Public Statement

  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines

    Airworthiness Directive
    Federal Register Information
    Header Information
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD;
    Amendment 39-15952; AD 2009-12-51]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines
    PDF Copy (If Available):

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-12-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective July 15, 2009 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued on June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of July 15, 2009.
    We must receive any comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to comment on this AD.
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
    Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    Contact Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15 for the service information identified in this AD.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 4, 2009, the FAA issued emergency AD 2009-12-51, that applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This condition, if not corrected, could result in uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed and approved the technical contents of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, that describes procedures for visual inspections of affected reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections.

    FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

    Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, we issued emergency AD 2009- 12-51 to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. You must use the service information described previously to perform the actions required by this AD.

    FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

    Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we have found that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable, and that good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately on June 4, 2009, to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. These conditions still exist, and we are publishing the AD in the Federal Register as an amendment to Section 39.13 of part 39 of the Code Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to make it effective to all persons.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send us any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD” in the subject line of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify it.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of the Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including, if provided, the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is the same as the Mail address provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-12-51 Turbomeca S.A.: Amendment 39-15952. Docket No. FAA-2009- 0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 15, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines if modified by Turbomeca Modification TU332 and fitted with modules M05 as listed by serial number in Figure 1 of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter France AS350B, AS350BA, AS365N, AS350B1, AS350B2, Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK117-C1, Agusta A109K2, and Sikorsky S-76A+, S-76A++ and S-76C helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of the lubrication duct plug, followed by a rapid draining of the oil tank, without indication to the cockpit through low oil pressure warning. This condition can lead to uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    Initial Visual Inspection Before Further Flight

    (f) Before further flight:
    (1) Visually inspect the module M05 lubrication duct for oil leakage. Use paragraph 1.C.(1)(a), paragraph 2.A., and Figure 2 of Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the inspection.
    (2) If oil leakage is found, repair the module M05 lubrication duct. Use paragraph 2.B.1, Figure 3, and Figure 4 in Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the repair.

    Repetitive Visual Inspections

    (g) If no oil leakage is found, repeat the visual inspection every four flight hours, or after the last flight of each day, whichever comes first.
    (h) The actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD may be performed by the owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate, and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v).

    Optional Terminating Action

    (i) As optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections in paragraph (g) of this AD, repair the affected modules M05 as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (j) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (k) European Aviation Safety Agency emergency airworthiness directive 2009-0117-E, dated June 2, 2009, also addresses the subject of this AD.

    Contact Information

    (l) For further information, contact: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e- mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (m) You must use Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to identify the serial numbers of modules M05 affected by this AD, and to perform the inspections and repairs required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You can get a copy from Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202- 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 22, 2009.
    Peter A. White,
    Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15277 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes

    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD;
    Amendment 39-15942; AD 2009-13-03]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Series Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2009.
    We must receive comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Discussion

    We received a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff on a Boeing Model 747-400 airplane powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524G/H engines. The automatic retraction was due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. In order to prevent impingement of efflux air from the thrust reversers during landing rollout, the FCU is designed to automatically retract the Group A leading edge flaps when a REV Amber signal is received from either both inboard or both outboard thrust reversers, and the airplane is on the ground. In this event, the first REV amber signal was received prior to V1 (takeoff decision speed). The second REV amber signal was received several seconds later, after takeoff decision speed. At that time, the FCU performed as designed and retracted the Group A leading edge flaps. At rotation the flight crew reported buffeting and stick shaker activation. After liftoff, a signal from the air/ground logic system caused the FCU to send a command to the Group A leading edge flaps to re-deploy after a five-second time delay. Re-deployment of the flaps takes approximately ten to fifteen additional seconds; during re-deployment, the flightcrew again reported buffeting and momentary stick shaker activation. The airplane jettisoned fuel and was landed safely; all four of the thrust reversers deployed and stowed normally after landing.
    In addition, one operator reported 12 single-engine REV indications during takeoff over the past three years, leading to seven rejected takeoffs. The incident described above was the first known simultaneous two- engine event.
    These conditions, if not corrected, could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Relevant Service Information

    We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009. The service information describes procedures for modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels. The modification includes re-routing and re- terminating one wire for each engine, and replacing the wire if necessary.

    FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

    No airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as described under “Difference Between the AD and the Service Information.”

    Difference Between the AD and the Service Information

    Operators should note that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, recommends that the modification be completed within 90 days (after the issue date of the service bulletin). This AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days. In developing this compliance time, we considered the manufacturer’s recommended 90-day compliance time (after June 8, 2009, which is the service bulletin issue date), a risk assessment of the unsafe condition, the scope of work required, and the number of affected airplanes, as well as the time normally required for the rulemaking process to be completed (approximately 30 days). In consideration of both of these factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of this AD will fall approximately at the same time (calendar date) as the compliance time recommended by the manufacturer, and represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. By adjusting the compliance time interval in this way:
    1. Operators will get a full 60 days in which to complete the modification; and
    2. The modification can be done within an interval of time that parallels normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators.
    This difference has been coordinated with Boeing.

    FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

    Automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff. Such a restriction could result in failure to achieve a minimum rate of climb, and consequent collision with terrain or obstacles or forced landing of the airplane. Because of our requirement to promote safe flight of civil aircraft and thus, the critical need to assure the proper functioning of the FCU and the short compliance time involved with this action, this AD must be issued immediately.
    Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, and because no airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are both impracticable and unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-13-03 Boeing: Amendment 39-15942. Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 series engines.

    Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78: Engine.

    Unsafe Condition

    (e) This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

    Modification

    (g) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Modify the thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM- 140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590. Or, e-mail information to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind, Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 12, 2009.
    Ali Bahrami,
    Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15255 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39
    [Docket No. FAA-2005-22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD;
    Amendment 39-15950; AD 2009-14-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F Turboshaft Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. That AD currently requires replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals. This AD requires the same repetitive replacements and would require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements. Modification Tf75 replaces the check valve piston with a piston design not requiring an O-ring. This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 3, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of August 3, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You can get the service information identified in this AD from Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com.
    The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 by superseding AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated Turbomeca Modification Tf75. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on January 22, 2009 (74 FR 3978). That action proposed to require replacing the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at repetitive intervals and to require incorporating Modification Tf75 as terminating action to the repetitive O-ring replacements.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We received no comments on the proposal or on the determination of the cost to the public.

    Change to the Mandatory Terminating Action Compliance Time

    Since we issued the proposed AD, we realized that there is no direct relationship between the mandatory terminating action compliance date in the proposed AD and the usage rate of the affected helicopters. We changed the AD to require the terminating action be done within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the change described previously. We have determined that this change will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect 94 Arrius 2F turboshaft engines installed on helicopters of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it will take about one work-hour per engine to perform an O-ring replacement, and about one work-hour to incorporate Modification Tf75. The average labor rate is $80 per work-hour. Required parts will cost about $16 per engine for O-ring replacement, and about $20 per engine for incorporating Modification Tf75. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost of the AD to U.S. operators to be $18,424.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by removing Amendment 39-14940 (72 FR 6925, February 14, 2007), and by adding a new airworthiness directive, Amendment 39-15950, to read as follows:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-01 Turbomeca S.A: Amendment 39-15950. Docket No. FAA-2005- 22039; Directorate Identifier 2005-NE-33-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 3, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) This AD supersedes AD 2005-17-17R1, Amendment 39-14940.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arrius 2F turboshaft engines that have not incorporated modification Tf75. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter EC120B helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Turbomeca S.A. mandating the incorporation of Modification Tf75. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded in-flight shutdown of the engine, which could result in a forced autorotation landing and damage to the helicopter.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    O-ring Replacement

    (f) Replace the O-ring on the check valve piston in the lubrication unit at the intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD. Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.C.(2) of Turbomeca Alert Service Bulletin No. A319 79 4802, Update No. 1, dated April 3, 2006, to replace the O-ring.

    Table 1–Compliance Times for O-ring Replacement

    If the class of oil is:
    Then replace the O-ring by the later of:
    Thereafter, replace the O-ring within:
    (1) HTS or unknown. 300 hours time-since-new (TSN) or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 300 hours time-since-last replacement (TSR).
    (2) STD. 450 hours TSN or 50 hours after March 21, 2007 (effective date of AD 2005-17-17R1). 500 hours TSR.

    Mandatory Terminating Action

    (g) Within 150 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, do the following mandatory terminating action to the repetitive O- ring replacements:
    (1) Incorporate Turbomeca Modification Tf75 by replacing the check valve piston in the lubrication unit, with a check valve piston requiring no O-ring.
    (2) Use the Instructions to be Incorporated paragraphs 2.A. through 2.B.(1)(r) of Turbomeca Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 319 79 4075, Version B, dated May 14, 2008, to replace the check valve piston.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (i) EASA AD 2008-0170, dated September 25, 2008, also addresses the subject of this AD.
    (j) Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria- dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http://www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of the service information identified in this AD.
    (k) Contact James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238- 7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (l) You must use the service information specified in the following Table 2 to perform the actions required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of the documents listed in the following Table 2 in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Turbomeca S.A., 40220 Tarnos, France; e-mail: noria-dallas@turbomeca.com; telephone 33 05 59 74 40 00, fax 33 05 59 74 45 15, or go to: http:/ /www.turbomeca-support.com, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Table 2–Incorporation by Reference

    Turbomeca Alert/MandatoryService Bulletin No.
    Page
    Update/Version
    Date
    A319 79 4802
    Total Pages: 7 ALL Update No. 1 April 3, 2006
    319 79 4075
    Total Pages: 9 ALL Version B May 14, 2008

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 19, 2009.
    Francis A. Favara,
    Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15099 Filed 6-26-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • NTSB TO MEET ON GROUND FIRE ABOARD CARGO AIRPLANE IN SAN FRANCISCO

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public Board meeting Tuesday, June 30, at 9:30 a.m., in its Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C.

    There is one item on the agenda. The Board will consider a final report on the following accident:

    * On January 28, 2008, at about 10:15 pm, an ABX Air Boeing 767-200, N799AX, operating as flight 1611 from San Francisco International Airport, experienced a ground fire before engine startup. The captain and the first officer evacuated the airplane through the cockpit windows and were not injured, but the airplane was substantially damaged.

    A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be available on the Board’s website at www.ntsb.gov. Technical support details are available under “Board Meetings.” To report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for Webcast Technical Support.

    A summary of the Board’s final report, which will include findings, probable cause and safety recommendations, will appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of the meeting. The entire report will appear on the website several weeks later.

    Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on Lower 10th Street, directly below L’Enfant Plaza. From Metro, exit L’Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets escalator, walk through shopping mall, at the CVS store (on the left), take escalator (on the right) down one level. The Board room will be to your left.

    NTSB Media Contact: Peter Knudson (202) 314-6100
    peter.knudson@ntsb.gov

    Src: http://ntsb.gov

  • Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration

    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD;
    Amendment 39-15940; AD 2009-13-01]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S- 92A Helicopters

    Hide details for Preamble InformationPreamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration, DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. That AD currently requires removing all main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium studs (titanium studs) and replacing them with steel studs. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD as well as changes to the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). This amendment is prompted by an accident, by recent RFM changes made by the manufacturer that were not available when we issued the existing AD, and by our determination that certain MGB Normal and Emergency procedures in the RFM are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 pounds per square inch (psi).
    Replacing the titanium studs is intended to prevent their failure, which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Changing the RFM procedures is intended to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions.

    DATES: Effective July 1, 2009.
    The incorporation by reference of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009, was approved previously for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009).
    Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before August 17, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    You may get the service information identified in this AD from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com, or at http:// www.sikorsky.com.
    Examining the Docket: You may examine the docket that contains the AD, any comments, and other information on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov, or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is located in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the West Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John M. Coffey, Flight Test Engineer, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March 23, 2009, we issued Emergency AD 2009-07-53 for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, which requires, before further flight, removing all titanium studs that attach the MGB filter bowl assembly to the MGB and replacing them with steel studs. That action was prompted by the failure of 2 studs that were found broken during a fatal accident investigation in Canada. Before the accident, the manufacturer was investigating a July 2008 incident that also involved broken studs. In both cases, the broken studs resulted in rapid loss of MGB oil. The failures have been tied to fretting and galling of the original titanium studs. That emergency AD was published as Amendment 39-15886 on April 27, 2009 (74 FR 18977). This AD continues to require removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs.
    Since the fatal accident and since issuing AD 2009-07-53, Sikorsky has issued revisions to the Normal and Emergency procedures of the RFM. We have determined that these revisions are necessary because the existing procedures are unclear, may cause confusion, and may mislead the crew regarding MGB malfunctions, in particular the urgency to land immediately after warning indications of loss of MGB oil pressure and oil pressure below 5 psi. This action does not mandate the procedures the pilot must perform in an emergency, but requires making changes to the RFM to clarify and emphasize the Normal and Emergency procedures addressing specified MGB malfunctions, thus giving the pilot the necessary information to make an informed decision. We are superseding the existing AD to include the most recent RFM revisions because the revisions were not available when we originally issued AD 2009-07-53.
    We have reviewed Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014A, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), which describes procedures for removing titanium studs and replacing them with steel suds. We have also reviewed the RFM revisions and, after full coordination with Sikorsky, approved them on May 13, 2009. Sikorsky has since assured us that they have provided the revised RFM procedures to all affected operators. The RFM revisions are as follows:

    SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
    SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
    SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
    SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
    SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
    SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
    S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

    In addition to the RFM revisions, we have also reviewed associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, that provide corrections to those RFM revisions; however, we are not mandating that they be incorporated.
    Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters of the same type design, this AD supersedes AD 2009-07-53 to require, before further flight, removing all titanium studs and replacing them with steel studs. These actions must be accomplished by following the specified portions of the ASB described previously. Because the critical unsafe condition can adversely affect the structural integrity and controllability of the helicopter, AD 2009-07-53 remains in full effect until the effective date of this AD.
    Making the Normal and Emergency RFM revisions that were not available when we issued AD 2009-07-53 is required within 10 hours time-in-service. The short compliance time is required because certain procedures in the existing RFM may be misleading, presenting an unacceptable level of risk, and because the required RFM revisions are already approved by the FAA and available to operators, imposing a minimal burden. Therefore, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are unnecessary and contrary to the public interest, and that good cause also exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
    We estimate that this AD will affect 35 helicopters of U.S. registry. Replacing the studs will take approximately 6 work hours per helicopter to accomplish at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. In accordance with the ASB, required parts and tooling are available at no cost. Making the changes to the RFM will take a minimal amount of time and cost. Based on these figures, we estimate the total cost impact of the AD on U.S. operators to be $16,800, assuming there are no parts and tooling costs.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any written data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include "Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend the AD in light of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of our docket Web site, you can find and read the comments to any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment. You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
    1. Is not a "significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    2. Is not a "significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD. See the AD docket to examine the economic evaluation.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, "General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. Section 39.13 is amended by removing Amendment 39-15886 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009), and by adding a new airworthiness directive (AD), Amendment 39-15940, to read as follows:

    Hide details for Regulatory InformationRegulatory Information

    2009-13-01 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation: Amendment 39-15940. Docket No. FAA-2009-0518; Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-22-AD. Supersedes AD 2009-07-53, Amendment 39-15886, Docket No. FAA-2009-0351, Directorate Identifier 2009-SW-08-AD.

    Applicability: Model S-92A helicopters, certificated in any category.
    Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
    To prevent failure of a main gearbox (MGB) filter bowl assembly mounting titanium stud (titanium stud), which could result in rapid loss of oil, failure of the MGB, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter; and to clarify and emphasize certain Normal and Emergency procedures to give the crew the best available information in the event of certain MGB malfunctions, accomplish the following:
    (a) Before further flight, for all Model S-92A helicopters with a MGB housing assembly, part number (P/N) 92351-15110-042, -043, or -044, that is not marked with "TS-062-01” near the P/N:
    (1) Remove the titanium studs by following the Accomplishment Instructions in Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Rev.

    A, dated March 20, 2009 (ASB), paragraph 3.A.

    Note 1: Figure 1 of the ASB contains guidance for removal and installation of the studs.
    (2) Visually inspect the tapped holes and the MGB housing lockring counterbore for damage. If you find damage in the tapped holes or in the MGB housing lockring counterbore, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office for an approved repair.
    (3) Install steel studs and mark the MGB housing as "TS-062- 01” near the P/N by following the Accomplishment Instructions in the ASB, paragraph 3.C.
    (b) Within 10 hours time-in-service, for all helicopters regardless of MGB housing assembly P/N:
    (1) Revise the Normal and Emergency procedures sections of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) by making the following changes, approved May 13, 2009:

    RFM Remove Remove Insert
    SA S92A-RFM-000 Part I Temporary Revision (T-Rev)No. 1., Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-000, Revision No. 4.
    SA S92A-RFM-002 Part I T-Rev No. 5, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 Gear Box Malfunctions from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-002, Revision No. 10.
    SA S92A-RFM-003 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-003, Revision No. 10.
    SA S92A-RFM-004 Part I T-Rev No. 4, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-12, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-004, Revision No. 8.
    SA S92A-RFM-005 Part I T-Rev No. 3, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-005, Revision No. 7.
    SA S92A-RFM-006 Part I T-Rev No. 2, Revised Main Gearbox Emergency Procedure Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III Page 2-13, and Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of SA S92A-RFM-006, Revision No. 8.
    S92A-RFMS No. 3 N/A Sub-Section 7 “Gearbox Malfunctions” from Section III Sub-Section 7 “Gear Box Malfunctions” from Section III of S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.
    All paragraphs of subsection 7 "Gear Box Malfunctions” starting with paragraph 7.0 are affected.

    Note 2: Inserting the following revisions, approved on May 13, 2009, and their associated Errata Sheets, dated June 4, 2009, into the RFM, as applicable, satisfies the requirements of this AD:
    (i) SA S92A-RFM-000 Revision No. 4,
    (ii) SA S92A-RFM-002 Revision No. 10,
    (iii) SA S92A-RFM-003 Revision No. 10,
    (iv) SA S92A-RFM-004 Revision No. 8,
    (v) SA S92A-RFM-005 Revision No. 7,
    (vi) SA S92A-RFM-006 Revision No. 8, and
    (vii) S92A-RFM Supplement No. 3, Revision No. 2.

    (c) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Contact the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Attn: John M. Coffey, FAA, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803, telephone (781) 238-7173, fax (781) 238-7170, for information about previously approved alternative methods of compliance.
    (d) Special flight permits will not be issued.
    (e) Remove and replace the titanium studs by following the specified portions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin No. 92-63-014, Revision A, dated March 20, 2009. The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of this information on April 27, 2009 under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51 (74 FR 18977, April 27, 2009. Copies may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 Main Street, Stratford, CT, telephone (203) 383-4866, e-mail address tsslibrary@sikorsky.com or at http:// www.sikorsky.com. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas, or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.
    (f) This amendment becomes effective on July 1, 2009.

    Hide details for Footer InformationFooter Information
    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on June 9, 2009.
    Mark R. Schilling,
    Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-14081 Filed 6-15-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • |

    Canadian Fowl Responsible for US Airways Incursion

    George’s Point of View

    Not much turns slower than the wheels of time during a plane investigation.

    Thorough research of every factor extends for years, even when the causes appear to be obvious. But it is a mark of how obvious the cause is that the Hudson River crash in which “Sully” Sullenberger became a household name has already been officially attributed to “Migratory Canada geese.” At this juncture, I should probably say something clever about
    1) green cards,
    2) carding migratory birds or
    3) Canadian Customs, but I am sure that Jay Leno already said it before he left the tonight show.

    Read the June 4, 2009 NTSB announcement below:

    NTSB Advisory
    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594
    June 4, 2009

    UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE US AIRWAYS A-320 HUDSON RIVER DITCHING ACCIDENT

    The National Transportation Safety Board today released additional information about the Board’s scheduled public hearing on the January 2009 ditching of the US Airways A-320 into the Hudson River.

    The hearing, originally scheduled for two days, has been expanded to three. It will convene at 9:00 a.m. on Tuesday, June 9, 2009, and is expected to conclude mid-day on Thursday, June 11. It will be held at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The room is lighted for television and a mult box is provided for sound.

    On January 15, 2009, at approximately 3:27 p.m. EST, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus Industrie A320 bound for Charlotte, North Carolina, incurred multiple bird strikes during its initial departure climb from New York’s La Guardia Airport (LGA). The airplane subsequently lost thrust to its engines and ditched in the Hudson River approximately three and a half minutes after striking the birds and about five minutes after leaving LGA. To date, of the five crewmembers and 150 passengers on board, five serious injuries have been reported.

    The Safety Board will also open the public docket at the start of the hearing. The public may view and download the docket contents on the web under the “FOIA Reading Room” at http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm at that time.

    The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident. The docket will include investigative group factual reports, interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other documents from the investigation. In addition, docket items that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will be available on the website under “Public Hearings”

    The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board’s efforts to develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will cover a wide range of safety issues including:

    Pilot training regarding ditching and forced landings on water.
    Bird detection and mitigation efforts. \ Certification standards regarding ditching and forced landings on water for transport-category airplanes.
    Cabin safety training, emergency procedures and equipment.
    Certification standards for bird ingestion into transport- category airplane engines.
    An agenda is posted on the Board’s website at http://www2.ntsb.gov/Weehawken-NJ/agenda.htm. A live webcast of the proceedings will be available on the Board’s website at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/hearing_sched.htm. Technical support details are available under “Board Meetings.” To report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for Webcast Technical Support.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 11

    Paris, 03 June 2009 – 13:21 local time
    Archbishop Of Paris Press Release
    INTER-RELIGIOUS PRAYER CEREMONY FOR THE 228 VICTIMS OF FLIGHT AF 447 OF 1ST JUNE 2009, AND FOR THEIR FAMILIES AND FRIENDS – NOTRE-DAME DE PARIS – WEDNESDAY, 3 JUNE 2009 AT 4PM
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    The ceremony will be attended by ~~~~inal André Vingt-Trois, Archbishop of Paris and President of the Bishops Conference of France, Grand Rabbi Haïm Korsia, the Jewish Chaplain for Air Personnel, Mr. Mohammed Moussaoui, President of the French Council of Muslim Faith, Metropolite Emmanuel, President of the Assembly of Orthodox Bishops of France and Pastor Claude Baty, President of the Protestant Federation of France.

    In addition to the Grand Rabbi Haïm Korsia, the Catholic, Protestant and Muslim Chaplains of Paris-Charles de Gaulle will attend: Father Francis Truptil, Father Gérard Sqarcioni, Father Baudouin Tournemire, Pastor Jean Pierre Dassonville and Imam Hazem El-Shaffei.

    This ceremony has been prepared together with Air France. It will be a moment of contemplation and prayer for the families and friends of the victims, in a spirit of unity among people from every country and religious belief. Readings will therefore be made in French, English and Brazilian. Prayers will be accompanied by hymns in French, Latin and German by the Choirs of Notre-Dame de Paris and Air France.

    At the start of the ceremony, His Eminence ~~~~inal Vingt-Trois will propose that the families and friends of the victims carry 228 lighted candles to the altar, each one symbolizing a victim.

    The families may then take the candle away with them after the ceremony.

    Music and Readings:

    Introit from Requiem op. 9, by Maurice Duruflé (Choir of Notre Dame)
    Psalm 42 Wie der Hirsch, by Felix Mendelssohn (Air France Choir)
    Reading: Lamentations 3, 17-26
    Psalm 129 (Choir of Notre Dame and congregation)
    I have waited for thee O Lord. My soul hath relied on his word
    Reading from the Gospel according to Saint Luke (Luke 23, 33-53)
    Johann Sebastian Bach, Chorale Ich harre des Herrn (from Cantata BWV 131) (Choir of Notre-Dame)
    Felix Mendelssohn, Da nobis Pacem (Air France Choir)
    Kyrie, from Requiem op. 9, by Maurice Duruflé (Choir of Notre-Dame)
    Giuseppe Verdi, Requiem, Libera me Domine – (Air France Choir)
    The poem Footsteps in the Sand by Brazilian poet Ademar de Barros will be read at the end of the ceremony.

    (Extracts)

    One night, I dreamed a dream, I was walking along the beach with my Lord. Across the dark sky flashed scenes from my life. For each scene, I noticed two sets of footprints in the sand, one belonging to me and one to my Lord. When the last scene of my life shot before me, I looked back at the footprints in the sand. There was only one set of footprints. I realized that this was at the lowest and saddest times of my life. This always bothered me and I questioned the Lord about my dilemma. “Lord, You told me when I decided to follow You, You would walk and talk with me all the way. But I’m aware that during the most troublesome times of my life there is only one set of footprints. I just don’t understand why, when I need You most, You leave me”.

    He whispered “My precious child, I love you and will never leave you, never, ever, during your trials and testings. When you saw only one set of footprints, it was then that I carried you.”

    Português

    Arcebispado de Paris

    Celebração inter-religiosa de prece
    Para as 228 vítimas do vôo AF 447 de 1° de junho de 2009, para suas famílias e seus entes próximos

    Catedral Notre-Dame de Paris – Quarta-feira 3 de junho de 2009 às 16 horas
    Na presença do ~~~~eal André Vingt-Trois Arcebispo de Paris e presidente da Conferência dos Bispos da França, do Grande Rabino Haïm Korsia, capelão Israelita do ar, do Sr.Mohammed Moussaoui, presidente do Conselho Francês do Culto Musulmano, do Metropolita Emmanuel, presidente da Assembléia dos Bispos Ortodoxos da França e do Pastor Claude Baty, Presidente da Federação Protestante da França.

    Além do Grande Rabino Haïm Korsia, dos capelões católicos, protestantes e musulmanos de Roissy estarão presentes: o Padre Francis Truptil, o Pastor Jean Pierre Dassonville e o Imame Hazem El-Shaffei.

    Esta celebração foi preparada conjuntamente com a Air France. Ela será um tempo de recolhimento e de prece para as famílias e os entes próximos das vítimas, dentro de um espírito de aproximação entre os homens de todos os países e de todas as religiões. Na ocasião serão feitas leituras em francês, inglês e português. A prece será acompanhada por cânticos em francês, latim e alemão da Maîtrise de Notre-Dame de Paris e do Coral da Air France.

    No início da celebração, Mgr Vingt-Trois vai propor aos membros das famílias e entes próximos de levarem 228 velas acesas diante do altar. Elas simbolizam cada um e cada uma dos desaparecidos.
    As famílias serão convidadas a conduzir esta vela no final da celebração.

    Músicas e Textos da celebração:

    Intróito do Requiem de Duruflé (Maîtrise de Notre Dame)
    Salmo 42 Wie der Hirsch de Felix Mendelssohn (Coral da Air France)
    Leitura do Livro das lamentações de Jeremias (Lm 3, 17-26)
    Salmo 129 (Maîtrise de Notre Dame e assembléia)
    Eu deposito minha esperança no Senhor, eu tenho a certeza da sua palavra
    Evangelho de Jesus Cristo segundo São Lucas (Lc 23, 33-53)
    Coral de Johann Sebastian Bach, Ich harre des Herrn (trecho Cantate BWV 131) (Maîtrise Notre-Dame de Paris)
    Felix Mendelssohn, Da nobis Pacem (Coral da Air France)
    Trecho do Requiem de Maurice Duruflé, Kyrie (Maîtrise de Notre-Dame)
    Giuseppe Verdi, Libera me Domine – trechos do Requiem (Coral da Air France)
    Um poema “Passos sobre a areia” de Ademar de Barros, poeta brasileiro, será lido no final da celebração.
    (trechos):

    Uma noite, eu tive um sonho,
    Eu caminhava pela praia, lado a lado com o Senhor, deixando uma dupla pegada na areia, a minha e a do Senhor.
    Veio-me a idéia – era um sonho – de que cada um dos meus passos representava um dia da minha vida. (…) Mas observei que em certos lugares em vez de duas pegadas, havia apenas uma. Então, dirigindo-me ao Senhor, ousei repreendê-Lo:
    “O Senhor nos havia no entanto prometido de estar conosco todos os dias!
    Por que não cumpristes a vossa promessa?
    Por que me deixastes sozinho no pior momento da minha vida?
    Nos dias em que eu mais precisava da vossa presença.”
    Mas o Senhor me respondeu:“Meu amigo, os dias em que tu vês uma única marca de passos sobre a areia, são os dias em que Eu te carreguei.”

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 10

    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 21:26 local time
    Memo to the press
    Inter-religious ceremony wednesday 3 June
    In respect for the mourning of the relatives and friends of the victims, we inform the press that they will not be able to attend the inter-religious ceremony to be held inside Notre Dame cathedral tomorrow at 4pm. There will be a sound broadcast of the ceremony on the square outside the cathedral.

    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 14:20 local time
    Press release N° 10
    Homage to victims in Paris
    An inter-religious ceremony for the relatives and friends of the victims will be held on Wednesday 3 June at 4pm at Notre-Dame Cathedral in Paris.

    Note for media: practical information will be sent later.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 9

    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 11:53 local time
    Press release N° 9
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Assistance to relatives of victims: Air France staff arrive in Rio de Janeiro

    A team of approximately 20 Air France staff members, including two doctors and a nurse, arrived in Rio de Janeiro on Tuesday morning on flight AF 442.

    This team has travelled to Brazil as back-up to Air France staff in Rio, to help and assist the families of victims.

    Phone numbers reserved for relatives and friends:

    0800 800 812 in France, 0800 881 20 20 in Brazil, and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

    Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

    Português

    Chega ao Rio de Janeiro mais uma equipe da Air France de ajuda às famílias das vítimas

    Além de toda a equipe destacada no Brasil, de profissionais de saúde e voluntários, um novo time de cerca de 20 voluntários, dois médicos e uma enfermeira vieram de Paris para prestar assistência aos familiares das vítimas, chegando hoje de manhã pelo voo AF 442 no Rio de Janeiro.

    Números toll free disponíveis para atendimento às famílias:

    Para todo o Brasil: 0800 881 2020;
    Para a França: 0800 800 812;
    Para outros países: + 33 1 57 02 10 55

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para estes números, reservados às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 8

    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 08:12 local time
    Press release N° 8
    How are Air France’s volunteers trained to assist relatives and friends of victims?
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Overall, 4,000 Air France staff members are part of the voluntary programme to help in case of a crisis.

    These volunteers have four main tasks: contact with relatives and friends, logistical assistance, back-up at airports and telephone assistance.

    This programme was launched in November 1998 by the Chairman of Air France.

    Air France offers these volunteers three one-day training modules:

    – Theory (explaining what it means to be a volunteer and the commitments involved etc.) and practical training with a psychiatrist,

    – Theoretical and practical courses to train leaders whose role is to lead a group of volunteers and liaise with the Air France crisis centre,

    – Training on how to handle telephone calls when the Air France toll-free number is available.

    Yesterday, as soon as the news of flight AF 447 was announced, around one hundred volunteers were contacted to provide back-up to Air France teams in Paris and Rio. Others will be taking over later.
    Português

    Como os voluntários da Air France são treinados para acompanhar as famílias e parentes das vítimas?

    No total, 4 mil funcionários da Air France fazem parte de um programa de voluntariado da companhia para serem acionados em situações de crise.

    Estes voluntários têm quatro missões principais: acolher famílias e parentes de vítimas, dar apoio logístico, reforçar equipes de aeroporto e dar assistência pelo telefone.

    Este programa foi lançado em novembro de 1998 pelo presidente da companhia.

    A Air France oferece aos voluntários módulos de treinamento de um dia:

    – Teoria (explicação dos princípios do voluntariado e seus compromissos, entre outros) e prática, na presença de um psicólogo.

    – Teoria e prática para treinar líderes para guiar um grupo de voluntários e fazer ligação com a equipe de crise da Air France.

    – Treinamento de escuta telefônica para preparar voluntários a atender ligações a partir do momento que um número de contato é disponibilizado.

    Desde o anúncio do desaparecimento do voo AF 447, uma centena de voluntários foi mobilizada para reforçar as equipes da Air France em Paris e no Rio de Janeiro. Outros poderão ser convocados nas próximas horas a fim de que haja um rodízio de equipes.

    Números toll free disponíveis para atendimento às famílias:

    Para todo o Brasil: 0800 881 2020;
    Para a França: 0800 800 812;
    Para outros países: + 33 1 57 02 10 55

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para estes números, reservados às famílias.
    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 07:25 local time
    Memo to the press
    Air France asks all journalists, and in particular those from the audio visual media, to respect the privacy of the relatives currently staying in hotels at Paris-Charles de Gaulle.

    Thank you for your cooperation.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 7

    Paris, 02 June 2009 – 05:38 local time
    Press release N° 7
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Flight deck crew

    Flight Captain:
    · French
    · 58 years old
    · Entered Air France in 1988
    · Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in February 2007
    · 11,000 flight hours, including 1,700 on Airbus A330/A340
    2 co-pilots:
    · French
    · 37 and 32 years old
    · Entered Air France in 1999 and 2004
    · Qualified on Airbus A330/A340 in April 2002 and June 2008
    · 6,600 flight hours, including 2,600 on Airbus A330/A340
    · 3,000 flight hours, including 800 on Airbus A330/A340
    Cabin crew

    Chief purser:
    · French
    · 49 years old
    · Entered Air France in 1985
    2 pursers:
    · French
    · 54 and 46 years old
    · Entered Air France in 1981 and 1989
    6 stewards and stewardesses:
    · 5 French and 1 Brazilian
    · Between 24 and 44 years old
    · Entered Air France in 1996 and 2007
    Phone numbers reserved for families and friends
    0800 800 812 in France,
    0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

    Português
    Tripulação técnica

    Comandante :
    Nacionalidade francesa
    58 anos
    Entrou na companhia em 1988
    Qualificação Airbus A330/A340 em fevereiro 2007
    11 000 horas de voo das quais 1 700 em Airbus A330/A340
    2 oficiais pilotos (co-pilotos) :
    Nacionalidade francesa
    37 anos e 32 anos
    Entraram na companhia em 1999 e em 2004
    Qualificação em Airbus A330/A340 em abril 2002 e em junho 2008
    6 600 horas de voo das quais 2 600 em Airbus A330/A340
    3 000 heures de voo das quais 800 em Airbus A330/A340
    Tripulação comercial (comissários de bordo)

    Chefe de cabine principal :
    Nacionalidade francesa
    49 anos
    Entrou na companhia em 1985
    2 chefes de cabine :
    Nacionalidade francesa
    54 e 46 anos
    Entraram na companhia em 1981 e em 1989
    6 comissárias e comissários
    5 de nacionalidade francesa e 1 de nacionalidade brasileira
    Entre 24 e 44 anos
    Entraram na companhia entre 1996 e 2007
    Números toll free disponíveis para atendimento às famílias:

    Para todo o Brasil: 0800 881 2020;
    Para a França: 0800 800 812;
    Para outros países: + 33 1 57 02 10 55
    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para estes números, reservados às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 6

    Paris, 01 June 2009 – 20:30 local time
    Press release N° 6
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France is doing its utmost to provide support for relatives and friends.

    Medical and psychological assistance involving 15 specialist physicians has been set up at Paris-Charles de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro airports.

    Some one hundred voluntary members of Air France staff are backing up the teams in Paris-Charles de Gaulle and Rio de Janeiro.

    Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the relatives and friends of passengers.

    Phone numbers reserved for relatives and friends

    0800 800 812 in France,
    0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

    Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.
    Português

    A Air France está fazendo tudo ao seu alcance para dar apoio aos familiares e pessoas próximas aos passageiros.

    Os familiares estão sendo encaminhados a um hotel na Barra da Tijuca, no Rio de Janeiro, onde podem se hospedar se assim desejarem. Além disso, uma equipe de médicos e psicólogos está no local para total assistência, sendo: 4 psicológos, 2 psiquiatras e dois clínicos.

    Equipes médica e psicológica também estão disponíveis no aeroporto do Galeão, no rio e no de Paris – Charles de Gaulle.

    Cerca de 100 voluntários da Air France reforçam as equipes dos aeroportos de Paris Charles de Gaulle e do Rio de Janeiro.

    Números toll free estão disponíveis para atendimento às famílias:

    Para todo o Brasil: 0800 881 2020;
    Para a França: 0800 800 812;
    Para outros países: + 33 1 57 02 10 55

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para este número, reservado às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 5

    Paris, 01 June 2009 – 18:13 local time
    Press release N° 5
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France is now able to confirm the nationalities of the passengers who were on board flight AF 447 on 31 May 2009, which disappeared between Rio de Janeiro and Paris-Charles de Gaulle. This list of nationalities is based on the information provided by the Brazilian Authorities.

    2 American
    1 Argentinian
    1 Austrian
    1 Belgian
    58 Brazilian
    5 British
    1 Canadian
    9 Chinese
    1 Croatian
    1 Danish
    1 Dutch
    1 Estonian
    1 Filipino
    61 French
    1 Gambian
    26 German
    4 Hungarian
    3 Irish
    1 Icelandic
    9 Italian
    5 Lebanese
    2 Moroccan
    3 Norwegian
    2 Polish
    1 Romanian
    1 Russian
    3 Slovakian
    1 South African
    2 Spanish
    1 Swedish
    6 Swiss
    1 Turkish
    Air France expresses its deepest sympathy to the relatives and friends of the passengers and crew who were on board this flight.

    Air France is doing its utmost to provide support to relatives and friends: counselling with physicians and psychologists as well as specially trained Air France volunteers has been set up at the airports of Paris-Charles de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro.

    Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the attention of relatives and friends of passengers who may have been on board. They can use this number to obtain information on whether or not a member of their family or friends was on board.

    Phone number reserved for relatives and friends

    0800 800 812 in France,
    0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

    Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

    Português

    Air France confirma as nacionalidades dos passageiros que se encontravam a bordo do voo AF 447 do dia 31 de maio 2009, desaparecido entre o Rio de Janeiro e Paris-Charles de Gaulle. Esta lista foi constituída tendo como base informações fornecidas por autoridades brasileiras.

    · 1 Sul-africano
    26 Alemães
    2 Norte-americanos
    1 Argentino
    1 Austríaco
    1 Belga
    58 Brasileiros
    5 Britânicos
    1 Canadense
    9 Chineses
    1 Croata
    1 Dinamarquês
    2 Espanhóis
    1 Estoniano
    61 Franceses
    1 Gambiano
    4 Húngaros
    3 Irlandeses
    1 Islandeses
    9 Italianos
    5 Libaneses
    2 Marroquinos
    1 Holandeses
    3 Noruegueses
    1 Filipinos
    2 Poloneses
    1 Romeno
    1 Russo
    3 Eslovacos
    1 Sueco
    6 Suiços
    1 Turco
    A Air France dirige suas sinceras condolências às famílias e aos parentes dos passageiros e membros da tripulação.

    A Air France está concentrando todos os seus esforços em dar suporte às famílias e parentes: uma assistência psicológica foi instalada no aeroporto de Paris Charles de Gaulle 2 e no aeroporto do Rio de Janeiro. Ela é composta de médicos e psicólogos, assim como voluntários da empresa, especialmente treinados para estas situações.

    A empresa também colocou à disposição um número de telefone toll free especial de atendimento às famílias dos passageiros. Ela informa, conforme solicitação, de uma eventual presença a bordo de um familiar.

    Números de telefone reservados às famílias
    0800 881 20 20 para o Brasil,
    0800 800 812 para a França,
    e 33 1 57 02 10 55 para outros países

    Air France comunicará outras informações assim que elas estiverem disponíveis.

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para este número, reservado às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 4

    Paris, 01 June 2009 – 14:44 local time
    Press release N° 4
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France expresses its deepest sympathy to the relatives and friends of the passengers and crew who were on board AF flight 447 on 31 May 2009, which disappeared somewhere between Rio de Janeiro and Paris-Charles de Gaulle.

    Air France is doing its utmost to provide support to relatives and friends: counselling with physicians and psychologists as well as specially trained Air France volunteers has been set up at the airports of Paris-Charles de Gaulle 2 and Rio de Janeiro.

    Air France has also established a special toll-free number for the attention of relatives and friends of passengers who may have been on board. They can use this number to obtain information on whether or not a member of their family or friends was on board.

    Phone number reserved for relatives and friends

    0800 800 812 in France,
    0800 881 20 20 in Brazil,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from all other countries.

    Air France will release further information as soon as it is available.

    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for relatives and close friends.

    Português
    Air France dirige suas sinceras condolências às famílias e amigos dos passageiros e membros da tripulação que se encontravam a bordo do voo AF 447 do dia 31 de maio, desaparecido entre o Rio de Janeiro e Paris Charles de Gaulle.

    A Air France está concentrando todos os seus esforços em dar suporte às famílias e parentes: uma assistência psicológica foi instalada no aeroporto de Paris Charles de Gaulle 2 e no aeroporto do Rio de Janeiro. Ela é composta de médicos e psicólogos, assim como voluntários da empresa, especialmente treinados para estas situações.

    A empresa também colocou à disposição um número de telefone toll free especial de atendimento às famílias dos passageiros. Ela informa, conforme solicitação, de uma eventual presença a bordo de um familiar.

    Números de telefone reservados às famílias
    0800 881 20 20 para o Brasil,
    0800 800 812 para a França,
    e 33 1 57 02 10 55 para outros países

    Air France comunicará outras informações assim que elas estiverem disponíveis.

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para este número, reservado às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 3

    Paris, 01 June 2009 – 13:59 local time
    Press release N° 3
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France has sent all the information in its possession on the disappearance of flight AF 447 operating the Rio de Janeiro – Paris-Charles de Gaulle route to the French Accident Investigation Bureau for civil aviation (BEA), the French organization in charge of technical investigations into civil aviation incidents and accidents, and to the aircraft manufacturer Airbus. Air France is in permanent contact with the BEA and Airbus.

    The Airbus A330-200 aircraft, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in Paris). The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal time), i.e. 4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4:14am in Paris) indicating a failure in the electric circuit in an area a long way off the coast.

    The aircraft was powered with General Electric CF6-80E engines.

    The aircraft had totalled 18,870 flight hours and went into service on 18 April 2005.
    Its last maintenance check in the hangar took place on 16 April 2009.

    Air France shares the anxiety and distress of the families concerned. The families are being taken care of in a specially reserved area of Paris-Charles de Gaulle Terminal 2.

    A toll-free number has been opened at 0800 800 812 in France,
    at 0800 881 20 20 in Brazil
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from outside France.
    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for families and close relatives.

    Português

    Air France informou ao Bureau de Investigação e Análises para a Segurança de Aviação civil, organismo responsavél na França pelas investigações técnicas sobre acidentes e incidentes da aviação civil, e para a Airbus, fabricante do avião, as informações que tem em seu poder após o desaparecimento do voo AF 447, fazendo a ligação Rio de Janeiro – Paris-Charles de Gaulle : a companhia está em contato permanente com o Bureau e com a Airbus.

    A aeronave, do tipo Airbus A330-200, matrícula F-GZCP, deixou o Rio dia 31 de maio às 19h03 (hora local).

    A aeronave atravessou uma zona de tempestade com fortes turbulências às 2 horas da manhã (horário TU) – 23 horas horário do Brasil. Uma mensagem automática foi recebida às 2h14 da manhã (horário TU = 23h14 horário do Brasil) indicando uma pane do circuito elétrico numa zona afastada da costa.

    A aeronave é equipada de motores General Electric CF6-80E.

    O avião tem um total de 18 870 horas de voo e começou a operar em 18 de abril de 2005.

    A última visita de manutenção em hangar foi feita em 16 de abril de 2009.

    A Air France divide a emoção e a inquietação das famílias envolvidas. Os familiares serão recebidos num local especialmente reservado no aeroporto de Paris Charles de Gaulle 2 assim como no Salão Nobre do Galeão.

    Um toll free está disponível :
    0800 881 2020 para o Brasil
    0800 800 812 para a França,
    e + 33 1 57 02 10 55 para outros países

    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para este número, reservado às famílias.

  • Flight 447: Press release N° 2

    Paris, 01 June 2009 – 13:10 local time
    Press release N° 2
    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France regrets to confirm the disappearance of flight AF 447 flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris-Charles de Gaulle, scheduled to arrive at 11:10am local time today, as announced to the press by Air France CEO, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon.

    The Airbus A330-200, registration F-GZCP, left Rio on 31 May at 7:03pm local time (12:03am in Paris).

    The aircraft hit a zone of stormy weather with strong turbulence at 2am this morning (universal time), i.e. 4am in Paris. An automatic message was received from the aircraft at 2:14am (4 :14am in Paris) indicating a failure in the electric circuit a long way from the coast.

    The Brazilian, African, Spanish and French air traffic control centres all tried to make contact with flight AF 447 but to no avail. The French military air traffic control centre tried to detect the aircraft but did not succeed.

    216 passengers were on board: 126 men, 82 women, 7 children and one infant.

    There were 12 flight crew members: 3 pilots and 9 flight attendants.

    The flight captain had a record of 11,000 flight hours and had already flown 1,700 hours on Airbus A330/A340s.

    Of the two first officers, one had flown 3,000 flight hours (800 of which on the Airbus A330/A340) and the other 6,600 (2,600 on the Airbus A330/A340).

    The aircraft was powered by General Electric CF6-80E engines.

    The aircraft had totalled 18,870 flight hours and went into service on 18 April 2005.
    Its last maintenance check in the hangar took place on 16 April 2009.

    Air France fully shares the anxiety and distress of the families concerned. The families are being taken care of in a specially reserved area of Paris-Charles de Gaulle Terminal 2.

    A toll-free number has been opened at 0800 800 812 for calls from France,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 for calls from outside France.
    NB: We ask journalists not to call this number, which is reserved for families and close relatives.

    Português
    A Air France lamenta informar o desaparecimento do voo AF 447 que efetuava a ligação entre Rio de Janeiro e Paris-Charles de Gaulle, chegada prevista às 11h10 (hora local), acaba de anunciar o Diretor Geral da Air France, Pierre-Henri Gourgeon.

    A aeronave, do tipo Airbus A330-200, matrícula F-GZCP, deixou o Rio dia 31 de maio às 19h03 (hora local).

    A aeronave atravessou uma zona de tempestade com fortes turbulências às 2 horas da manhã (horário TU) – 23 horas horário do Brasil. Uma mensagem automática foi recebida às 2h14 da manhã (horário TU = 23h14 horário do Brasil) indicando uma pane do circuito elétrico numa zona afastada da costa.

    O conjunto dos controles aéreos civis brasileiro, africano, espanhol e francês tentaram em vão estabelecer contato com o voo AF 447. O controle aéreo militar francês tentou detectar o avião, sem sucesso.

    216 passageiros estão a bordo : 126 homens, 82 mulheres, 7 crianças e um bebê.

    A tripulação é composta por 12 pessoas : 3 tripulantes técnicos e 9 comissários.

    O comandante tem 11 mil horas de voo e já tinha efetuado 1700 horas no Airbus A330/A340.

    Os dois co-pilotos possuem: um 3000 horas de voo, sendo 800 horas em Airbus A330/A340 e o outro 6600, sendo 2 600 em Airbus A330/A340.

    A aeronave é equipada de motores General Electric CF6-80E.

    O avião tem um total de 18 870 heures de voo e começou a operar em 18 de abril de 2005.

    A última visita de manutenção em hangar foi feita em 16 de abril de 2009.

    A Air France divide a emoção e a inquietação das famílias envolvidas. Os familiares serão recebidos num local especialmente reservado no aeroporto de Paris Charles de Gaulle 2 assim como no do Galeão.

    Um toll free está disponível :
    0800 881 2020 para o Brasil
    0800 800 812 para a França,
    e + 33 1 57 02 10 55 para outros países
    NB : Solicitamos aos jornalistas que NÃO liguem para este número, reservado às famílias

  • Flight 447: First Press Release

    Versão brasileira abaixo

    Air France regrets to announce that it has lost contact with flight AF 447 from Rio de Janeiro to Paris-Charles de Gaulle, expected to arrive this morning at 11:15 local time.

    The flight left Rio on 31 May at 7pm local time.

    216 passengers are on board.

    There are 12 crew members on board: 3 pilots and 9 cabin crew.

    The following toll-free number is available in France: 0800 800 812,
    and + 33 1 57 02 10 55 outside France.

    Air France fully shares the anxiety and distress of the families of the passengers concerned. The families are been taken care of in a specially reserved area at Paris-Charles de Gaulle 2 airport.

    Português

    Air France lamenta informar que se encontra sem notícias do voo AF 447 que efetuava a ligação entre Rio de Janeiro e Paris Charles de Gaulle, com chegada prevista às 11h15 da manhã (hora local).

    O voo decolou do Rio no dia 31 de maio às 19 horas locais.

    216 passageiros estão a bordo.

    A tripulação é composta de 12 pessoas : 3 tripulantes técnicos e 9 comissários.

    Um toll free está disponível :
    0800 800 812 para a França,
    e + 33 1 57 02 10 55 para outros países

    A Air France divide a emoção e a inquietação das famílias envolvidas. Os familiares serão recebidos num local especialmente reservado no aeroporto de Paris Charles de Gaulle 2 assim como no do Galeão.

  • | |

    Gulfstream International Airlines Fined

    Gulfstream International Airlines is being fined by the FAA for improper scheduling of flight crew duty, installation of unapproved air conditioner compressors and improperly maintained vent blowers on the airline’s fleet of 27 BE-1900-D aircraft.

    See the press release:

    Washington Headquarters Press Release
    For Immediate Release

    May 21, 2009
    Contact: Laura Brown
    Phone: (202) 267-3883

    FAA Proposes $1.3 Million Civil Penalty for Gulfstream International Airlines

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a $1.3 million civil penalty from Florida-based Gulfstream International Airlines, Inc. for violations of the Federal Aviation Regulations.

    The alleged violations include improper scheduling of flight crew duty time, and the installation of unapproved air conditioner compressors and improperly maintained vent blowers on the airline’s fleet of 27 BE-1900-D aircraft.

    An FAA review of the airline’s electronic record-keeping system for tracking crew duty and rest time revealed that Gulfstream International did not accurately input the proper data from its manually generated hard-copy aircraft logbook records into the electronic system. The discrepancies resulted in scheduling crew members in excess of daily and weekly flight time limitations.

    During a June 2008 inspection, the FAA determined that the airline had installed unapproved automotive air conditioner compressors on its aircraft between September 2006 and May 2008. Following the FAA inspection, the airline grounded all of the affected aircraft and replaced the units with approved aircraft air conditioner compressors.

    In the course of a July 2008 inspection of Gulfstream International avionics and component shops in Fort Lauderdale, the FAA discovered that the airline had installed improperly maintained vent blowers on six planes between January 2008 and June 2008. Following that inspection, the airline replaced the blowers with properly maintained units.

    Gulfstream International Airlines has 30 days from the receipt of the civil penalty letter to respond to the FAA.


    #
    (end of release)

    George’s Point of View

    Gulfstream is a former employer of the Captain Marvin Renslow of the ill-fated Continental Connection 3407 flight. If Gulfstream had kept proper records, trained and maintained according to accepted protocol, the Buffalo NY tragedy may never have happened.

  • UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE COLGAN AIR ACCIDENT NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

    May 8, 2009 -NTSB Advisory The National Transportation Safety Board today released additional information about the Board’s scheduled public hearing on the crash of the Colgan Air Dash-8 near Buffalo, New York. The three-day hearing will convene at 9:00 a.m. on May 12, 2009 at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The room is lighted for television and a mult box is provided for sound.

    Read More

  • |

    IATA Statement:Press release

    Date: 26 April 2009

    Swine Influenza

    IATA statement
    Geneva – The International Air Transport Association (IATA) is monitoring events concerning the recent cases of ‘swine influenza’ in Mexico and the United States. On 25 April 2009 the World Health Organization (WHO) convened a meeting of its Emergency Committee, and subsequently determined that the situation represented a ‘public health emergency of international concern’ under the terms of the International Health Regulation.

    WHO statement
    The World Health Organization has released a statement.

    WHO is not recommending any travel or trade restrictions.

    IATA goes on to say:
    “At the present time, IATA recommends that airlines review their preparedness plans for public health emergency and consider how they may be implemented in the event that the current situation becomes more widespread. No specific additional measures are currently advised. Recommendations will be reviewed in light of WHO evaluation of the evolving situation”

  • |

    Sikorsky S-92A Main Gearbox (MGB) Malfunctions.

    Subject:
    Sikorsky S-92A Main Gearbox (MGB) Malfunctions.

    Ref. Publications:
    Sikorsky Safety Advisory SSA-S92-08-006 dated 26 September Sikorsky Safety Advisory SSA-S92-08-006 dated 26 September 2008; and Sikorsky CCS-92-AOL-09-0008 dated 14 March 2009.

    Description:

    The Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation published SSA-S92-08-006 to The Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation published SSA-S92-08-006 to  inform owners and operators of impending Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) changes, prompted by service difficulties with the S-92A MGB lubrication system. More recently, CCS-92-AOL-09-0008 was published to inform owners and operators about a recent accident with an S-92A helicopter. The latest advisory document contains reminders of existing Sikorsky service publications that recommend specific action(s) that may or may not be related to the root cause(s) of the latest accident. CCS-92-AOL-09-0008 also specifies that ‘compliance’ with Sikorsky Safety Advisories is ‘essential’.

    After reviewing the information and pending the investigation, EASA supports the recommendations contained in CCS-92-AOL-09-0008, with the exception of SSA-S92-08-006. This advisory document refers to RFM changes that have not yet been approved by the FAA. In fact, the SSA specifies the ‘corrective action’ as “Ensure all flight crews become familiar with the RFM changes when received”. This SIB is published to ensure that all owners and operators of affected rotorcraft, registered in European Union Member States or associated countries, are aware that the procedures specified in SSA-S92-08-006 have not been approved by FAA or EASA. The relevant emergency procedures in the approved RFM must be observed.


    Applicability:

    Sikorsky S-92A helicopters, all serial numbers.

    Contact:
    For further information contact the Airworthiness Directives, Safety For further information contact the Airworthiness Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification Directorate, EASA. E-mail: ADs@easa.europa.eu. Copies of the referenced advisory documents and any other related Sikorsky service publications may be obtained upon request from Sikorsky Commercial Product Support, or call the Customer Service Engineering Desk, telephone: +1 203-416-4299, or E-mail: sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com.

    http://www.sikorsky.com/vgn-ext-templating-SIK/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=65f9e39d40a78110VgnVCM1000001382000aRCRD

  • Press Release: S-92TM Helicopter Operators Complying Worldwide With Sikorsky Bulletin on Gearbox Oil Bowl Studs

    March 23, 2009

    STRATFORD, Connecticut – Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. announced today that the majority of the worldwide S-92TM helicopter fleet already has complied with the company notice to retrofit the aircraft’s gearbox oil bowl with steel mounting studs. The company expects to have close to 100 percent compliance by the end of this week. Sikorsky is a subsidiary of United Technologies Corp. (NYSE:UTX).

    The company contacted all S-92 helicopter operators on March 20 after broken titanium studs were found during a helicopter crash investigation in Canada. The investigation is continuing, and no determination has been made that the broken studs contributed to the accident or if they resulted from it. Sikorsky immediately notified the operators as a safety precaution, and the Federal Aviation Administration is expected to issue an Airworthiness Directive instructing the retrofit.

    As of this moment, more than 50 of the 91 S-92 helicopter retrofits were completed. Sikorsky has made available all the parts and tools necessary for all operators to swap out the studs.

    “While the investigation remains ongoing, our priority has been to maintain safety and eliminate any potential risks,” said Marc Poland, Vice President of Sikorsky Global Helicopters. “The operators are reacting quickly, and we are doing all we can to encourage full and rapid compliance.”

    Canada’s Transportation Safety Board (TSB) is leading the investigation into the March 12 helicopter accident that occurred off the coast of Newfoundland and resulted in 17 deaths. Sikorsky is assisting with the investigation.

    “Our prayers and deepest condolences go out to the families of all involved in this terrible tragedy,” Poland said. “The investigation continues, and we are providing support and technical resources to assist the TSB while we continue to support the fleet.”
    The S-92 helicopter was designed with numerous structural and avionics safety features. The worldwide fleet has accumulated more than 140,000 flight hours since 2004. Approximately 66 percent of current S-92 operators are offshore oil customers. The remainder are performing search and rescue (SAR), Head of State, VIP, and airline missions.

    Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., based in Stratford, Conn., is a world leader in helicopter design, manufacture and service. United Technologies Corp., based in Hartford, Connecticut, provides a broad range of high technology products and support services to the aerospace and building systems industries.
    Contacts
    Marianne Heffernan
    Phone: +1 203-386-4373
    Paul Jackson
    Phone: +1 203-386-7143

  • |

    NTSB FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 11, 2009 SB-09-11

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: March 11, 2009 SB-09-11

    NTSB ISSUES URGENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATION TO ADDRESS ENGINE THRUST ROLLBACK EVENTS ON B-777 AIRCRAFT

    Washington, DC – Following two engine thrust rollback events on Boeing 777 aircraft powered by Rolls-Royce engines, the National Transportation Safety Board issued an urgent safety recommendation today calling for the redesign of a Rolls- Royce engine component. The Safety Board also recommended that, after the redesign is completed, the new system be installed on all affected B-777 airplanes at the next maintenance check or within six months.

    These recommendations are being issued in response to the findings in two investigations – an accident and an incident – involving engine thrust rollbacks on Boeing 777-200ER airplanes powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Trent 800 Series engines. In both cases a build-up of ice (from water normally present in all jet fuel) on the fuel/oil heat exchanger (FOHE) restricted the flow of fuel to the engine, resulting in an uncommanded engine rollback.

    The first event, which is still being investigated by the UK’s Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), occurred on January 17, 2008, when a Boeing 777 experienced a dual engine rollback on final approach and crashed short of the runway at London’s Heathrow International Airport. One passenger was seriously injured, eight passengers and four of the flight crew sustained minor injuries; the airplane was substantially damaged.

    The second event occurred on November 26, 2008, when a Delta Air Lines Boeing 777 experienced a single engine rollback during cruise flight over Montana while en route from Shanghai to Atlanta. Normal operations resumed after the flight crew followed Boeing’s published procedure to recover engine performance; the airplane landed safely in Atlanta.

    Testing in support of the UK accident investigation led Boeing to develop procedures to help prevent ice accumulation, and to recover thrust in cases of ice blockage. As more information from the Delta rollback event was developed, Boeing modified the procedures, which became the basis of an airworthiness directive issued by the Federal Aviation Administration.

    While the procedures may reduce the risk of a rollback in one or both engines due to FOHE ice blockage, they add complexity to flight crew operations, and the level of risk reduction is not well established. And because the recovery procedure requires a descent, the aircraft may be exposed to other risks such as rising terrain or hazardous weather, or the inability to achieve maximum thrust during a critical phase of flight, such as during a missed approach.

    Because of these hazards, the Safety Board has determined that the only acceptable solution to this safety vulnerability is a redesigned FOHE that would eliminate the potential of ice build-up. On February 23, 2009, Rolls-Royce indicated that a redesign of the FOHE was underway, and that they anticipated the redesign to be tested, certified and ready for installation within 12 months.

    “With two of these rollback events occurring within a year, we believe that there is a high probability of something similar happening again,” said NTSB Acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker. “We are encouraged to see that Rolls-Royce is already working on a redesign, and we are confident that with the FAA and EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) overseeing the process, this flight safety issue – even one as complex as this – will be successfully and expeditiously resolved.”

    The NTSB has made the following two recommendations to both the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency:

    Require that Rolls-Royce redesign the RB211 Trent 800 series engine fuel/oil heat exchanger (FOHE) such that ice accumulation on the face of the FOHE will not restrict fuel flow to the extent that the ability to achieve commanded thrust is reduced.
    Once the fuel/oil heat exchanger (FOHE) is redesigned and approved by certification authorities, require that operators of Boeing 777-200 airplanes powered by Rolls Royce RB211 Trent 800 series engines install the redesigned FOHE at the next scheduled maintenance opportunity or within 6 months after the revised FOHE design has been certificated, whichever comes first.

    The NTSB and AAIB will continue to work together closely on both of the rollback events as each of the investigations move forward.

    src: http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2009/090311.html

  • Preliminary report by Dutch Safety Board

    The English version of the report may be found here in .pdf form

    DUTCH SAFETY BOARD-04.03.2009–Today <4 March 2009>, the Dutch Safety Board has issued a warning for airline manufacturer Boeing and presents its initial findings regarding the terrible accident involving the Boeing 737/800, Turkish Airlines flight.

    This accident claimed the lives on nine people (5 passengers and 4 crew) and 80 passengers were injured. Twenty eight of those injured are still hospitalised.

    The Boeing was en route from Istanbul to Schiphol (on Wednesday 25 February 2009) and was due to land at Schiphol at 10.40.

    The Boeing had had a regular flight and no problems had been experienced until just before the approach.

    There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit.

    The crew made contact with air traffic control (Amsterdam Radar) at 10.04 and was transferred to the tower at Schiphol – for the landing – at 10.14. The tower then gave the Boeing permission to land on the Polderbaan 18R.

    The Polderbaan was approached according to fixed procedures, without any delay, and the Boeing was then given permission to decrease its altitude to 2000 feet (about 700 meters) and begin its descent to the Polderbaan.

    This descent takes place with the help of the automatic pilot, as is normal with Turkish Airlines (this method can be utilised by everybody, as can a manual landing).

    The voice recorder and the black box, both of which are in the hands of the Safety Board, show that an irregularity occurred during the descent, at 1950 feet. At a height of 1950 feet the left radio altimeter suddenly indicated a change in altitude – from 1950 feet to – 8 feet – and passed this onto the automatic pilot. This change had a particular impact upon the automatic throttle system which provides more or less engine power.

    The radio altimeter normally measures the altitude of the plane above the ground very accurately and can start registering this from 2500 feet. As already mentioned, this radio altimeter is very significant for providing the appropriate power for an automatic landing. A Boeing is fitted with two radio altimeters, a left one and a right one. The black box has shown that this deviation only occurred in the left radio altimeter. The voice recorder has shown that the crew were notified that the left radio altimeter was not working correctly (via the warning signal “landing gear must go down”). Provisional data indicates that this signal was not regarded to be a problem.

    In practice, the plane responded to this sudden change as though it was at an altitude of just a few meters above the Polderbaan and engine power was reduced. It seems that the automatic system – with its engines at reduced power – assumed it was in the final stages of the flight. As a result, the aircraft lost speed.

    Initially the crew did not react to the issues at hand.

    As a result of the deceleration, the aircraft’s speed was reduced to minimum flying speed (stalling situation) and warning signals (the steering column buzzes at an altitude of 150 metres) were given.

    The black box shows that full power was then applied immediately. However, this was too late to recover the flight, the aircraft was too low and, consequently, the Boeing crashed 1 kilometre short of the runway.

    The black box – which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights – showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.

    The aircraft initially hit the ground with its tail and then the undercarriage followed. The forward speed was about 175 km per hour upon impact. An aircraft of this weight should normally have a speed of 260 km per hour for landing.

    The aircraft came to a rapid halt (after about 150 m) as a result of the arable land being made up of boggy clay. The braking caused by the ground meant that the aircraft broke into two pieces; the tail broke off and the aircraft’s hull ruptured at business class.

    The landing gear broke off, in accordance with its design. This also applied to the two engines. The full power and the sudden braking resulted in both engines continuing forwards for a further 250 meters.

    Most of the fatally wounded victims were located near the rupture, in business class, and the three crew members in the cockpit died as a result of the enormous braking forces, partially caused by the embedded nose-wheel and the forward movement of the aircraft. The section that remained most intact was situated around the wings. On board the plane there were 127 passengers and 7 crew, of whom 28 are still hospitalised.

    The Board’s investigation will now focus fully on the workings of the radio altimeters and the connection to the automatic throttle (automatic steering system). Weather conditions, particularly visibility through the low cloud base and the mist, probably meant that the Polderbaan was not yet visible at the height at which the descent was commenced. The Safety Board board will be assisted in its investigation and its attempts to ensure lessons are learnt by the following organisations:
    • the National Transportation Safety Board • Bureau d’Enquetes et d’Analyse (BEA) • Aviation Accident Investigation Branche (AAIB)
    • Directorate General of Civil Aviation (Turkse Rijksluchtvaartdienst, DGCA) • Boeing • Turkish Airlines
    • The engine manufacturer, CFM
    • Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW) [Traffic and Waterways Inspectorate]
    • Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, American Civil Aviation Authority)
    • Vereniging van Nederlandse verkeersvliegers [Association of Dutch Commercial Pilots]
    • Nederlandse vereniging voor cabinepersoneel [Dutch Association for Cabin Personnel]

    Internationally, both the ICAO and the EU stipulate that involved parties may take part in the Board’s investigation (party system).

    The investigation itself, however, is supervised by and remains the Board’s responsibility. The Board has also received a great deal of data from the Public Prosecutor for its investigation. Furthermore, there have been content-based contributions from a great many police organisations. The National Police Force, particularly all staff from the National Team of Forensic Investigation who are responsible for the forensic work at the location itself, the Aviation Police, who took all the aviation photographs, and the National Traffic Assistance team who helped the Board to measure the location of the accident.

    The Public Prosecutor took possession of the aircraft and, as a result, responsibility for guarding it lay entirely with them. Police officers from all over the country were drafted in for this purpose. We are extremely grateful for their outstanding and meticulous work and for guarding the aircraft.

    There was a misunderstanding regarding the use of the data from the cockpit voice recorder and the flight recorder (black box). It is established, in Dutch law, that the Public Prosecutor may only have access to this data if there is a question of abduction, terrorism, murder or manslaughter. In such a situation, the Safety Board is also legally obliged to hand over this data to the Public Prosecutor. In principle, there are two investigations being carried out into the accident.
    • The judicial investigation. The search for punishable facts and the use of these to hold those responsible to account.
    • The independent investigation. This investigation focuses fully on finding out what happened so that lessons can be learnt.

    There is always some tension between the two investigations. Within criminal law you may be silent. Nobody needs to contribute to his or her sentence. With the independent investigation, however, you want to ensure that everything is said. For this reason, the reports from the Board may not be used as evidence in lawsuits.

    From today onwards, the investigation by the Board will concentrate on two subjects: The technical investigation will focus on the role of the automatic pilot, the automatic throttle system and the connection to the radio altimeter. .

    Alongside the aforementioned technical investigation, the focus will also be on the management of the crisis. How was the disaster dealt with and what can be learnt from this. This investigation will also focus on the passenger list.

    The recovery of the wreckage will probably take place at the end of this week. The aircraft will be taken to another location for – possible – further investigation. The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight. With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities.