Fort Lauderdale International | Fort Lauderdale, FL | 2 | 2004 |
| Dutchess County | Poughkeepsie, NY | 1 | 2004 |
| LaGuardia | Flushing, NY | 2 | 2005 |
| Boston Logan | Boston, MA | 2 | 2005/2006 |
| Laredo International | Laredo, TX | 1 | 2006 |
| San Diego International | San Diego, CA | 1 | 2006 |
| Teterboro | Teterboro , NJ | 1 | 2006 |
| Chicago Midway | Chicago, IL | 1 | 2006 |
| Merle K (Mudhole) Smith | Cordova, AK | 1 | 2007 |
| Location | # of Systems | Expected Installation Date |
|---|---|---|
| Charleston, WV | 1 | June 2007 |
| Chicago Midway | 3 | Spring/Summer 2007 |
| Wilkes-Barre Scranton, PA | 1 | Fall 2007 |
| JFK International | 1 | Fall 2007 |
| Chicago O’Hare | 2 | Spring 2008 |
| Telluride, CO | 2 | TBD |
| Manchester, NH | 1 | Spring 2008 |
| Newark Liberty, NJ | 1 | Spring 2008 |
After Australia’s CASA suspended Alligator Airways over safety risks, Alligator’s legal representative told the media that the suspension was costing the airline tens of thousands of dollars and that they believe the grounding is unwarranted.
CASA is concerned over “aircraft maintenance, failure to report incidents, inadequate pilot training records, a deficient safety culture, an inability of key personnel to carry out their safety obligations and key positions unoccupied or not functional.”
Alligator flies charter flights from both Kununurra, Broome, and Kimberley.
Rolls-Royce removed 53 Trent Engines from service over pipe thickness problems in the oil feed pipes. Thinned pipe walls and cracking from a manufacturing defect led to an internal oil fire on a Qantas Airways Airbus A380, which made an emergency landing in Singapore in 2010. This is the flaw that led to Qantas grounding its entire A380 fleet, and other carriers like Singapore Airlines. Several modification standards were published: FW48020, FW59326, and FW64481.
The ATSB does not expect a complete analysis of the data it is gathering on these engines until May 2012.
For Immediate Release
October 7, 2010
Helicopter air ambulance operations are unique due to the urgent nature of the flight. The FAA, operators, and the medical community all play a vital role in promoting a positive safety culture that ensures the safety of passengers, flight crews, and medical professional on these flights.
Since August 2004, the FAA’s has:
Background
The helicopter air ambulance industry grew by 54 percent between 2003 and 2008. There are currently 74 air ambulance companies that operate approximately 850 helicopters in the United States. The NTSB estimates that 400,000 patients and transplant organs are transported by helicopter each year.
The Role of the Medical Community
Aviation safety decisions are separate from medical decisions. The decision to conduct a flight with a patient on board does not mean that flight safety can be compromised in any way. Once the medical need for air transportation is determined, it is up to the operator to make the air transportation decision based on pre-flight factors such as weather conditions, maintenance, and crew readiness.
FAA Oversight
The FAA inspects air ambulance operators, but the agency’s oversight goes beyond inspection and surveillance. Rather, the FAA uses a risk-based system that includes the initiatives outlined below which focus on the leading causes of accidents.
FAA Actions
–Decision-making skills and risk assessment programs – 94 percent
–Response to FAA guidance on Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance – 89 percent
–Integration of operation control center – 89 percent
–Installation of Flight Data Recorders and devices that can re-create a flight. – 11 percent
–TAWS equipage – 41 percent
–Use of radar altimeters – 89 percent
Operations Specifications
On November 14, 2008, the FAA published a Notice in the Federal Register that advised operators of important mandatory changes to air ambulance flights. The agency also included a provision to encourage the use of NVGs and Terrain Awareness Warning Systems. Consistent with NTSB recommendations, all air ambulance operators will comply with Part 135 weather minimums, including repositioning flights with medical crew onboard. The FAA is also providing greater access to weather reporting facilities, and requiring the flight crew to determine a minimum safe altitude and obstacle clearance prior to each flight. The compliance date is no later than February 22, 2009.
Weather
In March 2006, the FAA and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research hosted a weather summit in Boulder, Colorado to identify the air ambulance-specific issues related to weather products and services. Attendees explored possible regulatory improvements, weather product enhancements, and operational fixes specific to HEMS operations. Attendees included the National Weather Service, National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Helicopter Association International, American Helicopter Society International, Association of Air Medical Services, National EMS Pilots Association, National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists, manufacturers, and many operators.
As a result, the FAA funded the development and implementation of a graphical flight planning tool for ceiling and visibility assessment along direct flights in areas with limited available surface observations capability. It improves the quality of go/no-go decisions for air ambulance operators. The tool was fielded in November 2006.
Night Vision Goggles
The FAA has a solid record of facilitating safety improvements and new technologies for EMS helicopters, including certification of NVGs. Since 1994, the FAA has worked 28 projects or design approvals called Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs) for installation of NVGs on helicopters. This number includes EMS, law enforcement and other types of helicopter operations. Of the 28 projects, the FAA has approved approximately 15 NVGs STC’s for EMS helicopters. The FAA initiated and wrote (in coordination with RTCA) the minimum standards for NVGs/cockpit lighting.
Technical Standard Order (TSO) C164 was published on September 30, 2004 referencing RTCA document DO 275 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS), published October 12, 2001. The FAA has hosted workshops to help applicants work with the FAA to obtain NVG certification. One set of NVGs costs approximately $7,000 and an operator must carry multiple sets per flight. Certification is just one step. The operator must also have an FAA-approved training program for using NVGs.
The FAA has revised the NVG guidance in the Operations Inspectors Handbook, Order 8900.1. Produced using considerable industry input, the revision includes the establishment of a cadre of NVG national resource inspectors (Notice 8000.349, Night Vision Imaging Systems).
While the FAA encourages use of NVGs where appropriate, they are not a one-size-fits-all solution. Flying at night is not inherently dangerous if rules and procedures are followed. In fact, many operators who do not use NVGs have never had an accident at night.
Flight Data Recorders
Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) are not required for air ambulance operations. FDRs offer value in any accident investigation by providing information on aircraft system status, flight path and attitude. The weight and cost of FDR systems are factors. Research and development is required to determine the appropriate standards for FDR data and survivability in the helicopter environment, which typically involves substantially lower speeds and altitudes than airplanes. Funds are currently best invested in preventive training.
However, the FAA is considering alternatives to expensive and heavy airliner-style FDRs, especially in light of the relatively low-impact forces in most helicopter accidents. By establishing a standard appropriate to the helicopter flight envelope, the FAA may be able to make meaningful future FDR rulemaking efforts.
Terrain Awareness Warning Systems
The FAA supports the voluntary implementation of TAWS and did consider the possibility of including rotorcraft in the previous TAWS rulemaking process. Through this process, however, the FAA concluded that there are a number of issues unique to VFR helicopter operations that must be resolved before the FAA considers mandating the use of TAWS in this area, such as modification of the standards used for these systems. For example, helicopters typically operate at lower altitudes so TAWS could potentially generate false alerts and “nuisance” warnings that could negatively impact the crew’s response to a valid alert. TAWS use in air ambulance operations required study of TAWS interoperability within the lower altitude environment, and possible modification of TAWS system standards.
At the FAA’s request, RTCA, Inc. established a Special Committee (SC-212) to develop H-TAWS standards for use in future FAA rulemaking projects. The final report was delivered to RTCA in March 2008. Those standards were subsequently reviewed by the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service and on December 17, 2008, the FAA issued Technical Standards Order (TSO) C-194 to standardize the manufacture of H-TAWS within the industry.
ICAO Headquarters, Montréal, 29 March – 1 April 2010
The goals of the High-level Safety Conference are to bring together the Directors General of Civil Aviation, or equivalent senior executives and stakeholders, to build consensus, obtain commitments and formulate recommendations deemed necessary for the effective and efficient progress of key safety activities by ICAO.
HIGH-LEVEL SAFETY CONFERENCE 2010
Montréal, 29 March to 1 April 2010
DRAFT DECLARATION
Whereas the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its Annexes provide the essential
framework required to meet the safety needs of a global aviation system;
Whereas Contracting States have a collective responsibility for international civil aviation safety;
Recognizing that the safety framework must be fully utilized by all stakeholders and that it must
continuously evolve to ensure its sustained effectiveness and efficiency in the changing regulatory, economic and technical environment of the 21st century;
Recalling that transparency and sharing of safety information are fundamental tenets of a safe air
transportation system and that one of the objectives of sharing information is to ensure a consistent,fact-based and transparent response to safety concerns at the State and at the global levels;
Recalling that mutual trust between States, as well as public confidence in the safety of air
transportation, is contingent upon access to adequate safety information;
Recognizing that safety is a shared responsibility, and advancements in global safety can only be
possible through a cooperative, collaborative and coordinated effort among all stakeholders, with ICAO’s
active participation and leadership role;
Recognizing that further improvements in aviation safety within and among States require a
cooperative and proactive approach in which safety risks are identified and managed;
Recognizing that the safety data necessary to support an effective safety management process require
adequate protection from inappropriate use;
Recognizing the difficulties that many ICAO States have in establishing and operating an efficient
safety oversight system and the need for these States to pool resources and work together within Regional
Safety Oversight Organizations;
Recognizing that the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme’s Continuous Monitoring
Approach (CMA) being established by ICAO will be implemented in stages during a two-year transition
period from 2011 to 2012;
HLSC 2010-WP/90
– 2 –
The Directors General of Civil Aviation:
1. Commit to reinforce the global aviation safety framework by:
a) supporting the CMA and providing ICAO with accurate and timely information;
b) implementing expeditiously the State Safety Programme (SSP) in their own States and
ensuring the implementation of safety management systems across the aviation industry;
c) maintaining the confidence of the public in the safe air transportation system through
enhanced transparency of safety information;
d) developing sustainable safety solutions, including the creation or strengthening of regional
and sub-regional safety oversight organizations and initiatives;
e) sharing appropriate safety-related information among States and all other aviation
stakeholders; and
f) working with ICAO to identify actions that can be taken to reduce the burden for certificate
holders to comply with multiple sets of similar, yet different, requirements;
The Conference:
2. Calls upon States and other stakeholders to enter into agreements with one another for the
exchange of safety information;
3. Calls upon States and other stakeholders to provide ICAO with accurate and timely information
in support of the CMA and its transition plan as requested;
4. Calls upon States to examine their existing legislation and adjust, as necessary, or enact laws and
regulations to protect safety information and its sources where the purpose is to improve safety;
5. Calls upon States, ICAO, industry, and donor organizations to direct resources towards the
establishment of sustainable safety oversight solutions;
6. Calls upon States, ICAO and industry to support the coordinated implementation of safety
management principles;
7. Calls upon ICAO to:
a) act as facilitator of safety information provided by the international community, and as the
responsible party for dissemination of safety intelligence, as appropriate;
b) develop a new Annex dedicated to safety management processes which would define the
safety management responsibilities of States under the SSP; and
c) identify actions which can be taken to reduce the burden for certificate holders to comply
with multiple sets of similar, yet different, requirements;
HLSC 2010-WP/90
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d) continue to support the establishment of Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (RSOOs)
and explore the development of alternative solutions for situations where the establishment of
RSOO is not possible;
8. Calls upon States to demonstrate the political will needed to address aviation safety
shortcomings, including the creation, strengthening and, where necessary, participation in RSOOs;
9. Calls upon States, ICAO and industry to increase their efforts to further improve the
competencies and professionalism of aviation personnel;
10. Calls upon States and industry to closely coordinate with ICAO their safety initiatives to ensure
optimum benefits to global aviation safety and to reduce duplication in effort; and
11. Re-emphasizes the need for States, ICAO and industry to act effectively and in a timely fashion
on lessons learnt from accidents.
— END —
New European rules ‘harmonizing’ the workload limits across 27 member states could allow pilots to fly aircraft for 22 hours without sleep, increasing a pilot’s work day from 16 hours 15 minutes to 20 hours, and the maximum shift time for a long haul flight with two pilots from 12 to 14 hours, as well as eliminating the need of a third pilot on long-haol flights.
The proposals have raised the attention of BALPA, The British Airline Pilots Association.
The seventeen percent increase in workload will result in a 5.5% higher chance of an accident.
It is inconceivable how EASA can call “flying farther with less rest-time, more frequently (7 starts in a row), no back up crew and more fatigue” bringing standards “up” when it is actually leveling down safety standards. Such a workload flies in the face of the constructs of human biology.
But the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) “has said they have no fundamental problem with the rules.”
