Carrier

  • | |

    Latin Airports Plagued with Problems

    Brazilian officials have yet to agree on exactly what caused a TAM airliner to skid off the rain-slicked runway at Congonhas on July 17, killing all 187 aboard and 12 on the ground. Critics claim the runway is too short and lacks grooves to prevent skidding during wet weather.

    Mountains increase the risks at airports in Tegucigalpa, Honduras and Quito, Ecuador.

    Birds pose problems at airports in Panama City; Guayaquil, Ecuador; and Barranquilla, Colombia. A single bird sucked into an engine can down a plane.

    Six hundred vultures have closed Barranquilla’s airport for two hours daily since June 19, Illegal dumping by squatters around the airport attracts the birds.

    Peter Cerda, a Miami-based specialist in air safety said, ”We don’t have any airport in the region that we consider to be unsafe, including Congonhas,”

    Mexico City already has modernized approach and departure procedures, allowing airliners to shave a few minutes off flights, and it is getting a new terminal later this year that will increase gates from 33 to 59. But air traffic there will remain congested because the airport’s two runways are too close together to permit simultaneous use.

    A similar plan in Brazil has yet to get under way.

  • | | |

    TAM Linhas Aéreas Crash on 17th July Airbus A320-233 Paulo, Brazil

    TAM Flight 3054 was a regular flight from Porto Alegre, Brazil, to São Paulo-Congonhas, Brazil.

    FACTS

    • The plane was carrying 181 passengers, all of whom died in the crash.
    • The plane was carrying 6 crewmembers, all of whom died in the crash.
    • The plane killed 11 people on the ground, all of whom died in the crash.
    • The Airbus A320 skid off the end of the rain-soaked runway cleared the airport fence and slammed into a TAM building.
    • A video shows the plane touching down then speeding up.
    • One of the Airbus 320’s two thrust reversers was deactivated.
    • Flying with only one thrust reverser is allowed and considered “safe”, but reduces braking power.
  • | |

    TAM AIRBUS Thrust Reverser ‘OFF’

    Tam Airlines admits a thrust reverser had been deactivated during maintenance checks.

    Tam Airlines insists the deactivation was in accordance with accepted procedures. Thrust reversers assist jets to slow down on landing.

    The Tam Airlines’ Airbus 320 overshot the runway at Sao Paulo’s Congonhas airport, hit buildings and exploded. Speculation continues but there is no confirmation on the crash’s cause. The same plane had problems landing at Congonhas a day prior the crash when it had barely managed to stop at the limit of the runway. The report said that the pilot told air traffic controllers it was very slippery.

    The right thrust reverser was “deactivated” at the time of the accident “in conditions stipulated by the maintenance of the manufacturer Airbus and approved by [Brazil’s] National Civil Aviation Agency” according to Tam Airlines. The Airbus’s manual says an inspection can be done up to 10 days after it is first detected and that the plane can continue to operate in the meantime.

    The crash occurred in wet conditions runway that has been criticized as being too short, and whose new surface had not yet been properly surfaced to handle rain.

    Video footage shows a few final moments of the Tam Airlines flight, and a similar plane that had arrived earlier. The Tam plane appears to be traveling at a higher than normal speed.The first aircraft apparently takes eleven seconds to travel along the visible section, while the plane that crashed covers the same distance in three. The Airbus 320 jet appears to continue speeding along the runway without slowing, before disappearing out of view. The flash of an explosion is then seen.

    The Brazilian air force believes the footage shows the plane was traveling at excessive speed, according to Globo TV. One theory speculates that the pilot tried to take off again. Instead, the aircraft crossed the road and ploughed into a Tam Airlines building.

    Brig Jorge Kersul Filho, director of the Air Force’s Centre for Investigation and Prevention of Air Accidents, said, “”That he jumped over the avenue was an indication he tried to take off. If he didn’t [try to take off] he would have gone nose down at the end of the runway.”

  • | | | |

    Has Brazil Overcome its Aeronautic Crisis?

    Three ANAC directors ( Denise Abreu, Jorge Luiz Veloso and Leur Lomanto) have resigned, leading ANAC ( Brazil’s National Civil Aeronautics Agency) to claim that the country’s aeronautic crisis has been overcome–a political move laying the blame of the entire system on the heads of three individuals.

    President Lula told local radio that “problems still exist at the airports.” Statistics show that 11 percent of flights, 20 percent of which were canceled, were delayed during the holidays on Independence Day.

    ANAC claims that problems began in Sept. 2006, when a GOL plane crashed in Mato Gross, killing 154, but the problem stems from a much earlier budget cut. The air disaster merely drew attention to the growing problem. The underfunded Brazilian air system has suffered from cutbacks and lowered standards across the board. Planes have been out of service for maintenance, and the airline Varig stopped flying.

    When overworked traffic controllers stated their demands, a group of them was transferred from Air Defense to Civil Aviation.

    After the TAM plane crash in July, killing 200 people, the Congonhas runway (known for its abbreviated length) in Sao Paulo was closed for resurfacing.

    Replacements for Denise Abreu, Jorge Luiz Veloso and Leur Lomanto, have not been selected.

  • | | | |

    Pilot Error Suspected

    Sources Close to Probe Say Engine Wasn’t Idled

    Authorities believe pilot error caused the tragedy. If confirmed, it would cast doubt that poor runway conditions were to blame.

    Pilots had programmed the computerized engine controls — similar to a car’s cruise-control system — to maintain a speed of about 150 mph. When the plane was about 30 feet off the ground, the pilots correctly switched one of the engines to idle, but did not do so with the other engine. When the plane was braked, the second engine attempted to accelerate to maintain the preset speed.

    One of the airplane’s thrust reversers, a device used to slow the aircraft, was broken but the manufacturer claims plane is safe to fly with a disabled reverser.

    However, it has long been claimed that the short runway at Congonhas is unsafe in rainy conditions. The runway has been the site of problem landings before, and was even closed briefly this year, by court order.

    Air traffic controllers fear that government officials will use reports of pilot error to excuse themselves from making further improvements to the air safety system.

  • | | | |

    Airbus says no evidence of plane fault

    A representative for the European aircraft manufacturer told the Brazilian Congress, “We don’t see any indication of a fault.”

    A TAM airline Airbus 320 overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo’s Congonhas airport crossed a road and slammed into an airport building, and exploded on July 17.

    Available data shows the aircraft’s brakes functioned correctly.

    But the representative said that one of the engine’s throttles was in the ‘climb’ position.

    The plane was also operating with only one of of its two thrust reversers, which are used to help brake the plane upon landing.

  • | |

    No ‘Errors’ In Sao Paulo, Brazil Plane Crash

    Mechanical or other failures were not responsible for the crash of a Brazilian airliner that killed 199 people in July, a report released Thursday said.

    The report, presented to Brazilian lawmakers, came from the manufacturers of the Airbus that crashed at Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, O Globo TV reported.

    However, the same congressional panel that heard the findings by Airbus determined last week that a misaligned engine throttle was likely the cause of the crash.

    REposted from: http://www.postchronicle.com/news/breakingnews/article_21296833.shtml

  • | |

    Infraero Oversight

    Infraero, the airport authority, owns and operates Brazil’s commercial airports and has been overseeing Congonhas. Rainwater acumulating on the tarmac is a big issue for them, as it causes landing planes to skid. It’s such a big problem that the airport shut 18 times in the first quarter from flooded runways. Even before the accident, the short runway where the Tam Airbus skidded and crashed was scheduled to be retextured to handle water, but had been declared open for use in spite of not being properly surfaced to handle rain.

    It was raining in Sao Paulo again yesterday.

    Rescue workers have removed 173 badly charred bodies. The three story Tam Cargo center that was hit housed about 55 employees. Of those employees, three were killed, 11 were injured. and five are missing.

    The word from officials investigating the crash is that the pilot attempted to take off when he realized the plane couldn’t stop.

    An emergency meeting of congress was called to discuss the crash.

    Dental records are being used to help identify the victims who are charred beyond recognition. All that remains of the airbus is the plane’s red tail fin.

    It is common knowledge that the runways at Congonhas are too short.

    A witness said, “We heard a loud skidding noise and saw the plane cross another lane very quickly, and then the plane disappeared. I felt the heat of the fire ball in my face. The fire was as big as a 25-story building.”

    Witnesses feared the fire might trigger other explosions.

    The plane’s black box is under investigation.

    The company producing the Airbus is based in Toulouse, France, a subsidiary of European Aeronautic, Defence & Space Co.

    It has been revealed that that particular plane had logged about 20,000 flight hours in 9,300 flights, and was powered by International Aero Engines’ engines.

    The leader of the opposition in the lower house of congress, Julio Redecker, was one of the passengers.

    Ten months ago, a Gol Linhas Aereas Inteligentes SA passenger plane collided in mid-air with a business jet over the Amazon, killing 154 people.

  • | | | | |

    Brazil Seizes Flight Control Data

    According to the Tam Airlines transcript, the pilots panicked, crying “Oh my God!, Oh my God!” as they tried to slow down the jetliner which landed with inoperable spoilers and a thrust reverser.

    “Come on! Come on! Turn, turn, turn, turn!” cried the co-pilot moments before a final utterance, “Oh no!,” was heard. The tape goes blank as the jetliner slammed into a cargo building at 137 mph and exploded.

    In the wake of the airliner crash in Sao Paulo last month, Brazil’s top prosecutor Matheus Baraldi Magnan, seized records from key flight control centers in response to concern over Brazil’s civil aviation system.

    Explaining the surprise data impoundment, Magnani said the military hindered his seizure, and “holds on to the information. It is not possible today to know the extent and frequency of problems. Only with that information will it be possible to evaluate and improve the system…The goal is to assure seizure of the incident records, and any information about problems in the air traffic control system, which will allow us to assess the risks passengers and crew face aboard aircraft.”

    The government confirmed that France and aircraft builder Airbus filed a complaint over leaks of the Tam airlines flight’s black box.

    The French bureau’s response on August third was that “All sorts of information, correct or incorrect, is circulating, along with speculation and attempts at explanations.”

    “It is a serious error to try to draw conclusions on the basis of incomplete and unanalyzed information.”

    A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder was released last week by a congressional committee investigating the accident on.
    July 17 when the TAM Airbus 320 carrying 187 people overran the runway while landing at Sao Paulo’s Congonhas airport, crossed a road and slammed into an airport building.

  • | | | |

    Brazil Air

    “How many people will be killed before the Brazilian government stops the [air force’s] live experiments on the travelling public’s safety?” said Marc Baumgartner, the president of the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers.

    Brazil is rethinking its flight patterns

    Across the country, frustrated passengers whose flights have been delayed or cancelled are rioting due to the long lines in Brazil’s airports. Underpaid and understaffed air traffic controllers are at the hub of a logistical nightmare. More than 10 government agencies oversee aviation.

    Baumgartner accused the Brazilian government of “chasing scapegoats” among the Brazilian air traffic controllers instead of “re-engineering the necessary safety oversight and risk assessment to prevent Brazilian civil aviation from falling into deeper chaos.”

    President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promised to get tough on safety and build a new airport in São Paulo to ease congestion. “Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in the expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties.” To ease the pressure, several measures are planned like bans on charter, cargo and executive flights to Congonhas. The question is what pressure will such changes actually ease: the stressed airport system, or the government taking the heat for the stressed airport system?

    Aviation experts say that the Airbus 320 that crashed at Congonhas was too large for the airport’s short runways, that the runway was not textured properly and part of the plane’s supplementary braking system was not working. Last February, a federal judge prohibited the landing large types of aircraft at the airport, including Fokker 100, Boeing 737-800 and Boeing 737-700.

    Carlos Gilberto Salvador Camacho, director of flight security for the National Union of Pilots, tokd a São Paulo newspaper last week. “There is subliminal pressure from the commercial airlines that if you don’t land there you are somehow hurting the companies that rely on their revenues from the passengers.”

    “What exploded at Congonhas was not just the TAM jet and its almost 200 victims, but the credibility of the Brazilian system of civil aviation. Ten months ago, the country felt the impact of the worst disaster in its history of civil aviation, an incident which lifted the veil off the chaos in the industry, and we completely ignored it.” wrote Cezar Britto, the national president of the Order of Brazilian Lawyers after the Congonhas crash.

  • | |

    Tam Air Crash Lawsuit

    A complaint filed by his family on behalf of Ricardo Tazoe, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, also names European jet manufacturer Airbus, the Goodrich Corp, and International Aero Engines (IAE) as defendants. The Miami resident died in an Airbus crash in Sao Paulo.

    198 other people who were killed when the Tam Airbus A320 skidded off a rainy runway at Sao Paulo’s Congonhas Airport.

    TAM is charged with negligence. The plane should have been grounded because one of its thrust reversers was not working. Defendants include Goodrich, the manufacturer of the aircraft’s braking system and IAE, which assembled the plane’s engine.

    “From the evidence gathered so far, it’s clear that TAM knew there were problems with the aircraft,” Steven C. Marks, an attorney at Miami law firm Podhurst Orseck, said in the statement. “Had (the thrust reverser) been operational, it may have prevented this accident.”

    The lawsuit seeks unspecified financial damages.

    IAE is United Technologies Corp. Pratt & Whitney, Britain’s Rolls-Royce Plc, Japan’s Aero Engines Corp. and Germany’s MTU Aero Engones.

    The firm that filed the suit is also representing several families in a suit concerning an earlier crash in the Amazon this year.

  • | |

    Radar Failure

    Radar failure over the Amazon is just one among a host of problems plaguing Brazil’s suffering aviation industry. The failure forced Brazilian and International flights to ground or to turn back. This from the country that sent a piece of the fuselage off thinking it was the flight recorder.

    The radar was out from midnight until 2:30 am, and caused by an electrical problem. Travellers found themselves trapped in airports, unable to catch flights home. There was mass confusion in spite of the president’s speech primishing safety measures.

    “Our aviation system, in spite of the investments we have made in expansion and modernization of almost all Brazilian airports, is passing through difficulties,” Silva said. “The security of our aviation system is compatible with all the international standards. We cannot lose sight of this.”

    A new airport location will be chosen within 90 days but will take five years to build and is not a high priority. Congonhas, the nation’s busiest airport, has a slick, short runway considered a likely factor in the crash of the TAM flight that killed nearly 200 people; and the planned repair and remediation does have priority. The crash was the country’s worst disaster until Tuesday’s accident and it exposed widespread problems with the country’s air traffic control system.

    Analysis of the recorded conversations should be available within a few weeks.

  • | |

    Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript

    CAM – Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
    HOT – Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
    PA – Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
    FWC – Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
    RDO – Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
    APP – Radio transmission from Approach Control
    TWR – Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
    CH2 – sound heard on CVR channel 2

    -1 – Voice identified as the captain/PIC
    -2 – Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
    -3 – Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
    -? – Voice unidentified
    * – Unintelligible word
    # – Expletive
    @ – Non-pertinent word
    ( ) – Questionable insertion
    [ ] – Editorial insertion

    Start Of Transcript

    18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
    [start of recording]
    18:18:24.5
    PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
    18:18:53.4
    CAM – ? [sound of whistling]
    18:20:25.0
    CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
    18:20:28.1
    CAM – 1 is ok?
    18:20:29.7
    CAM – 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
    18:20:33.3
    CAM -1 I have just informed.
    18:20:34.7
    CAM – 3 I didn’t hear – sorry -her talking.
    18:20:37.7
    CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
    18:20:39.3
    CAM – 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
    18:43:04.3
    HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
    18:43:06.9
    HOT-2 yes… only the left.
    18:43:24.0
    HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
    18:43:26.6
    HOT-2 checked.
    18:43:27.1
    HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
    18:43:29.4
    HOT-1 flaps one.
    18:43:30.7
    HOT-2 speed checked.
    18:43:36.7
    HOT-1 clear status.
    18:43:41.8
    HOT-2 clear status.
    18:43:43.8
    HOT-2 clear.
    18:43:48.2
    RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
    18:43:52.2
    APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
    18:44:00.0
    RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
    18:44:01.7
    HOT-1 good afternoon.
    18:44:06.4
    HOT-1 flaps two.
    18:44:08.01
    CAM-2 speed checked.
    18:44:20.0
    HOT-2 flaps at two.
    18:44:22.3
    RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
    18:44:26.01
    TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
    18:44:33.4
    RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
    18:44:36.3
    HOT-1 landing gear down.
    18:44:37.7
    HOT-2 landing gear down.
    18:44:53.9
    HOT-1 flaps three.
    18:44:55.1
    HOT-2 speed checked.
    18:44:57.4
    HOT-2 flaps three.
    18:45:03.9
    HOT-1 flap full.
    18:45:05.7
    CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
    18:45:10.6
    HOT-1 standby final checklist
    18:45:12.0
    HOT-2 standing by.
    18:45:12.9
    CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
    18:45:15.0
    CAM-2 ALT**.
    18:45:21.0
    CAM-2 six thousand feet.
    18:45:44.0
    CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
    18:45:52.1
    CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
    18:46:03.2
    HOT-1 final checklist.
    18:46:04.6
    HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
    18:46:10.4
    PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
    18:46: 14.0
    CAM- 2 cabin crew
    18:46:15.2
    CAM – 1 advised.
    18:46:16.00
    CAM – 2 auto thrust.
    18:46:18. 8
    CAM 1 – speed.
    18:46:20.0
    CAM 2 – **-
    18:46:21.1
    CAM 1 – landing no blue.
    18:46:22.6
    CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
    18:46:23.8
    HOT-1 landing, no blue
    18:46:24.9
    HOT-2 landing no blue.
    18:46:26.1
    HOT-1 okay?
    18:46: 26.7
    HOT-2 okay..what?
    18:46:28.6
    HOT-2 okay.
    18:46:30.8
    HOT-? *-
    18:46:30.8
    HOT-2 final checklist complete.
    18:46:33.8
    CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
    18:46:41.7
    CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
    18:46: 57.0
    RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
    18:47:01.7
    TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
    18:47:06.1
    RDO-2 already on final.
    18:47:07.5
    TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
    18:47:10.7
    HOT-1 wet and slippery!
    18:47:22.0
    HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
    18:47: 34.3
    TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
    18:47:40.6
    HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
    18:47:42.9
    HOT-1 checked.
    18:47:43.9
    TWR three zero five four?
    18:47:45.3
    RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
    18:47:46.4
    FWC four hundred.
    18:47:49.8
    HOT-1 is the landing clear?
    18:47:50.7
    HOT-2 clear to land.
    18:47:52.3
    HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
    18:47:53.7
    CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
    18:47:54.1
    HOT-2 checked.
    18:47:54.8
    HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
    18:47:55.7
    CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
    18:47:56.9
    HOT-2 what?
    18:47:58.8
    FWC three hundred.
    18:47:59.3
    HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
    18:48:00.6
    HOT-2 okay.
    18:48:03.0
    HOT-2 inhibit.
    18:48:05.8
    HOT-2 middle.
    18:48:11.6
    FWC two hundred.
    18:48:14.9
    HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
    18:48: 16.8
    HOT-1 okay.
    18:48:21.0
    FWC twenty.
    18:48:21.6
    FWC retard.
    18:48:23.0
    FWC retard.
    18:48:24.5
    CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
    18:48:24.9
    CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
    18:48:25:5
    GPWS retard.
    18:48:26:3
    CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
    18:48:26:7
    HOT-2 reverse number one only.
    18:48:29:5
    HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
    18:48:30:8
    HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
    18:48:33:3
    HOT-1 look this.
    18:48:34:4
    HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
    18:48:35:9
    HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
    18:48:40:0
    HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
    18:48:42:7
    HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
    18:48:44:6
    HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
    18:48:45:5
    CAM [sound of crushing noises].
    18:48:49:7
    CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
    18:48:50:0
    CAM [pause in crushing noises]
    18:48:50:6
    CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
    18:48:50:8
    CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
    [end of recording]
    18:48:51:4

  • | |

    Brazil’s TAM admits Brakes Not Working

    Brazilian airline TAM admitted one of the thrust reversers on the Airbus A320 that crashed at San Paulo was not operating.

    Its right braking system was deactivated in accordance with the Airbus manufacturer specifications approved by the Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Agency (Anac). There were problems with the brake days before the disaster.

    Brazil’s Air Force Accident Investigation and Prevention chief Jorge Kersul said any aircraft can land properly without using the reverse brake. The reverse brake is only an additional instrument to help the plane stop.

    Specialists said that if the airport’s runway is wet, it is difficult to land without using the reverse brake.

    The investigation will last some ten months.

  • | |

    S7 Airlines Flight 778 Disaster


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer

    What: S7 Airlines Flight 778 Airbus A310 en route from Moscow to Irkutsk
    Where: Irkutsk International Airport in Siberia
    When: July 9 2006
    Who: 193 passengers and 10 crew
    Why: The plane failed to decelerate on landing and crashed into the barrier.

    124 died.

    The investigation showed that as the pilot slowed with wheel braking, he deployed the right thrust reverser. The crew was unaware that the left engine thrust lever was (accidentally?)advanced. This prevented the plane from decelerating normally.

  • | | | |


    Pictured: A Piper PA-46-310P Malibu
    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Lindsay Hockey

    What: Piper PA-46-310P Crash
    Where: Houston TX
    When: Sept 17 2005
    Who: 2 fatalities
    Why: The 641-hour private pilot and passenger were departing on a 155-nautical mile night cross-country flight. The tower controller heard a weak transmission that she could not completely understand, but did hear the words “engine” and “power.” The controller asked the pilot to “say again”, but there was no response. She again asked, “say again” and the pilot transmitted, ” I’m going down.” There were no further communications from the pilot. impacting the ground, the airplane cartwheeled. 50 feet wide. Witness reports of the airplane’s flight path along with the wreckage distribution path were consistent with the pilot’s attempt to return to the airport. A post-impact fire consumed the fuselageThe reason for loss of engine power could not be determined.

  • | | | |

    Lion Air Crash in Indonesia


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Olaf Juergensmeier

    What: Lion Air flight McDonnell-Douglas en route from Solo City Java Indonesia
    Where: Adi Sumaro Airport
    When: November 30, 2004
    Who: The captain, 1 flight attendant, and 23 passengers were fatally injured; the first officer, 2 flight attendants and 56 passengers were seriously injured; and 84 passengers had minor or no injury
    Why: On November 30, 2004, at 1814 Jakarta time, a McDonnell-Douglas MD-82 Lion Air flight 538, was substantially damaged when it overran runway 26 at Adi Sumaro Airport(SOC), Solo City, Central Java, Indonesia. The captain, 1 flight attendant, and 23 passengers were fatally injured; the first officer, 2 flight attendants and 56 passengers were seriously injured; and 84 passengers received either minor injuries or were not injured. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed; however, rain showers were in the area, and the runway was wet. The flight originated at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport. After landing, it continued off the departure end of the runway and impacted the concrete base of a localizer array.

  • | | | | | | |

    Hendrick Motor Sports


    Pictured: A Beech 200 Super King Air
    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Carlos Barbosa

    What: Hendrick Motorsports Beechcraft Super King Air 200
    Where: Bull Mountain, seven miles from Blue Ridge Airport,
    When: October 24 2004
    Who: 2 pilots 10 passengers
    Why: On October 24 2004, en route to theNextel Cup Series, a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 owned by Hendrick Motorsports crashed in fog into Bull Mountain, seven miles from Blue Ridge Airport, carrying two pilots and ten passengers. Fatalities included Jon Hendrick and his twin daughters,and Ricky Hendrick. The plane missed its first landing attempt before veering off course and crashing; and the plane had not climbed to its temporarily assigned altitude of 2,600 feet; it instead descended to 1,800 feet before crashing. The cause was ruled failure to use an instrument approach and pilot error

    George’s Point of View

  • | | | |

    American Airlines flight 587


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact Photographer Gerard Helmer

    What: American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R en route from JFK to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic
    Where: Belle Harbor, New York,
    When: November 12, 2001
    Who: 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers
    Why: The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight.

    NTSB report has been added to this incident:

    NTSB Identification: DCA02MA001.
    The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact Records Management Division
    Scheduled 14 CFR AMERICAN AIRLINES INC
    Accident occurred Monday, November 12, 2001 in Belle Harbor, NY
    Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/14/2005
    Aircraft: Airbus Industrie A300B4-605R, registration: N14053
    Injuries: 265 Fatal.
    The Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm.

    On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
    The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
    the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

    FULL REPORT

    DCA02MA001

    The Board’s full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm.

    On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful.

    Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700.

    About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

    Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes.

    The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, “your leg, you check the rudders.” (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, “rudders check.” The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

    About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

    About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, “you have the airplane.”

    About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, “you happy with that [separation] distance?” About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, “we’ll be all right once we get rollin’. He’s supposed to be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s the idea.” About 0913:46, the first officer said, “so you’re happy.”

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220º. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain’s statement “clean machine,” indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

    About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a 0.04 G drop in longitudinal load factor, a 0.07 G shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a 0.3 G drop in normal (vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0º (neutral) to 2º nose up, 2º nose down, and back to 0º; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18º right, 30º left, 37º right, 34º left, 5º left, 21º left, and 23º right, before moving to between 5º and 6º left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0º (neutral) to about 2º left, about 0.6º right, and back to 0º.

    During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane’s pitch angle increased from 9º to 11.5º, decreased to about 10º, and increased again to 11º. The airplane’s bank angle moved from 0º (wings level) to 17º left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to
    the WAVEY navigation intersection.

    At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, “little wake turbulence, huh?” to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, “yeah.” At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

    At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, “max power.” At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, “you all right?” to which the first officer replied, “yeah, I’m fine.” One second later, the captain stated, “hang onto it. Hang onto it.” The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer’s statement “let’s go for power please” at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer’s right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

    According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64º to the right at 0915:51.5, 78º (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64º to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78º to the left at 0915:56.5.

    The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11º to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane’s center of gravity (cg) was about 4º to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5º to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2º to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7º to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10º and 11º to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11º and 12º to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

    The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer’s statement, “holy [expletive].” At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, “what the hell are we into…we’re stuck in it.” At 0916:12.8, the captain stated, “get out of it, get out of it.” The CVR recording ended 2 seconds later. The airplane was located at 40º 34′ 37.59″ north latitude and 73º 51′ 01.31″ west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight.

    For more information, look here:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Airlines_Flight_587
    http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2004/AAR0404.pdf
    http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20011130X02321&key=1

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    Singapore Airlines Tragedy at Taiwan


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Johan Knijn

    What: Singapore Airlines Boeing 747-400
    Where: Taiwan
    When: October 31, 2000,
    Who: 179 people aboard, 83 fatalities, 44 injuries
    Why: On October 31, 2000, approximately 2317 Taiwan time (1517 UTC), Singapore Airlines Flight SQ006 Boeing 747-400 airplane entered the incorrect runway at Chiang- KaiShek (CKS) Airport, Taiwan. Heavy rain and strong winds from typhoon “Xiang Sane” prevailed at the time of the accident. The airplane, during the take-off roll, was destroyed by its collision with the runway construction equipment and by post impact fire. There were a total of 179 people on board with 159 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers and 17 cabin attendants. There were a total of 83 fatalities (including 4 cabin crewmembers), and 44 people injured.

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    Egypt Air Crashes Into Atlantic Ocean


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Frank C. Duarte Jr.

    What: EgyptAir Boeing 767-366ER en route from New York to Cairo
    Where: Atlantic Ocean
    When: October 31, 1999
    Who: 4 flight crewmembers, 10 flight attendants, and 203 passengers
    Why: On October 31, 1999, the EgyptAir Boeing 767-366ER crashed into the Atlantic Ocean 60 miles south of Nantucket. It was en route from New York, to Cairo International Airport, Cairo, Egypt. The flight departed JFK about 0120, with 4 flight crewmembers, 10 flight attendants, and 203 passengers. All 217 people on board were killed.?Visual meteorological conditions prevailed , which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. NTSB determined probable cause to be the airplane’s departure from normal cruise flight and subsequent impact with the Atlantic Ocean as a result of the relief first officer’s flight control inputs. The reason for his actions was not determined.

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    Tokyo: China Airlines Typhoon Crash


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer J.Laporte

    What: China Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-11 en route from Bangkok to Hong Kong
    Where: Hong Kong
    When: August 23, 1999
    Who: 3 fatalities, 208 uninjured; 44 serious, 164 minor
    Why: Summary: On August 23, 1999 at approximately 1840 local time (+12 hours), a China Airlines flight 642 # B-150 McDonnell Douglas MD-11 crashed during a landing approach to the Hong Kong Chek Lap Kok airport. The plane, which was landing during a typhoon, touched down hard, flipped over and caught fire. The right wing struck the ground first, and the landing gear and wing separated as the aircraft rolled inverted. 200 of the 317 passengers were injured and the aircraft was destroyed by impact.