Air Safety

Air Safety

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    Update on Boeing 787 Dreamliner ZA002 Incident

    EVERETT, Wash., Nov. 10, 2010 /PRNewswire/ — During approach to Laredo, Texas, yesterday, airplane ZA002 lost primary electrical power as a result of an onboard electrical fire. Backup systems, including the deployment of the Ram Air Turbine (RAT), functioned as expected and allowed the crew to complete a safe landing. The cause of the fire is still under investigation by Boeing.

    The pilots executed a safe landing and at all times had positive control of the airplane and all of the information necessary to perform that safe landing.

    Initial inspection appears to indicate that a power control panel in the aft electronics bay will need to be replaced on ZA002. We are inspecting the power panel and surrounding area near that panel to determine if other repairs will be necessary.

    We have retrieved flight data from the airplane and are analyzing it in Seattle. This process will take several days. We are committed to finding the cause quickly but will not rush the technical team in its efforts.

    The team was conducting monitoring of the Nitrogen Generation System at the time of the incident but there is no reason to suspect that the monitoring or earlier testing of that system had anything to do with the incident.

    Consistent with our internal processes, until we better understand the cause of the incident on ZA002, we have decided to postpone flight test activities on other airplanes. Ground test activities will be conducted until flight test resumes.

    Likewise, we cannot determine the impact of this event on the overall program schedule until we have worked our way through the data. Teams have been working through the night and will continue to work until analysis is complete and a path forward is determined.

    See More on Dreamliner Test Flight Emergency Landing

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    Goodyear Expert Cites Tips for Proper Aircraft Tire Maintenance

    AKRON, Ohio, Nov. 10, 2010 /PRNewswire/ — When it comes to aircraft tire maintenance, few people in the industry have visited more hangars and seen all manner of service work and maintenance procedures than Goodyear Aviation’s Rob Robson.

    Robson is a Product Support Manager for The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company (NYSE: GT), and for more than 10 years he’s been immersed in aircraft tire product support for everything from piston singles to helicopters and fighter jets.

    By his own count, Robson has witnessed numerous aircraft tire maintenance procedures and has inspected hundreds of worn tires. He has seen firsthand the ill effects of improper maintenance. As a result, Robson can offer valuable advice for those who wish to better understand how proper aircraft tire maintenance can help to deliver more landings.

    The most important factor of any aircraft tire maintenance program is maintaining proper inflation pressure. According to Robson, the problems created by incorrect inflation can be severe. Over inflation often leads to uneven tread wear and reduced traction, makes the tread more susceptible to cutting, and places greater stress on aircraft wheels. Under inflation creates faster tread wear on the shoulders, damages the tire’s innerliner, and greatly increases the stress and flex heating in the tire that can lead to tire failure.

    “Because aircraft tire/wheel assemblies can lose up to 5 percent of their pressure each day, they need to be checked daily, or before each flight, with a calibrated pressure gauge when the tire is at ambient temperature (not heated by taxiing). Any tire that’s been run more than 10 percent underinflated should be removed from service,” Robson said. The industry veteran also recommends filling tubeless assemblies with nitrogen instead of air because it’s dry and non-combustible.

    Another key area of aircraft tire maintenance is making sure no harmful chemicals are used or spilled on the tires. Keep hangar floors clean of all debris to avoid foreign object damage to the tires. It is also important to inspect the tires closely, in addition to checking tire pressure, during pre-flights to check for any damage to the tires from service.

    These tips and more are covered in detail in Goodyear’s Tire Care & Maintenance Manual (PDF). For information about Goodyear aviation tires and dealer locations, visit www.goodyearaviation.com.

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    Release: Pilots: How to Handle Abnormal Situations

    http://www.faa.gov/news/safety_briefing/
    Now available online, the November/December 2010 issue of FAA Safety Briefing focuses on a subject fundamental to pilot safety: how to handle abnormal and emergency situations. The issue stresses the delicate art of planning for the unplanned and outlines several tools and resources pilots can draw upon to handle emergencies.
    Articles provide tips on unusual attitude recovery, partial-power takeoffs, and knowing what to do when your aircraft’s electrical system fails. Also, this issue’s Hot Spots article highlights the work FAA has been doing to identify the leading causes of GA fatal accidents and lists the top 10 causes. The Vertically Speaking column lists the top 10 causes of helicopter accidents and highlights the regional safety seminars the FAA Safety Team is conducting with Helicopter Association International.

    For Aviation Maintenance Technicians, the Nuts, Bolts, and Electrons article explains the Service Difficulty Reporting System and encourages AMTs to use it.

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    Body Found on Gulf Air Flight

    What: Gulf Air Airbus A330-200 en route from Bahrain to Manila
    Where: Manila
    When: Oct 20th 2010
    Why: Prior to landing in Manila, a Filipino electrician, Marlon Cueva, 36, of Lubang Island, Mindoro Occidental, who had been working in Abu Dhabi for three months was found with a cord around his neck in the lavatory. The news is reporting this alternately as a murder or a suicide. Although news reports say he was found inside the toilet at the rear of the plane by a flight steward after landing, other reports say the discovery was called in thirty minutes before landing. His wife and relatives were waiting at the airport for the plane to arrive, and they say there was no reason for him to commit suicide. Police are investigating if this could be a murder.

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    Number of Serious Runway Incursions Cut in Half

    Thank you, Laura (Brown). And thank you to everyone for coming to Logan today.

    I want to share with you some very good news about runway safety in the United States.

    This year we have cut the number of serious runway incursions in half. It’s the second year in a row we’ve cut the number by 50 percent.

    A serious runway incursion is when a collision is narrowly avoided.

    We are down to six serious incursions in the entire country. And that is down from 67 ten years ago.

    This marked increase in safety would not have been possible without the concerted efforts and partnership of the aviation industry.

    The FAA made a call to action in 2007 to ask the entire industry to focus on reducing runway incursions.

    And the entire industry really came together—airlines, pilots, air traffic controllers, airport vehicle operators, associations, management, labor and the FAA. We all worked together to reduce these occurrences. We have maintained the focus and we have cut the number.

    Our goal is to get the number down to zero.

    That brings me to some great safety innovations we are rolling out in Boston.

    We just finished 90 days of testing a new warning system at Logan International that will keep our runways safe. Boston is among the first airports in the country to get this new safety technology.

    This runway safety system consists of three types of safety lights that give pilots direct warnings about possible dangers on the runway.

    In a simplified explanation, the new safety lights work much like a traffic light. They warn a pilot if it’s not safe to cross, enter or proceed down a runway.

    Boston is the first and only airport in the country to install these lights at intersecting runways.

    A series of red lights embedded in the pavement at Logan will provide 3,000 feet of warning leading up to the runway intersection.

    If there is a potential safety problem, the red lights come on and stay on as long as the collision potential exists. You stop what you’re doing and stay where you are.

    Boston has added two more types of safety lights. It now joins Dallas/Fort Worth, San Diego and Los Angeles airports with these safety features.

    Boston added safety lights for planes leaving a taxiway and entering a runway. The lights turn red if it’s not safe to enter or cross the runway.

    The third type of safety lights are called takeoff hold lights. These lights turn red if it’s unsafe to begin or continue to takeoff on a runway.

    These three types of runway status lights are going to give us an additional layer of safety. They will help us improve the exceptional work we are already doing with runway safety in this country.

    By working together we have markedly reduced the serious incursions and we’re making progress on all of them.

    We want to get at the root cause of an incursion, no matter how serious or minor, in order to improve our procedures and training.

    Why do incursions happen, you may ask?

    Why can’t a pilot tell if a danger exists on a runway?

    Ideally the air traffic controller will tell the pilot where to taxi and the correct runway to use. And ideally the pilot will hear it correctly and follow through.

    But we are all human. And with larger airports there is a lot more to keep track of, including vehicles and people.

    These lights will make it very plain that a pilot should stop and avoid the runway intersection.

    If you see a red light, the typical human reaction is to stop. That’s the whole idea.

    We plan to add runways status lights to an additional 19 of our busiest airports in the country over the next five years.

    These lights provide a direct and immediate indication to pilots and vehicle drivers that a potentially unsafe condition is developing and they should avoid it.

    They will help us to continually improve safety.

    I’m happy that you will have the chance to board a plane today and see how they work.

    Thank you for your time.

    Next I’d like to introduce Congressman Michael Capuano who represents Massachusetts’ 8th District, including Logan International Airport. We have worked closely together on many issues and I’m pleased he could be here today.

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    Fact Sheet – FAA Initiatives to Improve Helicopter Air Ambulance Safety

    For Immediate Release
    October 7, 2010

    Helicopter air ambulance operations are unique due to the urgent nature of the flight. The FAA, operators, and the medical community all play a vital role in promoting a positive safety culture that ensures the safety of passengers, flight crews, and medical professional on these flights.

    Since August 2004, the FAA’s has:

    • Encouraged risk management training to flight crews so that they can make more analytical decisions about whether to launch on a flight.
    • Promoted better training for night operations and responding to inadvertent flight into deteriorating weather conditions.
    • Promoted technology such as night vision goggles (NVGs), terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) and radar altimeters.
    • Provided airline-type FAA oversight for operators. Identify regional FAA helicopter operations and maintenance inspectors to help certificate new operators and review the operations of existing companies.

    Background

    The helicopter air ambulance industry grew by 54 percent between 2003 and 2008. There are currently 74 air ambulance companies that operate approximately 850 helicopters in the United States. The NTSB estimates that 400,000 patients and transplant organs are transported by helicopter each year.

    The Role of the Medical Community

    Aviation safety decisions are separate from medical decisions. The decision to conduct a flight with a patient on board does not mean that flight safety can be compromised in any way. Once the medical need for air transportation is determined, it is up to the operator to make the air transportation decision based on pre-flight factors such as weather conditions, maintenance, and crew readiness.

    FAA Oversight

    The FAA inspects air ambulance operators, but the agency’s oversight goes beyond inspection and surveillance. Rather, the FAA uses a risk-based system that includes the initiatives outlined below which focus on the leading causes of accidents.

    FAA Actions

    • In August 2004, the FAA established a task force to review and guide government and industry efforts to reduce air ambulance accidents.
    • On January 14, 2005, the FAA hosted a meeting with industry representatives to discuss safety issues and gain feedback. Representatives from the Association of Air Medical Services, Helicopter Association International, the National EMS Pilots Association and several operators attended.
    • Decision-making skills:On January 28, 2005, the FAA published a notice providing guidance for safety inspectors to help operators review pilot and mechanic decision-making skills, procedural adherence, and crew resource management practices. It includes both FAA and industry intervention strategies (Notice 8000.293 Helicopter Emergency Medical Service Operations). These principles were reinforced in the Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) 06001 issued on January 28, 2006.
    • Risk assessment programs: On August 1, 2005, the FAA issued guidance to inspectors promoting improved risk assessment and risk management tools and training to all flight crews, including medical staff (Notice 8000.301 Operational Risk Assessment Programs for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services).
    • Air Medical Resource Management (AMRM): On September 22, 2005, the FAA issued guidance to operators establishing minimum guidelines for Air Medical Resource Management (AMRM) training. The training focuses on pilots, maintenance technicians, flight nurses, flight paramedics, flight physicians, medical directors, specialty team members (such as neonatal teams), communications specialists (dispatchers), program managers, maintenance staff, operational managers, support staff, and any other air medical team members identified by specific needs (AC No. 00-64 Air Medical Resource Management).
    • Special emphasis inspection program: On September 27, 2005, the FAA issued revised standards for inspection and surveillance of air ambulance operators, with special emphasis on operations control, risk assessment, facilities and training, especially at outer locations away from the certificated holder’s principal base on operations.
    • FAA establishes new office: In December 2005, the FAA’s Flight Standards Service’s Air Transportation Division established the new Commuter, On Demand, and Training Center Branch (AFS-250) to work Part 135 and Part 142 policy issues. The FAA has begun hiring aviation safety inspectors with specific “helicopter only” experience in order to keep pace with industry growth.
    • Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT): On January 24, 2006 the FAA issued a handbook bulletin to inspectors describing acceptable models for LOC and CFIT avoidance Programs. The bulletin provides inspectors with information to provide to operators for developing LOC/CFIT accident avoidance programs and clarifies existing guidance (HBAT 06-02 Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) Accident Avoidance Programs).
    • HBAT 06-01 & OpSpec A021: On January 24, 2006 the FAA issued revised guidance to inspectors regarding HEMS OpSpecs, amending the Visual Flight Rule (VFR) weather requirements for HEMS operations, including consideration of the adverse affects of reduced ambient lighting at night and mountainous terrain (HBAT 06-01 Helicopter Emergency Medical Services; OpSpec A021/A002 Revisions).
    • Guidance to Part 142 training centers: On February 24, 2006, the FAA issued a Notice to Training Center Program Managers assigned to oversee Part 142 training Centers advising them of recent changes to air ambulance operations and training standards (Notice 8000.317, Operator Training Provided by Part 142 Training Centers for Helicopter Emergency Medical Services.)
    • Public air ambulance operators:On March 2, 2006, the FAA issued guidance to inspectors on the surveillance and oversight of public aircraft operators for air ambulance operations (Notice 8000.318 Public Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) Operations).
    • Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems (TAWS): On June 27, 2006, at the FAA’s request, RTCA, Inc. established a Special Committee to develop Helicopter Terrain Awareness and Warning System (H-TAWS) standards. These standards will be used to develop FAA requirements for H-TAWS systems, installation and operations.
    • Aeronautical Information Manual: In August 2006, the FAA revised the Aeronautical Information manual (AIM) to provide guidance to pilots on assessing ambient lighting for night VFR operations and for off-airport/heliport landing zone operations.
    • International Helicopter Safety Team (IHST): The helicopter industry has formed the IHST to gather data and draft strategies to reduce helicopter accidents globally by 80 percent by 2015. The effort is modeled on the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) which has achieved a significant reduction in the commercial fatal accident rate in the United States. Members include the FAA, European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Transport Canada, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and industry representatives.
    • Surveillance of large HEMS operators: The FAA’s Flight Standards Service established a task group to focus on the certification and surveillance requirements for large air ambulance operators that support diverse medical programs throughout the United States. The group’s findings resulted in the increase in the cadre of inspectors assigned to air ambulance operations.
    • Operational Control Centers:On May 5, 2008, the FAA’s Flight Standards Service issued an advisory circular (AC 120-96) highlighting the “best practices” for use by air ambulance operators in establishing their control centers and training their specialists.
    • FAA/Association of Air Medical Service (AAMS) Safety Meeting: On July 11, 2008, 80 representatives from the FAA and operators met in response to recent accidents. Discussions focused on night operations in poor or deteriorating weather, risk management, complacency, the agency’s policies on the use of NVGs, as well as helicopter shopping.
    • Notice to FAA Inspectors:On January 12, 2009, the FAA issued a notice (Notice 8900.63) to agency inspectors with oversight of air ambulance operators to find out how many operators have adopted FAA-recommended best practices. With reports in from all of the 74 operators surveyed, the percentages that have adopted various programs are:

    –Decision-making skills and risk assessment programs – 94 percent

    –Response to FAA guidance on Loss of Control (LOC) and Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) avoidance – 89 percent

    –Integration of operation control center – 89 percent

    –Installation of Flight Data Recorders and devices that can re-create a flight. – 11 percent

    –TAWS equipage – 41 percent

    –Use of radar altimeters – 89 percent

    Operations Specifications

    On November 14, 2008, the FAA published a Notice in the Federal Register that advised operators of important mandatory changes to air ambulance flights. The agency also included a provision to encourage the use of NVGs and Terrain Awareness Warning Systems. Consistent with NTSB recommendations, all air ambulance operators will comply with Part 135 weather minimums, including repositioning flights with medical crew onboard. The FAA is also providing greater access to weather reporting facilities, and requiring the flight crew to determine a minimum safe altitude and obstacle clearance prior to each flight. The compliance date is no later than February 22, 2009.

    Weather

    In March 2006, the FAA and the University Corporation for Atmospheric Research hosted a weather summit in Boulder, Colorado to identify the air ambulance-specific issues related to weather products and services. Attendees explored possible regulatory improvements, weather product enhancements, and operational fixes specific to HEMS operations. Attendees included the National Weather Service, National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Helicopter Association International, American Helicopter Society International, Association of Air Medical Services, National EMS Pilots Association, National Association of Air Medical Communications Specialists, manufacturers, and many operators.

    As a result, the FAA funded the development and implementation of a graphical flight planning tool for ceiling and visibility assessment along direct flights in areas with limited available surface observations capability. It improves the quality of go/no-go decisions for air ambulance operators. The tool was fielded in November 2006.

    Night Vision Goggles

    The FAA has a solid record of facilitating safety improvements and new technologies for EMS helicopters, including certification of NVGs. Since 1994, the FAA has worked 28 projects or design approvals called Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs) for installation of NVGs on helicopters. This number includes EMS, law enforcement and other types of helicopter operations. Of the 28 projects, the FAA has approved approximately 15 NVGs STC’s for EMS helicopters. The FAA initiated and wrote (in coordination with RTCA) the minimum standards for NVGs/cockpit lighting.

    Technical Standard Order (TSO) C164 was published on September 30, 2004 referencing RTCA document DO 275 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS), published October 12, 2001. The FAA has hosted workshops to help applicants work with the FAA to obtain NVG certification. One set of NVGs costs approximately $7,000 and an operator must carry multiple sets per flight. Certification is just one step. The operator must also have an FAA-approved training program for using NVGs.

    The FAA has revised the NVG guidance in the Operations Inspectors Handbook, Order 8900.1. Produced using considerable industry input, the revision includes the establishment of a cadre of NVG national resource inspectors (Notice 8000.349, Night Vision Imaging Systems).

    While the FAA encourages use of NVGs where appropriate, they are not a one-size-fits-all solution. Flying at night is not inherently dangerous if rules and procedures are followed. In fact, many operators who do not use NVGs have never had an accident at night.

    Flight Data Recorders

    Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) are not required for air ambulance operations. FDRs offer value in any accident investigation by providing information on aircraft system status, flight path and attitude. The weight and cost of FDR systems are factors. Research and development is required to determine the appropriate standards for FDR data and survivability in the helicopter environment, which typically involves substantially lower speeds and altitudes than airplanes. Funds are currently best invested in preventive training.

    However, the FAA is considering alternatives to expensive and heavy airliner-style FDRs, especially in light of the relatively low-impact forces in most helicopter accidents. By establishing a standard appropriate to the helicopter flight envelope, the FAA may be able to make meaningful future FDR rulemaking efforts.

    Terrain Awareness Warning Systems

    The FAA supports the voluntary implementation of TAWS and did consider the possibility of including rotorcraft in the previous TAWS rulemaking process. Through this process, however, the FAA concluded that there are a number of issues unique to VFR helicopter operations that must be resolved before the FAA considers mandating the use of TAWS in this area, such as modification of the standards used for these systems. For example, helicopters typically operate at lower altitudes so TAWS could potentially generate false alerts and “nuisance” warnings that could negatively impact the crew’s response to a valid alert. TAWS use in air ambulance operations required study of TAWS interoperability within the lower altitude environment, and possible modification of TAWS system standards.

    At the FAA’s request, RTCA, Inc. established a Special Committee (SC-212) to develop H-TAWS standards for use in future FAA rulemaking projects. The final report was delivered to RTCA in March 2008. Those standards were subsequently reviewed by the FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service and on December 17, 2008, the FAA issued Technical Standards Order (TSO) C-194 to standardize the manufacture of H-TAWS within the industry.

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    The FAA Adjusting Separation

    The 787 Dreamliner and the new 747-8 will have adjusted separation distances, according to the FAA which is adjusting the recent separation guidelines.

    The FAA is gathering data on Boeing’s flight-test flights to determine the minimum spacing between the Boeing jets and planes following behind. The original document which has been rescinded— has incorrect data about the weights of the 787 Dreamliner and the new 747-8. The final standard has yet to be announced.

    For more information check the briefing guide

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    France: Air Traffic Control Strike

    French air traffic controllers are on strike.

    Strikers are protesting France’s pension reform that would raise the country’s state pension age for all workers in France from 60 to 62 by 2018. Although public announcements tried to assert that only short haul travel would be affected most strongly, air travel has come to standstill. British Airways has cancelled 90% of flights to France, and Ryanair has also cancelled flights over French airspace. Easyjet cancelled 61 flights; Iberia cancelled 34 flights yesterday alone.

    Spanish airports report some delays.

    French train service has also ground to a halt.

    Reports are that the general strike in France affect French airspace until 0600 hours on Friday, September 24.

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    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    September 23, 2010

    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION OVER MINNEAPOLISINVOLVING COMMERCIAL JETLINER AND SMALL CARGO AIRCRAFT

    The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating a near midair collision between a commercial jetliner and a small cargo aircraft that came within an estimated 50 to 100 feet of colliding near the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport (MSP).

    On September 16, 2010, about 6:49 a.m. CDT, US Airways flight 1848 (AWE 1848), an Airbus 320, was cleared for takeoff on runway 30R en route to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, carrying five crewmembers and 90 passengers. At the same time, Bemidji Aviation Services flight 46 (BMJ46), a Beech 99 cargo flight with only the pilot aboard, was cleared for takeoff on runway 30L en route to La Crosse, Wisconsin. Weather conditions at the time were reported as a 900-foot ceiling and 10 miles visibility below the clouds.

    Immediately after departure, the tower instructed the US Airways crew to turn left and head west, causing the flight to cross paths with the cargo aircraft approximately one- half mile past the end of runway 30L. Neither pilot saw the
    other aircraft because they were in the clouds, although the captain of the US Airways flight reported hearing the Beech 99 pass nearby. Estimates based on recorded radar data indicate that the two aircraft had 50 to 100 feet of vertical separation as they passed each other approximately 1500 feet above the ground.

    The US Airways aircraft was equipped with a Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) that issued climb instructions to the crew to avert collision. The Beech 99 was not equipped with TCAS and the pilot was unaware of the proximity of the Airbus. There were no reports of damage or injuries as a result of the incident.

    NTSB and FAA investigators conducted a preliminary investigation at the Minneapolis airport traffic control tower on September 18th and 19th and are continuing to review the circumstances of this incident.

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    MAK Finds Aviastar Inadequate

    MAK, the Interstate Aviation Committee investigated the Mar 22nd crash of the Aviastar-TU Tupolev TU-204-100 ferry flight en route from Hurghada Egypt to Moscow, and banned it from operating as a passenger airline. On the day of the crash, after the flight control computer failed, the Tu-204 flew 700 feet left of the runway when it was landing. The pilot was found to have “poor training” on simulators that did not correspond with the plane. According to Flight Global, “the crew failed to execute a go-around.”

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    NTSB: No Rush to Judge

    George’s Point of View

    As urgent as the idea of an NTSB recommendation sounds, there is apparently no rush. The latest NTSB safety recommendation to EASA is rooted in a 2001 crash: American Airlines Airbus Flight 587. (see narrative below)

    Probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. (i.e. The pilot used the rudder and it fell off.)

    (To put this into simplistic car terms, your car just skidded on some ice. You did some fancy and extreme steering which may or may not have been necessary. And the steering wheel just came off in your hands. Pretty much all you can do now is spectate and die.)

    The pilot’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal input was based on a violent wake turbulence encounter. The pilot’s “unnecessary and excessive” rudder pedal input broke the rudder.

    Isn’t this a dubious conclusion? Isn’t this like blaming a car crash on a driver hitting brakes too hard? The airbus had just taken off and encountered turbulence. Since when do flight controls not handle “aggressive input”?

    Initial suggestions included pilot retraining. (I.E. don’t fix the problem, train the pilots to work around it.) This month, the NTSB encouraged modification of European certification standards. In other words, the NTSB wants to physically limit the rudder movement to what the design can safely manage. Maybe that makes more sense than expecting a pilot engaged in a desperate struggle to save a failing plane to have to make accommodations for flighty flight controls.

    Some take the angle that the problem lies in the rudder design and/or composition. In 2001, the FAA was one of those so inclined.

    On November 16, 2001, the FAA issued emergency AD 2001-23-51 warning of failure of the vertical stabilizer-to-fuselage attachment fittings, transverse (side) load fittings, or rudder-to-vertical stabilizer attachment fittings, if not corrected, could result in loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or rudder and consequent loss of control of the airplane. The FAA considers that, before structural failure, it may be possible to detect indications of possible failure modes that could result in separation of the vertical stabilizer from the airplane. These indications include edge delaminations, cracked paint, surface distortions, other surface damage, and failure of the transverse (side) load fittings. Similarly, indications of failure of the rudder assembly, which could lead to failure of the vertical stabilizer, may also be detectable with such an inspection.

    This failure has happened more than once.

    In the Air Transat flight 961 incident (also a 300 series Airbus) out of Varadero, Cuba, the rudder disintegrated. The pilot in that flight questions the integrity of the rudder design and composition.

    Here another point that has been commonly made. Aircraft have had rudders made of aluminum for 70 years without them disintegrating. With high tech composites, planes are falling out of the sky.

    In March 2006, US safety investigators recommended rudder inspections on Airbus A300-600 jets because a FedEx A300-600 rudder damaged during maintenance.

    Tested on the ground by Fed Ex engineers, in the Fed-Ex A300 cargo plane, the hydraulic system which actuates the rudder tore a hole around the hinges exactly where the rudders of both flight 961 and flight 587 did. Coincidence? I think not.

    Does the certification process need an overhaul? I think so.

    Have a couple of dead pilots again become convenient scapegoats for/by using the very computer controlled flight control system that they believed protected them? I bet I know what the pilots think.

    Flight 587, Official NTSB narrative of the crash
    On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane’s vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane’s engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful.

    Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700.

    About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

    Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes.

    The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, “your leg, you check the rudders.” (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, “rudders check.” The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

    About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

    About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, “you have the airplane.”

    About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, “you happy with that [separation] distance?” About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, “we’ll be all right once we get rollin’. He’s supposed to be five miles by the time we’re airborne, that’s the idea.” About 0913:46, the first officer said, “so you’re happy.”

    The National Transportation Safety Board’s airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220º. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain’s statement “clean machine,” indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

    About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a 0.04 G drop in longitudinal load factor, a 0.07 G shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a 0.3 G drop in normal (vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0º (neutral) to 2º nose up, 2º nose down, and back to 0º; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18º right, 30º left, 37º right, 34º left, 5º left, 21º left, and 23º right, before moving to between 5º and 6º left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0º (neutral) to about 2º left, about 0.6º right, and back to 0º.

    During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane’s pitch angle increased from 9º to 11.5º, decreased to about 10º, and increased again to 11º. The airplane’s bank angle moved from 0º (wings level) to 17º left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to
    the WAVEY navigation intersection.

    At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, “little wake turbulence, huh?” to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, “yeah.” At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

    FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

    At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, “max power.” At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, “you all right?” to which the first officer replied, “yeah, I’m fine.” One second later, the captain stated, “hang onto it. Hang onto it.” The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer’s statement “let’s go for power please” at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer’s right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

    According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64º to the right at 0915:51.5, 78º (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64º to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78º to the left at 0915:56.5.

    The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11º to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane’s center of gravity (cg) was about 4º to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5º to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2º to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7º to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10º and 11º to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11º and 12º to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

    The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer’s statement, “holy [expletive].” At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, “what the hell are we into…we’re stuck in it.” At 0916:12.8, the captain stated, “get out of it, get out of it.” The CVR recording ended 2 seconds later. The airplane was located at 40º 34′ 37.59″ north latitude and 73º 51′ 01.31″ west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight.

  • | | |

    FAA: September/October 2010 issue of FAA Safety Briefing,


    Come Fly with Me

    September 14–The September/October 2010 issue of FAA Safety Briefing, which focuses on proficiency and its absolute importance for pilots and aviation maintenance technicians, also includes a must-read article for pilots. FAA’s Paul Greer writes about the complicated subject of receiving compensation for your flying. He says, “Flying and getting paid for it has been a dream that most pilots have had at one time or another. It’s been done by generations of pilots, but it’s also an area ripe with opportunities for new (and even older) pilots to run afoul of the regulations.” Read all about it on page 12 of the September/October 2010 issue.

  • | |

    Chinese Pilots Flying with False Records

    George’s Point of View

    Apparently false flying records are part of a known underground Chinese pilot subculture. All Chinese pilots know about it. Now the CAA does too. Just google this phrase: false pilot certification surname Xu

    192 Chinese pilots with falsified flight records are now under the eye of China’s Civil Aviation Authority; some of them have conditionally been allowed to continue flying pending re-application for pilot certificates after undergoing additional training under strict supervision. Some of the pilots involved had their licenses revoked. Here’s the big question that hit me, and the reason I posted this as an editorial and not just news:

    Should the pilots be allowed to earn their certification after falsifying their records?

    The US FDA would never let Chinese goods pass uninspected, especially since recent history has proven that if Chinese imports can somehow be adulterated (by melamine, or toxins in drywall, hook or crook, shame, fines, bribery, guilt, flattery or whatever), then it will be. So products are not to be trusted but must be inspected. This is not the sole dominion of Chinese exports, but all of all countries products.

    But what of the long-standing Chinese obsession with honor? Has honor decayed in the face of rapid economic and social change?

    The honor thing in China is very real. Zheng Xiaoyu, head of the Chinese FDA from 1998 to 2005, approved untested medicine in exchange for cash. In punishment, China executed him.

    Should China, which for centuries has set high standards for honor, now let these values erode because of a pilot shortage? Shouldn’t the ethics, honor and sense of responsibility of someone who is daily responsible for hundreds of lives be impeccable? Is someone who is willing to falsify their flying history an individual of impeccable honor, one responsible enough to bear the burden of all of those lives? Perhaps I should not bring this up, as the oriental concept of honor is not identical to the non-oriental perception. Perhaps saving face in this case is a matter of equating “honor” with the “Soprano-like” keeping of the false-paper pilot cult secret. Even so, the issue is not only the question of how one can be solidly qualified if the foundation of ones qualification is a tissue of lies, but also if a pilot is shady and unreliable enough to pretend to be qualified, how can that so-called pilot actually be reliable enough, trained enough, expert enough to safeguard the lives of planeloads of passengers who trust there is solid experience in the cockpit? It is a violation of the public trust.

    One of these falsely certified pilots was manning the Henan Airlines jet crash. His fake credentials and lack of experience caused the deaths of more than 40 people. How much more of a wake-up call does China need?

    But it is not unreasonable to allow testing to verify qualifications. It is more humane than applying the Chinese FDA solution. Perhaps the very existence of 192 known falsifications indicates some need of a fast-track solution for former military pilots who wanted to transition into commercial positions.

    I have personally flown within China in their planes. I felt safe. The flights had no incidents, and believe me, unlike many passengers whose lives do not revolve around aviation, I am always on the lookout.  So, let’s not put down the many for the few who have taken the course of this criminal act. Let us, rather, respect that China ferreted out the falsified records, and are proceeding in a modern and reasonable fashion to make amends. I personally love China, and travel there often. I will continue to do so, even if it is on a Chinese plane.

  • |

    Airborne Cell Phones In Legal Eye

    To phone or not to phone, that is the question. Or to update it a little:
    Do radio signals from cell phones disrupt key airplane functions?

    OR

    Are current U.S. cell phone bans outdated and useless at promoting air safety?
    That is today’s question.

    In U.S. air space, cell phones are banned, but all European carriers do not ban cell phone use.

    The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration says cell phones may emit signals that can affect aircraft communications, navigation, and flight control.

    There’s some piggyback legislation in the FAA reauthorization bill that would prohibit cell phone use on planes by anyone other than flight crews or law enforcement. Currently once planes reaches 10,000 feet it is up to the carrier to allow or disallow passengers to turn on most portable electronic devices except cell phones.

    Boeing, for example, prohibits the use.

  • | |

    FAA Warns of Design Flaw

    The FAA says the rudder system design in the Airbus A300-600 and the Airbus 320 is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds. The system is designed to limit available rudder pedal deflection as airspeed decreases, so at higher speeds, the pedal must be manipulated with greater sensitivity.

    The plane’s vertical stabilizer can separate due to excessive input because of the speed differential limits of rudder pedal deflection.

    The findings may affect several accident cases where the Airbus rudder separated, causing catastrophic conditions.

  • |

    India: Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council

    Air India Airlines did not single-handedly inspire the newly formed Indian separate body to investigate air accidents, but as the committee was formed immediately after the Air India Express crash in Mangalore that claimed 158 lives, it certainly was a major catalyst. It remains to be seen if the new investigatory committee will be as efficient or reliable as the US’s NTSB/FAA which investigates all major air events in the US and some outside of the US (when requested by foreign agencies or when American pilots, citizens, service or goods are involved).

    Certainly the DGCA needs help. We have already pointed out in a prior editorial that the DGCA’s report on the Mangalore crash is overdue. The Times of India quoted the DGCA’s own statutes:

    According to Civil Aviation Requirement (CAR) Section 5 (Air Safety), Series C, Part I issued on 13 October 2006, “preliminary report by the inspector of accidents/inquiry officer should be finalized within 10 days of the accident.”

    We have also located a source that claims that * all of Air India Express managerial positions are “part-time.” Does this mean that the company was deliberately set up to have no key personnel who can be targeted as decision-makers? Though why should that matter? Air India Express is the budget branch of a larger company; Air India Express is a wholly owned subsidiary of Air India which is now part of National Aviation Company of India Limited (a merger between Air India and Indian Airlines.) Someone is in control.

    Those who fly India and have high expectations of the new safety committee being effective may be in for a let down while the newly formed body finds its footing. The new, separate Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council which has been set up to handle air crashes has no experts from Air Traffic Control (ATC) nor expert pilots. Along with the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) chief, Dr Nasim Zaidi, the 28 member body includes Aviation CEOs including Air India Chairman Arvind Jadav, Spicejet CEO Sanjay Aggarwal, managing editor of Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, Kapil Kaul.

    If you take a look at how the NTSB handles an investigation, you will see that a team of experts are engaged and all interested parties, including pilots, are represented, including some you might not expect. Without such input, investigation is a waste of time.

    The NTSB team of investigators handle individual aspects of the individual investigation, allocated by expertise. Each expert is responsible for a specific and sometimes overlapping portion of the investigation. Specialization like this helps develop and apply expertise in each area and prevents key points from being overlooked. Also, bear in mind that the experts involved in investigating each crash will differ, depending on the parties involved; and most of these parties are on site within hours of the crash.

    SomeAreas of investigation/investigators

    • Structures investigators (who also usually takes responsibility for the crash site, ensuring that all the wreckage (e.g. wings, fuselage, and undercarriage) is accounted for and that proper trails of evidence are followed)
    • Engines investigators
    • Systems investigators such as flight controls
    • Airline’s Operations investigators (also studying crews’ training and suitability)
    • Black box investigators
    • Accident flight’s relationship with air traffic controllers
    • Meteorologists who analyze the weather at the time of the crash to determine if it had a bearing on the accident.
    • Metallurgists who analyze the condition of the plane’s metal and the forces on it
    • Sound specialists (for eg, identifying sounds on black box tapes)
    • Fire and Explosions experts
    • Simulation experts who reproduce the events
    • Flight survival experts who analyze the forces the passengers were subjected to. (These are the people who can tell you the safest place to sit on a plane.)
    • Maintenance experts who analyze the plane’s condition–and how it got that way
    • Psychologists may examine procedures to determine if airline practices exist that cause the pilot to make mistakes, like flying different types of planes. (e.g. Different types of cockpit controls make switching planes an unsafe practice.)
    • Manufacturers representatives who study and analyze their product’s performance
    • Pilots (representatives from the pilots’ union) may be attached to many or all groups; just as…
    • Labor Unions such as the International Association of Aircraft Machinists may attach representatives to multiple groups.
    • Cooperating “foreign specialists” in wreckage reconstruction, black box decoding or interpretation. (Countries who develop special expertise in various fields are often called to join the investigation, just as the NTSB is frequently asked to join foreign investigations.)

      Plane manufacturers have their own investigative teams experienced in this type of analysis, and they stand ready to work on any event that needs their expertise. And the investigation is networked so that if and when they need additional specialists, they can tap into their own company resources.

      One should note that in the case of the Mangalore Crash investigation, the wreckage sat out in the elements for 50+ days before being collected and warehoused. In my opinion, this is carelessness; and furthermore, this carelessness is just one visible aspect demonstrating where the existing procedures are obviously not up to par. While I am sure that experts combed the wreckage, including Boeing, (they always dispatch a team when one of their planes is in a crash,) leaving the wreckage out in the elements is not a best practice for conservation/preservation of evidence. One can only wonder how all other aspects of procedure including those behind closed doors-stand up to Aviation Industry’s internationally expected best practices.

      The industry calls this massive joint investigation the “party system.”

      The parties involved include all parties affected. The more parties involved, the faster the investigation may go.

      Chairmen of each group make their report; and any groups who discover any failures or unusual effects of machinery make note in the final report given to the primary investigator. The investigator invites the individual groups to provide their angle on what caused the crash and how it might be prevented.

      If all the probable causes line up neatly, then it is a simple thing to complete the final report. When theories conflict, the final report takes longer, and tension develops.

      All of this information is supposed to remain confidential until the final report is published.

      In this “party system,” the various opposing parties tend to keep each other “honest”. Unfounded attempts at blame by one party will be met with rebuttal by another–so it is obvious that if there is no pilot representation in this new committee, pilots may end up the “dumping ground.” Let’s say, for example, that a pilot in a crash went in with bad input like an outdated map. Is this committee set up to pursue the investigation to the source of the bad input? A pilot’s association representative would be instrumental in getting to the cause, whether it might be inadequate training, or materials.

      The international community and the people of India are waiting to see how this new committee manages to regulate and oversee all aspects of civil aviation in India, and whether it helps keep India’s DGCA and the safety of India’s aviation systems on track.

      * Need separate body to probe air crashes: Patel; Economic Times, The (India), May 25, 2010

  • |

    U.S. Aviation Safety Legislation at Hand

    Good news for Flyers: The FAA will not shut down Sunday due to lack of funds. Operating funds till the September 30th close of the 2010 fiscal year have been tacked on to a bill going through the Senate today.

    The main forse of the legislation stems from the Continental Connection Flight 3407 disaster, and as part of the FAA legislation goes before the Senate on July 30 2010. The bill attempts to raise the quality of pilot performance, a problem which was a contributing factor in the Continental Buffalo-Niagara crash, among others.

    These safety measures have been lobbied for almost a year and a half; and will require the FAA to limit pilot scheduling based on sleep/fatigue research; increase required minimum flight experience for pilots; strengthen pilot training; develop pilot mentoring programs; require disclosure of airlines at point of sale so passengers can see if the carrier is a major or regional carrier.

  • | |

    Hopefully Hiring Pilots Who Can

    Aviation is looking alive in India, according to Bombay’s * Economic Times.

    The corporation running Air India, National Aviation Company of India (NACIL), is hiring experienced Boeing 737 commanders, and for its Budget division (Air India Express), they are looking for experienced and inexperienced co-pilots.

    In this depressed global economy, jobs are always good news. Let’s hope that NACIL’s hiring practices involve some efforts at due diligence (hiring with a certain standard of care) and result in aviation excellence, even in its budget airlines Air India Express.

    Hiring is good news…as long as cutting cost in tough times does not mean cutting safety. Even travelers with modest incomes deserve to make it to their destination in one piece.

    “Recruitment gathers pace in aviation sector.” Economic Times. July, 2010.

  • | |

    Arik Air Undergoing Re-Certification

    Arik Chairman, Sir Joseph Arumemi Ikhide has announced that their airline is successfully going through the certification process. “Although the journey was long, tedious, hard and expensive, it was worth it.”

    Striving to meet the global standards of the ICAO and TSA, Arik Air has also been re-certified by the Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA). Six of eight US FAA criteria have been satisfied. Arik Air must satisfy a preliminary (mock) audit by the FAA prior to moving on to the final steps of certification.

  • | | |

    This Months Bad News: Trans States Holdings Inc

    This month’s poster child for how not to run your commuter airline:

    Trans States Holdings Inc.

    After two incidents in the last four months, there’s now a $2.5 million civil penalty in the offing for Trans States Holdings Inc. from the FAA. But more crucial than the last two incidents, the problem really comes down to hundreds of safety violations on 320 flights over the past two years, all related to maintenance, after repeated warnings and reoccurring violations.

    What is it I always say?

    Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance.

    See Below:

    FAA Proposes $2.5 Million in Civil Penalties Against Trans States, GoJet

    WASHINGTON — The Federal Aviation Administration is proposing $2,476,075 in civil penalties against Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines of Bridgeton, Mo., for violation of various maintenance procedures and operating nine jets on 320 revenue passenger flights when the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

    Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines are both owned and operated by Trans States Holdings. Trans States Airlines performs maintenance and training on GoJet aircraft.

    The proposed civil penalties involve seven GoJet+ Canadair Regional Jets and two Trans States Embraer 145 regional jets. The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet operated aircraft when maintenance had been carried out incorrectly, and that the company failed to complete required maintenance record-keeping.

    The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet violated a number of maintenance regulations and procedures, including use of outdated manufacturers’ maintenance instructions to perform repairs; failure to connect a wing flap actuator to its torque tube, rendering the flaps inoperative; failure to document an inspection after an aircraft was damaged by severe turbulence; failure to document and carry out proper repairs after aircraft warning systems identified problems; improper repair of an engine oil leak and failure to comply with minimum equipment list regulations.

    “Air carriers cannot ignore maintenance requirements or allow employees to take a pass on following regulations,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Safety depends not only on maintenance work being done correctly, but also being recorded properly.”

    Trans States and GoJet have 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letters to respond to the agency.

  • | |

    Maggots Delay Plane


    Pictured: Interior cabin of a US Airways Airbus A330-243
    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Peter Van Dyke

    An Atlanta to N. Carolina US Airways jet was delayed today due to falling maggots.

    Maggots were falling from an overhead compartment inside the plane. When the compartment was examined, the source appeared to be a container of meat that had been in the plane since Monday.

    The plane returned to the gate and the bin was cleaned before the flight continued on to NC. In NC, the plane was taken into maintenance and fumigated.

    George’s Point of View

    How is it that the meat was overlooked for two days? Doesn’t the flight crew and maintenance check the bins? Do you have any idea how rancid meat would get in two days during hot summer days in the south, in hundred degree weather? Even if they didn’t see it, surely they smelled it…And who is to say that the meat has been there since Monday? Maybe its been there even longer? If they’re not inspecting it every day, how can they have any idea HOW long it was there?

    I am surprised that a plane is not fully inspected on a daily basis–in fact, between each flight–in search of something more dangerous than rotting meat.

    How far does security extend? Passengers go through security. You’d think that compartments aboard a plane that carries passengers would undergo a thorough search after every flight.

  • Obama Administration Announces Border Drones

    Two more aerial drones and 1,000 more Border Patrol officers are joining 1,200 National Guard troops on the Mexico border. The vehicles can fly for 20 hours and will begin making rounds this summer. $500 million will be diverted to emergency border security. The new measures are part of stepped-up surveillance of criminal trafficking along the Mexican border, which has dropped in the past few months.

  • |

    Press Release: HELIPROPS

    Bell Helicopter Professional Pilots Safety Program or HELIPROPS
    Notice Number: NOTC2236
    Bell Helicopter, Textron Inc. safety publication, Helicopter Professional Pilots Safety Program or HELIPROPS, designed for helicopter pilots is now available electronically online. Bell ’s newsletter Human AD Airworthiness for Humans is published quarterly in English and Spanish and is distributed to readers in approximately 121 countries.

    A popular feature of the newsletter are articles from helicopter pilot’s own experiences flying in “unusual situations;” all for the purpose of exchanging safety information, best practices, etc, pilot to pilot.

    The web site, www.heliprops.com is a free resource for pilots, mechanics, owners – operators, students and enthusiasts. From the web site readers are able to download the Human AD newsletter, HELIPROPS Safety Posters. The FAAST program is committed to the reduction of helicopter accidents and encourages FAAST members as well as other airmen to review this valuable source of safety information.

    For more information visit the following links:

    English: http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/training/pdf/heliprops_21_3.pdf”>http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/training/pdf/heliprops_21_3.pd”>http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/training/pdf/heliprops_21_3.pdf
    Spanish: http://www.bellhelicopter.com/en/training/pdf/heliprops_21_3_span.pdf

  • |

    Press Release: ICAO ASSESSES SITUATION

    ICAO ASSESSES SITUATION OF AIR TRANSPORT FOLLOWING ERUPTION OF EYJAFJALLAJOKULL VOLCANO IN ICELAND

    he Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) met yesterday to review the current situation and welcomed the decision by the Ministers of Transport of the European Union (EU) to gradually reopen the European airspace, in a safe and coordinated manner.

    Today, the Organization’s Air Navigation Commission considered near-term initiatives to advance the science of aviation safety and airspace contaminated by volcanic ash.

    Both meetings included participation by the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

    The International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW) system, established by ICAO in coordination with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), is providing critical information to States, allowing them to exercise their responsibility as regards the use of their airspace.

    No incidents or accidents have been reported due to volcanic ash as a result of the smooth operation of the IAVW system that was established in 1987 to detect and track the movement of volcanic ash in the atmosphere and to warn States and aviation users. To this end, continuously updated information concerning the area affected by volcanic ash has been issued by the Volcanic Ash Advisory Centre (London) as required by the ICAO provisions.

    In light of the unprecedented disruptions to air traffic, however, it is clear that more effort needs to be undertaken to establish a global safety risk framework for routinely determining safe levels of operation in airspace contaminated by volcanic ash. ICAO invites States, the scientific community, aviation safety professionals, manufacturers, airports and airlines to provide valuable input to the development of such a framework.