Air Safety

Air Safety

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    NTSB TO HOLD A PUBLIC FORUM


    Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a safety forum on professionalism in aviation beginning Tuesday, May 18, 2010. The three-day, en-banc forum will be chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

    “NTSB’s investigations into the midair collision over the Hudson River last August, the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 in February 2009, and the October 2009 Northwest pilots’ overflight of their intended airport provided the impetus for this forum because all of them clearly demonstrated the hazards to aviation safety when pilots and air traffic controllers depart from standard operating procedures and established best practices,” Hersman said. “During the forum, we will gather information on the screening, selection and training of pilots and controllers and methods to reinforce professionalism and excellence.”

    Panelists participating in the forum will represent industry, government agencies, labor, academia, and professional associations. A technical panel composed of NTSB staff from the Offices of Aviation Safety and Research and Engineering, and the NTSB Board Members, who will make up the Board of Inquiry, will question the panelists.

    Dr. Tony Kern, an internationally recognized human factors and pilot performance expert, is the forum’s keynote speaker. The names of the participating panelists and the agenda will be provided in early May.

    The forum, titled “Professionalism in Aviation: Ensuring Excellence in Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Performance,” will be held at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center, located at 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The public can view the forum in person or by webcast on the NTSB’s web site.

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    IATA: Re-Think Volcano Measures


    IATA PRESS RELEASE SAYS: Re-Think Volcano Measures – Governments Must Base Decisions on Fact Not Theory

    Paris – The International Air Transport Association (IATA) sharply criticized European governments for their lack of leadership in handling airspace restrictions in light of the Icelandic volcano eruption and urged a re-think of the decision-making process.

    “We are far enough into this crisis to express our dissatisfaction on how governments have managed it-with no risk assessment, no consultation, no coordination, and no leadership. This crisis is costing airlines at least $200 million a day in lost revenues and the European economy is suffering billions of dollars in lost business. In the face of such dire economic consequences, it is incredible that Europe’s transport ministers have taken five days to organize a teleconference,” said Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s Director General and CEO.

    “Governments must place greater urgency and focus on how and when we can safely re-open Europe’s skies. This means decisions based on risk-management, facts and utilizing operational procedures that maintain safety,” said Bisignani.

    IATA criticized Europe’s unique methodology of closing airspace based on theoretical modeling of the ash cloud. “This means that governments have not taken their responsibility to make clear decisions based on facts. Instead, it has been the air navigation service providers who announced that they would not provide service. And these decisions have been taken without adequately consulting the airlines. This is not an acceptable system particularly when the consequences for safety and the economy are so large,” said Bisignani.

    “Safety is our top priority. Airlines will not fly if it is not safe. I have consulted our member airlines that normally operate in the affected airspace. They report missed opportunities to fly safely. The European system results in blanket closures of airspace. I challenge governments to agree on ways to flexibly re-open airspace. Risk assessments should be able to help us re-open certain corridors, if not entire airspaces,” said Bisignani.

    To assist governments in assessing risk, airlines have conducted successful test flights in several European countries. The results have not shown any irregularities or safety issues. Airlines are also exploring various operational measures to maintain safe operations. These include day flights, restrictions to specific flight corridors, special climb and descent procedures, and more frequent detailed boroscopic engine inspections to detect damage.

    The scale of airspace closures currently seen in Europe is unprecedented. “We have seen volcanic activity in many parts of the world but rarely has it resulted in airspace closures—and never at this scale. When Mount St. Helens erupted in the US in 1980, we did not see large scale disruptions, because the decisions to open or close airspace were risk managed with no compromise on safety,” said Bisignani, who urged Eurocontrol to establish a volcano contingency centre capable of making coordinated decisions.

    Bisignani called for an urgent meeting of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the specialized agency of the UN, to define government responsibility for the decisions to open or close airspace in a coordinated and effective way based on real data and special operating procedures.

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    Volcanic Ash Disrupts Aviation Traffic

    Volcanic ash ingested in an engine can cause an engine to shut down; plus the visibility problems are obvious.

    Eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjoll sent an ash plume into the sky threatening aviation safety.

    Curtailed: Amsterdam, Brussels; various locations in Norway, Sweden and Finland; German airports north of Frankfurt/Main.

    Airports are shutting down due to the threat: Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Birmingham, Manchester,Heathrow, Gatwick, Luton, Stansted;


    View Volcanic Ash Map in a larger map

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    FAA Expands Air Traffic Education Program

    April 12–The Federal Aviation Administration announced today five new colleges and universities will be part of the Air Traffic Collegiate Training Initiative (AT-CTI). This is the third year the FAA has added schools to the AT-CTI program bringing the total number of schools participating to 36.

    The FAA AT-CTI program was first established in 1990 at Minneapolis Community and Technical College. The program helps recruit candidates for terminal and en route air traffic controller positions.

    Twenty-one institutions submitted applications early last year to join AT-CTI. The applications were evaluated based on the school’s organizational foundation and resources, organization credibility, air traffic basic curriculum and facilities.

    The five schools joining the program are: Sacramento City College, (Sacramento, CA), Florida Institute of Technology College of Aeronautics (Melbourne, FL), Texas State Technical College (Waco, TX), Western Michigan University (Battle Creek, MI), and Hesston College (Hesston, KS).

    CTI institutions are not given federal funds to teach air traffic control courses, however the FAA does provide curriculum and instructor notes on air traffic basics. The institutions independently incorporate the material into their aviation programs.

    The AT-CTI curriculum provides appropriate education, experience, and training which meet the basic requirements for the terminal and en route air traffic occupations. As a result, AT-CTI graduates may be permitted to bypass the initial five-week air traffic basics training when they report to the FAA Academy in Oklahoma City.

    No jobs are promised to students, but from fiscal years 2005 until 2009 over 3,000, or 41 percent, of the air traffic controllers hired graduated from an AT-CTI school.

    AT-CTI programs are currently available at these institutions: Aims Community College (Colorado), Arizona State University, Broward Community College (Florida), Community College of Baltimore County (Maryland), Community College of Beaver County (Pennsylvania), Daniel Webster College (New Hampshire), Dowling College (New York), Eastern New Mexico University, Embry Riddle–Daytona Beach (Florida), Embry Riddle–Prescott (Arizona), Florida Community College of Jacksonville, Green River Community College (Washington), Hampton University (Virginia), Inter-American University of Puerto Rico, Mount San Antonio (California), Jacksonville University (Florida), Kent State University (Ohio), LeTourneau University (Texas), Lewis University (Illinois), Metropolitan State College of Denver (Colorado), Miami Dade County College (Florida), Middle Georgia College, Middle Tennessee State University, Minneapolis Community and Technical College (Minnesota), Purdue University (Indiana), St. Cloud University (Minnesota), Tulsa Community College (Oklahoma), University of Alaska, University of North Dakota, University of Oklahoma, and Vaughn College of Aeronautics (New York).

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    NTSB Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the
    Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the
    nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all
    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require
    replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine
    mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking
    in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated two accidents involving Piper PA-46-350P airplanes that resulted from fatigue cracking in the attachment between the nose landing gear (NLG) actuator and the engine mount. Such fatigue cracks can lead to the collapse of the NLG, which could cause a serious or catastrophic accident if the separation occurred at a critical point during takeoff or landing or if the aircraft collided with parked aircraft or aircraft waiting at taxiways.

    On August 16, 2009, about 1130 eastern daylight time,1 a Piper PA-46-350P, N548C, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Orlando-Sanford International Airport, Sanford, Florida.2 The private pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

    On May 19, 2007, about 1305, a Piper PA-46-350P, N411MD, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Indianapolis Metropolitan Airport near Fishers, Indiana.3 The pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the FAA. VMC prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The NLG actuator on Piper PA-46-350P airplanes is bolted via two attachment feet to the lower aft engine mount, which is constructed of welded tubes (see figure 1). The NLG actuator extends down and forward from the attachment feet and attaches to the NLG. During taxi, takeoff, and landing, the attachment feet transmit loads from the NLG to the engine mount, thus creating repetitive tensile stress in the engine mount attachment feet areas and, in some cases, leading to fatigue cracking.

    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P airplanes have either an original engine mount or a redesigned engine mount (see figure 2).5 In the original design, each attachment foot is a two-piece part consisting of a metal disk welded to the end of a metal tube, which is then welded to the engine mount support tubes. In the redesigned engine mount, each attachment foot is a one-piece machined part made from a single piece of steel, eliminating the welding within the feet themselves. However, on both the original and redesigned engine mounts, the attachment feet are welded to the engine mount support tubes, which is where fatigue cracking has been identified by the NTSB.

    The airplane in the Sanford, Florida, accident was equipped with a redesigned engine mount that was installed at the time of manufacture. The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N548C revealed that the right attachment foot had fractured at the engine mount support tube. The NTSB materials laboratory’s examination of the fractured foot revealed a fatigue crack emanating from multiple origins at the exterior of the joint where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 8 years old and had accumulated 711 flight hours with 878 cycles since new (CSN).

    The airplane in the Fishers, Indiana, accident had a redesigned engine mount that was installed on March 21, 2003. The airplane had accumulated 542 flight hours and an estimated 1,400 cycles since then. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 7 years old and had accumulated a total of 772 flight hours.6 The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N411MD revealed that the right attachment foot had separated from the rest of the engine mount due to fatigue cracking7 where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube.
    The NTSB also notes that a similar incident of fatigue cracking of an NLG attachment foot was found on September 29, 2009, during a routine inspection of a Piper PA-46-350P airplane. The airplane was 5 years old and had accumulated a total of 678 flight hours with 600 CSN and was equipped with the redesigned engine mount.

    On April 22, 2002, Piper issued mandatory Service Bulletin (SB) 1103, recommending that operators of PA-46-310P, -350P, and -500TP8 airplanes inspect the NLG actuator attachment foot area of the original engine mounts for evidence of fatigue cracking. The SB indicated that such cracking had been found in this area of some original engine mounts.

    The inspection included visual and liquid penetrant inspection at the next regular scheduled maintenance event and each 100 hours in service or at the annual inspection, whichever occurred first. If cracks were found, the original engine mounts were to be replaced with the redesigned engine mounts before returning to service. SB 1103 does not subject the airplanes with redesigned engine mounts to repetitive inspections, and replacing the original engine mount with the redesigned engine mount relieves the need for repetitive inspections. Piper issued several inspections.

    The NTSB is concerned that the redesigned engine mounts on Piper P
    A-46-310 and -350P model airplanes have attachment foot areas susceptible to fatigue cracking similar to the fatigue cracks identified by Piper on the original engine mounts. The NTSB concludes that the tensile stresses applied to the redesigned engine mounts could lead to fatigue fractures in the NLG actuator attachment foot areas. However, redesigned engine mounts are not currently subject to the inspection provisions of SB 1103, nor is compliance with SB 1103 required.10 Although the NTSB is not aware of incidents or accidents involving original engine mounts that have not been inspected, the NTSB believes that inspections of the original engine mounts should also be mandatory in order to detect fatigue cracking.

    Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the NLG actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary.

    As previously noted, Piper redesigned the engine mounts on the PA-46-310 and -350P in an effort to prevent fatigue cracking at the attachment foot areas. However, based on the accidents discussed above, this redesign does not appear to have been successful since fatigue cracking has also occurred in the redesigned engine mounts. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas.
    Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    In response to the recommendations in this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45. If you would like to submit your response electronically rather than in hard copy, you may send it to the following e-mail address: correspondence@ntsb.gov.

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    NTSB Meets

    NTSB TO MEET ON BUSINESS JET RUNWAY EXCURSION ACCIDENT THAT KILLED FOUR AND INJURED TWO IN SOUTH CAROLINA

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public Board meeting on its investigation into an accident in which a chartered business jet crashed during a rejected takeoff in Columbia, South Carolina, 18 months ago.

    The purpose of the meeting will be to determine the probable cause of the accident and to consider proposed safety recommendations to reduce the likelihood of future such mishaps.

    On September 19, 2008, at 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) operated by Global Exec Aviation and destined for Van Nuys, California, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured.

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    EU Banned List updated: Official Press Release

    Commission updates the list of airlines banned from the European airspace
    The European Commission has adopted the thirteenth update of the Community’s list of airlines banned in the European Union to include all air carriers of two additional countries: Sudan and the Philippines, on the basis of safety assessments by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). With this update, restrictions placed on Air Koryo from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and TAAG from Angola are partially lifted under certain conditions, while the operations of Iran Air will be restricted.

    Commission Vice-President Siim Kallas, responsible for Transport, said: “Safety comes first. We are ready to support countries that need to build up technical and administrative capacity to guarantee the necessary standards in civil aviation. But we cannot accept that airlines fly into the EU if they do not fully comply with international safety standards.”

    With this update, the Air Koryo licensed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, subject to an operating ban since March 2006, is allowed to resume operations into the EU with two aircraft which are fitted with the necessary equipment to comply with mandatory international standards and following appropriate oversight by its authority. The rest of its fleet remains barred from operating into the EU.

    The Commission recognises the improvements in the operations of TAAG Angola Airlines by allowing the air carrier to operate under certain strict conditions with specific aircraft to all destinations in the EU, not only to Lisbon.

    The civil aviation authority of Angola is urged to intensify its oversight in relation to all carriers and continue the recertification of the other Angolan air carriers which remain banned from operating into the EU.

    The Commission imposes an operating ban on all operations of Sudanese air carriers, due to a poor safety performance of the civil aviation authority of Sudan resulting from persistent non-compliance with international standards in the area of oversight.

    The Commission acknowledges the recent efforts launched by the competent authorities to reform the civil aviation system in the Philippines and steps taken to address safety deficiencies reported by the FAA and ICAO and measures taken by two carriers – Philippines Airlines and Cebu Airlines – to ensure safety of operations. It is ready to support the Philippines to overcome serious safety deficiencies.

    In view of the significant safety concerns identified by ICAO in relation to the authorities, the Commission with the unanimous support of the Air Safety Committee is forced to follow the principle of precaution and impose an operating ban on all air carriers licensed in the Philippines. The Commission is ready to support the Philippine authorities and conduct a visit to the country.

    Following an examination of the safety of Iran Air’s operations into the EU through ramp checks of its aircraft in the Community, evidence of serious incidents and accidents suffered by the carrier and insufficient oversight from the authority over the past year, the Air Safety Committee concluded unanimously that the operations of Iran Air to the EU should be restricted. The carrier will only be allowed to use certain aircraft for flights to Europe. The Commission will visit Iran over the next months to verify the oversight of the Iranian civil aviation organisation and the safety situation of Iran Air.

    The results of a recent visit by the European Aviation Safety Agency to Albania indicate that the competent authority needs to strengthen its capabilities to ensure the oversight of the air carriers it licences. The authorities have been urged by the Commission to take prompt action to address these issues. The Commission will closely monitor the situation.

    The Commission follows closely the performance of Egyptian air carriers. A visit to Egypt to verify the oversight functions of the civil aviation authority and the performance of certain air carriers showed that this authority is carrying out its responsibilities correctly. The Commission will continue to cooperate closely with this authority to ensure that proposed improvements can be implemented.

    Today, the Community’s list has three carriers whose operations are fully banned in the European Union – Ariana Afghan Airlines from Afghanistan, Siem reap Airways International from Cambodia and Silverback Cargo Freighters from Rwanda.

    All carriers from 17 countries – 278 companies in total – are banned: Angola, Benin, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, (with the exception of three carriers which operate under restrictions and conditions), Indonesia, Kazakhstan (with the exception of one carrier which operates under restrictions and conditions), the Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Swaziland and Zambia. 10 air carriers are allowed to operate under restrictions and conditions – Air Koryo from the Democratic People Republic of Korea, TAAG Angola Airlines, Air Astana from Kazakhstan, Iran Air from Iran Gabon Airlines, Afrijet and SN2AG from Gabon, Air Bangladesh, Air Service Comores and Ukrainian Mediterranean Airlines from Ukraine.

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    Press Release: NTSB TO MEET

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    April 1, 2010
    NTSB TO MEET ON BUSINESS JET RUNWAY EXCURSION ACCIDENT THAT
    KILLED FOUR AND INJURED TWO IN SOUTH CAROLINA

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public
    Board meeting on its investigation into an accident in which
    a chartered business jet crashed during a rejected takeoff
    in Columbia, South Carolina, 18 months ago.

    The purpose of the meeting will be to determine the probable
    cause of the accident and to consider proposed safety
    recommendations to reduce the likelihood of future such
    mishaps.

    On September 19, 2008, at 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Bombardier
    Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) operated by Global Exec Aviation
    and destined for Van Nuys, California, overran runway 11
    during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport.
    The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were
    killed; two other passengers were seriously injured.

    The meeting will be held in Washington on Tuesday, April 6,
    20010, at 9:30 a.m. ET, in the NTSB Board Room and
    Conference Center at 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

    A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be
    available on the Board’s website at
    http://www.ntsb.gov/Events/Boardmeeting.htm. Technical
    support details are available under “Board Meetings.” To
    report any problems, please call 703-993-3100 and ask for
    Webcast Technical Support.

    A summary of the Board’s final report, which will include
    its findings, probable cause and safety recommendations,
    will appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of
    the meeting. The entire report will appear on the website
    several weeks later.

  • New International Civil Aviation Organization Safety Database

    International Civil Aviation Organization is recommending a global safety information exchange accessible to travelers so they can make informed data-driven decisions. This database is to be developed by the ICAO, the US Federal Aviation Administration, the Commission of the European Union and the International Air Transport Association.

    The database will take advantage of the organizations’ number crunching abilities. By joining their vision, the ATA, ICAO, the FAA and the EU will add a more effective vision of events in the name of developing safety with a common goal of “zero accidents and zero fatalities.”

    The goal is to complete the database in a about a year to year and a half from now.

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    ICAO Press Release: Safety Conference

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    STRONG CONSENSUS REACHED AT ICAO SAFETY CONFERENCE ON WAYS TO REDUCE ACCIDENTS
    MONTREAL, 1 April 2010 – A High-Level Safety Conference which concluded today established a strong mandate for the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to create a strategy to further reduce the global accident rate, through the sharing of safety-related information among Member States and the air transport industry.

    More than 600 participants at the four-day event, attended by Ministers and Directors General of Civil Aviation from 150 Member countries as well as industry representatives, recommended that ICAO create a global safety information exchange to enable analysis of key safety indicators. This will guide future strategic decisions related to the evolution of today’s air transportation system. The Conference called upon ICAO to facilitate the collection, analysis and dissemination of safety information provided by States and industry partners, throughout the international aviation community.

    The Conference further recommended that ICAO develop processes to give the general public access to relevant safety information, thereby allowing them to make an informed decision about the safety of air transportation and to further ensure that such information is used solely to improve aviation safety and not for retribution or the purpose of gaining economic advantage.

    “We have traditionally focused our efforts on accident reports as a means to improve safety. This new approach will help us to better identify and deal with safety threats before they result in accidents”, said Roberto Kobeh González, President of the Council of ICAO.

    “Regulators and industry must come to manage safety-critical information in the same way that they view accidents. Both must become triggers for action in preventing accidents,” he added.

    On Tuesday, ICAO, the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States (FAA), the Commission of the European Union (EC) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) signed a Declaration of Intent on the development of a global safety information exchange agreement.

    In the months to come, the parties will establish an operational framework for the information exchange. It will address technical, confidentiality, legal and policy implications, as well as the relevance and timing of information collected.

    “ICAO has long promoted the concept of information sharing on a global scale so as to connect the various databases of regulators and industry. The recommendation from the Conference and the Declaration of Intent represent a breakthrough in achieving our objective of better utilizing data to reduce the accident rate globally and in specific regions and States around the world,” Mr. Kobeh emphasized.

    On the question of black boxes, the Conference recommended that ICAO look into technical enhancements that would improve the ability to locate and recover the units, such as longer time periods for signals, better resistance to crashes and floatability.

    “While the electronic transmission of information during flights is progressively improving, black boxes will remain absolutely indispensable for years to come as the primary source of technical data in cases of accidents or incidents,” Mr. Kobeh said.

    The Conference also called on States and industry to ensure improved communication and surveillance of flights over oceanic and remote areas through the use of all available technologies.

    Reaffirming the fundamental mission of ICAO to ensure the safety of international civil aviation, the Conference endorsed the creation of a new Annex to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, one dedicated exclusively to safety management principles.

    Recommendations from the Conference will be submitted to the Council of ICAO for consideration in the coming weeks.

    – END –

    PIO.04.10.ENGLISH PIO.04.10.FRENCH PIO.04.10.SPANISH PIO.04.10.RUSSIAN PIO.04.10.ARABIC PIO.04.10.CHINESE

    Posted in Uncategorized. Comments Off
    Sharing of Information highlight of second day of Safety Conference
    March 30, 2010 — oacicomm
    On the second day of the High-level safety Conference, the more than 600 participants from some 150 ICAO Member States and industry unequivocally endorsed the twin concepts of transparency and sharing of safety-related information among States and with major stakeholders within the global aviation community, as well as with the general public.

    There was agreement that ICAO should be the body charged with coordinating the integration of the safety information provided by the international community as well as for the dissemination of safety intelligence. To that end, ICAO would convene a group of experts to define and harmonize safety metrics, associated data requirements and analysis processes.

    ICAO would also develop a code of conduct on the sharing of safety information, so as to ensure that such information is used solely to improve aviation safety and not for retribution or the purpose of gaining economic advantage.

    Processes would be developed to provide the general public with access to relevant safety information which would allow them to make an informed decision about the safety of air transportation.

    Recommendations on these and other items will be reviewed and approved on the final day of the Conference, Thursday, 1 April. Recommendations will subsequently be submitted to the ICAO Council for consideration in the coming weeks.

    Earlier in the Conference, in line with the discussions on the sharing of information as a means to improve aviation safety levels around the world, ICAO and three other State and industry parties signed a Declaration of Intent on the Development of a Global Safety Information Exchange Agreement: the Federal Aviation Administration of the United States (FAA); the Commission of the European Union (EC); and the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

    In the weeks to come, representatives of the signatories will produce a work plan incorporating the following activities and concepts: identification of the safety information gathered by the Participants that would be most relevant to the enhancement of risk reduction activities; identification of the legal or policy constraints, if any, on the ability of Participants to share this information among the parties and development of mechanisms to overcome these constraints; identification of the appropriate timing of that information sharing; development of an efficient mechanism to ensure that this information is used to generate safety intelligence and identify critical safety trends in a timely fashion; development of policies and procedures to safeguard proprietary, confidentially submitted, and/or personal information in line with relevant applicable privacy laws, data sharing policies and regulations standardization of aspects of the audit metrics, data taxonomies etc, to maximize effective utilization of the safety information gathered in this process; and determination of how to disseminate this information globally as appropriate.

    Tomorrow the conference will discuss the creation of a new Annex to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, one dedicated to safety processes.

  • High-level Safety Conference 2010

    ICAO Headquarters, Montréal, 29 March – 1 April 2010

    The goals of the High-level Safety Conference are to bring together the Directors General of Civil Aviation, or equivalent senior executives and stakeholders, to build consensus, obtain commitments and formulate recommendations deemed necessary for the effective and efficient progress of key safety activities by ICAO.

    HIGH-LEVEL SAFETY CONFERENCE 2010
    Montréal, 29 March to 1 April 2010
    DRAFT DECLARATION
    Whereas the Convention on International Civil Aviation and its Annexes provide the essential
    framework required to meet the safety needs of a global aviation system;
    Whereas Contracting States have a collective responsibility for international civil aviation safety;
    Recognizing that the safety framework must be fully utilized by all stakeholders and that it must
    continuously evolve to ensure its sustained effectiveness and efficiency in the changing regulatory, economic and technical environment of the 21st century;
    Recalling that transparency and sharing of safety information are fundamental tenets of a safe air
    transportation system and that one of the objectives of sharing information is to ensure a consistent,fact-based and transparent response to safety concerns at the State and at the global levels;
    Recalling that mutual trust between States, as well as public confidence in the safety of air
    transportation, is contingent upon access to adequate safety information;
    Recognizing that safety is a shared responsibility, and advancements in global safety can only be
    possible through a cooperative, collaborative and coordinated effort among all stakeholders, with ICAO’s
    active participation and leadership role;
    Recognizing that further improvements in aviation safety within and among States require a
    cooperative and proactive approach in which safety risks are identified and managed;
    Recognizing that the safety data necessary to support an effective safety management process require
    adequate protection from inappropriate use;
    Recognizing the difficulties that many ICAO States have in establishing and operating an efficient
    safety oversight system and the need for these States to pool resources and work together within Regional
    Safety Oversight Organizations;
    Recognizing that the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme’s Continuous Monitoring
    Approach (CMA) being established by ICAO will be implemented in stages during a two-year transition
    period from 2011 to 2012;

    HLSC 2010-WP/90
    – 2 –
    The Directors General of Civil Aviation:
    1. Commit to reinforce the global aviation safety framework by:
    a) supporting the CMA and providing ICAO with accurate and timely information;
    b) implementing expeditiously the State Safety Programme (SSP) in their own States and
    ensuring the implementation of safety management systems across the aviation industry;
    c) maintaining the confidence of the public in the safe air transportation system through
    enhanced transparency of safety information;
    d) developing sustainable safety solutions, including the creation or strengthening of regional
    and sub-regional safety oversight organizations and initiatives;
    e) sharing appropriate safety-related information among States and all other aviation
    stakeholders; and
    f) working with ICAO to identify actions that can be taken to reduce the burden for certificate
    holders to comply with multiple sets of similar, yet different, requirements;
    The Conference:
    2. Calls upon States and other stakeholders to enter into agreements with one another for the
    exchange of safety information;
    3. Calls upon States and other stakeholders to provide ICAO with accurate and timely information
    in support of the CMA and its transition plan as requested;
    4. Calls upon States to examine their existing legislation and adjust, as necessary, or enact laws and
    regulations to protect safety information and its sources where the purpose is to improve safety;
    5. Calls upon States, ICAO, industry, and donor organizations to direct resources towards the
    establishment of sustainable safety oversight solutions;
    6. Calls upon States, ICAO and industry to support the coordinated implementation of safety
    management principles;
    7. Calls upon ICAO to:
    a) act as facilitator of safety information provided by the international community, and as the
    responsible party for dissemination of safety intelligence, as appropriate;
    b) develop a new Annex dedicated to safety management processes which would define the
    safety management responsibilities of States under the SSP; and
    c) identify actions which can be taken to reduce the burden for certificate holders to comply
    with multiple sets of similar, yet different, requirements;
    HLSC 2010-WP/90
    – 3 –
    d) continue to support the establishment of Regional Safety Oversight Organizations (RSOOs)
    and explore the development of alternative solutions for situations where the establishment of
    RSOO is not possible;
    8. Calls upon States to demonstrate the political will needed to address aviation safety
    shortcomings, including the creation, strengthening and, where necessary, participation in RSOOs;
    9. Calls upon States, ICAO and industry to increase their efforts to further improve the
    competencies and professionalism of aviation personnel;
    10. Calls upon States and industry to closely coordinate with ICAO their safety initiatives to ensure
    optimum benefits to global aviation safety and to reduce duplication in effort; and
    11. Re-emphasizes the need for States, ICAO and industry to act effectively and in a timely fashion
    on lessons learnt from accidents.
    — END —

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    Chicago: Bird Strike


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Antonis Panayotatos

    What: American Airlines McDonnell Douglas MD-82 en route from Chicago to Dallas
    Where: Chicago
    When: Mar 11 2010
    Who: 140 aboard
    Why: After takeoff, the MD-82 flew through a flock of birds. Several birdstrikes occurred in the right engine. The flight was cleared to return and landed safely a little while later. No injuries occurred.

    George’s Point of View


    Bird strike season again.

    I’m not claiming that bird strikes only happen in certain seasons. Birds live near airports and share the airspace. It’s going to happen.

    I’m just saying that some of the bird strikes can be predicted according to migratory patterns. Unfortunately, I don’t think this can be predicted in any useful way, at least not yet, but predicted in the sense that when you’re driving down the expressway and see a cloud of birds migrating, you know it is bird strike season again.

  • Just a Thought

    We often take for granted the very things that most deserve our gratitude. Cynthia Ozick

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    Testimony: Colgan Air

    Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

    Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety: One Year After The Crash of Flight 3407

    Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

    Thank you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. There is no question that the FAA’s job is to ensure that we have the safest aviation system in the world. The aviation safety record in the United States reflects the dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including the FAA’s inspector workforce. In an agency dedicated to aviation safety, any failure in the system, especially one that causes loss of life, is keenly felt. When accidents do happen, they reveal risks, including the tragic Colgan Air accident. Consequently, it is incumbent on all parties in the system to identify the risks in order to eliminate or mitigate them. As Administrator Babbitt noted when he appeared before you in December, history has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed upon solutions. The fastest way to implement a solution is for it to be done voluntarily, and that is what the Call to Action was intended to facilitate. On January 27, the FAA issued a report that describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the Call to Action and offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation safety. I would like to use this opportunity to review the issues the Administrator identified in December and let you know where we stand on them.

    Pilot Flight Time, Rest and Fatigue: When Administrator Babbitt was last here he told you that the aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) he convened for the purpose of making recommendations on flight time, rest and fatigue, consisting of representatives from the FAA, industry and labor organizations, provided him with recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management in early September. While we were extremely pleased with the product provided, the ARC did not reach a consensus agreement on all areas and was not charged with doing any type of economic analysis. Consequently, in spite of the Administrator’s direction for a very aggressive timeline in which to develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), his hope that a rulemaking proposal could be issued by the end of last year was not realized. The complexities involved with these issues are part of the reason why the FAA has struggled to finalize proposed regulations on fatigue and duty time that were issued in the mid-1990s. However, with the Administrator’s continued emphasis on this topic, we hope to issue an NPRM this spring. Although this is slightly later that we originally hoped, it is still an extremely expedited schedule, and I can assure you the FAA team working on this is committed to meeting the target.

    One of the issues contributing to fatigue that I know is of interest to many of you is that of pilots who commute by air to their job. I would like to describe some of the emails and letters the Administrator has been receiving on the issue of commuting from pilots who choose to commute by air to their job. As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. It is important to keep in mind these personal accounts because, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on. So we want to emphasize these issues are complex and, depending on how they are addressed, could have significant impacts on people’s lives.

    Focused Inspection Initiative: From June 24, 2009 to September 30, 2009, FAA inspectors conducted a two-part, focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices. The FAA inspected 85 air carriers to determine if they had systems to provide remedial training for pilots. The FAA did not inspect the 14 carriers that have FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP) because AQP includes such a system. Seventy-six air carriers, including AQP carriers, have remedial training programs. An additional 15 air carriers had some part of a remedial training program. There were eight air carriers that lacked any component of a remedial training program that received additional scrutiny and have since instituted some component of a remedial training system. Since we started, all carriers have implemented some component of a remedial training program. The FAA inspectors also observed 2,419 training and checking events during the evaluation. In the few instances we observed regulatory non-compliance, we took corrective action.

    Training Program Review Guidance: Based on the information from last summer’s inspections, the FAA is drafting a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) with guidance material on how to conduct a comprehensive training program review in the context of a safety management system (SMS). A complementary Notice to FAA inspectors will provide guidance on how to conduct surveillance. SMS aims to integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable, proactive systems. SMS programs emphasize safety management as a fundamental business process in the same manner as other aspects of business management. Now that we have completed our data evaluation and drafting, both guidance documents are in internal coordination.

    Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at the Call to Action, Administrator Babbitt sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards. Many airlines are now taking steps to promote the larger airline’s most effective safety practices at their smaller partner airlines. The Air Transport Association’s Safety Council is now including safety directors from the National Air Carrier Association and the Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. Several large air carriers are conducting periodic meetings with those with whom they have contract agreements to review safety information and we are encouraged by these efforts.

    In addition, I am pleased to say that since July 2009, after the Call to Action, the FAA approved 12 new Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs. Three air carriers that had no Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) have now established them. Four more air carriers have established new ASAP programs for additional employee groups. All of this supports the contention that the Call to Action did make a difference.

    Professionalism and Mentoring: Last week, the FAA met with labor organizations to discuss further developing and improving professionalism and transfer of pilot experience. In the interim, these organizations have answered the Call to Action and support the establishment or professional standards and ethics committees, a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings between the FAA and major and regional air carriers. We also believe that labor organizations can explore some of the ideas raised in the Call to Action road shows, such as establishing joint strategic councils within a “family of carriers,” use of professional standards committee safety conferences, and mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs, with the goal of coming up with concrete ideas on mentoring. These ideas merit further discussion and the FAA looks forward to continuing to work with these organizations on these concepts.

    Crew Training Requirements: As the Administrator explained during his last appearance before this Committee, the FAA issued a rulemaking proposal in January 2009 to enhance training programs by requiring the use of simulation devices for pilots. More than 3,000 pages of comments were received. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued in the coming months to allow the public to comment on the revisions that were made based on the comments that were submitted.

    One of the things that the Call Action has shone a light on is the issue of varying pilot experience. The FAA is attempting to address this issue with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in which we can consider possible alternative requirements, such as an endorsement on a commercial license to indicate specific qualifications. We know some people believe that simply increasing the minimum number of hours required for a pilot to fly in commercial aviation is appropriate. As Administrator Babbitt has stated repeatedly, he does not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations.

    The ANPRM requests recommendations from the public to improve pilot performance and professionalism; specifically on whether existing flight crew eligibility, training and qualification requirements should be increased for commercial pilots engaged in part 121 operations. The FAA is requesting comments and recommendations on four concepts for the purpose of reviewing current pilot certification regulations. The four concepts are: (1) requirement for all pilots employed in part 121 air carrier operations to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with the appropriate aircraft category, class and type rating, or meet the aeronautical experience requirements of an ATP certificate; (2) academic training as a substitute for flight hours experience; (3) endorsement for air carrier operations; and, (4) new additional authorization on an existing pilot certificate. The FAA has also asked for recommendations from industry and the public on any other concepts they may wish to offer. The ANPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 8.

    Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends its guidance to airlines, Administrator Babbitt asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. The airlines agreed to use this best practice for pilot record checks to allow for a more expansive review of records created over the course a pilot’s career. The expanded review would include all the records the FAA maintains on pilots in addition to the records airlines already receive from past employers. Of the 80 air carriers that responded to the FAA on this issue, 53 air carriers, or 66 percent, reported that they already require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15 percent reported that they plan to implement the same policy.

    As the Administrator stated when he appeared before you in December, the core of many of the issues facing the air carrier industry today is professionalism. It is the duty of the flight crew to arrive for work rested and ready to perform their jobs, regardless of whether they live down the street from the airport or a thousand miles away. Professionalism is not something we can regulate, but it is something to which we must encourage and urge pilots and flight crews to aspire. The conversations we have been having, in part because of the Call to Action, help emphasize the importance of professionalism in aviation safety.

    In conclusion, our efforts will not stop or even slow down just because the final report on the Call to Action was issued. We have been gratified with the response to this effort. We believe that the collective efforts of FAA, the airlines, labor unions and, of course, Congress, will continue to result in implementing best practices, transferring pilot experience, and achieving an overall improvement in safety. Safety is at the core of the FAA’s mission, and we will always strive to make a safe system safer.

    Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

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    Testimony: Icing

    Statement of John Hickey, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

    Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Aircraft Icing

    Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the challenges icing conditions pose to flight operations and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to mitigate the safety risks posed by icing. For more than a decade, the FAA has been working to better understand the hazards posed by icing conditions and to improve regulations, policies and procedures to ensure safe airplane operation. Still, research into the complicated phenomenon of icing continues to yield new insights and mitigation measures.

    Today, I want to highlight some of the known icing threats and mitigation measures as well as our icing program approach and a number of our recent efforts that have been crucial to further decreasing the risk associated with aircraft icing. First, however, it is important to understand the framework within which we work to address icing risks.

    As the agency charged with setting the standards for safe aircraft operations, we establish the standards for operations during all types of meteorological conditions, including those that might result in icing on the ground or in flight. Aircraft manufacturers and operators meet these standards through a variety of means depending on where the icing risk occurs (on the ground or in flight), and the aircraft’s system capabilities and intended usage. Our standards for operations in icing conditions encompass both operational and aircraft certification requirements. Operational requirements include standards and aircraft specific operating procedures for icing encounters and pilot and dispatcher training. All pilots engaged in commercial operations must receive training on identification of, safe operation in, and how to avoid and exit icing conditions. They must also be trained on deicing system operation and capabilities of the particular aircraft they operate.

    An aircraft design approval — what we call a “type certificate” — provides the design specifications that an aircraft must be built to, in order to meet the FAA’s standards for safe design. Aircraft must also comply with operation requirements, as set forth by the rules under which the airplane is being operated. Design and operation requirements must both be met in order to satisfy the FAA’s standards for safe operation. In order for an aircraft to be certificated for operations in icing conditions, the aircraft’s manufacturer must be able to demonstrate that the aircraft can safely operate within the icing conditions specified by FAA regulations. We know today that these specified conditions represent 99% of all known atmospheric conditions that result in icing. For the remaining 1%, we are conducting research and are working to translate our findings into certification standards. I want to emphasize that airplanes are prohibited from operations in known icing conditions unless they meet the certification standards for operations in those conditions and at no time may any aircraft continue to operate in severe icing conditions.

    Aircraft Icing

    Unmitigated icing presents risks to aircraft. The accumulation of ice on an aircraft’s wing changes the shape of the wing, and hence the aerodynamic capabilities of the wing to generate lift. For this reason, ice accumulation on an aircraft on the ground may impact the aircraft’s ability to takeoff, while ice accumulation in flight has the potential to raise the minimum speed at which the wing is capable of creating sufficient lift, and potentially causing the aircraft to stall.

    Ground icing: Ground icing is, as the name implies, the accumulation of ice, snow or frost on the aircraft while it is on the ground. This form of icing is both common and meteorologically predictable. During the winter months, the conditions in which ice accumulation on an aircraft is possible become more prevalent and vigilant action becomes necessary to ensure planes are properly deiced and cleared of snow and ice prior to takeoff. Winter precipitation poses a threat to aviation operations because airplane performance is predicated upon the wings being free of contamination. The accumulation of ice, snow, or frost has an adverse effect on the wing’s ability to produce lift, potentially limiting an airplane’s ability to takeoff and climb.

    Currently, the FAA prohibits takeoff unless the airplane’s critical surfaces are completely clear of wintry precipitation. As many of you have likely seen, this is typically achieved by applying deicing or anti-icing fluids to the critical surfaces of the airplane. To provide for a safe takeoff, it is important that a deiced airplane not remain on the ground for an extensive period after deicing during precipitation. At the start of this winter season, as in years past, the FAA issued its annual winter “hold over times” and list of approved anti ice and deicing fluids. “Hold over times” govern the amount of time that may elapse between deicing and takeoff. In the event that the aircraft exceeds the amount of wait time permitted between deicing and takeoff, FAA regulations require the aircraft to be reinspected for adhering contamination or exit the takeoff queue and be deiced again prior to departure. These holdover time tables are revised annually. Some of the reasons for the annual update include improvements in the effectiveness of deicing and anti-icing fluids, reduction of environmental impacts and new information learned through FAA fluid research.

    In-flight icing: Unlike ground icing, in-flight icing knows no season and can be difficult to predict. In-flight icing results from atmospheric conditions that can occur at anytime of the year, regardless of the weather conditions on the ground. According to FAA regulations, any pilot who finds himself or herself in icing conditions while operating an aircraft that is not approved for operations in icing must immediately exit the icing conditions. This means redirecting the aircraft to a different altitude or route, or landing.

    There are multiple atmospheric conditions that can result in the build-up of ice on an aircraft during flight. To mitigate the risk of ice build-up during flight, aircraft that are certificated to operate in icing conditions are equipped with devices that shed ice from the aircraft, such as expandable pneumatic boots, or prevent the formation of ice through the use of heat. A pilot’s ability to recognize icing conditions and activate deicing and anti icing systems in a timely manner is critical to those systems’ effectiveness. Because of the pilot’s critical role in managing flight in icing conditions, we have used both our rulemaking and advisory authorities, to provide pilots with the latest information on how to identify icing, to require early and systematic use of deicing systems and to require exit from icing conditions under certain circumstances.

    Some aircraft are also equipped with ice detection systems. Ice detection systems assist the flightcrew with ice detection and timely activation of the ice protection system. These systems automatically detect ice accretion and annunciate the presence of ice accretion to the flightcrew. Some ice detection systems are designed to automatically initiate the operation of the aircraft deicing systems while others are what we call “advisory” and require the flightcrew to ensure ice protection systems are activated at the first sign of ice accretion on the airplane.

    Although our current regulations address the vast majority of all known icing conditions, we have steadily worked to address two types of in-flight icing phenomena outside of the existing icing certification envelope: supercooled large droplets (SLD) and ice crystals. SLD icing can occur in freezing rain and freezing drizzle conditions — turning water to ice upon contact with the airframe, which can lead to larger accumulations or build up on areas of the wing and tail aft of the protected area. We expect to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address this small area of vulnerability, by incorporating atmospheric conditions that are associated with SLD icing into our certification criteria. In the interim, we have taken immediate steps through our airworthiness directive authority to ensure that pilots can identify severe icing which may be produced by SLD conditions and execute exit procedures.

    Ice crystals are also a newly identified threat. We now believe that flight into certain types of storm clouds can cause ice to build up deep inside the core of jet engines and cause temporary shutdowns. Understanding this threat has been particularly challenging because, typically, by the time an aircraft lands, the affected engine has restarted and there is no evidence for us to evaluate. We are currently working with industry and other governmental research partners on developing ways to recreate the atmospheric conditions in which ice crystals form and learn all that we can about how to mitigate the threat of this phenomenon. Although there is research that still needs to be done in this area, we are closely monitoring the condition and its possible causes. To mitigate the risk, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directives (ADs) requiring operational changes when in or near convective weather and engine design changes to make jet engines more tolerant of ice crystal conditions.

    Icing Safety Actions

    Safety concerns about the adequacy of the icing certification standards were brought to the forefront of public and governmental attention by a 1994 accident in Roselawn, Indiana, involving an Avions de Transport Regional ATR 72 series airplane. The NTSB attributed this accident to what we now call SLD–an icing phenomenon that, at the time, was not fully understood. Shortly after this accident, the FAA initiated a review of aircraft safety in icing conditions to determine what could be done to increase safety. This review resulted in our current icing program.

    As meteorologists will attest, simply understanding some of these icing phenomena are difficult and complex. Determining how to address these complex phenomena to support safe aircraft operations takes additional time and extensive research. That is why we tackle the dangers of icing with a multi-prong approach. To address those threats that are clearly understood or for which immediate mitigation is available, we take immediate safety action. In the meantime, concurrent research and development and rulemaking efforts are underway. To date, our icing program includes seven rulemaking initiatives–three have been adopted as final rules, while others are in various stages of development. Additionally, we have issued over 200 ADs on 50 different aircraft models, and have undertaken other operational training and mitigation initiatives.

    Immediate Actions: The FAA’s icing program addresses the immediate icing safety concerns for the current fleet of aircraft through the use of ADs. The FAA has the authority to issue an AD if we determine that some aspect of flying in icing conditions on a particular airplane model creates an unsafe condition that puts the flying public in immediate danger. ADs carry the same force as a regulation and are targeted to specific aircraft makes and models. ADs must be complied with in order to continue operating a covered airplane. As described above, the FAA has been aggressive in issuing ADs when we determine they are needed. These ADs cover safety issues ranging from crew operating procedures and training, to design changes that have significantly reduced the icing risk to the overall fleet.

    For example, with our AD authority, we require that pilots of airplanes equipped with deicing boots activate those boots at the first sign of icing conditions. We have also issued numerous ADs that direct the crews of certain airplane designs on how to monitor and detect early signs of the onset of severe icing and to exit the area immediately. Other ADs require stall warning systems of certain airplanes to be modified to provide an earlier warning of a potential stall in icing conditions and mandate changes to address any susceptibility to stalling of the horizontal tail in icing conditions. These ADs serve as effective safety measures for the current fleet.

    Longer Term Actions: The FAA’s icing program also includes a number of longer term actions to further improve the safety of flying in icing conditions both for the current fleet and for future airplane designs. These actions include rulemaking, issuing safety bulletins, developing improved training material, drafting new or updating existing Advisory Circular guidance material, and further research. We recognize that fast action is an important goal for implementing any safety improvement. We also acknowledge that some actions, such as rulemaking, take longer than others. Rulemaking is a deliberative process that must involve the input of those stakeholders who are affected by the rules.

    Also, in some cases, developing and implementing rules depends on extensive research to understand the particular phenomena and its effect on safety, and to develop appropriate risk mitigations.

    For example, in order to understand SLD icing sufficiently to identify an appropriate set of requirements that airplane manufacturers could comply with, a significant amount of research had to be done. We needed to learn how to characterize SLD, then reproduce it, and finally, understand its effect on airplane operations and designs. For these reasons, at the same time that we tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to develop certification criteria for the safe operation of airplanes in SLD icing conditions, we also began supporting research efforts by NASA and Environment Canada to gather additional SLD data. Using existing and new SLD data and analysis, the ARAC completed the majority of the work defining the SLD icing envelope. But even after the SLD icing envelope was defined, we continued to learn more about the complexities of SLD, which led us to focus analysis of the impact of SLD on aircraft engines and determine that new standards for smaller aircraft should be considered in a separate rulemaking. The process took time, more time than we anticipated and more time than we wanted, but once we had a sufficient understanding of the science and the technical solutions, we moved forward with the SLD rulemaking. I am pleased to report that the SLD NPRM is now in executive coordination within the Department.

    In the meantime, we formed and tasked an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to review the proposed regulations applicable to transport category aircraft for SLD, mixed phase, and ice crystals and recommend how they should be modified for smaller aircraft. The SLD research we conducted for the transport category SLD rulemaking provides the basis for our scientific understanding of SLD, upon which we can develop additional technological solutions for smaller aircraft.

    In addition to the intensive efforts to understand and revise our regulations to address SLD and ice crystals, since 2007, FAA has completed three icing rules and just this week closed the comment period on an additional NPRM. The completed icing rules include:

    • Performance and Handling Qualities in Icing Conditions for Transport Category Airplanes, adding new airworthiness requirements that require designers to demonstrate specific airplane performance and handling qualities for flight in icing conditions.
    • Activation of Airframe Ice Protection System for Transport Category Airplanes, requiring either the automatic activation of ice protection systems or a method to alert pilots when they should be activated. Further, after the initial activation, the ice protection system must operate continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled.
    • Removal of Airplane Operating Regulations Allowing Polishing of Frost on Wings of Airplanes, effectively prohibiting all aircraft from taking off with polished frost on the wings.

    The NPRM, for which the comment period just closed, would require certain scheduled airlines either to retrofit their existing fleet with ice-detection equipment or make sure the ice protection system activates at the proper time. For those aircraft with an ice-detection system, the FAA proposes that the system alert the crew each time they should activate the ice protection system. The ice protection system would either turn on automatically or pilots would manually activate it. For aircraft without ice-detection equipment, the crew would activate the protection system based on cues listed in their airplane’s flight manual during climb and descent, and at the first sign of icing during cruise.

    We are also evaluating the comments received in response to an additional NPRM that included proposed changes to training and checking requirements for pilots operating flights under part 121. In addition to many other revisions, this NPRM proposed changes that would further specify training requirements for icing operations.

    I want to acknowledge that throughout our ongoing and comprehensive effort to mitigate the risks presented by airplane icing, the National Transportation Safety Board icing recommendations have been instructive. Although we are not always able to take the exact action the Board recommends, we value and fully analyze their recommendations and benefit from their investigations of icing-related accidents. We firmly believe that our actions meet the intent of the vast majority of the Board’s icing recommendations.

    Although we have made significant advancements in our understanding of icing since the tragic 1994 Roselawn accident, icing related threats continue to be a focus of the FAA’s safety experts. The total number of accidents related to environmental icing of airplanes has been decreasing steadily, year after year, for the last 13 years. This safety achievement is the direct result of our intensive focus on improving our understanding of complex icing phenomenon and the best methods for avoiding and mitigating icing conditions. The FAA is proud of this growing safety record and is committed to expanding it.

    Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

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    Temperature rising in Spanish ATC

    PRESS RELEASE-Safety bulletin 12 February 2010–IFALPA has been notified by its Spanish Member Association SEPLA that the negotiation of a new labour agreement between Spanish controllers and AENA (the ATM service provider) has taken an unexpected twist after the approval by the Spanish government of a “Urgent Royal Decree” which changes the previous agreement.

    The Federation has no position on the state of the negotiations or the tactics employed in the dispute. However, the dispute does raise some safety concerns. Consequences may include increased tension in the controller’s work place, economic worries of ATC staff, unanticipated shortage of ATCOs and unexpected delays throughout Spanish airspace.
    SEPLA recommend that aircrews exercise extreme caution when flying within the Spanish FIRs (this includes the Spanish mainland, Balearic and Canary Islands as well as delegated airspace) and to consider the following safety recommendations:

    • Increased vigilance of all ATC procedures
    • Adhere strictly to standard operating procedures, paying extra attention to communications mainly when entering congested
      airspace (TMAs for example)

    • Consider taking extra fuel for unexpected extended delays or diversions
    • Exercise special attention during all ground movements
  • | |

    American Airlines: Under the Eye

    American Airlines will be stinging from harsh criticism from federal supervisors regarding maintenance issues and facing MD-80 related civil penalties from $10 million to $20 million. (In 2008, American was ordered to ground its MD-80 fleet. See letter pasted below:)

    Watch the news for the DOT’s upcoming report of AMR maintenance failures. From soup to nuts, from engines to deferred maintenance, to unqualified mechanics. A long standing review of aviation maintenance by the NTSB is directed toward problems in providing adequate maintenance for general aviation.

    Federal Aviation Administration Report to U.S. Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters on American Airlines MD-80 Groundings

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    This is the Federal Aviation Administration’s response to a request by US Transportation Secretary Mary E. Peters to document events leading up to, during and after the grounding of the MD 80 fleet of 367 aircraft by American Airlines on April 8, 2008, resulting in the cancellation of thousands of flights and tremendous inconvenience for hundreds of thousands of airline passengers.

    American Airlines grounded its MD80 fleet after being informed by FAA inspectors from the Southwest Region Flight Standards Division that inspections had revealed 16 aircraft were not in compliance with FAA AD 2006-15-15, which relates to clamping, bundling and sheathing of electrical wiring that surrounds the auxiliary hydraulic pump in the MD 80 aircraft. These findings were made during an audit conducted to verify airline compliance with various airworthiness directives. During the first phase of the audit – March 13 to March 28 – inspectors found aircraft at American that were not in compliance with AD-2006 15-15 and American grounded some aircraft and advised the FAA it would take corrective action. On April 8, as part of Phase II of the audit, FAA inspectors intended to verify that American had completed the corrective action and found, instead, aircraft in noncompliance.

    Prior to this audit, there was no requirement for the FAA to inspect the aircraft for this AD. The deadline for AD compliance was March 5, and it is the responsibility of the carrier to effectively perform the work as outlined in the AD. The carrier’s maintenance plan is audited regularly and American certified that the work had been done. American never applied for an Alternate Means of Compliance (AMOC)–a well-established procedure known throughout industry–or indicated they were having difficultly complying with the specific AD.

    This report details the timeline of FAA actions related to inspection of American Airlines aircraft as part of a special emphasis audit, the audit results at American, subsequent activities including the finding of non-compliance by the FAA and the grounding of the fleet by American. Also, as directed by Secretary Peters, the report contains a look at what, if anything, could have been done differently, and what can be done in the future to try to eliminate a similar circumstance while still maintaining the highest aircraft safety standards in the world.

    Overall Findings

    American Airlines did not perform adequate or sufficient work in response to AD 2006 -15-15 on its MD-80 fleet. The workmanship accomplished in response to this AD was unacceptable.
    Materials used to take the required corrective action were other than specified.
    The safety goal of the AD was not accomplished because the risk of chaffing, arcing and sparking — the very elements targeted by the AD — were not sufficiently addressed.
    American Airlines created an Engineering Change Order (ECO) to guide their mechanics in accomplishing the work of AD. There may have been confusion in the directives of the ECO that were in conflict with the AD.
    In summary, American failed to take opportunities available before March 5, 2008, to inspect, repair, and accomplish the AD, as required. As with any AD, the FAA established a compliance “threshold,” based on an engineering assessment of when action should be taken to detect or prevent the unsafe condition. The 18 months allowed in the AD was the time period deemed acceptable to accomplish the corrective actions, based on a risk analysis. This AD was designed to prevent ignition or possible fire or explosion near a fuel tank. While such an explosion is a “low probability” event, if it occurs, it has high consequences, according to the risk analysis. American, because of its large MD-80 fleet, had worked with Boeing in the development of the associated service bulletins (SB) and was aware of the needed corrective actions three and a half years before the end of the compliance period in March 2008. If American had properly accomplished the AD by the March deadline, or again on March 25-26 when problems were identified, the April grounding would not have been necessary.

    There was never any type of agreement—formal or informal—between the FAA and American Airlines to let the aircraft in question operate past the deadline established in the AD, as suggested by the Wall Street Journal article dated May 2. There is no “informal” path to operating in non-compliance with AD’s–the airline must demonstrate compliance.

    Background

    Often safety measures are developed as a result of lessons learned from major accidents or tragedies. The regulatory mission of the FAA encompasses learning from the past to proactively intervene in the potential issues of the future. Following the TWA 800 accident over Long Island in 1996, FAA and industry undertook a detailed analysis to determine potential ignition sources that may lead to a fuel tank explosion. Boeing identified wire bundles in the wheel well of the MD-80, which pass in close proximity to the fuel tank and where fuel vapors may be present, as creating a potential risk. To address this risk, Boeing developed specific service bulletins.

    After the Swissair 111 accident in September 1998 involving an MD-11, both the FAA and industry learned a great deal about wiring and the related safety issues. In January 1999, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a recommendation addressing the inspection and examination of wiring on MD-11 airplanes. The examinations were for loose wire connections, inconsistent wire routings, broken bonding wires, small wire bend radii, and chafed and cracked wire insulation. The inspections revealed chafed and cut wires; damaged, cracked, or chafed wires; and inconsistencies in the routing of wires and wire bundles.

    These findings, following the TWA 800 accident, added even more urgency to the elimination of possible ignition sources near fuel tanks.

    Boeing issued SB MD 80-29A070 in August 2004 and revised that SB in July 2005 as a result of reports from operators involving three instances of electrically shorted wires in the right wheel well and evidence of arcing on the auxiliary hydraulic pump power cables. One incident resulted in a fire in the wheel well. Investigation revealed damage to the power cables caused by structural chafing. Analysis also determined the need for extra protection on the harness where it came in close proximity to the center fuel tank. If not corrected, there is a possibility of electrical arcing and/or shorted wires which could result in a wheel well fire and/or hazard to the adjacent fuel tank.

    As a result, the FAA began to review Boeing SBs associated with arcing and sparking and reassessed safety concerns including SB MD 80-29A070. We determined that the issue addressed in the SB was critical and warranted an AD. AD 2006 15-15, issued in July 2006 required a one-time general visual inspection for chafing, or signs of arcing, of the wire bundle for the auxiliary hydraulic pump and required completion of all applicable corrective actions before further flight after the inspection. The corrective actions included:

    Installation of protective sleeving on the auxiliary hydraulic pump wire harness.
    Correction of the routing and clamping of the auxiliary hydraulic pump wire harness and airfoil ice protection system overheat sensor connector wire.
    Replacement of an existing connector “backshell” with a 90-degree version.
    Adding snap tubing on a portion of the wire harness.
    All of these interventions were tailored to secure the wire bundle in place, eliminate risk of chafing and sparking, and keep the wires out of close proximity to other moving parts to eliminate risk of interference.

    The compliance time was set at 18 months from the effective date of the AD, which was September 5, 2006. The 18-month compliance period is based on the manufacturer’s assessment of potential risk occurring as a result of any chafing or misrouted wire bundles. That 18-month period to comply ended on March 5, 2008.

    The stated purpose of the AD was:

    To prevent shorted wires or arcing at the auxiliary hydraulic pump, which could result in loss of auxiliary hydraulic power, or a fire in the wheel well of the airplane; and to reduce the potential of an ignition source adjacent to the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

    As the industry’s largest MD-80 operator, American was aware of the AD’s requirements years in advance of the AD’s actual issuance as the company worked with Boeing on SB MD80-29A070. This AD first addressed the wire harness issue. Subsequently, American issued internal maintenance directives known as Engineering Change Orders (ECO). An ECO is American’s means of taking an SB or AD, among other things, and converting it into the work instructions for their aircraft maintenance technicians. The ECO also ensures and documents compliance. Boeing issued a revision to the SB, and American revised its ECOs accordingly, even before the FAA issued the actual AD on September 5, 2006.

    Following the issuance of AD 2006-15-15, compliance with the corrective actions in the SB became mandatory, and all operators had 18 months to comply with the requirements of the AD. From the time American worked with Boeing on the original SBs, American had well over three and a half years to inspect and reconfigure fully, as necessary, its MD-80 fleet. If for any reason during the 18 months American found it couldn’t comply or had a different solution for compliance, it could have requested an Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOC) for the AD, a process available to any airline.

    Timeline of Inspections and Groundings

    On March 13, 2008, the Director of the Flight Standards Service issued Notice 8900.36, Special Emphasis Validation of Airworthiness Directives Oversight. This notice provided instructions for completing a two-phase special emphasis inspection to validate the FAA’s oversight of air carrier compliance with ADs. Phase I instructed aviation safety inspectors (ASI) with oversight responsibility for Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 121 air carriers to identify ten ADs for each aircraft fleet operated by the air carrier. In addition, they were to inspect the appropriate paperwork, for at least one aircraft for each of the ADs selected, to determine whether the air carrier had complied with the AD. Then, they were to perform a visual inspection of the aircraft, at their discretion, to verify the air carrier’s compliance with the AD. Inspectors completed Phase I on March 28, 2008.

    AD 2006-15-15, which affected 5 U.S. airlines (including American) and 535 MD-80 series aircraft, was one of the 10 ADs selected for the Phase I compliance review for operators with MD-80 fleets. American operates the bulk of the MD-80 fleet with 367 aircraft.

    On March 25 – 26, 2008, FAA inspectors notified American that they had concerns with American’s compliance with AD 2006-15-15 on ten aircraft being worked on at American’s maintenance base in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In all four areas highlighted in the Boeing SB, inspectors found instances of incorrect use of nylon tie wraps, incorrect installations of snap tubes, incorrect securing of clamps, clamps not installed at all, no or improper or no wrappings installed, and more importantly, instances of chafing between wire bundles and other surfaces. These were serious and unacceptable failures. In some cases, clamps were loose with the potential to dislodge, becoming free-floating projectiles. American chose to immediately ground a portion of its MD-80 fleet. As a result of FAA’s findings, the airline purportedly re-inspected its entire MD-80 fleet—supposedly identifying and repairing all aircraft not in compliance. (See attachment 1 for depictions of these problems and what a correct repair should look like.)

    Based upon the results of American’s fleet wide inspection, American requested, and was granted, an AMOC by the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO). American’s AMOC surprisingly only requested approval to use an alternative type of safety wire and no other modifications to the requirements of the AD. Because of the limited AMOC request, and American’s assurances that each aircraft returned to service would comply with the AD, the revelations of the subsequent inspections were totally unexpected.

    About two weeks later, beginning on Monday, April 7, and into Tuesday, April 8, 2008, FAA inspectors examined 17 aircraft at DFW International Airport to determine if American was in compliance with the AD and AMOC. Sixteen of 17 MD-80 aircraft inspected were found to be in noncompliance with the AD. The FAA immediately communicated these findings to American. Based upon the FAA inspections, neither compliance nor airworthiness of American’s MD-80 fleet could be assured in the opinion of the FAA. (See attachment 2 for examples of the types of issues inspectors found.) American agreed that, based upon these FAA findings, compliance could no longer be assumed, and American chose to cease operating its entire MD-80 fleet because the aircraft were not in compliance with the requirements of AD 2006-15-15.

    Beginning on the evening of April 8 through the morning of April 9, 2008, the Los Angeles ACO, Boeing, American, Southwest Region Flight Standards Division, and the AMR Certificate Management Office held teleconferences to address American’s request for an additional AMOC. Boeing and American proposed to address immediately only six items in the AD that they deemed to affect “safety-of-flight.” Under this scenario, American would be allowed to continue to operate an additional 60 days in order to come into full compliance with the AD.

    The principal avionics and maintenance inspectors did not support an extension of time to allow the carrier to attain full compliance with the AD because of safety-of-flight concerns. The photographs in attachment 2 are representative of the discrepancies found with American’s MD-80s. At this point, American had failed to demonstrate its ability to comply with the AD on several occasions, resulting in FAA’s decision to inspect 100% of the aircraft before they were returned to service. Had the AMOC been issued, and in order to provide the necessary level of assurance, FAA inspectors would have had to inspect each aircraft twice, once after the six safety-of-flight items were addressed and again after the additional requirements of the AD were met. A time extension without FAA inspection of each aircraft would have assumed that American would properly accomplish the six safety-of-flight items—an assumption not justified by American’s previous failures to perform the work properly.

    Why was the magnitude so great?

    The magnitude of the groundings, specifically beginning April 8, 2008, was due to the fact that MD-80 aircraft account for nearly 50 percent of American’s total number of aircraft, constituting well over 40 percent of its daily flights. The time required for American to return the MD-80s to service was, however, solely within its control. Depending upon the configuration of the aircraft, Boeing estimated that it would take as little as 2 hours to complete the AD to as much as 12.5 hours per aircraft. The FAA had inspectors available throughout the country to review aircraft as they completed their inspections and repairs. This was the result of constant coordination between the FAA and the airline.

    As the American maintenance crews completed the work on an aircraft, certifying that it was fully compliant with the AD, an FAA inspector reviewed the work in accordance with the AD, as well as general aircraft airworthiness requirements. These inspections were limited to the area affected by the AD.

    From April 8 – 12, 2008, American presented 351 aircraft to FAA inspectors, who initially found 207 aircraft not compliant with the AD. This represents a 70 percent failure rate. Each of these 207 aircraft required additional work before being accepted as in compliance and returned to service.

    During this time period, there were instances where FAA inspectors waited for hours for an aircraft to be ready for inspection. Also, onsite reports from inspectors included instances of parts shortages, as well as American personnel shortages, that were needed to inspect or repair aircraft. By April 12, 2008, all aircraft were found to be in compliance with AD 2006-15-15.

    Conclusion

    While it may be argued that any one of the discrepancies — or non-compliance issues — may not pose an immediate safety risk, the aggregate findings of the workmanship quality raised the specter of a cumulative safety risk. Left uncorrected, the workmanship errors would have increased the odds that one or more of American’s large MD-80 fleet would have experienced arcing, smoke, or fire–problems that have caused serious incidents and fatal accidents in the past.

    Despite the alleged ambiguity of the wiring AD, other carriers flying MD-80 models did not have significant problems complying with its provisions. But it also is fair to say that while American experienced issues responding to this particular airworthiness directive, there is no reason to suspect the overall quality of American’s maintenance program. During the audit FAA reviewed 59 additional airworthiness directives and American was able to demonstrate compliance. In addition, FAA regularly performs surveillance of American’s maintenance program.

    The American situation reinforces the need for the FAA to review the AD process, and even more important, for air carriers to follow ADs precisely. Carriers also must adhere to the provisions of the Enhanced Airworthiness program for Airplane Systems (EAPAS) rule, the premise of which is that wiring systems must be properly designed, installed and maintained to avoid catastrophic results.

    In answer to the question “What could have been done to prevent the extreme impact to the flying public,” American Airlines could have done the work properly in the allotted time or applied for a comprehensive AMOC earlier in the process and also resolved discrepancies involving safety of flight (e.g., chafing).

    Follow-up Actions

    The FAA has formed a joint industry/Government task force to review the AD process, starting with AD 2006-15-15. The task force will look into how the affected airlines developed the mechanics’ work instructions and how the airlines could have managed this AD better, as well as FAA’s process for developing this specific AD. After completing that effort, the task force will look at the overall FAA process for developing ADs, how we communicate critical AD information to operators, and what, if any, procedures need to be changed to improve this process.

    We will also increase our efforts on training and educating the industry regarding the importance of wiring in light of our SFAR 88 (Fuel Tank Safety), Aging Aircraft, and Enhanced Airworthiness Programs for Aircraft Systems (EAPAS) rules.

    American Airlines intends to create a process to prototype its work on an AD on one aircraft and have the work reviewed by FAA inspectors. Two other airlines have already begun a similar process.

    As steward of the nation’s aviation system, it is incumbent on the FAA to ensure the safety and efficiency of the system for the flying public. This situation with American Airlines that caused so much stress and disorder to the public was truly regrettable. We pledge, Madame Secretary, to continue to improve our oversight, reporting and communication with all in our industry, so the system can maximize efficiency with no cost to safety.

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    LAX Wake Turbulence


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Francisco Muro


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Rudy Chiarello

    updated
    What: American Eagle Embraer ERJ-140 en route from Lindbergh Field San Diego to Los Angeles
    What: LAN Airlines Boeing 767-300 from from Lima Peru to Los Angeles, CA
    Where: LAX
    When: Jan 19th 2010
    Why: At the time of the American Eagle’s arrival to LAX, both jets were flying at the same altitude. The danger was not collision. The danger was wake turbulence. Required separation behind the Boeing is 5 nautical miles.

    George’s Point of View

    Trailing behind an aircraft, wake turbulence is made up of multiple force drafts including wingtip vortices and jetwash. Jetwash is jet engine gas output which is turbulent but of short term but wingtip vortices can remain for up to three minutes.

    Picture, if you will, invisible speed bumps made of wind that could knock your car off the road trailing the car in front of you. If this were a factor with cars, tailgating would be a completely different thing.

    A cockpit voice recorder of the pilots responses will clearly indicate if the plane in the rear of the situation runs into the leading aircraft’s wake. What officials are questioning here are the actions and responses of LAX Air Traffic Control, which placed these two jets close enough to be endangered.

    On January 19, maybe Air Traffic Control error put the Eagle jet less than three miles from the 767, but the pilot managed to stay out of the other jet’s wake. LAX denies this is a case of inexperience and maybe they are correct, because the worst case scenario crash did not happen. Maybe it would have happened if the jet following were flying at lower altitude.

    What matters is that the flight landed safely and whether it was ATC or the pilot, someone did something right because both flights made it to the ground safely.

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    Aero Friedrichshafen


    Global Airshow for General Aviation
    April 8-11 2010

    Friedrichshafen, Germany –
    Over the past 30 years, AERO, a former aerial sports and leisure fair, has developed into an international communication platform for the businessoriented General Aviation industry.

    We would show more of the 2010 Press Releases but they aren’t up yet.

    This page will have the hall, exhibitors, products, aircraft, novelties and contact information “Starting in spring 2010.

    The show’s brochure will be available approx. 4 weeks prior to the show.
    “

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    Slovakia Plants Explosive on Dublin-bound Flight


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Diego Ruiz De Vargas

    What: Danube Wings Boeing 737-400 en route from Poprad/Tatry Slovakia to Dublin
    Where: The entire flight
    When: Jan 2nd 2010
    Who: Number aboard not released
    Why: A Slovakian agency decided to test their security by slipping 9 packages of explosives into innocent passengers’ luggage. Eight of those packages were found.

    George’s Point of View

    ONE of those packages—85 grams of RDX plastic explosive— made it all the way to the innocent Slovakian-Irish passenger’s HOUSE, where suddenly Irish forces evacuate their entire neighborhood (reportedly evacuating several apartment buildings and shutting down a couple of intersections) to retrieve that one package of live explosive from his apartment on Dorset Street. Stefan Gonda, a 49-year-old Slovak electrician working in Ireland, must have been really surprised at that knock on the door. On the other hand, maybe not, since he’s from Slovakia and may be used to such thoughtless, stupid, ridiculous, dangerous, psychotic behavior from his government.

    How do they justify endangering a plane full of innocent passengers on a commercial jet? RDX is considered unstable–it can light without a detonator. What if there had been turbulence? What if the temperature had dropped to make the compound even more unstable?

    One head has already rolled for this. The head of the Slovak border and foreign police Tibor Mako resigned. Was he the one responsible or did he throw himself on his sword? Is there more to this?

    I find it difficult to believe that anyone would use real passengers as guinea pigs, put real explosives on an actual international flight. If Ireland has a legal chip on its shoulder the same way the US does, there’d be an International lawsuit pending.

    The Slovokian ministry claims no one was endangered.

    Excuse me?

    85 grams of RDX plastic explosive aboard a plane. Irish forces evacuated the neighborhood to retrieve it…but hey, on a volatile oxygen pumped package like an airplane, no problem.

    It’s hard to believe they call that branch of government “intelligence.” Talk about an oxymoron.

  • Changes Mandated for Indian Pilots

    Indian pilots can be looking forward to better hours. The Indian Pilots Guild, the Indian Commercial Pilot Association, the Society for Welfare of Pilots ( Jet Airways) and the Federation of Indian Pilots sent the (Indian) government a list of suggestions to minimise pilot error due to fatigue.

    Collisions and near collisions are attributed to long hours, unreasonable work scheduling and pilot fatigue.

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    Flight 253 Incident Calls for Increased Vigilance

    WASHINGTON, DC – Capt. John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association , Int’l (ALPA), issued the following statement on the December 25 failed terrorist attack aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253.

    “The crew of Northwest Airlines Flight 253 performed their jobs flawlessly during the recent security incident, making this flight one of thousands across the country to arrive safely at its destination that day. A well-trained professional flight crew remains the last line of defense in keeping the nation’s airlines safe.
    “While an extraordinary level of safety and security exists in our nation’s air transportation system today, we must continue to scrutinize all aspects of aviation security. Working with government, industry, and airline operators, ALPA will thoroughly evaluate the series of events that led to this in-flight security incident and identify areas where the system can be improved.

    “The Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration have sought ALPA’s views on a broad range of security issues, including this most recent event. While ALPA respects the work and commitment of the current TSA leadership, we call for the rapid confirmation of Erroll Southers as TSA Administrator as an important step in providing security for the traveling public.

    “For decades, ALPA has advocated for a threat-based aviation security system that directs resources toward the greatest risk. We are continuing to work with the federal government agencies, Congress, and the airlines to ensure that our nation’s aviation security moves away from a one-size-fits-all approach to a threat-based system that focuses on intent rather than objects.”

  • Netherlands Will Be Scanning Passengers

    Full body scanners will be used in the Netherlands for flights to the US. There had been US objection based on privacy, but the recent terror threat has overcome the earlier objections. Such scanners likely would have alerted security guards to the materials hidden by Abdulmutallab on his person.

    Neither the European Union nor the US have approved the routine use of the scanners at European airports.

  • Aramark Workers Threaten Strike

    Failed contract negotiations at Logan airport may lead to a strike, and disruption in service. Even though they are upset over stalled negotiations regarding worker’s rights (they earn between $8 and $9 an hour, with few or no benefits, and that they have gone years without a raise), the strike was postponed due to Massachusetts Port Authority security concerns.