SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN: Main Landing Gear – Tires and Wheels

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  • Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes

    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD;
    Amendment 39-15942; AD 2009-13-03]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Series Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2009.
    We must receive comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Discussion

    We received a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff on a Boeing Model 747-400 airplane powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524G/H engines. The automatic retraction was due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. In order to prevent impingement of efflux air from the thrust reversers during landing rollout, the FCU is designed to automatically retract the Group A leading edge flaps when a REV Amber signal is received from either both inboard or both outboard thrust reversers, and the airplane is on the ground. In this event, the first REV amber signal was received prior to V1 (takeoff decision speed). The second REV amber signal was received several seconds later, after takeoff decision speed. At that time, the FCU performed as designed and retracted the Group A leading edge flaps. At rotation the flight crew reported buffeting and stick shaker activation. After liftoff, a signal from the air/ground logic system caused the FCU to send a command to the Group A leading edge flaps to re-deploy after a five-second time delay. Re-deployment of the flaps takes approximately ten to fifteen additional seconds; during re-deployment, the flightcrew again reported buffeting and momentary stick shaker activation. The airplane jettisoned fuel and was landed safely; all four of the thrust reversers deployed and stowed normally after landing.
    In addition, one operator reported 12 single-engine REV indications during takeoff over the past three years, leading to seven rejected takeoffs. The incident described above was the first known simultaneous two- engine event.
    These conditions, if not corrected, could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Relevant Service Information

    We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009. The service information describes procedures for modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels. The modification includes re-routing and re- terminating one wire for each engine, and replacing the wire if necessary.

    FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

    No airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as described under “Difference Between the AD and the Service Information.”

    Difference Between the AD and the Service Information

    Operators should note that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, recommends that the modification be completed within 90 days (after the issue date of the service bulletin). This AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days. In developing this compliance time, we considered the manufacturer’s recommended 90-day compliance time (after June 8, 2009, which is the service bulletin issue date), a risk assessment of the unsafe condition, the scope of work required, and the number of affected airplanes, as well as the time normally required for the rulemaking process to be completed (approximately 30 days). In consideration of both of these factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of this AD will fall approximately at the same time (calendar date) as the compliance time recommended by the manufacturer, and represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. By adjusting the compliance time interval in this way:
    1. Operators will get a full 60 days in which to complete the modification; and
    2. The modification can be done within an interval of time that parallels normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators.
    This difference has been coordinated with Boeing.

    FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

    Automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff. Such a restriction could result in failure to achieve a minimum rate of climb, and consequent collision with terrain or obstacles or forced landing of the airplane. Because of our requirement to promote safe flight of civil aircraft and thus, the critical need to assure the proper functioning of the FCU and the short compliance time involved with this action, this AD must be issued immediately.
    Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, and because no airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are both impracticable and unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-13-03 Boeing: Amendment 39-15942. Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 series engines.

    Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78: Engine.

    Unsafe Condition

    (e) This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

    Modification

    (g) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Modify the thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM- 140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590. Or, e-mail information to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind, Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 12, 2009.
    Ali Bahrami,
    Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15255 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39
    [Docket No. FAA-2005-22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD;
    Amendment 39-15950; AD 2009-14-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. That AD currently requires replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same repetitive replacements and would require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements. Modification Tf75 replaces the check valve piston with a piston design not requiring an O-ring. This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 3, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of August 3, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD from Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com.
    The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by superseding AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on January 22, 2009 (74 FR 3978). That action proposed to require replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals and to require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal or on the determination of the cost to the public.

    Change to the Mandatory Terminating Action Compliance Time

    Since we issued the proposed AD, we realized that there is no direct relationship between the mandatory terminating action compliance date in the proposed AD and the usage rate of the affected helicopters. We changed the AD to require the terminating action be done within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We have determined that this change will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 94 Arrius 2F turboshaft engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform an O-ring replacement, and about one work-hour to incorporate Modification Tf75. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $16 per engine for O-ring replacement, and about $20 per engine for incorporating Modification Tf75. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $18,424.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), and by adding a new airworthiness directive, Amendment 39-15950, to read as follows:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-01 Turbomeca S.A: Amendment 39-15950. Docket No. FAA-2005- 22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 3, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter EC120B helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    O-ring Replacement

    (f) Replace the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at the intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD. Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.C.(2) of Turbomeca Alert Service Bulletin No. A319 79 4802, Update No. 1, dated April 3, 2006, to replace the O-ring.

    Table 1–Compliance Times for O-ring Replacement

    If the class of oil is:
    Then replace the O-ring by the later of:
    Thereafter, replace the O-ring within:
    (1) HTS or unknown. 300 hours time-since-new (TSN) or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 300 hours time-since-last replacement (TSR).
    (2) STD. 450 hours TSN or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 500 hours TSR.

    Mandatory Terminating Action

    (g) Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, do the following mandatory terminating action to the repetitive O- ring replacements:
    (1) Incorporate Turbomeca Modification Tf75 by replacing the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, with a check valve piston requiring no O-ring.
    (2) Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.B.(1)(r) of Turbomeca Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 319 79 4075, Version B, dated May 14, 2008, to replace the check valve piston.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (i) EASA AD 2008-0170, dated September 25, 2008, also addresses the subject of this AD.
    (j) Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of the service information identified in this AD.
    (k) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238- 7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use the service information specified in the following Table 2 to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the documents listed in the following Table 2 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria-dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http:/ /www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Table 2–Incorporation by Reference

    Turbomeca Alert/MandatoryService Bulletin No.
    Page
    Update/Version
    Date
    A319 79 4802
    Total Pages: 7 ALL Update No. 1 April 3, 2006
    319 79 4075
    Total Pages: 9 ALL Version B May 14, 2008

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 19, 2009.
    Francis A. Favara,
    Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15099 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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  • |

    Boeing: New Airworthiness Directives

    A new airworthiness directive effective January 4, 2010 is being adopted regarding certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the skin along lap joints, butt joints, certain external doublers, and the large cargo door hinges; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The AD results from reports of scribe lines found at lap joints and butt joints, around external doublers, and at locations where external decals had been removed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.

    Also effective January 4 is another new directive regarding the landing gear of certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive lubrications of the right and left main landing gear (MLG) forward trunnion pins. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies of the transition radius of the MLG forward trunnion pins, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies (including finish damage, corrosion, pitting, and base metal scratches) of the transition radius of the left and right MLG trunnion pins, and corrective action if necessary. Replacing or overhauling the trunnion pins terminates the actions required by this AD. This AD results from a report that the protective finishes on the forward trunnion pins for the left and right MLG might have been damaged during final assembly. This AD is intented to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the forward trunnion pins, which could result in fracture of the pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.

    http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/index.cfm/go/document.list/display/new

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    FHA ISSUES Airbus Directive

    George’s Point of View

    Did the FAA consider grounding the affected planes and avoiding the chance that all “three” could fail and the pilot could lose control of the airplane?

    I’m not a pilot but come on, it’s just common sense.

    Bravo for taking action, but, is it safe to keep the affected planes in the air?

    Regarding the directive and a couple of loose valves:

    “The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. ”

    ——

    An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose[ning] of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances.
    A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves.
    Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event.
    Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation.
    The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane.
    * * * * *

    The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

    Read the directive:

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    FAA Issues Battery Statement. And Me Too…Attention, Boeing…

    My experts are telling me that it looks like Boeing is all alone on these 787 battery fires. The FAA issued 31 ‘Special Conditions’ (you can read that to mean that the FAA gave Boeing a whole lot of slack) but this battery problem is not getting a free ride, or any favors.

    SAFETY is the top priority. Make no mistake. The sooner the Dreamliner and its battery is grounded, the sooner the fix will be found and it will be safe to fly again. Well. While you’re at it fixing the battery problem, get that team of pilots who fly this thing to go over all areas of failure thus far, including the engines. Look at ALL of these…

    • Nov 6 2010: Boeing flight Texas: electrical problems in the aft electronics bay which disabled the primary flight displays in the cockpit.
    • Nov 6 2011: ANA Flight Okayama forced to deploy the landing gear using the alternate extension backup system, after an active warning light, which said that the wheels were not properly down.
    • July 28 2012: Boeing Flight Charleston: contained engine failure during a taxi test at Charleston International Airport PRE Delivery Taxi test. Debris fell from engine
    • Dec 4, 2012: United over Mississippi: “multiple messages” regarding flight-system errors, and diverted to New Orleans (KMSY). The problems occurred when one of the plane’s generators failed. Power was supplied to the aircraft with the five functioning generators.
    • Jan 7, 2013: JAL Boston: fire was discovered in a battery and electrical compartment of the aircraft.
    • Jan 8, 2013: JAL Boston: 40 gallons of fuel had spilled from one of its wing tanks at the gate. The plane was contacted before takeoff and it returned to the terminal without incident. Probably a case of overfilling the tank.
    • Jan 9, 2013: ANA Yamaguchi: Brake problems
    • Jan 16, 2013: ANA Takamatsu: instrument indications of smoke in the forward electrical compartment. No fire was found.

    Boeing? Are you listening? I fly everywhere, all over the world but at the moment, I’m not comfortable getting on this great plane that I really want to love for future travel. I’m am confident you can do it, even if all of these wrinkles are going to mean you need to bring in the really big iron. We need all the finders and fixers on this! The world has places to go and things to do, and you’re holding their safety in the palm of your hand.

    The Emergency Airworthiness Directive has been issued. Issued Jan 16, 2013
    and here is their announcement:

    As a result of an in-flight, Boeing 787 battery incident earlier today in Japan, the FAA will issue an emergency airworthiness directive (AD) to address a potential battery fire risk in the 787 and require operators to temporarily cease operations. Before further flight, operators of U.S.-registered, Boeing 787 aircraft must demonstrate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that the batteries are safe.
    The FAA will work with the manufacturer and carriers to develop a corrective action plan to allow the U.S. 787 fleet to resume operations as quickly and safely as possible.
    The in-flight Japanese battery incident followed an earlier 787 battery incident that occurred on the ground in Boston on January 7, 2013. The AD is prompted by this second incident involving a lithium ion battery. The battery failures resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787 airplanes. The root cause of these failures is currently under investigation. These conditions, if not corrected, could result in damage to critical systems and structures, and the potential for fire in the electrical compartment.

    Last Friday, the FAA announced a comprehensive review of the 787’s critical systems with the possibility of further action pending new data and information. In addition to the continuing review of the aircraft’s design, manufacture and assembly, the agency also will validate that 787 batteries and the battery system on the aircraft are in compliance with the special condition the agency issued as part of the aircraft’s certification.

    United Airlines is currently the only U.S. airline operating the 787, with six airplanes in service. When the FAA issues an airworthiness directive, it also alerts the international aviation community to the action so other civil aviation authorities can take parallel action to cover the fleets operating in their own countries.

    See Directive:

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    Flying with a Chance of Ice

    The latest brouhaha in the aviation set is that the safety directive on Rolls Royce Engines–which are liable to ice up–does not ground the planes for repair, but instead has a repair date of 2011. The engines are in Boeing 777s, and have been acknowledged to be responsible for engines shutting down while in flight.

    Two questionable parts do not require replacement until 2011.

    Read the directive below:

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    Under certain ambient conditions, ice can accumulate on the walls of the fuel pipes within the aircraft fuel system, which can then be released downstream when fuel flow demand is increased. This released ice can then collect on the fuel-to-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) front face and limit fuel flow through the FOHE.

    We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from blocking the FOHE, which could result in an unacceptable engine power loss, and loss of control of the airplane.

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