Agency

Public, government, national and international agencies

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    NTSB TO PARTICIPATE IN Oshkosh AVIATION EVENT

    July 20, 2012
    WASHINGTON – Next week senior investigators from the National Transportation Safety Board will provide 20 presentations on a variety of aviation safety issues at AirVenture 2012, the Experimental Aircraft Association’s annual fly-in convention in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.

    The NTSB has added new emphasis to general aviation as a safety advocacy priority. Last year general aviation safety was added to the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements. And earlier this year, the NTSB released its first-ever safety study on experimental amateur-built (E-AB) aircraft. In just the past few months, the Safety Board held two general aviation safety forums. Every year, more than 1,500 general aviation accidents occur resulting in the deaths of about 450 individuals. The NTSB is concerned that these numbers have remained stagnant over the past decade.

    “In Oshkosh, we’ll have tremendous opportunities to share lessons learned from our investigations with an enthusiastic aviation community,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “In particular, we’re look forward to interacting with experimental aircraft builders to relay the findings and recommendations from our E-AB safety study.”


    Investigators will discuss the study and other safety issues, including aeronautical decision making, weather flying, and accident case studies. They will also meet with members of the public who visit the NTSB exhibit in the Federal Pavilion.

    Media requests for interviews with one of the Board members or investigators should be emailed to NTSB press officer Peter Knudson.

    For a schedule of NTSB presentations at AirVenture 2012 as well as links to online resources, including a summary of the E-AB safety study, go to http://go.usa.gov/fI6

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    FAA Fact Sheet – What is the Airport Privatization Pilot Program?

    The airport privatization pilot program is designed to allow airports to generate access to sources of private capital for airport improvement and development. The 1996 Reauthorization Act, Title 49 United States Code §47134, authorized the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish the pilot program. The 2012 Reauthorization Act increased the number of airports that could participate in the program from five to 10. The same restrictions on participation apply. Only one large hub airport can participate in the program; one of the airports must be a general aviation airport. Commercial service airports can only be leased and general aviation airports can be sold or leased. The program now permits up to 10 public airport sponsors to sell or lease an airport with certain restrictions, and to exempt the sponsor from certain federal requirements that could otherwise make privatization impractical. Most commercial service airports in the United States are owned and operated by local or state governments. Public-use general aviation airports are both publicly and privately owned.
    AIRPORTS IN THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
    Chicago Midway Airport (MDW)
    Chicago Midway Airport (MDW), a large air carrier hub airport, owned and operated by the city of Chicago, handles more than 17 million passengers and 253,000 aircraft operations (calendar year 2008). The City also owns and operates Chicago O’Hare International Airport.
    Status:The FAA expects to receive a revised preliminary application including a revised timetable and a distribution ready copy of a request for qualifications or interest from the city of Chicago by December 31, 2012.
    Hendry County Airglades Airport (2IS)
    Airglades Airport, a general aviation reliever airport in Clewiston, Florida, is located 80 miles from Miami International Airport. The airport is owned and operated by Hendry County. The airport has a 5,603-foot runway, a general aviation terminal and hangars. Hendry County’s preliminary application was approved by the FAA on October 18, 2010.
    Status:The airport sponsor is negotiating an agreement with a private operator.
    Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU)
    Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport, a medium-hub airport is owned and operated by the Puerto Rico Ports Authority. In 2008, the airport had 4.6 million passenger boardings. The FAA approved the Authority’s preliminary application for the Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport on December 22, 2009.
    Status: The airport sponsor published a Request for Qualifications in July 2011 and prequalified six potential bidders to submit proposals. On July 19, 2012, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority selected Aerostar Airport Holdings as the winner of a public bidding process to become the private operator of the Luis Munoz Marin International Airport.
    AIRPORT INFORMATION IN THE DOCKET
    To review information on the airports submitted to the docket go to: www.regulations.gov.
    Chicago Midway, Docket Number FAA-2006-25867
    Airglades, Docket Number FAA-2008-1168
    Luís Muñoz Marín International, Docket Number FAA-2009-1144
    AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION FACTS
    What does FAA’s acceptance of the preliminary application mean?An airport sponsor who wants to participate in the airport privatization pilot program must receive preliminary FAA approval, through an application process, to reserve one of the five slots available under the program. Once the FAA approves the preliminary application, the sponsor can select a private operator to manage the airport, negotiate an agreement with the private operator, and prepare a final application for submittal to the FAA.
    Application process. A public airport sponsor and the private operator selected to purchase or lease an airport may request participation in the pilot program by filing an application for exemption under Title 49 United States Code §47134(a).
    A public sponsor may submit a preliminary application for FAA review and approval. It must contain summary narratives identifying the objectives of the privatization initiative, a description of the process and a realistic timetable for completing the program, current airport financial statements, and a distribution ready copy of the request for proposal. The FAA has 30 days to review the preliminary application.
    When the FAA approves the preliminary application, the applicant is guaranteed one of the five slots in the program.
    The airport sponsor may select a private operator, negotiate an agreement, and submit a final application to the FAA. There is no timeline for the FAA to complete its review of the final application.
    After the FAA reviews and approves the final application and lease agreement, it publishes a notice in the Federal Register for a 60-day public review and comment period.
    The FAA completes its review, prepares its Findings and Record of Decision (ROD), addresses the public comments in the ROD, and publishes the agency decision.
    If the FAA approves the ROD, it monitors the legal settlement and transfer of the airport from public owner and sponsor to the new private operator and sponsor.
    Number and category of airports. The legislation authorizes 10 airports to participate in the program. At least one must be a general aviation airport and no more than one large hub air carrier airport may participate. Under the pilot program, general aviation airports may be leased or sold, but an air carrier airport may only be leased.
    Exemption from federal requirement. The 1996 Reauthorization Act permits the FAA to exempt an airport sponsor from certain requirements that could otherwise make privatization unattractive. First, the public airport sponsor may receive an exemption to use the lease or sale proceeds for non-airport purposes. Generally, all proceeds from the lease or sale of airport land must be used for the capital or operating costs of the airport. This exemption requires the approval of 65 percent of the air carriers at the airport (by number of carriers and by landed weight). The FAA also can exempt a public sponsor from an obligation to repay federal grants and return property acquired with federal assistance upon the lease or sale of the airport.
    Conditions for granting exemptions. The FAA approval is based upon a number of conditions listed in Title 49 United States Code § 47134. These include the private operator’s ability to assume the public operator’s grant obligations, and ensure continued access to the airport on reasonable terms. The private operator must operate the airport safely, maintain and improve the airport, provide security, mitigate noise and environmental impacts, and abide by existing collective bargaining agreements. The public operator must provide a plan for continued operation of the airport in case of bankruptcy of the private operator.
    Federal assistance. The private operator of an air carrier airport may receive Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, collect Passenger Facility Charges, and charge reasonable fees. Airport rates and charges that exceed the Consumer Price Index require approval of 65 percent of air carriers. Private operators of general aviation airports can receive AIP discretionary grants.
    Federal oversight. Airports in the pilot program must comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 and with Transportation Security Administration requirements for airport security.

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    PR: New International Aircraft Emissions Standard

    July 18–The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recently took another step to make aviation “greener” when it unanimously approved a metric that will be the basis for developing the first-ever carbon dioxide standard for commercial aircraft. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) played a key role in making progress toward a new international standard.

    “A core element of the Obama Administration’s plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in aviation is to support development and integration of new, more fuel-efficient technologies,” said FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta. “This international agreement underscores our nation’s commitment and the commitment of other countries to make aviation as environmentally efficient as possible.”

    The FAA is a member of ICAO’s Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP). Recently, the CAEP was charged with developing a new standard as more scientific evidence has found that CO2 contributes significantly to global warming. A team of technical experts from the FAA, together with experts from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), worked closely with experts from other ICAO member countries to develop this new CO2 metric for aircraft. The new metric, which is based on fuel-burn performance at three different cruise conditions and accounts for different aircraft sizes, now lays the groundwork for development of an internationally agreed upon CO2 aircraft standard.

    The FAA has long been a leader in making aviation as environmentally friendly as possible. At the heart of the FAA’s work in developing the Next Generation of Air Transportation system, or NextGen, is the promise of more direct routes that will reduce fuel and emissions. In addition, the FAA has been working with its academic and industry partners to develop sustainable alternative fuels, as well as more efficient aircraft engine and body designs through the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) and the agency’s Continuous Lower Energy, and Emissions and Noise (CLEEN) programs.

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    PR: FAA Proposes $13.57 Million Civil Penality Against Boeing

    SEATTLE – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has proposed a civil penalty of $13.57 million against The Boeing Company for failing to meet a deadline to submit service instructions that would enable airlines to further reduce the risk of fuel tank explosions on more than 380 Boeing jetliners.

    “We are committed to ensuring the safety of the flying public,” said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “Manufacturers must provide the necessary instructions so the airlines can comply with this important safety regulation.”

    “We take this matter very seriously,” said Acting FAA Administrator Michael Huerta. “We have issued hundreds of directives to eliminate fuel ignition sources over the past 16 years, and this step will add another layer of safety.”

    Following the TWA 800 accident in July 1996, the FAA has issued 283 directives to prevent the ignition of vapors in and around commercial aircraft fuel tanks. On July 21, 2008, the FAA published the Fuel Tank Flammability Rule, which required manufacturers to develop design changes and service instructions for installing systems to further reduce fuel tank flammability.

    The rule gave the two companies that design affected aircraft until Dec. 27, 2010, to submit service instructions for FAA approval. The FAA alleges that in January 2010, Boeing committed to provide the instructions by the deadline. The instructions were to explain how to install systems that would replace the oxygen in airplane fuel tanks with non-flammable nitrogen gas, reducing the risk of explosion.

    Boeing missed the deadline for submitting service instructions for the 747s by 301 days, delivering them to the FAA on Oct. 24, 2011. The company was 406 days late in submitting service instructions for the 757s. In total, 383 U.S.-registered Boeing aircraft are affected by these delays.

    Airbus, the other manufacturer required to develop instructions for retrofitting certain models of its airplanes, met the Dec. 27, 2010, deadline.

    The Fuel Tank Flammability Rule requires airlines to retrofit half of its fleet by 2014, and complete the retrofit by 2017. An airline trade group has proposed an extension of those two dates because of the service instruction delay for certain Boeing aircraft.

    The FAA expects that most, if not all, operators will meet both the 2014 and 2017 deadlines, even if they received service instructions later than anticipated. The FAA has advised the trade group that the agency is not considering any extensions to the 2017 deadline for completing the fleet retrofit. However, the agency will consider extending the 2014 deadline if necessary, based on the specific circumstances for a particular operator.

    The total amount of the proposed civil penalty against Boeing is $13,574,400.

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    PR: FAA Proposes $185,750 Civil Penalty Against Kingfisher Air

    ATLANTA – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a civil penalty of $185,750 against Kingfisher Air Services Air Safari, Inc., of San Juan, P.R., for allegedly operating a Cessna 208B on 44 flights between June 2 and June 11, 2010, when it was not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

    The FAA alleges that three pilots reported that the aircraft’s engine temperature exceeded the take-off limits before the carrier took the required maintenance action and had the engine repaired. The engine maintenance manual requires the operator to send the engine to an overhaul facility for a light overhaul when such problems are reported. The carrier failed to send the engine for overhaul after the first and second pilot reports.

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    PR: FAA Proposes $987,500 in Civil Penalties Against Delta Air Lines

    ATLANTA – The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing two civil penalties totaling $987,500 against Delta Air Lines of Atlanta, for allegedly operating an Airbus A320 and a Boeing 737-800 on flights when they were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

    In the first case, the FAA alleges Delta failed to repair a chip in the nose radome, or nose cone, on the B-737 after an FAA inspector conducted a pre-flight inspection and informed Delta he had observed chip damage. Delta’s structural repair manual requires the airline to seal radome chip damage before further flight. The enroute inspection took place Feb. 25, 2010, and the airline operated the plane on 20 additional flights between that date and March 1 while the aircraft was not in compliance.

    The FAA further alleges Delta again failed to repair the radome during layover inspections of the aircraft on Feb. 25 and 28. The proposed civil penalty is $687,500.

    “Safety is our highest priority,” said FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta. “Operators must follow the proper procedures to maintain their aircraft.”

    The FAA also proposes a civil penalty of $300,000 against Delta for allegedly operating an Airbus A320 on 884 flights between May 25, 2010 and Jan. 3, 2011, when it was not in compliance with FAA regulations.

    The FAA alleges the carrier incorrectly deferred repair of a broken cockpit floodlight socket at the first officer’s position. Maintenance procedures allow the airline to defer repairs on a dome light for no more than 10 days before repairing or replacing it. The FAA discovered the alleged violation during a routine inspection.

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    The BEA releases the “Final report” on Air France Flight 447


    The BEA report (pp 200-201) concluded:

    • The crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to undertake the flight.
    • The aeroplane possessed a valid Certificate of Airworthiness, and had been
      maintained in accordance with the regulations.
    • The aeroplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits.
    • The aeroplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro without any known technical
      problems, except on one of the three radio management panels.
    • The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures.
    • The meteorological situation was not exceptional for the month of June in the
      inter-tropical convergence zone.
    • There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF 447. Some of
      them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
    • An additional meteorological analysis showed the presence of strong
      condensation towards AF 447’s flight level, probably associated with convection
      phenomena.
    • The precise composition of the cloud masses above 30,000 feet is little known,
      in particular with regard to the super-cooled water/ice crystal divide, especially
      with regard to the size of the latter.
    • Several aeroplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the same
      altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses.
    • The crew had identified some returns on the weather radar and made a heading
      change of 12° to the left of their route.
    • At the time of the autopilot disconnection, the Captain was taking a rest.
    • The departure of the Captain was done without leaving any specific instructions
      for crossing the ITCZ.
    • There was an implicit designation of a pilot as relief Captain.
    • There was an inconsistency between the speeds measured, likely following the
      blockage of the Pitot probes by ice crystals.
    • The AP then the A/THR disconnected while the aeroplane was flying at the upper
      limit of a slightly turbulent cloud layer.
    • The aeroplane systems detected an inconsistency in the measured airspeeds. The
      flight control law was reconfigured to alternate 2B.
    • No failure message on the ECAM clearly indicates the detection by the system of
      an inconsistency in measured airspeeds.
    • The pilots detected an anomaly through the autopilot disconnection warning
      that surprised them.
    • The engines functioned normally and always responded to the crew’s inputs.
    • The PNF called out imprecise flight path corrections. They were however essential
      and sufficient for short-term management of the situation.
    • The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll of
      5.3#degrees to the left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.
    • The Pitot probes installed on F-GZCP met requirements that were stricter than
      the certification standards.
    • Analysis of the events related to the loss of airspeed indications had led Airbus
      and Air France to replace C16195AA Pitot probes by the C16195BA model. The
      first aeroplane had been modified on 30 May#2009.
    • EASA had analyzed Pitot probe icing events; it had confirmed the severity of the
      failure and had decided not to make the probe change mandatory.
    • The flight was not transferred between the Brazilian and Senegalese control
      centres.
    • Between 8 h 22 and 9 h 09, the first emergency alert messages were sent by the
      Madrid and Brest control centres.
    • The crew was not able to use the ADS-C and CPDLC functions with DAKAR Oceanic.
      If the connection had been established, the loss of altitude would have generated
      an alert on the controller’s screen.
    • The first floating aeroplane parts were found 5 days after the accident.
    • The flight recorders were recovered 23 months after the accident.

    The accident occurred after the following events:

    1. Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following
      the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the
      autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;
    2. Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
    3. The lack of any link by the crew between the loss of indicated speeds called out
      and the appropriate procedure;
    4. The late identification by the PNF of the deviation from the flight path and the
      insufficient correction applied by the PF;
    5. The crew not identifying the approach to stall, their lack of immediate response
      and the exit from the flight envelope;
    6. The crew’s failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs
      that would have made it possible to recover from it.

    Download the complete final report here:

    BEA FINAL REPORT on AF 447

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    TSA Draws a Zero Tolerance Line in the Sand


    A group of air marshals which included one supervisor, went to lunch at a restaurant, and eight of them drank alcohol. Some of the marshals were armed. The incident was reported by an Air Marshal who witnessed the incident. The eight who were drinking were fired. Seven of the agents will have a chance to appeal. Six were suspended for not reporting the drinking.

    TSA also fired eight Newark security screeners for allegedly sleeping while on duty.

    TSA said:

    “TSA holds all of its employees to the highest professional and ethical standards and has zero tolerance for misconduct in the workplace,” said Nico Melendez, an agency spokesman. “TSA’s decision to remove the individuals involved in the misconduct affirms our strong commitment to the highest standards of conduct and accountability.”

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    PR: FAA Proposal of $206,550 Penalty Against Martinaire Aviation

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a $206,550 civil penalty against Martinaire Aviation, of Addison, Texas, for violating U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations.

    The FAA conducted a comprehensive hazardous materials inspection at the company’s headquarters on July 8, 2011. As a result of that inspection, the FAA alleges the airline routinely failed to complete documents properly and comply with the requirements for notifying pilots in command about hazardous materials transported as cargo.

    The allegations involve 17 shipments of hazardous materials Martinaire accepted for transportation by air on 12 flights between April 1 and June 22, 2011. Martinaire is a scheduled air cargo and cargo charter company. The flights operated between various cities across the country.

    Martinaire has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the Agency.

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    NTSB Safety Recommendation


    The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require that Avions de Transport Régional (ATR)42-seriesairplanes operating in the United States incorporate a revised stickpusher activation angle of attack(AOA), such that the stick pusher activates before the stall AOA in the presence of airframe ice accretions. (A-12-24)

    Evaluate all U.S.-certificated transport-category airplanes equipped with stick pushers to ensure that the stick pusher
    activates at an angle of attack that will provide adequate stall protection in the presence of airframe ice accretions.(A-12-25)

  • NTSN Lists Top 10 Leading Causes of Fatal General Aviation Accidents 2001-2011

    The Top 10 Leading Causes of Fatal General Aviation Accidents 2001-2011
    1. Loss of Control Inflight
    2. Controlled Flight Into Terrain
    3. System Component Failure – Powerplant
    4. Low Altitude Operations
    5. Unknown or Undetermined
    6. Other
    7. Fuel Related
    8. System Component Failure – Non-Powerplant
    9. Midair Collisions
    10. Windshear or Thunderstorm

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    NTSB Warns Old Weather Data on Pilot Displays Can Contribute to Plane Crashes

    The NTSB has sent out a safety alert concerning weather information that is up to twenty minutes old, although it may be advertised as real time data. The discrepancy in time can be fatal when weather conditions are in rapid flux. The NTSB has related this old weather information to two recent crashes that occurred at night:

    • March 2010 med-evac helicopter Tennessee crash where the pilot was racing to home base trying to beat a storm
    • December 2011 Piper PA-32 Bryan Texas where the plane broke up in stormy weather.

    In both these crashes, “the time stamps indicated the one-minute time interval used to create the image, and not the actual age of the data used to create the image.”

    The Tennessee crash involved information five minutes old; the Texas crash involved information six to eight minutes old.

    The night crashes in particular are affected by old data. Pilots need to be aware that the data can be old, and not use the weather display to navigate around bad weather.

  • ICAO Promoting Airport Safety

    Yesterday the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Airports Council International (ACI), signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) to provide a framework to jointly pursue the highest possible levels of safety at airports worldwide. The group objectives are to support the development of the ACI Airport Excellence in Safety Programme, designed to help airports worldwide to identify and address safety vulnerabilities; joint technical assistance projects; regular exchange of safety-relevant information and data and by providing mutual access to databases; exchanging experts and providing training; and promoting regional cooperation.

    We hope that the action is more than just public paperwork on a grand stage. Maybe it will save some lives.

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    Engineered Material Arresting System Fact Sheet

    Background

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires that commercial service airports, regulated under Part 139 safety rules and federally obligated, have a standard Runway Safety Area (RSA) where possible. The RSA is typically 500 feet wide and extends 1,000 feet beyond each end of the runway. The FAA has this requirement in the event that an aircraft overruns, undershoots, or veers off the side of the runway. Many airports were built before the 1,000-foot RSA length was adopted some 20 years ago, and it is not practicable to achieve the full standard RSA. This is due to obstacles such as bodies of water, highways, railroads, and populated areas or severe drop-off of terrain.

    The FAA began conducting research in the 1990s to determine how to ensure maximum safety at airports where the full RSA cannot be obtained. Working in concert with the University of Dayton, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the Engineered Arresting Systems Corporation (ESCO) of Logan Township, NJ, a new technology emerged to safely arrest overrunning aircraft. EMAS uses crushable concrete placed at the end of a runway to stop an aircraft that overruns the runway. The tires of the aircraft sink into the lightweight concrete and the aircraft is decelerated as it rolls through the material.

    Benefits of the EMAS Technology

    The EMAS technology improves safety benefits in cases where land is not available, or not possible to have the standard 1,000-foot overrun. A standard EMAS installation extends 600 feet from the end of the runway. An EMAS arrestor bed can be installed to help slow or stop an aircraft that overruns the runway, even if less than 600 feet of land is available.

    Current FAA Initiatives

    The Office of Airports prepared an RSA improvement plan for the runways at approximately 575 commercial airports in 2005. This plan allows the agency to track the progress and to direct federal funds for making all practicable improvements, including the use of EMAS technology. Of the approximately 1,000 RSAs at these airports, an estimated 65 percent have been improved to full standards, and an estimated 90 percent have been improved to the extent practicable, not including the relocation of FAA-owned navigational equipment.

    Presently, the EMAS system developed by ESCO using crushable concrete is the only system that meets the FAA standard. The FAA has conducted research through the Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) that examined a number of alternatives to the existing approved system. ACRP Report 29, Developing Improved Civil Aircraft Arresting Systems, is available at the Transportation Research Board.

    Many of the EMAS beds installed prior to 2006 need periodic re-painting to maintain the integrity and functionality of the bed. The EMAS manufacturer has developed improved plastic seal coating for EMAS beds. This new coasting should eliminate the need for the periodic re-painting.

    EMAS Arrestments

    To date, there have been eight incidents where EMAS has safely stopped overrunning aircraft with a total of 235 crew and passengers aboard those flights.

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    Simplified drug and alcohol management plans

    Small aviation organisations will be able to use a new simplified and streamlined process to comply with important drug and alcohol management requirements.
    The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is introducing the simplified drug and alcohol management processes for aviation organisations with seven or fewer employees engaged in safety sensitive activities.


    The new simplified processes do not apply to any aviation organisation engaged in or providing services to regular public transport operations.

    Aviation organisations eligible to use the new drug and alcohol compliance processes will use a standard drug and alcohol management plan provided by CASA. Full details of eligibility requirements are on CASA’s web site.

    Organisations will also use a CASA e-learning package to educate and train their employees in drug and alcohol responsibilities.

    CASA’s Director of Aviation Safety, John McCormick, said the new drug and alcohol compliance processes for small organisations recognised that the existing requirements could be unnecessarily onerous for these operations.

    “We are making life easier for small aviation organisations by streamlining the process of drug and alcohol management while maintaining high safety standards,” Mr McCormick said.

    “Small aviation organisations will no longer have to develop their own drug and alcohol management plans.”

    “By using CASA’s new drug and alcohol management plan and new on-line training small aviation organisations will save time and resources and still be confident they are meeting all the regulatory requirements.

    “CASA has listened to the concerns of the aviation industry about the impact of drug and alcohol management plans on small organisations and found a solution that is simpler and protects safety.”

    Small aviation organisations using the new processes will still be required to report to CASA every six months on their drug and alcohol management performance and CASA will continue to check on compliance.

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    Nigerian Aviation Under Scrutiny

    The numbers for the Dana Air crash may be as high as 222: 153 passengers and crew and a possible 69 ground casualties. The Voice of America puts the Nigerian death toll from 110 recorded crashes since 1943 with a total of 1500 fatalities. AllAfrica puts that number at 162 fatalities and 16 crashes.

    Can we say there has been improvement when there were three crashes in 2005-2006 that killed a whopping 320 people? Regardless of the exact recorded figures, the list of Nigerian plane crashes makes a long, sad story. Carriers have a history of financing problems or corruption.

    Prior to Dana Air, the last big crash was Oct. 29, 2006, when an Aviation Development Co. flight from Abuja to Sokoto crashed, killing 96 people after two minutes in the air. There was also the Bellview Airlines Crash in 2005, and Sosoliso Airlines–a plane full of children.

    On Wednesday Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council established a nine-man Technical and Administrative Review Panel headed by Group Captain John Obakpolor to “determine the remote and immediate causes of the crash.” But here’s the problem–studies have already been made, and findings found. But where is the implementation of concrete reform?

    Is Nigerian aviation industry in a tailspin? We can only hope that progress is being made in this country where governmental corruption has rendered airline regulation ineffective. We have seen time and again in aviation safety, when corners are cut, lives are lost.

    After looking at the November 2006 ICAO audit here, we can only hope that Nigeria will redouble its efforts at aviation safety reform.

    NTSB Investigation Arrives in Lagos
    Questions follow Dana Air
    Dana Air Semantic Wars
    Husband Files Dana Air Flight 992 Lawsuit
    Dana Air’s license Suspended
    Witnesses of the Dana Air Crash Recount What they Saw
    First Report of Dana Air Crash in Lagos

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    NTSB Investigation Arrives in Lagos


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Peter Tonna

    What: Dana Air McDonnell Douglas MD-83 en route from Abuja to Lagos, Nigeria
    Where: Iju neighborhood, Lagos
    When: June 3, 2012
    Who: 153 passengers
    Why: The plane crashed after experiencing failure in both engines.

    The black boxes were sent last week to the US, and now the US has sent US National Transportation Safety Board investigators to assist Nigeria’s AIB in the investigation.

    According to Governor Godswill Akpabio of Akwa Ibom, prior to the accident, there had been complaints of Dana Air and he had warned them to maintain or suspend flights and to check its fleet.

    The NTSB published the following release:
    The NTSB is dispatching an investigator to assist the government of Nigeria in its investigation of the crash of a Dana Air Boeing MD-83 airplane, Flight # 0992.

    On June 3, 2012 at about 11:51 a.m. local time, the airplane, en route from Abuja to Lagos Nigeria, crashed outside the airport into a two story building. All 153 passengers and crew onboard were fatally injured, and an undetermined number of ground fatalities and injuries also occurred.

    As the state of design and manufacture of the Boeing MD-83, the NTSB has designated Senior Aviation Accident Investigator, Mr. Dennis Jones, as the traveling U.S. Accredited Representative. Mr. Jones will be assisted from NTSB headquarters by investigative staff specializing in operational factors, powerplants, and airworthiness as well as advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney.

    The investigation is being conducted by the Nigerian Accident Investigation Bureau, which will release all information.

    Questions follow Dana Air
    Dana Air Semantic Wars
    Husband Files Dana Air Flight 992 Lawsuit
    Dana Air’s license Suspended
    Witnesses of the Dana Air Crash Recount What they Saw
    First Report of Dana Air Crash in Lagos
    IDENTIFICATION
    Regis#: DANA992 Make/Model: MD80 Description: MD-81/82/83/87/88
    Date: 06/03/2012 Time: 1530

    Event Type: Accident Highest Injury: Fatal Mid Air: N Missing: N
    Damage: Destroyed

    LOCATION

    DESCRIPTION
    DANA AIR FLIGHT 992 BOEING MCDONNELL DOUGLAS MD83 AIRCRAFT CRASHED INTO A 2-STORY BUILDING IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA,153 PERSONS ON BOARD WERE FATALLY INJURED, UNKNOWN GROUND INJURIES, LAGOS, NIGERIA

    INJURY DATA Total Fatal: 153
    # Crew: 6 Fat: 6
    # Pass: 147 Fat: 147

    OTHER DATA
    Activity: Business Phase: Unknown Operation: Air Carrier

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    Alligator Airways is Suspended

    The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (Australia) suspended Alligator Airways’ air operator’s certificate and certificate of approval on 3 May 2012 because the company’s conduct of operational and maintenance-related activities was seen to pose a serious and imminent risk to air safety.

    On 18 May 2012, the Federal Court granted CASA’s application for an order to prohibit Alligator Airways from operating until 4 June 2012.

    This prohibition order allowed CASA to finalise its investigations into a range of safety issues, including two recent serious incidents involving aircraft operated by Alligator Airways.

    Under the Civil Aviation Act, once investigations are completed, CASA has up to an additional five working days from 5 June 2012 to issue a show case notice if CASA believes there would still be a serious and imminent risk to air safety if Alligator Airways was to resume operations.

    If CASA does issue a show case notice the suspension will continue while the matters raised in that notice are addressed and a final decision made whether to vary, suspend or cancel the certificates. This could take up to 33 days.

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    NTSB Assisting Dana Air Crash Investigation


    The NTSB is dispatching an investigator to assist the government of Nigeria in its investigation of the crash of a Dana Air Boeing MD-83 airplane, Flight # 0992.

    On June 3, 2012 at about 11:51 a.m. local time, the airplane, en route from Abuja to Lagos Nigeria, crashed outside the airport into a two story building. All 153 passengers and crew onboard were fatally injured, and an undetermined number of ground fatalities and injuries also occurred.

    As the state of design and manufacture of the Boeing MD-83, the NTSB has designated Senior Aviation Accident Investigator, Mr. Dennis Jones, as the traveling U.S. Accredited Representative. Mr. Jones will be assisted from NTSB headquarters by investigative staff specializing in operational factors, powerplants, and airworthiness as well as advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Boeing, and Pratt & Whitney.

    The investigation is being conducted by the Nigerian Accident Investigation Bureau.

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    Wyoming 757 RUNWAY EXCURSION Due to Mechanical Defects and Flawed Monitoring Procedure

    Mechanical defects that prevented the automatic deployment of speedbrakes, which assist in slowing the plane after landing, and the captain’s failure to monitor and manually deploy them led to an overrun of a passenger jetliner off of a snowy runway in Wyoming. The incident was compounded by an anomaly with the thrust reversers.

    On December 29, 2010, at about 11:38 a.m. MST, American Airlines flight 2253, a Boeing 757-200, ran off the departure end of runway 19 during light snow after landing at Wyoming’s Jackson Hole Airport (JAC). The airplane came to rest about 730 feet past the departure end of the runway in deep snow. None of the 179 passengers and six crewmembers were injured; the airplane sustained minor damage. The flight originated from Chicago O’Hare Airport.

    “Through this investigation, all of us — the investigator, manufacturer, operator, and pilots, alike — all learned important safety lessons,” Hersman said. “The recommendations we issue today will make valuable contributions to improving aviation safety.”

    The investigation found that the pilots, both of whom had flown into JAC on numerous occasions, were familiar with the challenging wintertime landing conditions there and had made thorough preparations for the approach and landing during what they described as an otherwise uneventful flight from Chicago.

    The approach to the runway was normal and the airplane touched down about 600 feet beyond the approach threshold. The speedbrakes, which disrupt the airflow over the wings and greatly increase the wheel braking effectiveness, did not automatically deploy as designed. The CVR transcript showed that the captain, acting as the monitoring pilot, failed to identify the non-deployment and erroneously stated “deployed” shortly after touchdown. Immediately after this, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, tried to deploy the thrust reversers; when they did not initially deploy, the captain took over the thrust reverser controls and they deployed about 18 seconds after touchdown. Subsequently, the airplane continued off the departure end of the runway, coming to a stop in deep snow off the end of the paved surface.

    American Airlines training and procedures require the pilot monitoring (in this case, the captain) to observe and call out the position of the speedbrake lever after landing; if the speedbrakes do not deploy automatically, the captain is to manually deploy them. Although the pilots could have manually deployed the speedbrakes at any time during the landing roll, neither pilot recognized that the speedbrakes had not automatically deployed because they were both trying to resolve the thrust reverser issue.

    The landing performance analysis showed that under similar runway conditions, even without thrust reverser deployment, the airplane would have stopped about 4500 feet down the 6300-foot runway had the speedbrakes been promptly deployed.

    The investigation revealed that the speedbrakes did not automatically deploy because of a latent assembly defect in one of the speedbrakes mechanisms. In addition, the NTSB determined that the thrust reversers did not initially deploy because of a rare mechanical/hydraulic interaction that occurred in the thrust reverser system as a result of an unloading event at the precise instant that the first officer commanded their deployment immediately after touchdown.

    As a result of the investigation, the NTSB made the following new safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): require that all transport category air carriers develop and incorporate training to address recognition of a situation in which the speedbrakes do not deploy as expected after landing; require all newly type-certificated air transport category airplanes to have an aural, or otherwise unique, alert that warns pilots that the speedbrakes have not deployed during the landing roll; and require Boeing to establish guidance for pilots of all relevant airplanes to follow when an unintended thrust reverser lockout occurs and to provide that guidance to all operators of those airplanes.

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    NTSB To Meet over Jackson Hole Airport Incident

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will hold a meeting to determine the probable cause and consider safety recommendations for a highway collision and an aviation incident.
    The first item the Board will discuss will be the March 12, 2011, crash in New York City of a World Wide Tours-operated motorcoach. Fifteen passengers died in the collision.
    The second item is a December 29, 2010, incident in which an American Airlines B-757 ran off the departure end of the runway into deep snow after landing at Wyoming’s Jackson Hole Airport. None of the 185 passengers and crew onboard were injured; the aircraft sustained minor damage.
    Event: Board Meeting
    Date/Time: Tuesday, June 5, 9:30 a.m. (ET)
    Location: NTSB Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza SW, Washington, DC
    Participants: NTSB Board Members

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    New head of NTSB Aviation Safety


    National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah A. P. Hersman announced the selection of John DeLisi as the new Director of the Office of Aviation Safety (OAS). Mr. DeLisi will assume his new position on June 2, 2012 following the retirement of Tom Haueter, the current director.

    “It gives me great pleasure to announce John’s selection to lead OAS,” said Chairman Hersman. “With more than two decades of outstanding accident investigation experience, John has made significant contributions to safety and to the NTSB. I look forward to continuing to work with him to further improve the safety of air travel.”

    DeLisi has been serving as the Deputy Director of OAS since 2007. During his 20 years with the NTSB, he has overseen numerous major investigations, including the January 2009 ditching of US Airways flight 1549 in the Hudson River and the February 2009 Colgan Air accident in Buffalo, New York.

    Beginning as an Aircraft Systems Engineer, DeLisi has been an on-scene investigator for 20 major domestic aviation accidents and 6 international investigations. And later serving as the Chief of the Major Investigations Division for the NTSB, he oversaw the development of more than a dozen other major airline accident investigations, including the investigation of the August 2006 Comair flight 5191 accident in Lexington, Kentucky.

    DeLisi is a cum laude graduate of the University of Michigan with a degree in Aerospace Engineering, and has done graduate work in Engineering Management at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. He holds a private pilot certificate.

    Haueter, who is retiring after 28 years of Federal service, has served the NTSB as a technical expert in charge of major accidents and as an ambassador for aviation safety all over the world. His portfolio of investigative work has encompassed everything from small general aviation crashes to some of our nation’s largest and most complex accidents involving major air carriers.

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    NTSB to Present Findings of Safety Study


    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a Board meeting on May 22, 2012, to consider the findings of a draft safety study on experimental amateur-built (E-AB) aircraft.

    Of the approximately 224,000 general aviation (GA) aircraft in the U.S., about 33,000 of them are classified as E-AB. This includes a wide variety of aircraft, which can be built from a prefabricated kit, existing plans, or a builder’s unique design. Unfortunately, this group of aircraft has, for several years, experienced accident rates greater than those of other comparable segments of GA.

    The NTSB, with the assistance and input from the Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) and its many members, undertook the study to identify areas that could be addressed to improve the safety record of this growing and innovative segment of GA.

    The meeting will be webcast live at bit.ly/fzFiOW

    Event: Board Meeting

    Date/Time: Tuesday, May 22, 2012, 9:30 am (EST)

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    PR: FAA Proposes $395,850 Civil Penalty Against US Airways

    NEW YORK—The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a $395,850 civil penalty against US Airways Inc., of Tempe, Ariz., for allegedly violating U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations.

    The FAA conducted a periodic dangerous goods inspection of US Airways’ facilities at Hartford’s Bradley International Airport (BDL), May 10-18, 2010. As a result of the inspection, the FAA alleges the airline committed various violations between Feb. 26 and May 12, 2010. The alleged violations involve 12 flights to or from BDL.

    In one instance, the Transportation Security Administration discovered, while inspecting passenger checked baggage, that US Airways had accepted an undeclared shipment containing ten disposable cigarette lighters filled with flammable gas. The FAA alleged the airline failed to notify the FAA of this discrepancy.

    In another instance, US Airways offered an improperly packaged shipment containing wet cell batteries filled with alkali, a corrosive, for transportation by air on a US Airways passenger-carrying flight.

    The FAA also alleged the airline failed to provide pilots with the required "accurate and legible written information" regarding 23 shipments of hazardous materials it accepted for transportation by air.

    US Airways has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the agency.