Official Report

  • NTSB PUBLISHES AGENDA FOR PROFESSIONALISM IN AVIATION FORUM

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington , DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 5, 2010
    SB-10-17

    ( Washington , DC ) The National Transportation Safety Board
    today published its agenda for the Professionalism in
    Aviation safety forum which will begin at 9:00 a.m.,
    Tuesday May 18, 2010. NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman
    will chair the three-day, en-banc forum which is open to the
    public (there is no registration for attendees).

    Following the Chairman’s opening remarks and the keynote
    presentation, 10 panels composed of invited representatives
    from industry, government agencies, labor, academia and
    professional associations, will address subjects relevant to
    developing and ensuring professionalism in pilots and air
    traffic controllers.

    Below is the forum’s agenda of panel titles:

    Tuesday, May 18
    —————————————————–
    * Welcome and Opening Remarks
    * Keynote Presentation
    * Screening and Selection Methods and Their Role in
    Developing Professional Pilots
    * Structured Development of Professional Pilots
    * Developing Excellence and Professionalism in Air
    Traffic Controllers Through Screening, Selection, and
    Training

    Wednesday, May 19
    —————————————————–
    * Developing Professionalism and Excellence Through
    Operator Training
    * Shared Responsibility to Reinforce Professional
    Standards in Pilots
    * Shared Responsibility to Reinforce Professional
    Standards in Air Traffic Controllers
    * The Captain’s Role in Ensuring Professionalism

    Thursday, May 20
    —————————————————–
    * Ensuring Effective Pilot-Controller Communications
    * Ensuring Excellence Through Data and Information
    Sharing
    * The Role of the Regulator in Ensuring Professionalism
    in Aviation
    * Closing Remarks
    Organizations and/or individuals can submit input for
    consideration as part of the forum’s archived materials.
    Submissions should directly address one or more of the 10
    subject areas (panel titles) of the forum and be submitted
    electronically as an attached document not to exceed 10
    pages to: Professionalism.Forum@ntsb.gov. The deadline for
    receipt is June 3, 2010. Input received will be entered
    into the Safety Board’s public docket on this forum.

  • |

    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION OF SOUTHWEST 737 AND NEWS HELICOPTER OVER HOUSTON HOBBY AIRPORT

    The NTSB has launched an investigation into the near collision of a Southwest Airlines jetliner and a news helicopter over a runway at Houston’s Hobby Airport last week.

    At about 12:25 p.m. CDT on Wednesday, April 28, a Southwest Airlines 737, flight 1322 (N242WN) and a Bell 207 news gathering helicopter (N6YJ), came within an estimated 125 feet vertically and 100 feet laterally from each other as both were departing the airport.

    The Baltimore-bound 737 with 135 passengers and a crew of five had been cleared to depart from runway 12R. At about the same time the helicopter was cleared to depart from another part of the airport. The near-collision occurred as the helicopter converged into the flight path of the 737 shortly after the jetliner lifted off from the runway. Both crews took evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding.

    NTSB investigator Betty Koschig, an air traffic control specialist based in Washington, is traveling to Houston tomorrow to begin the investigation.

    This is the second runway safety incident that the NTSB has investigated in the last two weeks. On April 19, a 737 and a small private plane came within about 200 feet of colliding over the airport in Burbank, Calif.

    Improving runway safety has been on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements since 1990:
    http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/runways.htm

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    NTSB: CREW ACTIONS AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT CREDITED WITH SAVING LIVES

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 4, 2010
    SB-10-16

    Washington, DC — In addition to the decisions and actions of
    the flight crewmembers, overwater safety equipment likely
    saved lives that might have otherwise been lost to drowning,
    the NTSB said.

    Today the Safety Board met to conclude its 15-month
    investigation into the January 15, 2009, accident in which a
    US Airways A320 jetliner bound for Charlotte was ditched
    into the Hudson River after striking a flock of Canada geese
    shortly after departing New York’s LaGuardia Airport. All of
    the 150 passengers and five crewmembers survived.

    Investigators said that had the airplane not been equipped
    with forward slide/rafts, many of the 64 occupants of those
    rafts would likely have been submerged in the 41-degree
    Hudson River, potentially causing a phenomenon called “cold
    shock,” which can lead to drowning in as little as five
    minutes.

    The accident flight had the additional safety equipment
    available only because the particular aircraft operated that
    day happened to be certified for extended overwater (EOW)
    operations even though current FAA regulations did not
    require the flight from New York to Charlotte to be so
    equipped.

    Good visibility, calm waters, and proximity of passenger
    ferries, which rescued everyone on flight 1549 within 20
    minutes, were other post-accident factors the Safety Board
    credited with the survival of all aboard the aircraft.

    “Once the birds and the airplane collided and the accident
    became inevitable, so many things went right,” said NTSB
    Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “This is a great example of
    the professionalism of the crewmembers, air traffic
    controllers and emergency responders who all played a role
    in preserving the safety of everyone aboard.”

    The Safety Board said that the probable cause of the
    accident was the ingestion of large birds into each engine,
    resulting in an almost total loss of engine power.
    Contributing to the severity of the fuselage damage and
    resulting unavailability of the aft slide/rafts, the Board
    cited the FAA’s inadequate ditching certification standards,
    lack of industry training on ditching techniques, and the
    captain’s resulting difficulty maintaining his intended
    airspeed on final approach due to task saturation resulting
    from the emergency situation.

    The report adopted by the Safety Board today validated the
    Captain’s decision to ditch into the Hudson River saying
    that it “provided the highest probability that the accident
    would be survivable.” Contributing to the survivability of
    the accident was the crew resource management between the
    captain and first officer, which allowed them to maintain
    control of the airplane, increasing the survivability of the
    impact with the water.

    In addressing the hazards that birds pose to aircraft of all
    sizes, the report noted that most bird strike events occur
    within 500 feet of the ground while flight 1549 struck geese
    at 2700 feet. Investigators said that this difference
    demonstrates that “bird strike hazards to commercial
    aircraft are not limited to any predictable scenario.”

    Concluding that engine screens or changes to design would
    not be a viable solution to protect against bird ingestion
    events on commercial jetliners, the Board made it clear that
    the potential for significant damage from encounters with
    birds remains a challenge to the aviation community.

    As part of its extensive examination into the behavior of
    the passengers and crewmembers from the time the plane left
    the gate at LaGuardia to the moment the last person was
    rescued in the river, the Board noted that since most of the
    passengers indicated that they had not paid attention to the
    preflight oral safety briefing, “more creative and effective
    methods of conveying safety information to passengers” was
    needed. Survival factors investigators also found that
    passengers had significant problems in donning the life
    vests that were stowed under each seat.

    The Board made 35 safety recommendations on engine and
    aircraft certification standards, checklist design, flight
    crew training, airport wildlife mitigation, cabin safety
    equipment, and preflight passenger briefings.

    “I believe the safety recommendations that have come out of
    this investigation have an extraordinary origin — a very
    serious accident in which everyone survived,” said Chairman
    Hersman. “Even in an accident where everyone survives, there
    are lessons learned and areas that could use improvement.
    Our report today takes these lessons learned so that, if our
    recommendations are implemented, every passenger and
    crewmember may have the opportunity to benefit from the
    advances in safety.”

  • |

    Press Release: NTSB CHAIRMAN ISASI SPEECH

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 29, 2010
    SB-10-14

    NTSB CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES ADVANTAGES – AND LIMITATIONS – OF USING DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY

    National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said today that the use of data to manage and improve safety in the aviation industry has had a positive effect on the world’s improving aviation safety record but she cautioned against over-reliance on these systems to the neglect of forensic investigation.

    Addressing a conference of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators in Chantilly, Virginia, Hersman noted that “we have reached an era when aviation accidents are extremely rare…” One reason is the use of data – particularly, but not exclusively, Safety Management Systems (SMS) – in accident prevention and investigation.

    The Board has been advocating the use of SMS for a decade, having issued 17 recommendations in favor of implementing SMS in the aviation industry. When implemented correctly, Hersman said, “SMS holds real promise in a variety of scenarios.” She noted several instances where SMS helped
    eliminate potential unsafe conditions, notably a corporate flight operation that used flight data to determine that high bank angles occurred on repositioning flights, and a review of commercial aircraft approach data that indicated a high rate of TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
    System) warnings at a particular airport. In these instances, she said, “data management adeptly identified a clearly measurable set of information and allowed for a relatively simple and effective solution.”

    However, Hersman noted, SMS works well for companies that are already “getting it right,” but may provide little more than false confidence for companies with less than robust safety cultures.

    Also, there are accidents caused by a combination of factors that SMS cannot possibly detect. As an example, Hersman mentioned the British Airways Boeing 777 crash at Heathrow Airport two years ago involving a dual engine failure on approach. It was not data analysis that solved the mystery, but detailed forensic analysis; the circumstances were so unusual that a data analysis system would not pick them up.

    Hersman said she hoped that with all the focus SMS will place on data collection and analysis, “let’s not lose focus on outcomes. The success of SMS won’t be measured by how much data we collect, but by how many lives we save.”

    “I will enthusiastically support any approach that will make our nation safer,” she said. “But I think we need a measured approach – one that acknowledges the potential benefits and limitations of SMS, and further, doesn’t discount tried and true methods for identifying vulnerabilities, such as accident investigations.”

  • NTSB Hudson River Docket Opened

    NTSB TO OPEN DOCKET ON INVESTIGATION INTO THE MIDAIR COLLISION OVER THE HUDSON RIVER

    Washington, DC – In its continuing investigation of the midair collision of an air tour helicopter and a small plane over the Hudson River, the National Transportation Safety Board will open the public docket on Wednesday, April 28, 2010 at 10 a.m.

    On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA (N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard
    the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plans were filed for either flight. The local sightseeing
    helicopter flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal airplane flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

    The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide any analysis. The docket includes: investigative group factual reports, interview summaries, crew statements, air traffic control transcripts, controller statements, the meteorology report, and other documents.

    Additional material will continue to be added to the docket as it becomes available. Analysis of the accident, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the
    investigation is completed.

  • NTSB To Meet

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    April 26, 2010

    NTSB TO MEET ON US AIRWAYS 1549 HUDSON RIVER ACCIDENT

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public Board meeting on May 4 on its investigation into the accident in which a US Airways jetliner came to rest in the Hudson River near New York City after a low-altitude encounter with a flock of birds.

    The purpose of the meeting will be to determine the probable cause of the accident and to consider proposed safety recommendations to reduce the likelihood of future such mishaps.

    On January 15, 2009, at 3:27 p.m. EDT, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus A320, lost engine power after striking a flock of Canada geese shortly after departing New York’s LaGuardia Airport. The captain brought the plane down into the Hudson River after determining that landing at an airport was not feasible. The plane, destined for Charlotte, N.C., carried 150 passengers and a crew of five. Four passengers and one flight attendant received serious injuries.

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION

    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION OF JETLINER AND SMALL PLANE OVER AIRPORT IN CALIFORNIA

    The National Transportation Safety Board has opened an investigation into the near collision of a commercial jetliner and a small private plane at the intersection of two active runways at Burbank’s Bob Hope Airport in Southern California.

    At about 10:58 a.m. PDT on April 19, Southwest Airlines flight 649, a Boeing 737-700 (N473WN) inbound from Oakland, carrying 119 passengers and a crew of five was landing on runway 8 while a Cessna 172, in the departure phase of a “touch and go” on runway 15, passed over the 737. A “touch and go” is a practice maneuver in which an aircraft briefly lands on the runway before accelerating and becoming airborne again.

    According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airplanes came within 200 feet vertically and 10 feet laterally of each other at the runway intersection. No one was injured in the incident, which occurred under a clear sky with visibility of 10 miles.

    NTSB investigator Betty Koschig, an air traffic control specialist based in Washington, is traveling to Burbank today to begin the investigation.

  • |

    NTSB Press Release

    NTSB TO HOLD A PUBLIC FORUM ON PROFESSIONALISM IN AVIATION

    ( Washington , DC ) The National Transportation Safety Board
    will hold a safety forum on professionalism in aviation
    beginning Tuesday, May 18, 2010. The three-day, en-banc forum
    will be chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

    “NTSB’s investigations into the midair collision over the
    Hudson River last August, the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407
    in February 2009, and the October 2009 Northwest pilots’
    overflight of their intended airport provided the impetus for
    this forum because all of them clearly demonstrated the
    hazards to aviation safety when pilots and air traffic
    controllers depart from standard operating procedures and
    established best practices,” Hersman said. “During the forum,
    we will gather information on the screening, selection and
    training of pilots and controllers and methods to reinforce
    professionalism and excellence.”

    Panelists participating in the forum will represent industry,
    government agencies, labor, academia, and professional
    associations. A technical panel composed of NTSB staff from
    the Offices of Aviation Safety and Research and Engineering,
    and the NTSB Board Members, who will make up the Board of
    Inquiry, will question the panelists.

    Dr. Tony Kern, an internationally recognized human factors and
    pilot performance expert, is the forum’s keynote speaker. The
    names of the participating panelists and the agenda will be
    provided in early May.

  • | |

    NTSB TO HOLD A PUBLIC FORUM


    Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a safety forum on professionalism in aviation beginning Tuesday, May 18, 2010. The three-day, en-banc forum will be chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

    “NTSB’s investigations into the midair collision over the Hudson River last August, the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 in February 2009, and the October 2009 Northwest pilots’ overflight of their intended airport provided the impetus for this forum because all of them clearly demonstrated the hazards to aviation safety when pilots and air traffic controllers depart from standard operating procedures and established best practices,” Hersman said. “During the forum, we will gather information on the screening, selection and training of pilots and controllers and methods to reinforce professionalism and excellence.”

    Panelists participating in the forum will represent industry, government agencies, labor, academia, and professional associations. A technical panel composed of NTSB staff from the Offices of Aviation Safety and Research and Engineering, and the NTSB Board Members, who will make up the Board of Inquiry, will question the panelists.

    Dr. Tony Kern, an internationally recognized human factors and pilot performance expert, is the forum’s keynote speaker. The names of the participating panelists and the agenda will be provided in early May.

    The forum, titled “Professionalism in Aviation: Ensuring Excellence in Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Performance,” will be held at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center, located at 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The public can view the forum in person or by webcast on the NTSB’s web site.

  • |

    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATST


    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 8, 2010

    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATISTICS; ON-DEMAND ACCIDENTS AT LOWEST LEVEL IN LAST 20 YEARS

    Washington, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board today released preliminary aviation accident statistics for 2009 showing an overall decrease in U. S. civil aviation accidents that includes general aviation and on-demand Part 135 operations. In fact, on-demand Part 135 operations had the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents for that type of air operation in the last 2 decades.

    The total number of U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased from 1,658 in 2008 to 1,551 in 2009. Total fatalities also showed a decrease from 566 to 534. The majority of these fatalities occurred in general aviation and scheduled Part 121 operations.

    General aviation accidents decreased from 1,566 in 2008 to 1,474 in 2009. There were 272 fatal general aviation accidents, down from 275 the year before. However, the accident rate increased to 7.20 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 6.86 in 2008, due to the decrease in the number total of flight hours. Although fatalities decreased from 494 to 474, the fatal accident rate increased to from 1.21 to 1.33.

    Last year, one fatal accident occurred involving a scheduled Part 121 operator. On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8- 400, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, crashed outside of Buffalo , New York, resulting in 50 fatalities.

    On-demand Part 135 operations reported 47 accidents in 2009, a decrease from 58 in 2008. Fatalities also decreased from 69 in 2008 to 17 in 2009. The accident rate decreased to 1.63 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 1.81 in 2008.

    Tables 1-12 providing additional statistics are available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm

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    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATISTICS

    ON-DEMAND ACCIDENTS AT LOWEST LEVEL IN LAST 20 YEARS

    Washington, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board
    today released preliminary aviation accident statistics for
    2009 showing an overall decrease in U. S. civil aviation
    accidents that includes general aviation and on-demand Part
    135 operations. In fact, on-demand Part 135 operations had
    the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents for that
    type of air operation in the last 2 decades.

    The total number of U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased
    from 1,658 in 2008 to 1,551 in 2009. Total fatalities also
    showed a decrease from 566 to 534. The majority of these
    fatalities occurred in general aviation and scheduled Part
    121 operations.

    General aviation accidents decreased from 1,566 in 2008 to
    1,474 in 2009. There were 272 fatal general aviation
    accidents, down from 275 the year before. However, the
    accident rate increased to 7.20 per 100,000 flight hours in
    2009 from 6.86 in 2008, due to the decrease in the number
    total of flight hours. Although fatalities decreased from
    494 to 474, the fatal accident rate increased to from 1.21
    to 1.33.

    Last year, one fatal accident occurred involving a scheduled
    Part 121 operator. On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air,
    Inc., Bombardier DHC-8- 400, operating as Continental
    Connection flight 3407, crashed outside of Buffalo , New
    York, resulting in 50 fatalities.

    On-demand Part 135 operations reported 47 accidents in 2009,
    a decrease from 58 in 2008. Fatalities also decreased from
    69 in 2008 to 17 in 2009. The accident rate decreased to
    1.63 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 1.81 in 2008.

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    NTSB Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the
    Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the
    nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all
    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require
    replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine
    mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking
    in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated two accidents involving Piper PA-46-350P airplanes that resulted from fatigue cracking in the attachment between the nose landing gear (NLG) actuator and the engine mount. Such fatigue cracks can lead to the collapse of the NLG, which could cause a serious or catastrophic accident if the separation occurred at a critical point during takeoff or landing or if the aircraft collided with parked aircraft or aircraft waiting at taxiways.

    On August 16, 2009, about 1130 eastern daylight time,1 a Piper PA-46-350P, N548C, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Orlando-Sanford International Airport, Sanford, Florida.2 The private pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

    On May 19, 2007, about 1305, a Piper PA-46-350P, N411MD, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Indianapolis Metropolitan Airport near Fishers, Indiana.3 The pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the FAA. VMC prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The NLG actuator on Piper PA-46-350P airplanes is bolted via two attachment feet to the lower aft engine mount, which is constructed of welded tubes (see figure 1). The NLG actuator extends down and forward from the attachment feet and attaches to the NLG. During taxi, takeoff, and landing, the attachment feet transmit loads from the NLG to the engine mount, thus creating repetitive tensile stress in the engine mount attachment feet areas and, in some cases, leading to fatigue cracking.

    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P airplanes have either an original engine mount or a redesigned engine mount (see figure 2).5 In the original design, each attachment foot is a two-piece part consisting of a metal disk welded to the end of a metal tube, which is then welded to the engine mount support tubes. In the redesigned engine mount, each attachment foot is a one-piece machined part made from a single piece of steel, eliminating the welding within the feet themselves. However, on both the original and redesigned engine mounts, the attachment feet are welded to the engine mount support tubes, which is where fatigue cracking has been identified by the NTSB.

    The airplane in the Sanford, Florida, accident was equipped with a redesigned engine mount that was installed at the time of manufacture. The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N548C revealed that the right attachment foot had fractured at the engine mount support tube. The NTSB materials laboratory’s examination of the fractured foot revealed a fatigue crack emanating from multiple origins at the exterior of the joint where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 8 years old and had accumulated 711 flight hours with 878 cycles since new (CSN).

    The airplane in the Fishers, Indiana, accident had a redesigned engine mount that was installed on March 21, 2003. The airplane had accumulated 542 flight hours and an estimated 1,400 cycles since then. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 7 years old and had accumulated a total of 772 flight hours.6 The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N411MD revealed that the right attachment foot had separated from the rest of the engine mount due to fatigue cracking7 where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube.
    The NTSB also notes that a similar incident of fatigue cracking of an NLG attachment foot was found on September 29, 2009, during a routine inspection of a Piper PA-46-350P airplane. The airplane was 5 years old and had accumulated a total of 678 flight hours with 600 CSN and was equipped with the redesigned engine mount.

    On April 22, 2002, Piper issued mandatory Service Bulletin (SB) 1103, recommending that operators of PA-46-310P, -350P, and -500TP8 airplanes inspect the NLG actuator attachment foot area of the original engine mounts for evidence of fatigue cracking. The SB indicated that such cracking had been found in this area of some original engine mounts.

    The inspection included visual and liquid penetrant inspection at the next regular scheduled maintenance event and each 100 hours in service or at the annual inspection, whichever occurred first. If cracks were found, the original engine mounts were to be replaced with the redesigned engine mounts before returning to service. SB 1103 does not subject the airplanes with redesigned engine mounts to repetitive inspections, and replacing the original engine mount with the redesigned engine mount relieves the need for repetitive inspections. Piper issued several inspections.

    The NTSB is concerned that the redesigned engine mounts on Piper P
    A-46-310 and -350P model airplanes have attachment foot areas susceptible to fatigue cracking similar to the fatigue cracks identified by Piper on the original engine mounts. The NTSB concludes that the tensile stresses applied to the redesigned engine mounts could lead to fatigue fractures in the NLG actuator attachment foot areas. However, redesigned engine mounts are not currently subject to the inspection provisions of SB 1103, nor is compliance with SB 1103 required.10 Although the NTSB is not aware of incidents or accidents involving original engine mounts that have not been inspected, the NTSB believes that inspections of the original engine mounts should also be mandatory in order to detect fatigue cracking.

    Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the NLG actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary.

    As previously noted, Piper redesigned the engine mounts on the PA-46-310 and -350P in an effort to prevent fatigue cracking at the attachment foot areas. However, based on the accidents discussed above, this redesign does not appear to have been successful since fatigue cracking has also occurred in the redesigned engine mounts. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas.
    Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    In response to the recommendations in this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45. If you would like to submit your response electronically rather than in hard copy, you may send it to the following e-mail address: correspondence@ntsb.gov.

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    CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA RUNWAY OVERRUN

    NTSB TO OPEN PUBLIC DOCKET ON JANUARY 2010 CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA RUNWAY OVERRUN

    As part of the Safety Board’s investigation into the runway overrun at Yeager Airport, Charleston, West Virginia, the NTSB will open the public accident docket on Thursday, April 8, 2010.

    On January 19, 2010, PSA Airlines d.b.a. US Airways Express flight 2495, a Bombardier CL600-2B19, registration N246PS, rejected the takeoff and ran off the end of the runway at Yeager Airport, Charleston, West Virginia. The airplane stopped in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS).

    There were no injuries to the 31 passengers or 3 crew members onboard and the airplane received minor damage. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121 and its intended destination was Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina.

    The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has assigned an Accredited Representative to assist the investigation under the provisions of ICAO Annex 13 as the State of the Manufacturer of the airplane.

    The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide any analysis. It will include investigative group factual reports, photographs, and other documents from the investigation. Additional material will be added to the docket as it becomes available. Analysis of the accident, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the investigation is completed.

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    NTSB Release: Maintenance Causes 2008 Crash

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    April 6, 2010
    SB-10-10

    POOR MAINTENANCE STARTED ACCIDENT CHAIN THAT RESULTED IN HIGH-SPEED RUNWAY EXCURSION THAT KILLED FOUR IN 2008, NTSB DETERMINES

    Washington, DC – A chartered business jet crashed at a South Carolina airport 18 months ago because of the operator’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane’s tires and the decision by the captain to attempt a high-speed rejected takeoff, which went against standard operating procedures and training, the NTSB determined today.

    On September 19, 2008, at 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) operated by Global Exec Aviation and destined for Van Nuys, California, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport. After the airplane left the departure end of runway 11, it struck airport lights, crashed through a perimeter fence, crossed a roadway and came to rest on a berm. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured.

    The investigation revealed that prior to the accident the aircraft was operated while the main landing gear tires were severely underinflated because of Global Exec Aviation’s inadequate maintenance. The underinflation compromised the integrity of the tires, which led to the failure of all four of the airplane’s main landing gear tires during the takeoff roll.

    Shortly after the first tire failed, which occurred about 1.5 seconds after the airplane passed the maximum speed at which the takeoff attempt could be safely aborted, the first officer indicated that the takeoff should be continued but the captain decided to reject the takeoff and deployed the airplane’s thrust reversers. Pilots are trained to avoid attempting to reject a takeoff at high-speed unless the pilot concludes that the airplane is unable to fly; the investigation found no evidence that the accident airplane was uncontrollable or unable to become airborne.

    The tire failure during the takeoff roll damaged a sensor, which caused the airplane’s thrust reversers to return to the stowed position. While the captain was trying to stop the airplane by commanding reverse thrust, forward thrust was being provided at near-takeoff power because the thrust reversers were stowed. The Safety Board determined that the inadvertent forward thrust contributed to the severity of the accident.

    The Safety Board also found that neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor Learjet adequately reviewed the Airplane’s design after a similar uncommanded forward thrust accident that occurred during landing in Alabama in 2001. While the modifications put into place after the Alabama accident provided additional protection against uncommanded forward thrust upon landing, no such protection was provided for a rejected takeoff.

    “This accident chain started with something as basic as inadequate tire inflation and ended in tragedy,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “This entirely avoidable crash should reinforce to everyone in the aviation community that there are no small maintenance items because every time a plane takes off, lives are on the line.”

    The safety recommendations that the NTSB made to the Federal Aviation Administration as a result of this investigation are: provide pilots and maintenance personnel with information on the hazards associated with tire underinflation, including the required intervals for tire pressure checks, and allow pilots to perform pressure checks in air taxi operations to ensure that tires remain safely inflated at all times; require tire pressure monitoring systems for all transport category airplanes; identify and correct deficiencies in both Learjet’s thrust reverser system safety analysis and the FAA’s design certification process to ensure that hazards encountered in all phases of flight are mitigated; require that simulator training for pilots who conduct turbojet operations include opportunities to practice responding to events other than engine failures near takeoff speeds; require that pilots who fly air taxi turbojet operations have a minimum level of pilot operating experience in an airplane type before acting as pilot-in- command in that type; and require that airplane tire testing criteria reflect the loads that may be imposed on tires both during normal operating conditions and after the loss of one tire.

  • | | | |

    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    NTSB PRESS RELEASE

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 2, 2010
    SB-10-02

    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the
    captain of Colgan Air flight 3407 inappropriately responded
    to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an
    aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
    In a report adopted today in a public Board meeting in
    Washington, additional flight crew failures were noted as
    causal to the accident.

    On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
    400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight
    3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara
    International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed
    into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5
    nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2
    flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane
    were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the
    airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash
    fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
    Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey.
    Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
    time of the accident.

    The report states that, when the stick shaker activated to
    warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the
    captain should have responded correctly to the situation by
    pushing forward on the control column. However, the
    captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and
    placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall.

    Contributing to the cause of the accident were the
    Crewmembers’ failure to recognize the position of the
    low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that
    the stick shaker was about to activate, and their failure to
    adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other contributing
    factors were the captain’s failure to effectively manage the
    flight and Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed
    selection and management during approaches in icing
    conditions.

    As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board
    issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) regarding strategies to prevent flight
    crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue,
    remedial training, pilot records, stall training, and
    airspeed selection procedures. Additional recommendations
    address FAA’s oversight and use of safety alerts for
    operators to transmit safety-critical information, flight
    operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs, use of
    personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, and
    weather information provided to pilots.

    At today’s meeting, the Board announced that two issues that
    had been encountered in the Colgan Air investigation would
    be studied at greater length in proceedings later this year.
    The Board will hold a public forum this Spring exploring
    pilot and air traffic control high standards. This
    accident was one in a series of incidents investigated by
    the Board in recent years – including a mid-air collision
    over the Hudson River that raised questions of air traffic
    control vigilance, and the Northwest Airlines incident last
    year where the airliner overflew its destination airport in
    Minneapolis because the pilots were distracted by non-flying
    activities – that have involved air transportation
    professionals deviating from expected levels of performance.
    In addition, this Fall the Board will hold a public forum
    on code sharing, the practice of airlines marketing their
    services to the public while using other companies to
    actually perform the transportation. For example, this
    accident occurred on a Continental Connection flight,
    although the transportation was provided by Colgan Air.

    A summary of the findings of the Board’s report are
    available on the NTSB’s website at:
    http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm
    -30-

  • | |

    NTSB ADVISORY: NTSB TO MEET ON FINAL REPORT ON COLGAN AIR DASH-8 ACCIDENT NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

    ************************************************************
    NTSB ADVISORY
    ************************************************************

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    January 29, 2010

    ************************************************************

    NTSB TO MEET ON FINAL REPORT ON COLGAN AIR DASH-8 ACCIDENT
    NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

    ************************************************************

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a Board
    meeting on Tuesday, February 2, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. in its
    Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.,
    Washington, D.C. The Board will consider a final report on
    the following investigation:

    On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
    400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight
    3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara
    International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed
    into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5
    nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2
    flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane
    were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the
    airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash
    fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
    Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey.
    Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
    time of the accident.

    A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be
    available on the Board’s website at
    http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm. Technical
    support details are available under “Board Meetings” on the
    NTSB website. To report any problems, please call 703-993-
    3100 and ask for Webcast Technical Support.

    A summary of the Board’s final report, which will include
    findings, probable cause and safety recommendations, will
    appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of the
    meeting. The entire report will appear on the website
    several weeks later.

    Verizon wireless cellular service is accessible in the Board
    Room and Conference Center.

    Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on
    Lower 10th Street, directly below L’Enfant Plaza. From
    Metrorail, exit L’Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets
    escalator, walk through shopping mall, at CVS store (on the
    left), take escalator (on the right) down one level. The
    Board Room will be to your left.

    NTSB Media contact: Keith Holloway
    202-314-6100
    hollowk@ntsb.gov

  • |

    Airworthiness Directives: McDonnell Douglas Corporation Model MD-11 and MD-11F Airplanes

    SUMMARY: FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
    Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time
    inspection to determine if wires touch the upper surface of the center
    upper auxiliary fuel tank and marking the location, if necessary; a
    one-time inspection of all wire bundles above the center upper
    auxiliary fuel tank for splices and damage; a one-time inspection for
    damage to the fuel vapor barrier seal and upper surface of the center
    upper auxiliary fuel tank; and corrective actions, if necessary. This
    AD also requires installation of nonmetallic barrier/shield sleeving,
    new clamps, new attaching hardware, and a new extruded channel. This AD
    results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are
    issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
    tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
    in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.

    For More Information…

  • |

    Flying with a Chance of Ice

    The latest brouhaha in the aviation set is that the safety directive on Rolls Royce Engines–which are liable to ice up–does not ground the planes for repair, but instead has a repair date of 2011. The engines are in Boeing 777s, and have been acknowledged to be responsible for engines shutting down while in flight.

    Two questionable parts do not require replacement until 2011.

    Read the directive below:

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

    Under certain ambient conditions, ice can accumulate on the walls of the fuel pipes within the aircraft fuel system, which can then be released downstream when fuel flow demand is increased. This released ice can then collect on the fuel-to-oil heat exchanger (FOHE) front face and limit fuel flow through the FOHE.

    We are issuing this AD to prevent ice from blocking the FOHE, which could result in an unacceptable engine power loss, and loss of control of the airplane.

  • |

    FHA ISSUES Airbus Directive

    George’s Point of View

    Did the FAA consider grounding the affected planes and avoiding the chance that all “three” could fail and the pilot could lose control of the airplane?

    I’m not a pilot but come on, it’s just common sense.

    Bravo for taking action, but, is it safe to keep the affected planes in the air?

    Regarding the directive and a couple of loose valves:

    “The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. ”

    ——

    An A330 operator experienced a low level of the Yellow hydraulic circuit due to a loose[ning] of check valve part number (P/N) CAR401. During the inspection on the other two hydraulic systems, the other three CAR401 check valves were also found to be loose with their lock wire broken in two instances.
    A340 aeroplanes are also equipped with the same high pressure manifold check valves.
    Investigations are on-going to determine the root cause of this event.
    Additional cases of CAR401 check valve loosening have been experienced in service on aeroplanes having accumulated more than 1000 flight cycles (FC). The check valve fitted on the Yellow hydraulic system is more affected, probably due to additional system cycles induced by cargo door operation.
    The loss of torque due to pressure cycles could contribute to check valve loosening, resulting in a leak and finally the loss of the associated hydraulic system and, in the worst case, of the three hydraulic systems of the aeroplane.
    * * * * *

    The unsafe condition is the possible loss of all three hydraulic systems, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.

    Read the directive:

  • |

    Boeing: New Airworthiness Directives

    A new airworthiness directive effective January 4, 2010 is being adopted regarding certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires inspections for scribe lines in the skin along lap joints, butt joints, certain external doublers, and the large cargo door hinges; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. The AD results from reports of scribe lines found at lap joints and butt joints, around external doublers, and at locations where external decals had been removed. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct scribe lines, which can develop into fatigue cracks in the skin. Undetected fatigue cracks can grow and cause sudden decompression of the airplane.

    Also effective January 4 is another new directive regarding the landing gear of certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive lubrications of the right and left main landing gear (MLG) forward trunnion pins. This AD also requires an inspection for discrepancies of the transition radius of the MLG forward trunnion pins, and corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies (including finish damage, corrosion, pitting, and base metal scratches) of the transition radius of the left and right MLG trunnion pins, and corrective action if necessary. Replacing or overhauling the trunnion pins terminates the actions required by this AD. This AD results from a report that the protective finishes on the forward trunnion pins for the left and right MLG might have been damaged during final assembly. This AD is intented to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the forward trunnion pins, which could result in fracture of the pins and consequent collapse of the MLG.

    http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/index.cfm/go/document.list/display/new

  • | | | | |

    FAA Fine Proposals against United Airlines and US Airways

    $3.8 million fine
    The FAA says United Airlines:

    • Boeing 737 flew in over 200 flights not in airworthy condition (two shop towels in the engine’s oil sump area)

    $5.4 million fine
    The FAA says US Airways:

    • Embraer ERJ-190s on 19 flights in AD violation (open cargo door Directive)
    • Airbus A320s on 26 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • A320 on 17 flights in AD violation (inspection of the landing gear for cracks)
    • Airbus A320 on 855 flights in maintenance violation (engine repair)
    • Boeing 757 on 505 flights in maintenance violation(missed engine work inspections)
    • Boeing 757 on 121 in maintenance violation
    • Boeing 767 on 53 flights without weekly inspection
    • Boeing 767 on 51 flights without inspections, tests and sampling

  • General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Airworthiness Directive

    Federal Register Information

    Header Information
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration

    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD;
    Amendment 39-15958; AD 2009-14-08]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; General Electric Company (GE) CF6- 80C2B5F Turbofan Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule.

    SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain part number (P/N) high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/ shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit. This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: The Docket Operations office is located at Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590- 0001.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a proposed AD. The proposed AD applies to GE CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines. We published the proposed AD in the Federal Register on February 20, 2009 (74 FR 7831). That action proposed to require removing certain P/N HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shafts before they exceed a new, reduced life limit.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the development of this AD. We have considered the comment received. The commenter supports the proposal.

    Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD as proposed.

    Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD will affect one engine installed on an airplane of U.S. registry. We also estimate that the actions would require no work-hours per engine. No parts are required. Based on these figures, we estimate there is no cost of this AD to U.S. operators.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and

    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-14-08 General Electric Company: Amendment 39-15958. Docket No. FAA-2009-0121; Directorate Identifier 2008-NE-36-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective August 5, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engines with a high-pressure compressor rotor (HPCR) stages 11-14 spool/shaft, part number (P/N) 1703M74G03, installed. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Boeing 747 series airplanes.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from an internal GE audit that compared the life limited parts certification documentation to the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the instructions for continuing airworthiness (ICA). We are issuing this AD to prevent HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft fatigue cracks caused by exceeding the life limit, which could result in a possible uncontained failure of the HPCR spool/shaft and damage to the airplane.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    New Reduced Life Limit for the HPCR Stages 11-14 Spool/Shaft

    (f) Remove any CF6-80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, before the spool/shaft meets or exceeds the new, reduced life cycle limit of 19,500 cycles.

    Installation Prohibition

    (g) After the effective date of this AD, do not install any CF6- 80C2B5F turbofan engine that has an HPCR stages 11-14 spool/shaft, P/N 1703M74G03, that meets or exceeds 19,500 cycles.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (h) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Special Flight Permits

    (i) Under 14 CFR part 39.23, we are prohibiting special flight permits for this AD.

    Related Information

    (j) Robert Green, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Part, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: robert.green@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7754; fax (781) 238-7199.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (k) None.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 25, 2009.
    Peter A. White,
    Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15513 Filed 6-30-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines

    Airworthiness Directive
    Federal Register Information
    Header Information
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD;
    Amendment 39-15952; AD 2009-12-51]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 Turboshaft Engines
    PDF Copy (If Available):

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
    Transportation (DOT).

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-12-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    DATES: This AD becomes effective July 15, 2009 to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued on June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of July 15, 2009.
    We must receive any comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to comment on this AD.
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
    Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
    Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Fax: (202) 493-2251.
    Contact Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15 for the service information identified in this AD.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e-mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On June 4, 2009, the FAA issued emergency AD 2009-12-51, that applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This condition, if not corrected, could result in uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed and approved the technical contents of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, that describes procedures for visual inspections of affected reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections.

    FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

    Since the unsafe condition described is likely to exist or develop on other engines of the same type design, we issued emergency AD 2009- 12-51 to prevent uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. You must use the service information described previously to perform the actions required by this AD.

    FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date

    Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, we have found that notice and opportunity for public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable, and that good cause existed to make the AD effective immediately on June 4, 2009, to all known U.S. owners and operators of Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. These conditions still exist, and we are publishing the AD in the Federal Register as an amendment to Section 39.13 of part 39 of the Code Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to make it effective to all persons.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment. However, we invite you to send us any written relevant data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES. Include “AD Docket No. FAA-2009-0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD” in the subject line of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify it.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of the Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including, if provided, the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78).

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is the same as the Mail address provided in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;
    2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a summary of the costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD Docket. You may get a copy of this summary at the address listed under ADDRESSES.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-12-51 Turbomeca S.A.: Amendment 39-15952. Docket No. FAA-2009- 0544; Directorate Identifier 2009-NE-17-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective July 15, 2009, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by emergency AD 2009-12-51, issued June 4, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Turbomeca S.A. Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines if modified by Turbomeca Modification TU332 and fitted with modules M05 as listed by serial number in Figure 1 of Turbomeca S.A. Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009. These engines are installed on, but not limited to, Eurocopter France AS350B, AS350BA, AS365N, AS350B1, AS350B2, Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH MBB-BK117-C1, Agusta A109K2, and Sikorsky S-76A+, S-76A++ and S-76C helicopters.

    Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from reports of oil leaks from certain reduction gearbox (module M05) front casings. The engine manufacturer reported that the lubrication duct plug was not properly bonded/glued in place. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of the lubrication duct plug, followed by a rapid draining of the oil tank, without indication to the cockpit through low oil pressure warning. This condition can lead to uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.

    Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified unless the actions have already been done.

    Initial Visual Inspection Before Further Flight

    (f) Before further flight:
    (1) Visually inspect the module M05 lubrication duct for oil leakage. Use paragraph 1.C.(1)(a), paragraph 2.A., and Figure 2 of Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the inspection.
    (2) If oil leakage is found, repair the module M05 lubrication duct. Use paragraph 2.B.1, Figure 3, and Figure 4 in Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to do the repair.

    Repetitive Visual Inspections

    (g) If no oil leakage is found, repeat the visual inspection every four flight hours, or after the last flight of each day, whichever comes first.
    (h) The actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD may be performed by the owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate, and must be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance with this AD in accordance with 14 CFR 43.9 and 14 CFR 91.417(a)(2)(v).

    Optional Terminating Action

    (i) As optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections in paragraph (g) of this AD, repair the affected modules M05 as specified in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance

    (j) The Manager, Engine Certification Office, has the authority to approve alternative methods of compliance for this AD if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.

    Related Information

    (k) European Aviation Safety Agency emergency airworthiness directive 2009-0117-E, dated June 2, 2009, also addresses the subject of this AD.

    Contact Information

    (l) For further information, contact: James Lawrence, Aerospace Engineer, Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine and Propeller Directorate, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; e- mail: james.lawrence@faa.gov; telephone (781) 238-7176; fax (781) 238-7199, for more information about this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (m) You must use Turbomeca S.A. MSB No. A292 72 0825, Version A, dated May 27, 2009, to identify the serial numbers of modules M05 affected by this AD, and to perform the inspections and repairs required by this AD. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service bulletin in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You can get a copy from Turbomeca, 40220 Tarnos, France; telephone (33) 05 59 74 40 00, fax (33) 05 59 74 45 15. You may review copies at the FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202- 741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations.html.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on June 22, 2009.
    Peter A. White,
    Assistant Manager, Engine and Propeller Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15277 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

  • Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes

    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    Federal Aviation Administration
    14 CFR Part 39

    [Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD;
    Amendment 39-15942; AD 2009-13-03]

    RIN 2120-AA64

    Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F Series Airplanes Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 Series Engines

    Preamble Information
    AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

    ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

    SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes. This AD requires modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the flap control unit (FCU). This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the FCU from the thrust reverser control system. We are issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    DATES: This AD is effective July 6, 2009.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of July 6, 2009.
    We must receive comments on this AD by August 31, 2009.

    ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
    Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http:// www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
    Fax: 202-493-2251.
    Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
    Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.

    Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street address for the Docket Office (telephone 800-647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.

    FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590.

    SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

    Discussion

    We received a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff on a Boeing Model 747-400 airplane powered by Rolls-Royce RB211-524G/H engines. The automatic retraction was due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. In order to prevent impingement of efflux air from the thrust reversers during landing rollout, the FCU is designed to automatically retract the Group A leading edge flaps when a REV Amber signal is received from either both inboard or both outboard thrust reversers, and the airplane is on the ground. In this event, the first REV amber signal was received prior to V1 (takeoff decision speed). The second REV amber signal was received several seconds later, after takeoff decision speed. At that time, the FCU performed as designed and retracted the Group A leading edge flaps. At rotation the flight crew reported buffeting and stick shaker activation. After liftoff, a signal from the air/ground logic system caused the FCU to send a command to the Group A leading edge flaps to re-deploy after a five-second time delay. Re-deployment of the flaps takes approximately ten to fifteen additional seconds; during re-deployment, the flightcrew again reported buffeting and momentary stick shaker activation. The airplane jettisoned fuel and was landed safely; all four of the thrust reversers deployed and stowed normally after landing.
    In addition, one operator reported 12 single-engine REV indications during takeoff over the past three years, leading to seven rejected takeoffs. The incident described above was the first known simultaneous two- engine event.
    These conditions, if not corrected, could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Relevant Service Information

    We reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009. The service information describes procedures for modifying certain thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels. The modification includes re-routing and re- terminating one wire for each engine, and replacing the wire if necessary.

    FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD

    No airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously, except as described under “Difference Between the AD and the Service Information.”

    Difference Between the AD and the Service Information

    Operators should note that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, recommends that the modification be completed within 90 days (after the issue date of the service bulletin). This AD specifies a compliance time of 60 days. In developing this compliance time, we considered the manufacturer’s recommended 90-day compliance time (after June 8, 2009, which is the service bulletin issue date), a risk assessment of the unsafe condition, the scope of work required, and the number of affected airplanes, as well as the time normally required for the rulemaking process to be completed (approximately 30 days). In consideration of both of these factors, we find that a compliance time of 60 days after the effective date of this AD will fall approximately at the same time (calendar date) as the compliance time recommended by the manufacturer, and represents an appropriate interval of time for affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety. By adjusting the compliance time interval in this way:
    1. Operators will get a full 60 days in which to complete the modification; and
    2. The modification can be done within an interval of time that parallels normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators.
    This difference has been coordinated with Boeing.

    FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

    Automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps could result in reduced climb performance during takeoff. Such a restriction could result in failure to achieve a minimum rate of climb, and consequent collision with terrain or obstacles or forced landing of the airplane. Because of our requirement to promote safe flight of civil aircraft and thus, the critical need to assure the proper functioning of the FCU and the short compliance time involved with this action, this AD must be issued immediately.
    Because an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD, and because no airplanes affected by this AD are on the U.S. Register, we find that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are both impracticable and unnecessary and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

    Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments before it becomes effective. However, we invite you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD” at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this AD. We will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this AD because of those comments.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http:// www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we receive about this AD.

    Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

    Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    You can find our regulatory evaluation and the estimated costs of compliance in the AD Docket.

    List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

    Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

    PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

    Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

    2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

    Regulatory Information

    2009-13-03 Boeing: Amendment 39-15942. Docket No. FAA-2009-0556; Directorate Identifier 2009-NM-112-AD.

    Effective Date

    (a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective July 6, 2009.

    Affected ADs

    (b) None.

    Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-400 and -400F series airplanes, certificated in any category; Powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 series engines.

    Subject

    (d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 78: Engine.

    Unsafe Condition

    (e) This AD results from a report of automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff due to indications transmitted to the flap control unit (FCU) from the thrust reverser control system. The Federal Aviation Administration is issuing this AD to prevent automatic retraction of the leading edge flaps during takeoff, which could result in reduced climb performance and consequent collision with terrain and obstacles or forced landing of the airplane.

    Compliance

    (f) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done.

    Modification

    (g) Within 60 days after the effective date of this AD: Modify the thrust reverser control system wiring to the FCU in the P414 and P415 panels in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009.

    Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN: Douglas Bryant, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM- 140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-6505; fax (425) 917-6590. Or, e-mail information to 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC- Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) To request a different method of compliance or a different compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office. The AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.

    Material Incorporated by Reference

    (i) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-78A2181, dated June 8, 2009, to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this service information under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) For service information identified in this AD, contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-5000, extension 1, fax 206-766-5680; e-mail me.boecom@boeing.com; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (3) You may review copies of the service information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind, Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.
    (4) You may also review copies of the service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:// www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html.

    Footer Information
    Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 12, 2009.
    Ali Bahrami,
    Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
    Aircraft Certification Service.
    [FR Doc. E9-15255 Filed 6-29-09; 8:45 am]
    BILLING CODE 4910-13-P