NEVADA AIR TOUR HELICOPTER ACCIDENT

Volcano Crisis Cost Airlines $1.7 Billion in Revenue – IATA Urges Measures to Mitigate Impact

Berlin – The International Air Transport Association (IATA) estimated that the Icelandic volcano crisis cost airlines more than $1.7 billion in lost revenue through Tuesday—six days after the initial eruption. For a three-day period (17-19 April), when disruptions were greatest, lost revenues reached $400 million per day.

“Lost revenues now total more than $1.7 billion for airlines alone. At the worst, the crisis impacted 29% of global aviation and affected 1.2 million passengers a day. The scale of the crisis eclipsed 9/11 when US airspace was closed for three days,” said Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s Director General and CEO.

IATA noted there are some cost savings related to the flight groundings. For example, the fuel bill is $110 million a day less compared to normal. But airlines face added costs including from passenger care. “For an industry that lost $9.4 billion last year and was forecast to lose a further $2.8 billion in 2010, this crisis is devastating. It is hitting hardest where the carriers are in the most difficult financial situation. Europe’s carriers were already expected to lose $2.2 billion this year—the largest in the industry,” said Bisignani.

Mitigating the Financial Impact

“As we are counting the costs of the crisis we must also look for ways to mitigate the impact. Some of our airport partners are setting industry best practice. London Heathrow and Dubai are waiving parking fees and not charging for repositioning flights. Others airports must follow,” said Bisignani.

But the larger role is for governments. Bisignani made three specific requests for regulatory relief:

Relax Airport Slot Rules: IATA urged that rules on take-off and landing slot allocation (use it or lose it) be relaxed to reflect the extra-ordinary nature of the crisis.
Lift Restrictions on Night Flights: IATA urged governments to relax bans on night flights so carriers can take every opportunity to get stranded passengers back home as soon as possible.
Address Unfair Passenger Care Regulations: “This crisis is an act of god—completely beyond the control of airlines. Insurers certainly see it this way. But Europe’s passenger rights regulations take no consideration of this. These regulations provide no relief for extraordinary situations and still hold airlines responsible to pay for hotels, meals and telephones. The regulations were never meant for such extra-ordinary situations. It is urgent that the European Commission finds a way to ease this unfair burden,” said Bisignani.
Bisignani also urged governments to examine ways for governments to compensate airlines for lost revenues. Following 9/11, the US government provided $5 billion to compensate airlines for the costs of grounding the fleet for three days. The European Commission also allowed European states to provide similar assistance.

“I am the first one to say that this industry does not want or need bailouts. But this crisis is not the result of running our business badly. It is an extra-ordinary situation exaggerated with a poor decision-making process by national governments. The airlines could not do business normally. Governments should help carriers recover the cost of this disruption,” said Bisignani.

Re-Opening Air Space

On Monday, the European Commission announced revised measures for handling airspace closures, following widespread criticism of their methodology.

“Airspace was being closed based on theoretical models not on facts. Test flights by our members showed that the models were wrong. Our top priority is safety. Without compromising on safety, Europe needed to find a way to make decisions based on facts and risk assessment, not theories,” said Bisignani.

“The decision to categorize airspace based on risk was a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, not all states are applying this uniformly. It is an embarrassing situation for Europe, which after decades of discussion, still does not have an effective Single European Sky. The chaos and economic losses of the last week are a clarion call to Europe’s political leaders that a Single European Sky is critical and urgent,” said Bisignani.

The English version of the report may be found here in .pdf form

DUTCH SAFETY BOARD-04.03.2009–Today <4 March 2009>, the Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning for airline manufacturer Boeing and presents its initial findings regarding the terrible accident involving the Boeing 737/800, Turkish Airlines flight.

This accident claimed the lives on nine people (5 passengers and 4 crew) and 80 passengers were injured. Twenty eight of those injured are still hospitalised.

The Boeing was en route from Istanbul to Schiphol (on Wednesday 25 February 2009) and was due to land at Schiphol at 10.40.

The Boeing had had a regular flight and no problems had been experienced until just before the approach.

There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit.

The crew made contact with air traffic control (Amsterdam Radar) at 10.04 and was transferred to the tower at Schiphol – for the landing – at 10.14. The tower then gave the Boeing permission to land on the Polderbaan 18R.

The Polderbaan was approached according to fixed procedures, without any delay, and the Boeing was then given permission to decrease its altitude to 2000 feet (about 700 meters) and begin its descent to the Polderbaan.

This descent takes place with the help of the automatic pilot, as is normal with Turkish Airlines (this method can be utilised by everybody, as can a manual landing).

The voice recorder and the black box, both of which are in the hands of the Safety Board, show that an irregularity occurred during the descent, at 1950 feet. At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude – from 1950 feet to – 8 feet – and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power.

The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing. A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one. The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter. The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not working correctly (via the warning signal “landing gear must go down”). Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem.

In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced. It seems that the automatic system – with its engines at reduced power – assumed it was in the final stages of the flight. As a result, the aircraft lost speed.

Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand.

As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft’s speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were given.

The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately. However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway.

The black box – which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights – showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.

The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed. The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact. An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.

The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up of boggy clay. The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off and the aircraft’s hull ruptured at business class.

The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design. This also applied to the two engines. The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further 250 meters.

Most of the fatally wounded victims were located near the rupture, in business class, and the three crew members in the cockpit died as a result of the enormous braking forces, partially caused by the embedded nose-wheel and the forward movement of the aircraft. The section that remained most intact was situated around the wings. On board the plane there were 127 passengers and 7 crew, of whom 28 are still hospitalised.

The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system). Weather conditions, particularly visibility through the low cloud base and the mist, probably meant that the Polderbaan was not yet visible at the height at which the descent was commenced. The Safety Board board will be assisted in its investigation and its attempts to ensure lessons are learnt by the following organisations:
• the National Transportation Safety Board • Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyse (BEA) • Aviation Accident Investigation Branche (AAIB)
• Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkse Rijksluchtvaartdienst, DGCA) • Boeing • Turkish Airlines
• The engine manufacturer, CFM
• Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW) [Traffic and Waterways Inspectorate]
• Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, American Civil Aviation Authority)
• Vereniging van Nederlandse verkeersvliegers [Association of Dutch Commercial Pilots]
• Nederlandse vereniging voor cabinepersoneel [Dutch Association for Cabin Personnel]

Internationally, both the ICAO and the EU stipulate that involved parties may take part in the Board’s investigation (party system).

The investigation itself, however, is supervised by and remains the Board’s responsibility. The Board has also received a great deal of data from the Public Prosecutor for its investigation. Furthermore, there have been content-based contributions from a great many police organisations. The National Police Force, particularly all staff from the National Team of Forensic Investigation who are responsible for the forensic work at the location itself, the Aviation Police, who took all the aviation photographs, and the National Traffic Assistance team who helped the Board to measure the location of the accident.

The Public Prosecutor took possession of the aircraft and, as a result, responsibility for guarding it lay entirely with them. Police officers from all over the country were drafted in for this purpose. We are extremely grateful for their outstanding and meticulous work and for guarding the aircraft.

There was a misunderstanding regarding the use of the data from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight recorder (black box). It is established, in Dutch law, that the Public Prosecutor may only have access to this data if there is a question of abduction, terrorism, murder or manslaughter. In such a situation, the Safety Board is also legally obliged to hand over this data to the Public Prosecutor. In principle, there are two investigations being carried out into the accident.
• The judicial investigation. The search for punishable facts and the use of these to hold those responsible to account.
• The independent investigation. This investigation focuses fully on finding out what happened so that lessons can be learnt.

There is always some tension between the two investigations. Within criminal law you may be silent. Nobody needs to contribute to his or her sentence. With the independent investigation, however, you want to ensure that everything is said. For this reason, the reports from the Board may not be used as evidence in lawsuits.

From today onwards, the investigation by the Board will concentrate on two subjects: The technical investigation will focus on the role of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle system and the connection to the radio altimeter. .

Alongside the aforementioned technical investigation, the focus will also be on the management of the crisis. How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from this. This investigation will also focus on the passenger list.

The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week. The aircraft will be taken to another location for – possible – further investigation. The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight. With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities.