In case you didn’t know, planes should not fly into Meteorological Evaluation Towers.
The NTSB has just issued a warning for pilots to avoid these towers, which at 200 feet are below the threshold for markings. The biggest danger, apparently is that they can be built quickly and whoever builds them is not required to inform aviators.
So pilots, if you didn’t know to avoid them, you know now. Read the alert here.
The NTSB was discussing safety measures in late October, especially pilot training before stalls. The new rule has been a long time coming. Earl Weener, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, talked about the serious history of pilots wrongly pulling the plane’s nose up till the plane fell to the ground. If training is part of the problem, then at least that is a lack that can be amended.
Only twenty-six percent of pilots train for high altitude stalls, but according to a NASA study, twenty-eight percent of stalls are high altitude stalls. Seventy-one percent of stalls happen while autopilot is on.
In early November we heard how the FAA unveiled a rule about pilot training to avoid stalling airliners. It came about because of four crashes: Those crashes were Colgan 3407 in 2009, Air France 447 in June 2009, Pinnacle Airlines 3701 in October 2004 and USAir 427 in September 1994. (Too bad there have to be stall issues before stall training came to the attention of officials.) In the February 2009 crash of Colgan Air, it was determined that the pilots–as in the three other flights–in the midst of a blizzard in Buffalo pulled up on the nose of the plane, causing the crash. A meeting of air safety leaders in late November has jump-started the plans. Though something that has taken so long in the works can hardly said to be jump—started.
The powers that be sound positive about the new rule.
The FAA speculates training will save nearly seven million because of prevention—at a program cost of $274 million. Within five years this will mean:
I have been beating a drum for a long time about obvious solutions to obvious problems. Yes, things may fail, but why not implement preventative measures where available? So now rather than my usual battle-cry: Maintenance! Maintenance! Maintenance! Maybe I will be saying Training! Training! Training! I am looking forward to increased safety brought about by this new rule.
A helicopter crash-landed in Atkinson, Henry County, Illinois, at around 5 P.M. on August 5.
According to sources, the aircraft hit a power line, caught fire, and landed in a soy bean field.
The pilot, who was the only person aboard, was pulled out of the burning helicopter by farm owner. He was airlifted to Peoria, Illinois, in serious condition.
The NTSB and Illinois State Police were investigating the crash.
Is Your Aircraft Talking To You? Listen!
Two weeks ago, we were disappointed to learn of internal documents released by Pinnacle Airlines Corp., parent company of Colgan Air, that were not provided to the NTSB during the course of our investigation into the February 12, 2009, crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407. The NTSB investigation began immediately after the crash and concluded with a public meeting on February 2, 2010.
Today, in a letter to Pinnacle Airlines Corp., the NTSB requested that the company make available any and all information regarding the training and technical qualifications of the Captain and First Officer on-board Flight 3407.
While the content of the newly released email exchanges appears to be consistent with information our investigators learned through other means during the course of the investigation, it is critical that the factual record of this accident be complete. The previously undisclosed documents do not appear to give reason for reconsideration of the NTSB’s final report and probable cause determination.
https://airflightdisaster.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Demand_Letter_Pinnacle_110911.pdf
NTSB IDENTIFIES ORIGIN OF JAL BOEING 787 BATTERY FIRE; DESIGN, CERTIFICATION AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES COME UNDER SCRUTINY
February 7, 2013
WASHINGTON – At a news conference today, NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman identified the origin of the Jan. 7 battery fire that occurred on a Japan Airlines 787 parked at Boston Logan Airport, and said that a focus of the investigation will be on the design and certification requirements of the battery system.
“U.S. airlines carry about two million people through the skies safely every day, which has been achieved in large part through design redundancy and layers of defense,” said Hersman. “Our task now is to see if enough – and appropriate – layers of defense and adequate checks were built into the design, certification and manufacturing of this battery.”
After an exhaustive examination of the JAL lithium-ion battery, which was comprised of eight individual cells, investigators determined that the majority of evidence from the flight data recorder and both thermal and mechanical damage pointed to an initiating event in a single cell. That cell showed multiple signs of short circuiting, leading to a thermal runaway condition, which then cascaded to other cells. Charred battery components indicated that the temperature inside the battery case exceeded 500 degrees Fahrenheit.
As investigators work to find the cause of the initiating short circuit, they ruled out both mechanical impact damage to the battery and external short circuiting. It was determined that signs of deformation and electrical arcing on the battery case occurred as a result of the battery malfunction and were not related to its cause.
Chairman Hersman said that potential causes of the initiating short circuit currently being evaluated include battery charging, the design and construction of the battery, and the possibility of defects introduced during the manufacturing process.
During the 787 certification process, Boeing studied possible failures that could occur within the battery. Those assessments included the likelihood of particular types of failures occurring, as well as the effects they could have on the battery. In tests to validate these assessments, Boeing found no evidence of cell-to-cell propagation or fire, both of which occurred in the JAL event.
The NTSB learned that as part of the risk assessment Boeing conducted during the certification process, it determined that the likelihood of a smoke emission event from a 787 battery would occur less than once in every 10 million flight hours. Noting that there have been two critical battery events on the 787 fleet with fewer than 100,000 flight hours, Hersman said that “the failure rate was higher than predicted as part of the certification process and the possibility that a short circuit in a single cell could propagate to adjacent cells and result in smoke and fire must be reconsidered.”
As the investigation continues, which will include testing on some of the batteries that had been replaced after being in service in the 787 fleet, the NTSB will continue to share its findings in real time with the FAA, Boeing, the Japan Transport Safety Board, and the French investigative agency, the Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses.
“The decision to return the fleet to flight will be made by the FAA, which underscores the importance of cooperation and coordination between our agencies,” Hersman said.
She also announced that the NTSB would release an interim report of factual findings within 30 days.
Additional information, including a video of the today’s media briefing, the PowerPoint presentation, the FAA’s Special Conditions for the B-787 battery system, and related documents, can be accessed at http://go.usa.gov/4K4J.
