Air France: Blithe Unconcern, Unconcern or something more?

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  • Remembering September 11, 2011, Long May We Wave

    This day we are threatened by nature. Yesterday, the winds of Hurricane Harvey hammered Texas, and tomorrow Irma will be slamming Florida. It is a storm we will weather. We know we will, because we have lived through worse. We must remember this, because today is September tenth. And September 11, 2011 is a date no American can forget, marked as it is by four scars that will never heal. Four hijacked airliners carved the names of nearly three thousand victims into our memories, names written in blood. Three thousand names with more than three thousand families—and that is not even adding the number of injured, the number of rescuers, all losses that destroyed the innocence of our country. We were initiated on that day into a sad new world, scarred by tragedy that turned the sky from blue to red. How could we understand what was going on? The mass murder of our people, the senseless destruction, the planes crashing, buildings burning before our eyes. I’m just an ordinary guy. When it happened, I was bewildered by it all.

    On Sept 11, this day, in 2011, Flight 11 and Flight 175 hit the twin towers.

    The tragedy was filmed as it happened. We were glued to our screens, helpless, terrorized, mesmerized along with the international audience, the terrible scenes of desperate people making impossible choices: die in the burning towers, or jump to the unforgiving pavement. We cried, but we did not cry alone. The world cried with us.

    American Airlines Flight 77 hit the Pentagon, 64 aboard the plane and 125 in the impact, all fatalities.

    On Flight 93, we saw our people become heroes. We learned of Burnett, Beamer, and Bradshaw, of passengers fighting the hijackers. “Are you guys ready? Let’s roll.” They rolled into history as heroes. How many lives they saved by their actions—an incalculable number—and these were passengers who acted against the hijackers knowing they would lose their own.

    Children of today who ride airplanes are accustomed to today’s security protocols. It must be impossible for them to believe that there was a time when we simply walked aboard. There was no threat. But these days are different. We live in a world that irrevocably changed that day. It is a day we can never forget.

    We tightened our belts.
    We sharpened our defenses.
    And we are not alone in this. The whole world is a more vigilant place.

    The twin towers were a symbol of our prosperity, a couple of the world’s greatest buildings in one of the world’s greatest cities; and though the towers stand no more, our cities and our country goes on. The Pentagon was rebuilt. A Pennsylvania park commemorates the heroes of Flight 93.

    I certainly mourn those who were lost on September 11; and I feel for the families of the injured, as I believe we all do. I may mourn our loss of innocence, but I can also take pride that we stand now, scarred perhaps, but stronger because of what we have survived. We have taken measures to make our world safer, but we can never relax our vigilance. We can never such a thing to happen to us again. On the ashes of the towers, we rebuilt. Some of us are still rebuilding. On the ashes of history, we rise.

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    Aviation Safety Action Program

    Because of management issues, labor vs management issues, and the question of how much protection should pilots/crew have when they make a mistake, a number of big carriers have dropped the Aviation Safety Action Program. THe official goal of the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) is “to enhance aviation safety through the prevention of accidents and incidents. Its focus is to encourage voluntary reporting of safety issues and events that come to the attention of employees of certain certificate holders.”

    But pilots are being punished for their honesty.

    The program that is being dropped allows pilots and other airline workers to report mistakes they’ve made and safety issues.

    This enables carriers to spot trends before they become safety issues.

    So..why have Delta, American, U. S. Airways and Com Air dropped the program?

    Should we even FLY these carriers if they are not following ASAP?

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    Maintenance is Key to Aviation Safety

    In George’s Point of View

    Inevitably into my business life flows discussion of (aviation-oriented) sequestration, the closing of traffic control towers, and how this will inevitably lead to more aviation accidents.

    Yes, I agree with Harrison Ford’s comment that accidents are going to happen. But that prediction leaves a lot unsaid.

    Cutbacks in other places, cutbacks in maintenance budgets, in the number and quality of inspections and maintenance personnel are going to be just as lethal.

    Turn on your mind’s eye and picture the air traffic situation as you would on the ground in your car. Suspended towers are like suspended traffic lights. Picture what would happen if intersections were eliminated, forcing traffic from smaller streets to the larger intersections that are already overburdened with traffic. Into this already overburdened traffic situation, maintenance shortfalls make the problem even worse.

    You have older, poorly maintained vehicles in the flow of traffic, and they’re falling apart, causing crashes and pileups. On the ground, they cause disaster. More so, falling from the sky.

    Maintenance is a complicated thing, because even the perfect man-made thing is subject to the laws of physics.

    The most perfect plane would decay over time even if it were not flown. So of course, even the best maintained vehicles are subject to fatigue. And not everything is maintained to “perfect” standards. Believe me, I see this first-hand, as I fly.

    When the first commercial planes were built, who would have guessed planes would be required to fly for so long, so continuously and over such distances. It’s miracle enough that a machine can get people off the ground at all, much less doing it continuously for twenty years.

    As fleets age, you have rivets flying all over the place when there is metal fatigue. Especially with older planes, metal fatigue will be increasingly the cause of future plane crashes. There are two choices: 1) old planes will be automatically junked (unlikely to happen in our increasingly green society) or 2) extreme comprehensive and manditory testing must be put in to place. This testing-maintenance can not be cut back.

    I don’t mean put in to place after an event. I mean in place to prevent an event. To be able to get the plane in the air in the first place, most components of plane have been studied to the breaking point already. That is the kind of knowledge that must be applied to maintenance schedules. Get those parts replaced well before they become the weakest link.

    MAINTENANCE is where it is. You can see the decay on the inside, on the parts that don’t matter much for flight safety. The seats on a plane break apart. Window shades won’t close. They are stuck up there somewhere, and if you try and force them, they break. (Just think of what frailties develop in crucial components that the passenger can’t see.)

    The metal on a plane degrades in the same way. (Engineers have a name and formula for it: Paris-Erdogan law.) If you sit on the wing of an airliner that you know is 20+ years old—such as the plane I was on yesterday from New York—and you encounter turbulence—as we did—any passenger stuck on that plane can’t help but look in disbelief at wings that are bobbling up and down and flexing like a preschooler’s teeter totter. Here’s the question you don’t want to ask yourself at 20,000 feet: are the wings going to stay put? Are they going to flex and flex and flex like a metal clothes hanger bending till it breaks? How do wings not come off the aging plane?

    I’m not accepting of the fact that crashes will happen. That’s too easy to say. It is pure negligence to accept oncoming disaster and do nothing to avert it. We can’t just let it ride. The aviation industry must remain proactive, no matter the cost.

    It’s like the poor horse in Central Park. The older he is, the more maintenance he requires to keep from collapsing as he pulls the buggies and sometimes heavy bodies of those in the carriage. He needs to be fed better, to have water more often, to have a pasture to enjoy, and other horses available where he can socialize. Though the needs of a living creature differ from those of a machine, it goes without saying that both will thrive better with love and care than without.

    Maintenance is key. First-class maintenance. Constant, consistent, perpetual maintenance. It is not adequate to rely on the pilot alone to do his walk around of the aircraft prior to take off. Sure, the pilot should do his visual, but his walk should be preceded by the maintenance specialist. The experts must scrutinize, inspect, examine, and put the plane through its paces.

    Especially the aging plane.

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    Luggage Strike Database Upcoming?

    George’s Point of View

    LAX! We set the standards for the world.

    This is getting embarrassing.

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    Regarding Boeings New Generation Take on Old (Persistent?) Problems. Maybe. Maybe not.

    George’s Point of View

    The 787: Dreamliner test flight suffered from extensive smoke, fire and structural damage originating in the P100′ electrical panel, a key component that distributes power from the left generator to power vital systems

    The 777: United electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire. This was initially reported as smoke. Thus no reason for the FAA to go there. And the full narrative said only “electrical fire” but did not elucidate beyond “electrical fire” to explain the electrical panel set the nearby insulation blankets on fire.

    The AAIB conclusions 4,5, and 6, were:

    • “The RGCB and Right Bus Tie Breaker (RBTB) suffered from severe internal arcing and short circuits which generated temperatures in excess of 1,000°C, and resulted in uncontained failures. The RGCB was probably the first to fail.”
    • “ Molten copper and silver droplets from the failed contactors dropped down through the open base of the P200 panel and ignited the insulation blankets below.”
    • “The insulation blanket fire spread underneath a floor panel to the opposite P205 power panel, causing heat and fire damage to structure, cooling ducts and wiring.”

    The three requirements for a fire: oxygen, ignition source and fuel.

    From 2000 to 2008, over 22 ADs are directed at insulation blankets that burn. Before that, from 1988 to 2010, 8 FAA Tech Center reports and 2 FAA Safety Conference Papers are directed at electrical induced fires or the insulation blankets that give fuel to the fire.

    When was the latest AD ?
    2008-23-09. REMOVE PET (AN-26). Boeing Model 727-200s, 737-200s, 737-300s, and 737-400, 747s, 757s, 767s Series Airplanes.from the fuselage. Such insulation blankets could ignite and propagate a fire that is the result of electrical arcing or sparking.
    DATES; Issued Oct 24, 2008 -effective Dec 15, 2008 – Comply by
    2014. If you read the AD, you can note that the compliance date is actually set beyond the affected planes anticipated passenger service-life. Compliance is put off until the planes will likely be converted from passenger to cargo.

    2002 FAA ASTRAC Conference Conclusions

    • In-flight Fires In Hidden Areas are a risk to aviation safety.
    • Most hidden fires are caused by electrical problems.
    • Non-compliance with Safety Regulations have been uncovered.
    • Fire Safety Problems and Improvements are in various stages of correction and study.
    • It is impossible to predict the relative risk of serious fires occurring in Hidden Areas or Locations.

    Without being too critical or belaboring the obvious, I do have to say that the 2002 conclusions are overly obvious and simplistic. These same points will probably be as true in 2002 and 2011 as in 3011. Point by point? Consider this:

    • In-flight fires are a risk to safety, whether they’re hidden or not. Certainly if one doesn’t know where they are, they have more time to be destructive before they are found. And as for being predictable-there probably is a random statistical probability that can come pretty close; but translating theory back to real life situations perfectly only happens on tv.
    • Electrical problems are certainly a broad umbrella-one might even say the current problems with rogue batteries to be a form of electrical problem.
    • Non compliance regarding safety is hardly an issue when a plane is in the testing phase; in fact, that is when the manufacturer is are troubleshooting to get rid of potential safety issues. The 777 electrical panel issue may or may not have a common cause; and if it does have a common cause, then, isn’t that splendid for Boeing? The detective job (i.e. finding the cause) is half of the problem already solved. What luck! But in real life, are the causes that easy to find? And in practice, how many times are non-compliance with Safety Regulations due to poor operator maintenance versus to unsafe parts?
    • Fire Safety Improvements are an ongoing process. It’s the nature of the beast.

    So here is the problem as it should possibly be stated:

    -We need compliance now because people are on these planes now, not at some random future date. Pushing back solutions puts more people are at risk. We need feasible compliance that doesn’t put good companies out of business but still maintains the highest possible safety standards NOT the lowest possible cost. Putting off compliance over a combustible insulation blanket until 2014? Really? How is this safe?

    -The lowest common denominator should not be lowest possible cost-to-the- industry. It should be the highest possible safety for the passenger. These things are not always mutually exclusive.

    -If the root problem is less than ideal materials used across many manufacturer and model applications, then quit pussyfooting around.
    If the boy is going to cry wolf, let it be for a real wolf. If the wolf is real, then act. If inadequate materials, composites, etc are the problem, then don’t point the finger and do nothing. Questionable materials have no place in an industry that lives under guidelines advocating and promoting safety over all.

    Like Yoda said, “Do or do not. There is no try.”

    Raise the standards.

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    Automated Cockpit Props up Undertrained Pilots

    The Asiana investigation continues.

    Back in July, the pilot who was insecure about making a visual approach in a 777 crashed at San Francisco International Airport on a visual approach in Asiana Flight 214’s Boeing 777. Specifically, he told NTSB investigators “it was very difficult to perform a visual approach with a heavy airplane.” The glideslope was not working at the San Francisco airport, and that was an instrument the (*undertrained) pilot was relying on. The plane came in so low the tail struck the seawall and broke off. The video below shows the plane rotate 360 degrees and catch fire by the runway.

    New Asiana Crash Video

    Video with news commentary

    Before impact, the relief pilot in the jump seat repeated several times “sink rate” trying to warn the pilots at the controls that the jet was too quickly losing altitude. One of the pilots said “It’s low.” Then there was a stick shaker alert (which occurs when the plane is about to stall from flying too slowly. I once had a pilot do a presentation that included the disturbing grinding of the stick shaker alarm as it violently vibrated the control yoke. It’s an alarming direction to the pilots to increase thrust.)

    When the stick shaker went off, the instructor called for a go around. It went off four seconds before impact. It was too late.

    Both the instructor and the captain were relying on the auto throttle, and both were unaware it was off.

    In George’s Point of View

    I do not know how anyone can watch the surveillance video of the Asiana crash and not marvel that of the three hundred and seven people aboard the plane, there were only three deaths.

    I’m not discounting the wounds of the injured, nor those three deaths, nor the tragedy of one of the teen victims being run over by an airport crash tender. (That’s a whole tragedy by itself—who knows if she might have survived but for being so obscured by foam that she was not visible to crash responders—through the firemen who carried her out surely must have known she was there.)

    A dozen critically injured, a hundred-sixty-nine injured, but only three deaths.

    It’s nothing short of a miracle. Especially on inspecting the condition of the burned out shell of the hull. Especially on reviewing the just-released surveillance video that shows the plane splintering after impacting the firewall, cartwheeling like a crippled gymnast down the runway and dissolving into a cloud of dust and flame. No jet fuel fire here——leaking oil ignited as it poured on to a hot engine.

    The Kazan crash (Tatarstan Airlines Flight 363) from November 17th is fresh in my mind. Everyone aboard–fifty people (forty-four passengers and six crew) all died. The plane just fell from the sky while landing at an impossible 75-degree-nose-down attitude, piloted by a pilot whose license is apparently fake. Everyone in that crash died. (Tatarstan surveillance below.)

    Of course one can see the physics—that everyone on the Tatarstan flight received the full direct impact, versus how the rolling of the Asiana plane dispersed some of the impact energy. Still, there is tremendous force in a crash.

    I know I should be talking about pilot training, because this is yet another crash that appears to be due to pilots becoming too dependent on technology. But I will focus on that another day. Right now, I am overwhelmed after looking at the crash tape.

    Asiana—Cartwheeling Catastrophe
    I am surprised that I have neither heard or seen choruses of amazement that all but three people survived the rolling catastrophe in San Francisco. Some credit should perhaps go to the rescue crew, quick actions of the cabin crew, performance of the emergency slides, and maybe even the aerodynamics of the 777 whose seats are required to withstand 16g of dynamic force.

    Sure, there was error involved in this crash, but when you look at the survival rate, some credit is due to the 5.5 billion Boeing put into research, development and safety of the 777.

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