• |

    Man vs Wire

    George’s Point of View

    As opposed to Boeing, where the pilot always has the upper hand over the machine, the basic tenet of Airbus philosophy is machine knows best. That must be the case, because when all else fails, here comes the Airbus autopilot and the pilot can’t do anything. We’ve seen this bite pilots in the *** in a number of circumstances, but the first one that comes to mind, for me, is the big TAM crash in Sao Paulo. Not being a pilot, I’ve had to ask airbus pilots about this, and believe me, I’ve heard some horror stories that would curl your hair. Maybe that’s what is at the root of my negativity toward the Airbus. The other would be their tendency to crash and kill a lot of people at one time.

    Anyway, Airbus recently started production of the A320 series in China. They just did a maiden flight on the first plane. I like China very much but I don’t know about getting on China-made planes. It is bad enough that they are Airbus.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • |

    Boeing Tailpipe Fire cancels flight


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Joseph Wagner

    What: United Airlines Boeing 757-200 en route from Denver,CO to Sacramento,CA
    Where: Denver
    When: Jun 10th 2009
    Who: 186 passengers and 6 crew
    Why: On startup, the right hand engine experienced a fire burning the tailpipe, which also damaged the wing. Passengers debarked before takeoff.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • Continental Ships Minors to Wrong Destination. 2x

    George’s Point of View

    Oops. And Oops again.

    Taylor Williams of College Station got on a plane to go to Charlotte North Carolina. Only the plane ended up in Fayetteville, Ark., instead of Charlotte, N.C. She got to see a little more of the country than she’d bargained for. But then they figured out the mistake and sent her to Houston, and then to Charlotte, where she finally ended up with her father who was no doubt going crazy with worry.

    Did I mention she is eight years old?

    Then there’s Miriam Kamens. Miriam took off from Logan Airport in Boston to go to Cleveland to visit her grandparents. But SHE ended up in Newark NJ. And Miriam isn’t 8. She’s 10.

    Apparently Continental Airlines has a little problem getting unaccompanied minors to their exact destinations.

    There was a time when children flying alone on a plane had to do something really embarrassing, like wear a notebook sized placard around their neck with their destination written on it.

    Maybe they should start doing that again. On the other hand…there’s no actual proof that airline staff can actually read.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • |

    Lightning Strikes Ryanair Boeing


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Martin Hartmann

    What: Ryanair Boeing 737-800 en route from Stansted UK to Krakow
    Where: Frankfurt
    When: Jun 15th 2009
    Who: Not listed
    Why: The plane encountered turbulence and was struck by a lightning, after which it diverted to Frankfurt Hahn (Germany), where it landed safely.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration

    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD;
    Amendment 39-15940; AD 2009-13-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

    Hide details for Preamble InformationPreamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. That AD currently requires removing all main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium studs (titanium studs) and replacing them with steel studs. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD as well as changes to the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This amendment is prompted by an accident, by recent RFM changes made by the manufacturer that were not available when we issued the existing AD, and by our determination that certain MGB Normal and Emergency procedures in the RFM are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 pounds per square inch (psi).
    Replacing the titanium studs is intended to prevent their failure, which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Changing the RFM procedures is intended to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions.

    DATES: Effective July 1, 2009.
    The incorporation by reference of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, was approved previously for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009).
    Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before August 17, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    You may get the service information identified in this AD from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or at http:// www.sikorsky.com.
    Examining the Docket: You may examine the docket that contains the AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is located in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John M. Coffey, Flight Test Engineer, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 23, 2009, we issued Emergency AD 2009-07-53 for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, which requires, before further flight, removing all titanium studs that attach the MGB filter bowl assembly to the MGB and replacing them with steel studs. That action was prompted by the failure of 2 studs that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Before the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of MGB oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs. That emergency AD was published as Amendment 39-15886 on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977). This AD continues to require removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs.
    Since the fatal accident and since issuing AD 2009-07-53, Sikorsky has issued revisions to the Normal and Emergency procedures of the RFM. We have determined that these revisions are necessary because the existing procedures are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 psi. This action does not mandate the procedures the pilot must perform in an emergency, but requires making changes to the RFM to clarify and emphasize the Normal and Emergency procedures addressing specified MGB malfunctions, thus giving the pilot the necessary information to make an informed decision. We are superseding the existing AD to include the most recent RFM revisions because the revisions were not available when we originally issued AD 2009-07-53.
    We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), which describes procedures for removing titanium studs and replacing them with steel suds. We have also reviewed the RFM revisions and, after full coordination with Sikorsky, approved them on May 13, 2009. Sikorsky has since assured us that they have provided the revised RFM procedures to all affected operators. The RFM revisions are as follows:

    SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
    SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
    SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
    SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
    SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
    SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
    S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

    In addition to the RFM revisions, we have also reviewed associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, that provide corrections to those RFM revisions; however, we are not mandating that they be incorporated.
    Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters of the same type design, this AD supersedes AD 2009-07-53 to require, before further flight, removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs. These actions must be accomplished by following the specified portions of the ASB described previously. Because the critical unsafe condition can adversely affect the structural integrity and controllability of the helicopter, AD 2009-07-53 remains in full effect until the effective date of this AD.
    Making the Normal and Emergency RFM revisions that were not available when we issued AD 2009-07-53 is required within 10 hours time-in-service. The short compliance time is required because certain procedures in the existing RFM may be misleading, presenting an unacceptable level of risk, and because the required RFM revisions are already approved by the FAA and available to operators, imposing a minimal burden. Therefore, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are unnecessary and contrary to the public interest, and that good cause also exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
    We estimate that this AD will affect 35 helicopters of U.S. registry. Replacing the studs will take approximately 6 work hours per helicopter to accomplish at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. In accordance with the ASB, required parts and tooling are available at no cost. Making the changes to the RFM will take a minimal amount of time and cost. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators to be $16,800, assuming there are no parts and tooling costs.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any written data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include "Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the AD in light of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of our docket Web site, you can find and read the comments to any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment. You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
    1. Is not a "significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    2. Is not a "significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the AD docket to examine the economic evaluation.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-15886 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009), and by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD), Amendment 39-15940, to read as follows:

    Hide details for Regulatory InformationRegulatory Information

    2009-13-01 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-15940. Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD. Supersedes AD 2009-07-53, Amendment 39-15886, Docket No. FAA-2009-0351, Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.

    Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters, certificated in any category.
    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
    To prevent failure of a main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium stud (titanium stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter; and to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions, accomplish the following:
    (a) Before further flight, for all Model S-92A helicopters with a MGB housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with "TS-062-01” near the P/N:
    (1) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev.

    A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.

    Note 1: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.
    (2) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the MGB housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the MGB housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.
    (3) Install steel studs and mark the MGB housing as "TS-062- 01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.
    (b) Within 10 hours time-in-service, for all helicopters regardless of MGB housing assembly P/N:
    (1) Revise the Normal and Emergency procedures sections of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) by making the following changes, approved May 13, 2009:

    RFM Remove Remove Insert
    SA S92A-RFM-000 Part I Temporary Revision (T-Rev)No. 1., Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-000, Revision No. 4.
    SA S92A-RFM-002 Part I T-Rev No. 5, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 Gear Box Malfunctions from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-002, Revision No. 10.
    SA S92A-RFM-003 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-003, Revision No. 10.
    SA S92A-RFM-004 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-004, Revision No. 8.
    SA S92A-RFM-005 Part I T-Rev No. 3, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-005, Revision No. 7.
    SA S92A-RFM-006 Part I T-Rev No. 2, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-006, Revision No. 8.
    S92A-RFMS No. 3 N/A Sub-Section 7 “Gearbox Malfunctions” from Section III Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.
    All paragraphs of subsection 7 "Gear Box Malfunctions” starting with paragraph 7.0 are affected.

    Note 2: Inserting the following revisions, approved on May 13, 2009, and their associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, into the RFM, as applicable, satisfies the requirements of this AD:
    (i) SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
    (ii) SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
    (iii) SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
    (iv) SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
    (v) SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
    (vi) SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
    (vii) S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

    (c) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Attn: John M. Coffey, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
    (d) Special flight permits will not be issued.
    (e) Remove and replace the titanium studs by following the specified portions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of this information on April 27, 2009 under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009. Copies may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com or at http:// www.sikorsky.com. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.
    (f) This amendment becomes effective on July 1, 2009.

    Hide details for Footer InformationFooter Information
    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 9, 2009.
    Mark R. Schilling,
    Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-14081 Filed 6-15-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • Caution: Volcano Crossing

    George’s Point of View

    A disaster not in California…

    From June 12 to June 15, the Sarychev Peak on the Russian Kuril Islands erupted, causing air traffic disruptions between Northern American and Japan. The ash clouds are reaching “estimated heights of 45,000 feet.” (Danger zone for aviation from from E152 to W155 over a distance of 2000nm and N40 to N48).

    The dust clouds are drifting east and dispersing.

    Alaska Volcano Observatory

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | |

    American Airlines MD 80 Engine Damage


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Joe Statz

    What: AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 1317 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD 80 en route to WASHINGTON-DULLES AIRPORT
    Where: WASHINGTON-DULLES, Chantilly Va
    When: 06/15/2009
    Who: No injuries
    Why: The flight reported an engine problem but landed without further incident. The engine damage was minor.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | |

    Ethiopian 767 Gear Damage on DC Landing


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Michael Schmidt
    What: ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES B767 en route from Fiumicino Airport Rome to Washington Dulles Airport
    Where: CHANTILLY, VA where it arrived 62 minutes late
    When: 06/14/2009
    Who: No injuries were reported.
    Why: Ethiopian Airlines Flight 500 left gear was damaged from a hard landing, striking the runway.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | | | | |

    Northwest Airbus Double-diversion


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Martin Woudstra

    What: Northwest Airlines Airbus A330-300 en route from Rome Fiumicino Italy to Atlanta,GA
    Where: Shannon, Ireland/Cincinnati/ Northern Kentucky
    When: Jun 12th 2009
    Who: 285 people on board
    Why: En route, smoke developed in the cabin supposedly from the galley. On landing, Shannon fire services sprayed the right hand main gear. Passengers debarked and re-embarked. The flight reached Atlanta but after circling, weather-caused traffic congestion in Atlanta forced the flight to land in Cincinnati.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | |

    Airbus Oil Leak Downs Lisbon Flight


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Michael Schmidt

    What: SATA International Airbus A310-300 en route from Lisbon Portugal to Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport
    Where: Lisbon
    When: Jun 15th 2009
    Who: 222 passengers
    Why: After takeoff, an oil leak was detected in the Airbus and it returned to the airport. Passengers debarked and eventually took an alternative airbus. One passenger was ill.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • |

    Tam Airbus Flight Cancelled over Electrical Failure

    What: TAM Airbus flight en route from Florianópolis to Brasilia
    Where: Hercilio Luz International Airport in Florianópolis
    When: Thursday June 11
    Who: Number of passengers was not released
    Why: After the plane experienced electrical failure, the flight out of Hercilio Luz International Airport in Florianópolis was cancelled.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • |

    The Crash is Never Over

    George’s Point of View

    Judgements and awards offer no closure.

    For those left behind, the accidents are never over.

    Angela de Marchi lost her husband in September 29 2006, a Boeing Legacy crash, when 154 died.

    She lost him again at the crash of Tam Congonhas Flight 3054 July 17 2007 when 199 people died.

    And now this new Airbus crash…she lost him again.

    For the families, each new crash brings the memories back, the hope, the loss.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | |

    Turbulence in Charlotte


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Stewart Andrew

    What: US Airways Airbus A330-300 en route from Frankfurt/Main to Charlotte
    Where: Charlotte
    When: 06/14/2009
    Who: The number of passengers was not reported
    Why: U S Air Flight 705 was in descent when it encountered turbulence. A flight attendant sustained minor injuries. She was apparently the only injury; otherwise, the flight landed safely.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | |

    Airbus Engine Issues in Billings

    What: United Airbus 320
    Where: Billings Logan International Airport
    When: Saturday June 13
    Who: 136 passengers
    Why: The number two engine had problems, necessitating an emergency landing in Billings.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | | |

    Southwest Emergency Landing


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Manas Barooah

    What: Southwest Airlines Flight 1040 Boeing 737-500 en route from Chicago to Fort Myers
    Where: Columbus, Ga
    When: Jun 14th 2009
    Who: 122 people on board
    Why: Over Columbus, the plane experienced low cabin pressure and performed an emergency landing. 5 hours later, the replacement Boeing picked up the stranded passengers and continued the flight. Maintenance did not release a public report of what caused the low cabin pressure, but if they tell me why, you’ll be the first to know.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • Thoughts on Co-Pilot Salaries…

    George’s Point of View

    I came across this Safer skies article discussing Continental Express Flight 3407, and panning the Federal Aviation Administration for lack of supervision.

    The article mentions that “The co-pilot of the doomed flight in Buffalo lamented moments before the crash that she lacked flight experience in icy weather conditions? Does it care that she was making about $11/hour…” and goes on to pressure government agencies to better regulate pilot training, so that future pilots have the experience to fly the planes they are flying.

    I’d like to make a point here about being a pilot.

    Pilots are professionals. GOOD pilots have spent many hours learning their craft; and it is proper that they do so, because the lives of so many people rest on their shoulders. They SHOULD be expert if they have been given the control of the cockpit. Even co-pilots have spent significant time getting educated and up to speed, getting licensed.

    IF the FAA does its job and regulates pilot training, then co-pilots should be earning more than $11/hr. They’re not flipping burgers. They’re not selling footwear.

    Think about this: when you get into a taxi, you’re paying for someone who can drive the taxi. Whatever their vehicle, they are licensed to drive. Even the cheaper or shabbier taxi companies can not operate with drivers who are not licensed. They MUST be licensed if they are behind the wheel. To stay in business, even the funkiest, rattiest, cheesiest taxi company has drivers who are professionally qualified for their taxi licenses. I have no idea what they make for a living. But it is probably more than $11.00/hr. And if they wreck their taxis, they’re not going to fall 10,000 feet.

    When you get into a plane, as a passenger, you trust that your pilot and your copilot are highly paid, highly skilled professionals. If they aren’t highly skilled, they shouldn’t be at the wheel.

    So I would urge the FAA to step up to the plate and raise the bar on pilots; raise the bar on supervision; raise the bar on training. And with the professional standards well maintained–with adequate supervision–pilots and co-pilots should be paid wages that reflect their skill and professionalism.

    $11.00 an hour doesn’t cut it.

    Our pilots don’t need to ferry from one corner of the country to another, coming in to work exhausted, and flying planes on which they are not adequately trained. They should know the planes they fly, backwards and forwards, upside down, inside out and sideways. They should be paid commiserate to that degree of knowledge and skill. Or else, they should not be pilots at all.

    Imagine the responsibility of the pilot and co-pilot. All those lives on the plane are completely dependent on the pilot’s skill.

    What if the pilot has a heart attack? a bout of food poisoning as was recently in the news? or is otherwise unable to fly the plane? It’s like the co-pilot is the spare tire. You wouldn’t have a spare tire that was flat.

    That’s what the copilot is there for. Except the co-pilot is not a spare tire. The co-pilot is not some kind of sub-human or half-pilot, deserving of a half-pilot wage. In this case, they’re the expert who’s on hand in case of emergency.

    The co-pilot bears the responsibility of all those lives. The co-pilot shares the responsibility because they HAVE the responsibility. It’s their job. They should be prepared to do their jobs; and they should be paid a legitimate professional wage to do so.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | |

    Iberia Airbus has Navigation Issues

    What: Iberia Airbus A321-200 en route from Madrid to Copenhagen, Denmark
    Where: Madrid’s Barajas Airport
    When: Jun 13th 2009
    Who: 190 passengers
    Why: After 40 minutes struggling with technical problem with the navigation instruments, the Airbus returned to land safely in Madrid. The passengers were accommodated with a replacement plane, while this plane was examined by maintenance crews. No injuries were reported.

    George’s Point of View

    Please note there was a similar incident that happened the day before with another model of airbus but there was even less information available so we didn’t write it up.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | |

    Shannon Emergency Landing

    What: Northwest Airlines Airbus A330 light 821
    Where: Shannon Airport
    When: 1.20pm
    Who: 285 passengers
    Why: smokey stench in the forward galley. The plane made a successful emergency landing, without further incident.

    George’s Point of View

    I’m glad there were no injuries involved; but I chuckle picturing the chargeback on some flight attendant’s chit because the airline was forced to land the plane when she 1. burned the toast or
    2. accidentally toasted the microwave or
    3. tried to sneak in a smoke:

    June 1-15: +$1080.00
    Taxes: – XXXX
    Emergency -140,008.72
    Landing

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | | |

    Delta Emergency Landing

    What: Delta (Skywest Airlines Canadair CRJ-200) en route from Kalispell to Salt Lake
    Where: Missoula International airport
    When: June 12, 2009 3 pm
    Who: 49 passengers and 3 crew members
    Why: While on route to Salt Lake, the plane experienced problems with its landing gear. After making efforts to deal with the problem and carry on, they decided to make an emergency landing at the Missoula International Airport 45 minutes after take-off. The gear lowered and locked and the plane landed without injury to anyone.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | | |

    Jetstar A332 Cockpit Fire


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer John Richard Thomson

    What: Australian Jetstar (division of Qantas) Airbus A330-200 en route from Japan to Australia (Osaka Kansai to Bilinga Gold Coast)
    Where: emergency landing on the island of Guam
    When: June 10th
    Who: 203 mostly Japanese passengers and crew
    Why: When a fire broke out in the cockpit when the plane was over the Pacific Ocean, one of the pilots used a fire extinguisher to control the fire.

    Passengers debarked normally.

    The plane is only two years old; and will be held in Guam as the incident is investigated. 4 investigators will be sent to examine the aircraft.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | |

    CRJ-200 Partial Gear Landing

    What: Delta /Atlantic Southeast Airlines 50-seat CRJ-200 Bombardier en route from Columbus to Atlanta
    Where: Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport.
    When: June 11, 2009
    Who: 19 passengers and 3 crew
    Why: On approach to Atlanta, the left main gear failed to extend, in spite of extended efforts. After a partial gear landing, the plane ended up off runway 27 right. No one was reported to be injured.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • |

    Air France Airbus Flight 447: Information Withheld

    George’s Point of View

    The next big question is whether or not information is withheld.

    That’s what some families are wondering, and that’s part of the reason why they’ve hired lawyers. Plaintiffs have access to more information; and they want to know what reason Air France has for not replacing a known Airbus problem, the pitot probes (airbus speed sensors.)

    What has been published is error messages based on inconsistent readings taken by the pitot probes.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • Flight 447: another update

    George’s Point of View

    41 bodies from Brazil plane crash have been found.

    Brazilian and French searchers are looking northeast of the Fernando de Noronha.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.
  • | |

    Pinnacle CRJ Emergency Landing in Memphis

    What: Pinnacle/Northwest Airlines Canadair CRJ-200 en route from Detroit I to Huntsville
    Where: Memphis International Airport
    When: Jun 11th 2009
    Who: 36 passengers and 3 crew
    Why: The plane flew into an area of severe turbulence and diverted to Memphis. Weather may have been an issue.

    To include the featured image in your Twitter Card, please tap or click their icon a second time.