Australian Transport Safety Bureau has issued a safety alert.

The Qantas A380 Rolls Royce engine failure was due to a (fatigue) cracked tube. The Australian Trade Practices Act allows Qantas to pursue a legal solution against rolls Royce, especially as it appears they were aware of engine problems (fatigue cracking in the thin side of an unevenly bored oil tube) but did not inform Qantas. If there were flawed oil tubes on the earliest “A-version” Trent 900s, have some of these survived in lagter models? Qantas no longer uses A version engines.

George’s Point of View

Good for Qantas, if they are going to sue.

Now the passengers should sue Quantas for the close miss to a possible tragedy and for the mental stress.

The Australian Report:
Manufacturing problem potential factor in QF32 engine failure
Date: 02 December 2010

The ATSB has issued a safety recommendation about potential engine problems in some Airbus A380 aircraft.

The safety recommendation identifies a potential manufacturing defect with an oil tube connection to the high-pressure (HP)/intermediate-pressure (IP) bearing structure of the Trent 900 engine installed in some A380 aircraft.

The problem relates to the potential for misaligned oil pipe counter-boring, which could lead to fatigue cracking, oil leakage and potential engine failure from an oil fire within the HP/IP bearing buffer space.

In response to the recommendation Rolls Royce, affected airlines and safety regulators are taking action to ensure the continued safe operation of A380 aircraft. The action involves the close inspection of affected engines and the removal from service of any engine which displays the suspected counter-boring problem.

The ATSB will hold a media briefing tomorrow (Friday 3 December 2010) at 10.30am to accompany the release of its preliminary factual investigation report into the QF32 occurrence. ATSB Chief Commissioner Mr Martin Dolan will present the known facts gathered from the investigation and highlight the key safety issues that have resulted from the investigation to date.

Summary
On 4 November 2010, at 0157 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), an Airbus A380 aircraft, registered VH-OQA (OQA), being operated as Qantas flight 32, departed from runway 20 centre (20C) at Changi Airport, Singapore for Sydney, New South Wales. On board the aircraft were five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers (a total of 469 persons on board).

It was reported that shortly after departing Singapore the No. 2 engine failed. The aircraft was returned to Singapore for a safe landing after reducing its fuel load. The investigation is continuing.

A report has not yet been released for this investigation.

Preliminary report to be released 10.30am Friday, 3 December 2010

On 4 November 2010, at 0157 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC), an
Airbus A380 aircraft, registered VH-OQA (OQA), being operated as
Qantas flight 32, departed from runway 20 centre (20C) at Changi
Airport, Singapore for Sydney, New South Wales. On board the
aircraft were five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440 passengers (a
total of 469 persons on board).

It was reported that shortly after departing Singapore the No. 2
engine failed. The aircraft was returned to Singapore for a safe
landing after reducing its fuel load. The investigation is
continuing.

A report has not yet been released for this investigation.

Preliminary report to be released 10.30am Friday, 3 December
2010

Recommendation

Safety Recommendation AO-2010-089-SR-012

On 4 November 2010, at 0157 Universal Coordinated
Time (UTC), an Airbus A380 aircraft, registered VH-OQA (OQA), being
operated as Qantas flight 32, departed from runway 20 centre (20C)
at Changi Airport, Singapore for Sydney, New South Wales. On board
the aircraft were five flight crew, 24 cabin crew and 440
passengers (a total of 469 persons on board).

Following a normal takeoff, the crew retracted the
landing gear and flaps. The crew reported that, while maintaining
250 kts in the climb and passing 7,000 ft above mean sea level,
they heard two almost coincident ‘loud bangs’, followed shortly
after by indications of a failure of the No 2 engine.

The crew advised Singapore Air Traffic Control of the
situation and were provided with radar vectors to a holding
pattern. The crew undertook a series of actions before returning
the aircraft to land at Singapore. There were no reported injuries
to the crew or passengers on the aircraft. There were reports of
minor injuries to two persons on Batam Island, Indonesia.

A subsequent examination of the aircraft indicated
that the No 2 engine had sustained an uncontained failure of the
Intermediate Pressure (IP) turbine disc. Sections of the liberated
disc had penetrated the left wing and the left wing-to-fuselage
fairing, resulting in structural and systems damage to the
aircraft. The No 2 engine was removed from the aircraft and
disassembled in an authorised engine workshop for examination,
under the supervision of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. In
addition, a large section of liberated IP turbine disc was also
recovered from Batam Island for examination. Those examinations are
ongoing.

As a result of this occurrence, a number of safety
actions were immediately undertaken by Qantas, the Australian Civil
Aviation Safety Authority, Airbus, Rolls-Royce plc, and the
European Aviation Safety Agency.

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau has prepared a
Preliminary Factual Report on the investigation of the occurrence.
That report will be publically released on 3 December 2010.

Recent developments

Recent examination of components removed from the
failed engine at the Rolls-Royce plc facility in Derby, United
Kingdom, have identified the presence of fatigue cracking within a
stub pipe that feeds oil into the High Pressure (HP) / Intermediate
Pressure (IP) bearing structure. While the analysis of the engine
failure is ongoing, it has been identified that the leakage of oil
into the HP/IP bearing structure buffer space (and a subsequent oil
fire within that area) was central to the engine failure and IP
turbine disc liberation event.

Further examination of the cracked area has
identified the axial misalignment of an area of counter?boring
within the inner diameter of the stub pipe; the misalignment having
produced a localised thinning of the pipe wall on one side. The
area of fatigue cracking was associated with the area of pipe wall
thinning

Critical Safety Issue

Misaligned stub pipe counter-boring is understood to be related
to the manufacturing process. This condition could lead to an
elevated risk of fatigue crack initiation and growth, oil leakage
and potential catastrophic engine failure from a resulting oil
fire.

As a result of the identified critical safety issue, the
Australian Transport Safety Bureau issues the following safety
recommendation:

Safety Recommendation AO-2010-089-AR-012

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau recommends
that Rolls-Royce plc address the safety issue and take actions
necessary to ensure the safety of flight operations in transport
aircraft equipped with Rolls-Royce plc Trent 900 series
engines.

Aircraft Details