George’s Point of View
The IATA ( Air Transport Association) is an association representing the world’s airlines commitment to excellence and safety in aviation. All of its 224 Member airlines live up to best practice standards in airline safety. 8 airlines lost membership due to failing a 2008 IOSA ( IATA Operational Safety Audit) audit.
Airlines which fail the safety audit, or are otherwise unable to reach the safety standards are banned by the European Union. One of those banned airlines is Garuda Indonesia, the national airline of Indonesia. That’s the same airline which has been in the news for the recent sentencing of one of it’s pilots. Not that Garunda Indonesia even flies to Europe.
Marwoto Komar who was piloting Garuda Indonesia Flight 200 , ignored warnings not to land the plane when he brought it in at twice the safe speed, resulting in the plane slamming into the runway, skidding off and bursting into flame, killing 21. While he did not get life in prison, he did get jail time.
The pilot’s sentencing is really a symptom of what is going on with Garunda Indonesia, which is a lack of government supervision. In fact, aircrafts which would otherwise be considered safe, are NOT safe simply because of being part of GI’s under-supervised, under-inspected, under-maintained fleet. In fact, there is a $24 million Indonesian governmental program now in place to train Indonesian air safety inspectors, an ambitious program which may still take years to bring the airline up to acceptable safety standards.
In the meantime, apparently the burden of safety rests on the shoulders of pilots, which in view of recent history, does not particularly appear to be a good thing. Furthermore, no one yet has made it public exactly why Marwoto Komar ignored air traffic control AND his instruments AND his co-pilot to attempt a landing at twice the safe speed, but perhaps while he is in jail, the Indonesian skies may be marginally safer. Not that it does any good for the 21 victims of Flight 200.
Similar Posts
Thanksgiving Wishes

It is time again for Thanksgiving. In my heart, I feel Thanksgiving every day, perhaps because in my business I am constant touch with families of victims. I work closely with people in all stages of loss. I have to admit, it takes a toll. Even the news of the day takes a toll-the deaths of children abroad in bombings, this bus crash in Tennessee, the latest crash: they all take a piece of me. There are so many times that I can bring hope or help; I can’t help but wish I could always do so. There are so many who have so much. I feel deeply for those who are struggling to get their lives on track, and those who have to scratch for meals wherever they may be.As this day of Thanksgiving approaches, I extend my condolences to all those who have suffered loss or deprivation. I pray that this season, everyone has everything they need, peace of heart, peace of mind, and tables full of blessings. At the same time, I give thanks for every moment, for my friends, family and health, and all the blessings of those close to me. Have a happy Thanksgiving.
- Air France | Airbus | Crash | Editorial
Notes on Air France Flight 447: Thoughts on the CVR Facts
So there you have it: the short version of the investigation’s reading of the Cockpit Voice recorder.
If you missed it, we have posted it here in this blog in it’s entirety:https://airflightdisaster.com/?p=17147
If you don’t like the visual rendition, you can click at the bottom for the .pdf.
The problems seem to begin at 2 h 08 min 07; then at 2 h 10 min 05 autopilot & auto thrust disengages. The pilots note that the speeds do not agree,( which means the speeds are incorrect, and it is an indication that pitot tubes are malfunctioning. Around this time, ACARS sent a PITOT error message, which was not mentioned in the CVR summary.) The PIC (captain) re-enters at 2 h 11 min 40 and it is all downhill from there.
As far as we can tell, everything in the cockpit voice recorder still indicates that the main cause for this crash is Thales defective pitot tubes which froze over and sent incorrect data back. How could anyone make correct decisions without knowing the speed at which the plane was traveling? How would the pilots have discerned when the incoming data was faulty and which of it—if any—was correct?
Based on the pilots’ response to the stall, we can also reiterate points made at the February 24 hearing, where Justice Zimmerman pointed out a lack of training for pilots on how to respond to a catastrophic failure. Shouldn’t pilots (and not just the PIC) be trained in this procedure to the point that the correct corrective response is second nature? The time to try to figure out how to respond is not during the catastrophe, with 228 lives hanging in the balance.
There does not appear to be an emergency procedure from the manufacturer. (This was also noted in the February hearing by Justice Zimmerman.)
It appears that the plane stalled, and that could not be corrected in time to prevent the catastrophe.
So now, all eyes will turn to the DVR, which will hopefully help decode what happened mechanically in the stall.
And I do have questions about the notation, which seems to imply that even if autopilot is not online, some (background?) processes continue to be determined by digital input, which may be faulty.
When the measured speeds are below 60 kt, the measured angle of attack values are considered invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are below 30 kt, the speed values themselves are considered invalid. (Or I am misreading the data and the fact of unrecoverability is due to other system factors. It does appear that the Flight Control System is unwieldy or badly conceived.)It seems to me as a layman, that this is a fly-by-wire conundrum. If the plane is in crisis, but it is logically disregarding the correct input when it is beyond a “safe or logical” range, then how can it be corrected, if there are no manual controls? (Not to mention no emergency procedures to fall back on.)
- Air Safety | Editorial | Yemen | Yemenia Air
Yemenia Spotless Record? Really?
I glance at a lot of news sites, mostly skimming just to make sure the facts are the same across the board, and I don’t usually stop and make comments about one particular site, or other. I’m usually focused on the message, not the messenger.
But once in a while, I come across erroneous content.
What should I do when I come across a site that posts an article that says up till the crash in the Comoros, Yemenia Airlines had an unblemished record?
What world is that staff reporter living in? Who gave them that information? Because it’s wrong.
Today’s Yemenia was formerly Yemen Airlines and Yemen Arab Airlines and Yemen Airways. (There may be more DBA names I’m leaving out.)
This airline, rebranded over and over, has had at least 11 crashes and a couple of hijackings thrown in (1973 and 1975.) Just take a look at the actual record.
And there were EU Safety sanctions in JUL 2008: EU safety action (Safety deficiencies noted by ramp inspections in several countries; Yemenia took corrective actions.); on JUL 2009: EU safety action (The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) suspended the maintenance organisation approval EASA.145.0177 issued to Yemenia Yemen Airways, due to unresolved safety deficiencies.) On JUL 2009: EU safety action (The authorities of France suspended the certificates of airworthiness of the aircraft of type Airbus A310 registered in France (F-OHPR and F-OHPS) and operated by the carrier.) On NOV 2009: EU safety action (Member States will verify systematically the effective compliance of Yemenia with the relevant safety standards through the prioritisation of ramp inspections to be carried out on aircraft of this carrier.)
The EU is right to be so demanding. Yemenia Airlines has a dangerous record, no matter what the airline is called. Lack of safety is the reason the airline has been on the EU blacklist. Don’t the people of Yemen deserve a safe carrier?
(See below)
Hijacks first:
- 14-SEP-1994——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia—— Boeing 737-2R4C Hijacker(s) demanded to be taken to Saudi Arabia. Duration of the hijacking: less than 1 day.
- 25 August 1973——a Yemen Airlines Douglas DC-6 was hijacked during a passenger flight from Ta’izz to Asmara. The perpetrator forced the pilots to divert the aircraft with fifteen other passenger and six crew members on board to Kuwait Airport, for which a refueling stop at Djibouti Airport turned out to be necessary. In Kuwait, the hijacker surrendered to local police forces.
- 23 February 1975——a Yemen Airlines DC-3 was hijacked during a flight from Al Hudaydah to Sana’a and forced to land at an airport in Saudi Arabia. There, the aircraft was stormed and the perpetrator overpowered.
- 27-AUG-1993——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Boeing 737-2R4C An Alyemda Boeing 737 aircraft was hijacked during a domestic flight from Riyan Airport (RIY) to Al Ghaydah Airport The hijacker, a Yemeni soldier who reportedly was armed with a handgun and a hand grenade, demanded to be taken to either Kuwait or Oman. The pilot convinced the hijacker that a refueling stop was necessary.
- 20-JAN-1983——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Boeing 707-300 Three hijackers forced the aircraft to land at Djibouti. After the aircraft landed a gun battle erupted inside the aircraft and two passengers were reportedly wounded. The hijackers subsequently surrendered and were taken Into custody by Djibouti authorities. The hijackers were convicted of air piracy in Djibouti and reportedly sentenced to six months In prison. This was suspended.
- 22-AUG-1972——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Douglas DC-6 Three passengers hijacked the Alyemda plane en route between Beirut (BEY) and Cairo. The flight diverted to Nicosia (NIC), Cyprus. The hijackers said that they belonged to a group named the Eagles of National Unity in South Yemen. After a three hour refueling stop the airplane continued to Benghazi (BEN), Libya. The hijackers surrendered to Libyan authorities.
- 15-AUG-1985——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Boeing 707-336C Climbing through FL230, water inadvertently spilled on the autopilot panel and the crew had to disengage the autopilot because the stabilizer trim wheel started to rotate. Control was lost as the plane pitched up and down. Control was regained at 1000 feet and an emergency landing was carried out at Aden.
- 09-MAY-1982——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— DHC-7-103 A Dash 7 passenger plane, operated by Alyemda, crashed into the sea some 2 km from the Aden International Airport (ADE), Yemen. Of the 49 occupants, 23 were killed. The pilot had reported the runway in sight at a distance of 9 nautical miles (17 km) and was cleared to report on final for runway 26. The wind was reported 240 degrees at 5 knots. The aircraft reported short final, was sighted by the tower and cleared to land, then lost altitude andcrashed in the sea.
- 26-JAN-1982——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)——The Boeing 707 was flying a cargo of military supplies from Libya to Damascus when it was attacked by an Iraqi or Israeli fighter plane. The crippled freighter managed to land at Damascus, but was considered damaged beyond repair.
- 01-MAR-1977——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Douglas C-47A-25-DK 7O-ABF Crashed into the sea off Aden. 19 fatalities, 19 aboard
- 17-SEP-1975——Alyemda (Merged with Yemenia)—— Douglas DC-3 Nose, front fuselage and propellers where damaged following a heavy landing. Aviation News reported the accident happened on Sept. 16
- 3 November 1958——a Yemen Airlines Douglas C-47 Skytrain #YE-AAB crashed near in Italy, killing eight people on board. The aircraft had been on a flight from Rome Ciampino Airport to Yemen with a planned stopover at Belgrade, carrying the Yemenite Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs.
- 19 March 1969——a Yemen Airlines C-47 (registered 4W-AAS) crashed near Ta’izz during a post-maintenance test flight, killing the four occupants. It turned out that the elevator of the aircraft did work properly. Repair work had been done on that part, because it had been damaged some days earlier in a ground collision.
- 16 September 1971——a Yemen Airlines C-47 (registered 4W-ABI) crashed near Rajince, Serbia when it encountered severe icing conditions, killing the five people on board. The aircraft had been on a multi-stopover flight from Yemen to Europe and had just departed Belgrade Airport.
- 1 November 1972——a Yemen Airlines Douglas DC-3 (registered 4W-ABJ) was destroyed in a crash-landing at an airfield near Beihan.
- 13 December 1973——a Yemen Airlines DC-3 (registered 4W-ABR) crashed near Ta’izz.
- 14 November 1978——a Yemen Airlines C-47 (registered 4W-ABY) was damaged beyond repair in a heavy landing at an airfield near Ma’rib.
- 26 June 2000——a Yemenia Boeing 737-200C, registered 7O-ACQ, was damaged beyond repair when it veered off the runway upon landing at Khartoum International Airport following a cargo flight from Yemen. Despite their plans to carry out a runway 36 approach, the crew landed straight-in on runway 18. The aircraft departed the side of the runway. The nose gear collapsed as it contacted obstructions.
- 21 January 2001——a Yemenia Flight 448, a Boeing 727-200 with 91 passengers and 10 crew on board, was hijacked 15 minutes into a flight from Sana’a to Ta’izz by an Iraqi man. The plane was forced to land at Djibouti-Ambouli International Airport, where the perpetrator was overpowered by the crew.
- 1 August 2001——a Yemenia Boeing 727-200 (registered 7O-ACW) was damaged beyond economic repair when it overran the runway upon landing at Asmara International Airport following a flight from Sana’a with 107 passengers and four crew on board, none of whom were significantly injured.
- 30 June 2009——a Yemenia Flight 626 from Sana’a to Moroni, Comoros crashed into the sea shortly before landing. Of the 142 passengers and eleven crew that had been on the Airbus A310-300 with the registration 7O-ADJ,[23] only a 12-year-old girl, Bahia Bakari, was recovered, alive and conscious, although suffering from extreme tiredness and hypothermia, cuts to her face and a fractured collar-bone.
New Lows for Air India Crash Compensation
Compensation disbursal has hit a new low. It was recently published on the Khaleej Times site that Air India’s insurance company is calculating compensation claims based on ‘the loss of livelihood” rather than “loss of life.’ Loss of life according to the Montreal Convention (in terms of Indian currency) amounts to nearly Rs7.5million. Advocate and solicitor Hoshang D Nanavati, who represents Air India’s legal counsel, is saying they are settling cases where the issue of applying 100,000 SDR (Special Drawing Rights) equivalent to $160,000 did not arise.
Compensation is complicated—a complicated process, and it is frequently misunderstood.
Families understand, or are made to believe that soon the carrier will be coming around to pay no less than $100,000 SDRS less the amount of the advance they received. This is not always the case. If the emergency advance was $10,000 and that 100,000SDRs equates to $151,000 US dollars, the family is entitled to the $141,000 that is still due under the treaty ONLY IF THEY CAN PROVIDE THE DOCUMENTATION. To qualify, documents must show that the person who died had a life span long enough to earn at least that amount based on the decedent’s profile, hence the term above, “loss of livelihood.” It’s always been my opinion that the Montreal Treaty, as other treaties/conventions before it, is not intended to protect the passenger. It’s to protect the operator of the airline from being sued for more than the amount called for in the treaty. The 100,000 SDRs is not a right, it’s a cap, the maximum that, in addition to a small amount for baggage, the operator will have to pay each family of a decedent unless negligence is proved. (Negligence can creep into the picture in a number of ways, such as lack of maintenance, or inferior pilot training leading to pilot error.)
The insurance companies and lawyers commonly require a global release upon payment of any funds, so even if they paid the maximum per the treaty, if more culpable parties turn up, those who signed too early have signed away their rights. If a global release was required before operator paid the compensation, all doors would be shut to sue anyone else later found responsible, such as the manufacturer of a component or the manufacturer of the aircraft.
Keep in mind that we don’t even have a final report on the cause of the crash, other than bits and pieces about pilot error. Other responsible parties may turn up.
The loss of a decedent is handled by profile. It is NOT generic. The loss is based on the person’s age, employment, if not employed, what did he do when he was employed, then how many children, wife/husband, who else depended on the decedent for support, was he the bread winner for how many? All these factors play into what make determining compensation complicated. But in this circumstance, that cap is not a baseline, it is a ceiling.
And unless you have a top earner, there is nothing to negotiate beyond the economics which depend on the country (in this case, India.) And then there’s pain and suffering, and how each country handles it. In India, it is possible that pain and suffering is not even considered. In some countries, there may be a fixed amount for pain and suffering; or it may be banned all together. What happens to the family member in India who was not a top earner?
For those families who are trying to hold out for the compensation they deserve, for authorities to say cases are delayed because of pending case opposition is just a typical delay tactic. There’s always the ambition on the part of airline and insurance lawyers that the families who are most in need of cash will capitulate and accept lesser compensation. The longer the lawyers take, the more red tape and loopholes the families have to weave through, the longer the families have to struggle along, make their bills, and stretch out whatever interim compensation the law has allowed. The more likely they are to capitulate and accept less.
When the Indian Civil Aviation Minister assures speedy disbursal of maximum compensation, if he is thinking of his constituents, is he referring to maximum compensation to take care of widows and orphans, or that completely different number that the insurance companies and airlines would like to redefine as “maximum,” in other words, the least possible that they can legally get the victims to accept?
The Montreal Convention is a treaty that governs international aviation incidents. The airline is automatically liable for up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights I mentioned above. But an airline is liable to claims over that limit if it is unable to prove that the crash was not due to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of the company or any of its servants, or that the crash was solely due to the negligence or wrongful act or omission of a third party.
If there is no cap, because of the certain pilot error, shouldn’t that victim, even if a low earner, at least get the cap amount? Their life has value. Every life has value.
Air India’s parent company, National Aviation Company of India Ltd said that next week they will make public the steps toward safety taken during the past year. “We are now preparing a whole list of what all actions we have taken. That should come out in public domain in a week’s time.”
That is a very good thing. I look forward to seeing the list of actions taken that comprise improvements, for is also the selfsame list of practices which were negligent in 2010. Every item on that list should be financially compensated as an action which was denied the victims of the Mangalore crash.
I wish there were some way to empower the struggling families to see that there is a light at the end of the tunnel if they do not cave in to lesser offers. The pain and suffering, the loss of life, the decreased quality of life, and the loss of income are very real. They have more than the emotional weight which the families are suffering, but also a physical reality reflected in concrete family circumstances.
The families are living through a terrible ordeal, and the song and dance that the victims are being forced to endure is unnecessarily cruel punishment.There is no question that the airline and insurance companies bear the responsibility; they should just stop playing a numbers game, stop extending the misery, and just provide the families the compensation they deserve.
- Air India Express | airliners.net | Boeing | Crash | Editorial | India | Mangalore | update
INDIA’s DGCA Asserts Co-Pilot Assertiveness
George’s Point of View
Following the Air India Express tragedy in Mangalore India (and definitely in response to it), the DGCA (India’s Directorate-General of Civil Aviation) has been trying to shut the gate after the horses are out. They’re still pointing their fingers at the pilot.
The tape of the crash records the co-pilot Capt H S Ahluwalia (*i.e. the pnf) insisting to Commander Capt Zlatko Glusica to initiate a go-around. The Captain (**i.e. the pf) did not, and the plane landed too far down the runway, clipped an antenna, crashed thru the end of the runway, off the edge of the runway plateau. We can only assume the captain ignored his co-pilot, as no go-around was initiated.
Apparently the pilot was in error and the co-pilot knew it. It must have been obvious to Ahluwalia that they were landing at the wrong angle too far down (the middle) of the runway–but he did not act on his knowledge. At any rate, he was in disagreement with his superior officer.
Consequently, the DCGA has issued an operations circular highlighting procedural assertiveness for the co-pilot when he knows the pilot is wrong. The Mangalore tragedy is not mentioned by name, but it is certainly the silent subtext.
Did the crash occur because the co-pilot did not take the controls? What exactly will this circular accomplish? Had this circular been public already, would the pilot and co-pilot have ended up in a wrestling match over controls of the airplane?
It will be interesting to hear from pilots about what they think the consequences of this directive might be, and if they think a cultural context may play a part.
I always turn to the experts. Right now, before the full investigation is out, I am hearing a lot of speculative “pilot error” but it is all speculation. But is it all pilot error?
My experts remind me that “Every incident is linked to a chain of events. Each event alone is not sufficient reason to provoke an accident although when they link together the chances are multiplied and sometimes the accident occurs.” ( I am quoting a pilot.)
For example, if pilot fatigue were a contributing factor (landing at dawn after a long tiring duty cycle), isn’t the carrier’s policy on pilot fatigue a contributory factor?
The Boeing 737 landed midway on runway 24, and then overshot it, crashing into a gorge. Initial reports on the civil aviation website showed runway 27 mislabeled as runway 24. The actual crash site was not even pictured, a mistake that certainly casts doubt on the quality of the investigation, and possibly even the quality of the resources available to pilots at the time they were negotiating a landing. What did their map say? Is a pilot alone in error if the resources provided him are in error? I know I am digressing, but the point I want to make is this:
I don’t have years of flight school, or engineering training but I do have opinion. And in my opinion, pilot error alone does not cause a crash like this.
Terminology
*pnf – pilot not flying
**pf – pilot flying
—

Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer WTWhat: Air India Express Boeing 737-800 en route from Dubai to Mangalore
Where: Mangalore airport
When: 6:00 a.m May 22 2010
Who: 160 (?) passengers including 23 children, 6 crew= 158 fatalities and 8 survivors
Why: Air India Express flight 812 attempted touch down was around the middle marker. (Conflicting) reports are that it overshot the runway, and that the pilot intended a go round (tapes reveal the co pilot was urging a go-round) but the plane hit the localizer antenna at the runway’s end, plowed through the perimeter losing part of a wing, and went down 75 feet into a ravine, and broke into pieces and burst into flames. On touchdown, there was a reported “bang” which may have been a tire bursting. A drizzle started after the accident. From 5 to 10 people have been hospitalized, but according to reports there are possibly 3 survivors.Survivor Abdul Puttur suffered burns. He was seated near the wing exit and said that the pilot had announced the landing, then there was a thud. He saw huge flames after the plane fell into the ravine and then he jumped out from the back entrance. Another passenger said the pilot made no announcement.
The Serbian pilot was Zlatko Glusica, first officer was S.S. Ahluwalia.
According to DGCA rules, Mangalore International Airport is deemed a “critical airfield” which means that “supervised take offs and landings” are prohibited. Only the captain (not the first officer) can pilot take-offs and landings. Mangalore International Airport has a controversial table top runway and which forces pilots to make a precision landing. The airport has no buffer zone, and pilots landing planes must fly precisely or risk hurtling off the edge.
Cost of Aviation
If you want to see the most current mappings of the ash, here’s the British meteorological service site.
As I sit here in a foreign country separated from my home by an ocean and a sky full of volcanic ash they are saying may disrupt trans-atlantic aviation for the next six months, and wondering when I will get home, I read the chilling words of a American scrivener remembering the recent flight that wiped out the Polish “politocracy.”
Michael White: “An airplane is a hollow bullet filled with humans lives, shot from a gun we call an airport. Should it impact with the ground other than according to the dictates of precise technology, its content perishes.”
Those of us who fly so often take for granted that flight is a right, but every so often, Nature reminds us we are not birds, we are Icarus, daring to fly too close to the sun. We are creatures of the earth. We have no wings beyond those our imagination have wrought.
Who among us can say it is worth the cost, especially those people I work with every day who have lost their nearest and dearest.
And yet, how we have flown.

>