NTSB Advisory

  • FOUR RECENT UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE EVENTS PROMPT NTSB TO ISSUE URGENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS TO FAA

    The National Transportation Safety Board today issued two
    urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA). The first recommendation asks that the
    FAA require operators of aircraft equipped with a particular
    model engine to immediately perform blade borescope
    inspections (BSI) of the high pressure turbine rotor at
    specific intervals until the current turbine disk can be
    redesigned and replaced with one that can withstand the
    unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. The
    second recommendation asks the FAA to require the engine
    manufacturer to immediately redesign the disk. The NTSB
    issued an additional recommendation for a requirement that
    operators perform a second type of inspection and another
    recommendation related to the engine manufacturer regarding
    the installation of the replacement disk.

    All four recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine
    (LPT) stage 3 (S3) rotor disk in the General Electric (GE)
    CF6-45/50 series turbofan engines that can fail unexpectedly
    when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance.

    An uncontained engine event occurs when an engine failure
    results in fragments of rotating engine parts penetrating
    and exiting through the engine case. Uncontained turbine
    engine disk failures within an aircraft engine present a
    direct hazard to an airplane and its passengers because
    high-energy disk fragments can penetrate the cabin or fuel
    tanks, damage flight control surfaces, or sever flammable
    fluid or hydraulic lines. Engine cases are not designed to
    contain failed turbine disks. Instead, the risk of
    uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks
    as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine
    whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the
    aircraft.

    In its safety recommendations to the FAA, the NTSB cited
    four foreign accidents, which the NTSB is either
    investigating or participating in an investigation led by
    another nation, in which the aircraft experienced an
    uncontained engine failure of its GE CF6-45/50 series
    engine.

    The date, location, and circumstances of these four events
    (none had injuries or fatalities) are as follows:

    On July 4, 2008, a Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) Boeing
    747-300 experienced an engine failure during initial climb
    after takeoff from Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This
    investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

    On March 26, 2009, an Arrow Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10F,
    about 30 minutes after takeoff from Manaus, Brazil,
    experienced loss of oil pressure in one engine. The pilots
    shut down the engine and diverted to Medellin, Columbia.
    This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

    On December 17, 2009, a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F airplane
    was passing through 7,000 feet above ground level (agl) when
    the flight crewmembers heard a muffled explosion and
    immediately applied left rudder. With one engine losing oil
    pressure, the airplane returned to land at Changi,
    Singapore. The NTSB is participating in the investigation
    that is being led by the Air Accident Investigation Bureau
    of Singapore.

    On April 10, 2010, an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an
    engine failure while accelerating for takeoff at Manama,
    Bahrain. The crew declared an emergency, rejected the
    takeoff, activated the fire suppression system, and
    evacuated the airplane. The NTSB is participating in the
    investigation that is being led by the Bahrain Ministry of
    Transportation – Civil Aviation.

    The four recommendations to the FAA are as follows:
    1. Immediately require operators of CF6-45/50-powered
    airplanes to perform high pressure turbine rotor blade
    borescope inspections every 15 flight cycles until the
    low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a
    redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance
    vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.
    (Urgent)
    2. Require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to
    perform fluorescent penetrant inspections of CF6-45-
    50- low pressure turbine stage 3 disks at every engine
    shop visit until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk
    is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand
    the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure
    rotor.
    3. Immediately require General Electric Company to
    redesign the CF6-45/50 low pressure turbine stage 3
    disk so that it will not fail when exposed to high
    pressure rotor unbalance forces. (Urgent)
    4. Once General Electric Company has redesigned the CF6-
    45/50 low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 disk in
    accordance with Safety Recommendation [3], require all
    operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to install
    the newly designed LPT S3 at the next maintenance
    opportunity.

  • NTSB Parental Safety Alert

    The National Transportation Safety Board today issued a
    Safety Alert to advise parents of the dangers to young
    children on aircraft when not restrained in an approved
    child restraint system or device. The Safety Alert notes
    that preventable injuries and deaths have occurred in
    children younger than 2 years who were unrestrained.

    Specific child passenger safety issues on aircraft include
    the likelihood that parents and caregivers may not be able
    to maintain a secure hold on a lap-held child during
    turbulence and survivable accidents. Additionally,
    unrestrained children have become separated from their
    parents during survivable crashes and parents were unable to
    locate them during the evacuation.

    “As the summer travel season gets underway, the NTSB would
    like to remind families traveling with children that child
    restraints are the best way to keep youngsters safe –
    whether traveling by car or air,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah
    A.P. Hersman. “While the NTSB would still like to see a
    federal regulation requiring the use of child restraints on
    aircraft, we continue to recommend that, when traveling by
    air, all parents purchase an airline ticket for every child
    in the family and place each child in a size-appropriate
    restraint system to ensure that everyone travels safely.”

  • |

    NTSB SENDING TEAM TO ASSIST GOVERNMENT OF INDIA WITH YESTERDAY’S AIRLINER ACCIDENT

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    May 22, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board is dispatching a
    team of investigators to assist the government of India with
    its investigation of yesterday’s airplane accident in
    Mangalore.

    At about 6:10 a.m. local time, Saturday, an Air India
    Express B737-800 (VT-AXV), overran the runway during landing
    at Mangalore International Airport. Preliminary reports
    indicate that 158 of the 166 passengers and crew onboard
    were fatally injured. Flight #182 originated in Dubai.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman has designated Senior Air
    Safety Investigator Joe Sedor as the U.S. Accredited
    Representative. The U.S. team will also include an NTSB
    flight operations specialist, an NTSB aircraft systems
    specialist, and technical advisors from the Federal Aviation
    Administration and Boeing. The team is expected to arrive
    in Mangalore on Tuesday morning (local time).

    The investigation is being conducted by India’s Directorate
    General of Civil Aviation, which will release all
    information on the progress of the investigation.

  • NTSB Safety Recommendations

    The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
    recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:
    Work with the military, manufacturers, and National
    Aeronautics and Space Administration to complete the
    development of a technology capable of informing pilots
    about the continuing operational status of an engine. (A-10-
    62)

    Once the development of the engine technology has been
    completed, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-62,
    require the implementation of the technology on transport-
    category airplane engines equipped with full-authority
    digital engine controls. (A-10-63)

    Modify the 14 Code of Federal Regulations 33.76(c) small and
    medium flocking bird certification test standard to require
    that the test be conducted using the lowest expected fan
    speed, instead of 100-percent fan speed, for the minimum
    climb rate. (A-10-64)

    During the bird-ingestion rulemaking database (BRDB) working
    group’s reevaluation of the current engine bird-ingestion
    certification regulations, specifically reevaluate the 14
    Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 33.76(d) large flocking
    bird certification test standards to determine whether they
    should 1) apply to engines with an inlet area of less than
    3,875 square inches and 2) include a requirement for engine
    core ingestion. If the BRDB working group’s reevaluation
    determines that such requirements are needed, incorporate
    them into 14 CFR 33.76(d) and require that newly
    certificated engines be designed and tested to these
    requirements. (A-10-65)

    Require manufacturers of turbine-powered aircraft to develop
    a checklist and procedure for a dual-engine failure
    occurring at a low altitude. (A-10-66)

    Once the development of the checklist and procedure for a
    dual-engine failure occurring at a low altitude has been
    completed, as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-66,
    require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135,
    and Part 91 Subpart K operators of turbine-powered aircraft
    to implement the checklist and procedure. (A-10-67)

    Develop and validate comprehensive guidelines for emergency
    and abnormal checklist design and development. The
    guidelines should consider the order of critical items in
    the checklist (for example, starting the auxiliary power
    unit), the use of opt outs or gates to minimize the risk of
    flight crewmembers becoming stuck in an inappropriate
    checklist or portion of a checklist, the length of the
    checklist, the level of detail in the checklist, the time
    needed to complete the checklist, and the mental workload of
    the flight crew. (A-10-68)

    Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135,
    and Part 91 Subpart K operators to include a dual-engine
    failure scenario occurring at a low altitude in initial and
    recurrent ground and simulator training designed to improve
    pilots? critical-thinking, task-shedding, decision-making,
    and workload-management skills. (A-10-69)

    Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135,
    and Part 91 Subpart K operators to provide training and
    guidance to pilots that inform them about the visual
    illusions that can occur when landing on water and that
    include approach and touchdown techniques to use during a
    ditching, with and without engine power. (A-10-70)

    Work with the aviation industry to determine whether
    recommended practices and procedures need to be developed
    for pilots regarding forced landings without power both on
    water and land. (A-10-71)

    Require applicants for aircraft certification to demonstrate
    that their ditching parameters can be attained without
    engine power by pilots without the use of exceptional skill
    or strength. (A-10-72)

    Require Airbus operators to amend the ditching portion of
    the Engine Dual Failure checklist and any other applicable
    checklists to include a step to select the ground proximity
    warning system and terrain alerts to OFF during the final
    descent. (A-10-73)

    Require Airbus operators to expand the angle-of-attack-
    protection envelope limitations ground-school training to
    inform pilots about alpha-protection mode features while in
    normal law that can affect the pitch response of the
    airplane. (A-10-74)

    Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139-
    certificated airports to conduct wildlife hazard assessments
    (WHA) to proactively assess the likelihood of wildlife
    strikes, and, if the WHA indicates the need for a wildlife
    hazard management plan (WHMP), require the airport to
    implement a WHMP into its airport certification manual. (A-
    10-75)

    Work with the U.S. Department of Agriculture to develop and
    implement innovative technologies that can be installed on
    aircraft that would reduce the likelihood of a bird strike.
    (A-10-76)
    Require Airbus to redesign the frame 65 vertical beam on
    A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes to lessen the
    likelihood that it will intrude into the cabin during a
    ditching or gear-up landing and Airbus operators to
    incorporate these changes on their airplanes. (A-10-77)

    Conduct research to determine the most beneficial passenger
    brace position in airplanes with nonbreakover seats
    installed. If the research deems it necessary, issue new
    guidance material on passenger brace positions. (A-10-78)

    Require, on all new and in-service transport-category
    airplanes, that cabin safety equipment be stowed in
    locations that ensure that life rafts and/or slide/rafts
    remain accessible and that sufficient capacity is available
    for all occupants after a ditching. (A-10-79)

    Require quick-release girts and handholds on all evacuation
    slides and ramp/slide combinations. (A-10-80)

    Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135,
    and Part 91 Subpart K operators to provide information about
    life lines, if the airplane is equipped with them, to
    passengers to ensure that the life lines can be quickly and
    effectively retrieved and used. (A-10-81)

    Require that aircraft operated by 14 Code of Federal
    Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K
    operators be equipped with flotation seat cushions and life
    vests for each occupant on all flights, regardless of the
    route. (A-10-82)

    Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, Part 135,
    and Part 91 Subpart K operators to brief passengers on all
    flotation equipment installed on an airplane, including a
    full demonstration of correct life vest retrieval and
    donning procedures, before all flights, regardless of route.
    (A-10-83)

    Require modifications to life vest stowage compartments or
    stowage compartment locations to improve the ability of
    passengers to retrieve life vests for all occupants. (A-10-
    84)

    Revise the life vest performance standards contained in
    Technical Standard Order-C13f to ensure that they result in
    a life vest that passengers can quickly and correctly don.
    (A-10-85)

    Conduct research on, and require 14 Code of Federal
    Regulations Part 121, Part 135, and Part 91 Subpart K
    operators to implement, creative and effective methods of
    overcoming passengers? inattention and providing them with
    safety information. (A-10-86)

  • |

    NTSB ISSUES UPDATE ON ITS INVESTIGATION OF FLIGHT 27 THAT DIVERTED TO DULLES AIRPORT

    NTSB ADVISORY
    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594
    May 21, 2010

    In its continuing investigation of a fire aboard a Boeing
    757 that diverted to Dulles Airport (IAD) enroute to the Los
    Angeles International airport (LAX) from New York’s John F.
    Kennedy International airport (JFK), the National
    Transportation Safety Board has developed the following
    factual information:

    On Sunday, May 16, 2010, about 9:17 pm (EDT) the pilots on
    United Airlines flight 27, a Boeing 757, N510UA, noted a
    strong acrid smell and observed smoke from the Captain’s
    lower front windshield. The incident occurred about 30
    minutes into the flight while the aircraft was level at
    36,000 feet MSL. On board the aircraft were 7 crew members
    and 105 passengers.

    The Captain and First Officer reported that they donned
    their oxygen masks and smoke goggles immediately after
    observing the smoke and fire. The Captain then gave control
    of the airplane to the First Officer and discharged a halon
    fire extinguisher. The smoke and fire dissipated but then
    re-ignited. The Captain obtained a second bottle from the
    Purser. The fire remained extinguished after this second
    bottle was discharged. At approximately 500 feet MSL on
    final approach to Runway19L at IAD, the Captain’s windshield
    cracked. The landing was uneventful. The airplane cleared
    the runway, after which ARFF (Aircraft Rescue Firefighting)
    entered the aircraft to check for residual heat and fire.
    None was found and the airplane was towed to the gate for
    deplaning. There were no evacuation and no injuries to the
    flight crew or passengers.

    Preliminary examination of the cockpit area revealed that
    the inner pane of the Captain’s windshield had cracked. One
    of the five terminal blocks attached to the inside of the
    lower left windshield was consumed by fire and the portion
    of the wire harness associated with this terminal block was
    significantly damaged by fire. There was significant sooting
    and paint peeling to the left hand side of the windshield
    air frame support.

    The Captain’s windshield was moved and will be examined by
    Board investigators at the manufacturer.

    Two previous windshield fire events on B757-200 aircraft
    prompted the NTSB to issue Safety Recommendation A-07-50
    http://www.ntsb.gov/recs/letters/2007/A07_49_50.pdf. The
    Safety Board investigators will look closely at the
    recovered hardware to determine if this latest event is
    related.

  • |

    NTSB SENDING TEAM TO ASSIST GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA IN AVIATION ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

    The National Transportation Safety Board is dispatching a team of investigators to assist the government of Libya in its investigation of an accident involving an Airbus A330-200, which was equipped with General Electric CF6-8E1
    engines. At approximately 6:00 am local time on May 12, 2010, the aircraft, operated by Afriqiyah Airways, crashed on approach to Tripoli airport in Tripoli, Libya. Of the 104 passengers and crew on board the airplane, there was one
    survivor. The airplane originated in Johannesburg, South Africa.

    As the State of design and manufacture for the engines, NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman has designated Senior Air Safety Investigator, Lorenda Ward, as the U.S. Accredited Representative. The U.S. team will also include an NTSB engines specialist as well as technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration, and General Electric. The team is expected to arrive tomorrow afternoon.

    The Bureau d’Enquete et d’Analyse (BEA) of France, representing the country of manufacture of the airplane, has also sent a team of investigators to Libya.

    The investigation is being conducted by the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority, which will release all information on the progress of the investigation.

  • |

    Dutch Safety Board (DSB) Issues Accident Report on February 25, 2009 Accident of a Boeing 737-800 at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (EHAM)

    The National Transportation Safety Board assisted in the investigation of the accident of Turkish Airlines flight 1951, a Boeing 737-800, registration TC-JGE, which occurred on February 25, 2009, while on approach to runway 18R at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport (EHAM), Amsterdam, Netherlands.

    Under the provisions of ICAO Annex 13, the investigation was conducted under the authority of the Dutch Safety Board ( – DSB) as the State of Occurrence. The United States, as State of Manufacture and Design of the Boeing 737, appointed an accredited representative from the NTSB’s Major Investigations Division to participate in the investigation and lead the U.S. investigative team. The U.S. team included NTSB technical advisors in flight crew operations, systems, powerplants, flight recorders, and survival factors. In addition, technical advisors from the FAA, Boeing, Honeywell, and CFM International were part of the team.

    The accredited representative and advisors participated throughout the investigation in the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On December 16, 2009, the DSB provided a copy of the draft final report to the U.S. team for review and comment.

    In accordance with ICAO Annex 13, the U.S. accredited representative provided the team’s comments to the DSB on February 13, 2010. The U.S. comments have been appended to the final version of the DSB report and consist of 1) a brief analysis of the factual data collected during the investigation; 2) detailed comments related to specific sections of the draft report; and 3) a summary of the findings from the engineering simulator testing conducted by the investigation.

  • NTSB PUBLISHES AGENDA FOR PROFESSIONALISM IN AVIATION FORUM

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington , DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 5, 2010
    SB-10-17

    ( Washington , DC ) The National Transportation Safety Board
    today published its agenda for the Professionalism in
    Aviation safety forum which will begin at 9:00 a.m.,
    Tuesday May 18, 2010. NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman
    will chair the three-day, en-banc forum which is open to the
    public (there is no registration for attendees).

    Following the Chairman’s opening remarks and the keynote
    presentation, 10 panels composed of invited representatives
    from industry, government agencies, labor, academia and
    professional associations, will address subjects relevant to
    developing and ensuring professionalism in pilots and air
    traffic controllers.

    Below is the forum’s agenda of panel titles:

    Tuesday, May 18
    —————————————————–
    * Welcome and Opening Remarks
    * Keynote Presentation
    * Screening and Selection Methods and Their Role in
    Developing Professional Pilots
    * Structured Development of Professional Pilots
    * Developing Excellence and Professionalism in Air
    Traffic Controllers Through Screening, Selection, and
    Training

    Wednesday, May 19
    —————————————————–
    * Developing Professionalism and Excellence Through
    Operator Training
    * Shared Responsibility to Reinforce Professional
    Standards in Pilots
    * Shared Responsibility to Reinforce Professional
    Standards in Air Traffic Controllers
    * The Captain’s Role in Ensuring Professionalism

    Thursday, May 20
    —————————————————–
    * Ensuring Effective Pilot-Controller Communications
    * Ensuring Excellence Through Data and Information
    Sharing
    * The Role of the Regulator in Ensuring Professionalism
    in Aviation
    * Closing Remarks
    Organizations and/or individuals can submit input for
    consideration as part of the forum’s archived materials.
    Submissions should directly address one or more of the 10
    subject areas (panel titles) of the forum and be submitted
    electronically as an attached document not to exceed 10
    pages to: Professionalism.Forum@ntsb.gov. The deadline for
    receipt is June 3, 2010. Input received will be entered
    into the Safety Board’s public docket on this forum.

  • |

    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION OF SOUTHWEST 737 AND NEWS HELICOPTER OVER HOUSTON HOBBY AIRPORT

    The NTSB has launched an investigation into the near collision of a Southwest Airlines jetliner and a news helicopter over a runway at Houston’s Hobby Airport last week.

    At about 12:25 p.m. CDT on Wednesday, April 28, a Southwest Airlines 737, flight 1322 (N242WN) and a Bell 207 news gathering helicopter (N6YJ), came within an estimated 125 feet vertically and 100 feet laterally from each other as both were departing the airport.

    The Baltimore-bound 737 with 135 passengers and a crew of five had been cleared to depart from runway 12R. At about the same time the helicopter was cleared to depart from another part of the airport. The near-collision occurred as the helicopter converged into the flight path of the 737 shortly after the jetliner lifted off from the runway. Both crews took evasive maneuvers to avoid colliding.

    NTSB investigator Betty Koschig, an air traffic control specialist based in Washington, is traveling to Houston tomorrow to begin the investigation.

    This is the second runway safety incident that the NTSB has investigated in the last two weeks. On April 19, a 737 and a small private plane came within about 200 feet of colliding over the airport in Burbank, Calif.

    Improving runway safety has been on the NTSB’s Most Wanted List of Safety Improvements since 1990:
    http://www.ntsb.gov/Recs/mostwanted/runways.htm

  • |

    NTSB: CREW ACTIONS AND SAFETY EQUIPMENT CREDITED WITH SAVING LIVES

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: May 4, 2010
    SB-10-16

    Washington, DC — In addition to the decisions and actions of
    the flight crewmembers, overwater safety equipment likely
    saved lives that might have otherwise been lost to drowning,
    the NTSB said.

    Today the Safety Board met to conclude its 15-month
    investigation into the January 15, 2009, accident in which a
    US Airways A320 jetliner bound for Charlotte was ditched
    into the Hudson River after striking a flock of Canada geese
    shortly after departing New York’s LaGuardia Airport. All of
    the 150 passengers and five crewmembers survived.

    Investigators said that had the airplane not been equipped
    with forward slide/rafts, many of the 64 occupants of those
    rafts would likely have been submerged in the 41-degree
    Hudson River, potentially causing a phenomenon called “cold
    shock,” which can lead to drowning in as little as five
    minutes.

    The accident flight had the additional safety equipment
    available only because the particular aircraft operated that
    day happened to be certified for extended overwater (EOW)
    operations even though current FAA regulations did not
    require the flight from New York to Charlotte to be so
    equipped.

    Good visibility, calm waters, and proximity of passenger
    ferries, which rescued everyone on flight 1549 within 20
    minutes, were other post-accident factors the Safety Board
    credited with the survival of all aboard the aircraft.

    “Once the birds and the airplane collided and the accident
    became inevitable, so many things went right,” said NTSB
    Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “This is a great example of
    the professionalism of the crewmembers, air traffic
    controllers and emergency responders who all played a role
    in preserving the safety of everyone aboard.”

    The Safety Board said that the probable cause of the
    accident was the ingestion of large birds into each engine,
    resulting in an almost total loss of engine power.
    Contributing to the severity of the fuselage damage and
    resulting unavailability of the aft slide/rafts, the Board
    cited the FAA’s inadequate ditching certification standards,
    lack of industry training on ditching techniques, and the
    captain’s resulting difficulty maintaining his intended
    airspeed on final approach due to task saturation resulting
    from the emergency situation.

    The report adopted by the Safety Board today validated the
    Captain’s decision to ditch into the Hudson River saying
    that it “provided the highest probability that the accident
    would be survivable.” Contributing to the survivability of
    the accident was the crew resource management between the
    captain and first officer, which allowed them to maintain
    control of the airplane, increasing the survivability of the
    impact with the water.

    In addressing the hazards that birds pose to aircraft of all
    sizes, the report noted that most bird strike events occur
    within 500 feet of the ground while flight 1549 struck geese
    at 2700 feet. Investigators said that this difference
    demonstrates that “bird strike hazards to commercial
    aircraft are not limited to any predictable scenario.”

    Concluding that engine screens or changes to design would
    not be a viable solution to protect against bird ingestion
    events on commercial jetliners, the Board made it clear that
    the potential for significant damage from encounters with
    birds remains a challenge to the aviation community.

    As part of its extensive examination into the behavior of
    the passengers and crewmembers from the time the plane left
    the gate at LaGuardia to the moment the last person was
    rescued in the river, the Board noted that since most of the
    passengers indicated that they had not paid attention to the
    preflight oral safety briefing, “more creative and effective
    methods of conveying safety information to passengers” was
    needed. Survival factors investigators also found that
    passengers had significant problems in donning the life
    vests that were stowed under each seat.

    The Board made 35 safety recommendations on engine and
    aircraft certification standards, checklist design, flight
    crew training, airport wildlife mitigation, cabin safety
    equipment, and preflight passenger briefings.

    “I believe the safety recommendations that have come out of
    this investigation have an extraordinary origin — a very
    serious accident in which everyone survived,” said Chairman
    Hersman. “Even in an accident where everyone survives, there
    are lessons learned and areas that could use improvement.
    Our report today takes these lessons learned so that, if our
    recommendations are implemented, every passenger and
    crewmember may have the opportunity to benefit from the
    advances in safety.”

  • |

    Press Release: NTSB CHAIRMAN ISASI SPEECH

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 29, 2010
    SB-10-14

    NTSB CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES ADVANTAGES – AND LIMITATIONS – OF USING DATA-DRIVEN SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE AVIATION SAFETY

    National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman said today that the use of data to manage and improve safety in the aviation industry has had a positive effect on the world’s improving aviation safety record but she cautioned against over-reliance on these systems to the neglect of forensic investigation.

    Addressing a conference of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators in Chantilly, Virginia, Hersman noted that “we have reached an era when aviation accidents are extremely rare…” One reason is the use of data – particularly, but not exclusively, Safety Management Systems (SMS) – in accident prevention and investigation.

    The Board has been advocating the use of SMS for a decade, having issued 17 recommendations in favor of implementing SMS in the aviation industry. When implemented correctly, Hersman said, “SMS holds real promise in a variety of scenarios.” She noted several instances where SMS helped
    eliminate potential unsafe conditions, notably a corporate flight operation that used flight data to determine that high bank angles occurred on repositioning flights, and a review of commercial aircraft approach data that indicated a high rate of TCAS (Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
    System) warnings at a particular airport. In these instances, she said, “data management adeptly identified a clearly measurable set of information and allowed for a relatively simple and effective solution.”

    However, Hersman noted, SMS works well for companies that are already “getting it right,” but may provide little more than false confidence for companies with less than robust safety cultures.

    Also, there are accidents caused by a combination of factors that SMS cannot possibly detect. As an example, Hersman mentioned the British Airways Boeing 777 crash at Heathrow Airport two years ago involving a dual engine failure on approach. It was not data analysis that solved the mystery, but detailed forensic analysis; the circumstances were so unusual that a data analysis system would not pick them up.

    Hersman said she hoped that with all the focus SMS will place on data collection and analysis, “let’s not lose focus on outcomes. The success of SMS won’t be measured by how much data we collect, but by how many lives we save.”

    “I will enthusiastically support any approach that will make our nation safer,” she said. “But I think we need a measured approach – one that acknowledges the potential benefits and limitations of SMS, and further, doesn’t discount tried and true methods for identifying vulnerabilities, such as accident investigations.”

  • NTSB Hudson River Docket Opened

    NTSB TO OPEN DOCKET ON INVESTIGATION INTO THE MIDAIR COLLISION OVER THE HUDSON RIVER

    Washington, DC – In its continuing investigation of the midair collision of an air tour helicopter and a small plane over the Hudson River, the National Transportation Safety Board will open the public docket on Wednesday, April 28, 2010 at 10 a.m.

    On August 8, 2009, at 11:53 a.m. EDT, a Eurocopter AS 350 BA (N401LH) operated by Liberty Helicopters and a Piper PA-32R-300 (N71MC) operated by a private pilot, collided in midair over the Hudson River near Hoboken, New Jersey. The certificated commercial pilot and five passengers onboard
    the helicopter were killed. The certificated private pilot and two passengers onboard the airplane were also killed. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plans were filed for either flight. The local sightseeing
    helicopter flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 136. The personal airplane flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

    The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide any analysis. The docket includes: investigative group factual reports, interview summaries, crew statements, air traffic control transcripts, controller statements, the meteorology report, and other documents.

    Additional material will continue to be added to the docket as it becomes available. Analysis of the accident, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the
    investigation is completed.

  • NTSB To Meet

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    April 26, 2010

    NTSB TO MEET ON US AIRWAYS 1549 HUDSON RIVER ACCIDENT

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public Board meeting on May 4 on its investigation into the accident in which a US Airways jetliner came to rest in the Hudson River near New York City after a low-altitude encounter with a flock of birds.

    The purpose of the meeting will be to determine the probable cause of the accident and to consider proposed safety recommendations to reduce the likelihood of future such mishaps.

    On January 15, 2009, at 3:27 p.m. EDT, US Airways flight 1549, an Airbus A320, lost engine power after striking a flock of Canada geese shortly after departing New York’s LaGuardia Airport. The captain brought the plane down into the Hudson River after determining that landing at an airport was not feasible. The plane, destined for Charlotte, N.C., carried 150 passengers and a crew of five. Four passengers and one flight attendant received serious injuries.

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION

    NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR COLLISION OF JETLINER AND SMALL PLANE OVER AIRPORT IN CALIFORNIA

    The National Transportation Safety Board has opened an investigation into the near collision of a commercial jetliner and a small private plane at the intersection of two active runways at Burbank’s Bob Hope Airport in Southern California.

    At about 10:58 a.m. PDT on April 19, Southwest Airlines flight 649, a Boeing 737-700 (N473WN) inbound from Oakland, carrying 119 passengers and a crew of five was landing on runway 8 while a Cessna 172, in the departure phase of a “touch and go” on runway 15, passed over the 737. A “touch and go” is a practice maneuver in which an aircraft briefly lands on the runway before accelerating and becoming airborne again.

    According to the Federal Aviation Administration, the airplanes came within 200 feet vertically and 10 feet laterally of each other at the runway intersection. No one was injured in the incident, which occurred under a clear sky with visibility of 10 miles.

    NTSB investigator Betty Koschig, an air traffic control specialist based in Washington, is traveling to Burbank today to begin the investigation.

  • |

    NTSB Press Release

    NTSB TO HOLD A PUBLIC FORUM ON PROFESSIONALISM IN AVIATION

    ( Washington , DC ) The National Transportation Safety Board
    will hold a safety forum on professionalism in aviation
    beginning Tuesday, May 18, 2010. The three-day, en-banc forum
    will be chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

    “NTSB’s investigations into the midair collision over the
    Hudson River last August, the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407
    in February 2009, and the October 2009 Northwest pilots’
    overflight of their intended airport provided the impetus for
    this forum because all of them clearly demonstrated the
    hazards to aviation safety when pilots and air traffic
    controllers depart from standard operating procedures and
    established best practices,” Hersman said. “During the forum,
    we will gather information on the screening, selection and
    training of pilots and controllers and methods to reinforce
    professionalism and excellence.”

    Panelists participating in the forum will represent industry,
    government agencies, labor, academia, and professional
    associations. A technical panel composed of NTSB staff from
    the Offices of Aviation Safety and Research and Engineering,
    and the NTSB Board Members, who will make up the Board of
    Inquiry, will question the panelists.

    Dr. Tony Kern, an internationally recognized human factors and
    pilot performance expert, is the forum’s keynote speaker. The
    names of the participating panelists and the agenda will be
    provided in early May.

  • | |

    NTSB TO HOLD A PUBLIC FORUM


    Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a safety forum on professionalism in aviation beginning Tuesday, May 18, 2010. The three-day, en-banc forum will be chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.

    “NTSB’s investigations into the midair collision over the Hudson River last August, the crash of Colgan Air flight 3407 in February 2009, and the October 2009 Northwest pilots’ overflight of their intended airport provided the impetus for this forum because all of them clearly demonstrated the hazards to aviation safety when pilots and air traffic controllers depart from standard operating procedures and established best practices,” Hersman said. “During the forum, we will gather information on the screening, selection and training of pilots and controllers and methods to reinforce professionalism and excellence.”

    Panelists participating in the forum will represent industry, government agencies, labor, academia, and professional associations. A technical panel composed of NTSB staff from the Offices of Aviation Safety and Research and Engineering, and the NTSB Board Members, who will make up the Board of Inquiry, will question the panelists.

    Dr. Tony Kern, an internationally recognized human factors and pilot performance expert, is the forum’s keynote speaker. The names of the participating panelists and the agenda will be provided in early May.

    The forum, titled “Professionalism in Aviation: Ensuring Excellence in Pilot and Air Traffic Controller Performance,” will be held at the NTSB’s Board Room and Conference Center, located at 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The public can view the forum in person or by webcast on the NTSB’s web site.

  • |

    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATST


    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: April 8, 2010

    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATISTICS; ON-DEMAND ACCIDENTS AT LOWEST LEVEL IN LAST 20 YEARS

    Washington, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board today released preliminary aviation accident statistics for 2009 showing an overall decrease in U. S. civil aviation accidents that includes general aviation and on-demand Part 135 operations. In fact, on-demand Part 135 operations had the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents for that type of air operation in the last 2 decades.

    The total number of U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased from 1,658 in 2008 to 1,551 in 2009. Total fatalities also showed a decrease from 566 to 534. The majority of these fatalities occurred in general aviation and scheduled Part 121 operations.

    General aviation accidents decreased from 1,566 in 2008 to 1,474 in 2009. There were 272 fatal general aviation accidents, down from 275 the year before. However, the accident rate increased to 7.20 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 6.86 in 2008, due to the decrease in the number total of flight hours. Although fatalities decreased from 494 to 474, the fatal accident rate increased to from 1.21 to 1.33.

    Last year, one fatal accident occurred involving a scheduled Part 121 operator. On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8- 400, operating as Continental Connection flight 3407, crashed outside of Buffalo , New York, resulting in 50 fatalities.

    On-demand Part 135 operations reported 47 accidents in 2009, a decrease from 58 in 2008. Fatalities also decreased from 69 in 2008 to 17 in 2009. The accident rate decreased to 1.63 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 1.81 in 2008.

    Tables 1-12 providing additional statistics are available at: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm

  • |

    NTSB RELEASES 2009 AVIATION ACCIDENT STATISTICS

    ON-DEMAND ACCIDENTS AT LOWEST LEVEL IN LAST 20 YEARS

    Washington, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board
    today released preliminary aviation accident statistics for
    2009 showing an overall decrease in U. S. civil aviation
    accidents that includes general aviation and on-demand Part
    135 operations. In fact, on-demand Part 135 operations had
    the lowest number of accidents and fatal accidents for that
    type of air operation in the last 2 decades.

    The total number of U.S. civil aviation accidents decreased
    from 1,658 in 2008 to 1,551 in 2009. Total fatalities also
    showed a decrease from 566 to 534. The majority of these
    fatalities occurred in general aviation and scheduled Part
    121 operations.

    General aviation accidents decreased from 1,566 in 2008 to
    1,474 in 2009. There were 272 fatal general aviation
    accidents, down from 275 the year before. However, the
    accident rate increased to 7.20 per 100,000 flight hours in
    2009 from 6.86 in 2008, due to the decrease in the number
    total of flight hours. Although fatalities decreased from
    494 to 474, the fatal accident rate increased to from 1.21
    to 1.33.

    Last year, one fatal accident occurred involving a scheduled
    Part 121 operator. On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air,
    Inc., Bombardier DHC-8- 400, operating as Continental
    Connection flight 3407, crashed outside of Buffalo , New
    York, resulting in 50 fatalities.

    On-demand Part 135 operations reported 47 accidents in 2009,
    a decrease from 58 in 2008. Fatalities also decreased from
    69 in 2008 to 17 in 2009. The accident rate decreased to
    1.63 per 100,000 flight hours in 2009 from 1.81 in 2008.

  • |

    NTSB Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the
    Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the
    nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all
    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require
    replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine
    mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking
    in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has investigated two accidents involving Piper PA-46-350P airplanes that resulted from fatigue cracking in the attachment between the nose landing gear (NLG) actuator and the engine mount. Such fatigue cracks can lead to the collapse of the NLG, which could cause a serious or catastrophic accident if the separation occurred at a critical point during takeoff or landing or if the aircraft collided with parked aircraft or aircraft waiting at taxiways.

    On August 16, 2009, about 1130 eastern daylight time,1 a Piper PA-46-350P, N548C, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Orlando-Sanford International Airport, Sanford, Florida.2 The private pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident.

    On May 19, 2007, about 1305, a Piper PA-46-350P, N411MD, experienced an NLG collapse during landing at the Indianapolis Metropolitan Airport near Fishers, Indiana.3 The pilot and passenger were uninjured, and the airplane sustained substantial damage. No flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, nor was one required to be filed by the FAA. VMC prevailed at the time of the accident.

    The NLG actuator on Piper PA-46-350P airplanes is bolted via two attachment feet to the lower aft engine mount, which is constructed of welded tubes (see figure 1). The NLG actuator extends down and forward from the attachment feet and attaches to the NLG. During taxi, takeoff, and landing, the attachment feet transmit loads from the NLG to the engine mount, thus creating repetitive tensile stress in the engine mount attachment feet areas and, in some cases, leading to fatigue cracking.

    Piper PA-46-310 and -350P airplanes have either an original engine mount or a redesigned engine mount (see figure 2).5 In the original design, each attachment foot is a two-piece part consisting of a metal disk welded to the end of a metal tube, which is then welded to the engine mount support tubes. In the redesigned engine mount, each attachment foot is a one-piece machined part made from a single piece of steel, eliminating the welding within the feet themselves. However, on both the original and redesigned engine mounts, the attachment feet are welded to the engine mount support tubes, which is where fatigue cracking has been identified by the NTSB.

    The airplane in the Sanford, Florida, accident was equipped with a redesigned engine mount that was installed at the time of manufacture. The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N548C revealed that the right attachment foot had fractured at the engine mount support tube. The NTSB materials laboratory’s examination of the fractured foot revealed a fatigue crack emanating from multiple origins at the exterior of the joint where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 8 years old and had accumulated 711 flight hours with 878 cycles since new (CSN).

    The airplane in the Fishers, Indiana, accident had a redesigned engine mount that was installed on March 21, 2003. The airplane had accumulated 542 flight hours and an estimated 1,400 cycles since then. At the time of the accident, the airplane was 7 years old and had accumulated a total of 772 flight hours.6 The NTSB’s postaccident examination of N411MD revealed that the right attachment foot had separated from the rest of the engine mount due to fatigue cracking7 where the attachment foot was welded to the support tube.
    The NTSB also notes that a similar incident of fatigue cracking of an NLG attachment foot was found on September 29, 2009, during a routine inspection of a Piper PA-46-350P airplane. The airplane was 5 years old and had accumulated a total of 678 flight hours with 600 CSN and was equipped with the redesigned engine mount.

    On April 22, 2002, Piper issued mandatory Service Bulletin (SB) 1103, recommending that operators of PA-46-310P, -350P, and -500TP8 airplanes inspect the NLG actuator attachment foot area of the original engine mounts for evidence of fatigue cracking. The SB indicated that such cracking had been found in this area of some original engine mounts.

    The inspection included visual and liquid penetrant inspection at the next regular scheduled maintenance event and each 100 hours in service or at the annual inspection, whichever occurred first. If cracks were found, the original engine mounts were to be replaced with the redesigned engine mounts before returning to service. SB 1103 does not subject the airplanes with redesigned engine mounts to repetitive inspections, and replacing the original engine mount with the redesigned engine mount relieves the need for repetitive inspections. Piper issued several inspections.

    The NTSB is concerned that the redesigned engine mounts on Piper P
    A-46-310 and -350P model airplanes have attachment foot areas susceptible to fatigue cracking similar to the fatigue cracks identified by Piper on the original engine mounts. The NTSB concludes that the tensile stresses applied to the redesigned engine mounts could lead to fatigue fractures in the NLG actuator attachment foot areas. However, redesigned engine mounts are not currently subject to the inspection provisions of SB 1103, nor is compliance with SB 1103 required.10 Although the NTSB is not aware of incidents or accidents involving original engine mounts that have not been inspected, the NTSB believes that inspections of the original engine mounts should also be mandatory in order to detect fatigue cracking.

    Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the NLG actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary.

    As previously noted, Piper redesigned the engine mounts on the PA-46-310 and -350P in an effort to prevent fatigue cracking at the attachment foot areas. However, based on the accidents discussed above, this redesign does not appear to have been successful since fatigue cracking has also occurred in the redesigned engine mounts. Therefore, the NTSB recommends that the FAA require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas.
    Therefore, the National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Require repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the nose landing gear actuator attachment foot areas on all Piper PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts and require replacement, if necessary. (A-10-44)

    Require Piper to redesign the PA-46-310 and -350P engine mounts so that they are not susceptible to fatigue cracking in the attachment foot areas. (A-10-45)

    In response to the recommendations in this letter, please refer to Safety Recommendations A-10-44 and -45. If you would like to submit your response electronically rather than in hard copy, you may send it to the following e-mail address: correspondence@ntsb.gov.

  • |

    CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA RUNWAY OVERRUN

    NTSB TO OPEN PUBLIC DOCKET ON JANUARY 2010 CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA RUNWAY OVERRUN

    As part of the Safety Board’s investigation into the runway overrun at Yeager Airport, Charleston, West Virginia, the NTSB will open the public accident docket on Thursday, April 8, 2010.

    On January 19, 2010, PSA Airlines d.b.a. US Airways Express flight 2495, a Bombardier CL600-2B19, registration N246PS, rejected the takeoff and ran off the end of the runway at Yeager Airport, Charleston, West Virginia. The airplane stopped in the engineered materials arresting system (EMAS).

    There were no injuries to the 31 passengers or 3 crew members onboard and the airplane received minor damage. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 121 and its intended destination was Charlotte/Douglas International Airport, Charlotte, North Carolina.

    The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has assigned an Accredited Representative to assist the investigation under the provisions of ICAO Annex 13 as the State of the Manufacturer of the airplane.

    The information being released is factual in nature and does not provide any analysis. It will include investigative group factual reports, photographs, and other documents from the investigation. Additional material will be added to the docket as it becomes available. Analysis of the accident, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the investigation is completed.

  • |

    NTSB Release: Maintenance Causes 2008 Crash

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    April 6, 2010
    SB-10-10

    POOR MAINTENANCE STARTED ACCIDENT CHAIN THAT RESULTED IN HIGH-SPEED RUNWAY EXCURSION THAT KILLED FOUR IN 2008, NTSB DETERMINES

    Washington, DC – A chartered business jet crashed at a South Carolina airport 18 months ago because of the operator’s inadequate maintenance of the airplane’s tires and the decision by the captain to attempt a high-speed rejected takeoff, which went against standard operating procedures and training, the NTSB determined today.

    On September 19, 2008, at 11:53 p.m. EDT, a Bombardier Learjet Model 60 (N999LJ) operated by Global Exec Aviation and destined for Van Nuys, California, overran runway 11 during a rejected takeoff at Columbia Metropolitan Airport. After the airplane left the departure end of runway 11, it struck airport lights, crashed through a perimeter fence, crossed a roadway and came to rest on a berm. The captain, the first officer, and two passengers were killed; two other passengers were seriously injured.

    The investigation revealed that prior to the accident the aircraft was operated while the main landing gear tires were severely underinflated because of Global Exec Aviation’s inadequate maintenance. The underinflation compromised the integrity of the tires, which led to the failure of all four of the airplane’s main landing gear tires during the takeoff roll.

    Shortly after the first tire failed, which occurred about 1.5 seconds after the airplane passed the maximum speed at which the takeoff attempt could be safely aborted, the first officer indicated that the takeoff should be continued but the captain decided to reject the takeoff and deployed the airplane’s thrust reversers. Pilots are trained to avoid attempting to reject a takeoff at high-speed unless the pilot concludes that the airplane is unable to fly; the investigation found no evidence that the accident airplane was uncontrollable or unable to become airborne.

    The tire failure during the takeoff roll damaged a sensor, which caused the airplane’s thrust reversers to return to the stowed position. While the captain was trying to stop the airplane by commanding reverse thrust, forward thrust was being provided at near-takeoff power because the thrust reversers were stowed. The Safety Board determined that the inadvertent forward thrust contributed to the severity of the accident.

    The Safety Board also found that neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor Learjet adequately reviewed the Airplane’s design after a similar uncommanded forward thrust accident that occurred during landing in Alabama in 2001. While the modifications put into place after the Alabama accident provided additional protection against uncommanded forward thrust upon landing, no such protection was provided for a rejected takeoff.

    “This accident chain started with something as basic as inadequate tire inflation and ended in tragedy,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “This entirely avoidable crash should reinforce to everyone in the aviation community that there are no small maintenance items because every time a plane takes off, lives are on the line.”

    The safety recommendations that the NTSB made to the Federal Aviation Administration as a result of this investigation are: provide pilots and maintenance personnel with information on the hazards associated with tire underinflation, including the required intervals for tire pressure checks, and allow pilots to perform pressure checks in air taxi operations to ensure that tires remain safely inflated at all times; require tire pressure monitoring systems for all transport category airplanes; identify and correct deficiencies in both Learjet’s thrust reverser system safety analysis and the FAA’s design certification process to ensure that hazards encountered in all phases of flight are mitigated; require that simulator training for pilots who conduct turbojet operations include opportunities to practice responding to events other than engine failures near takeoff speeds; require that pilots who fly air taxi turbojet operations have a minimum level of pilot operating experience in an airplane type before acting as pilot-in- command in that type; and require that airplane tire testing criteria reflect the loads that may be imposed on tires both during normal operating conditions and after the loss of one tire.

  • | | | |

    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    NTSB PRESS RELEASE

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: February 2, 2010
    SB-10-02

    CAPTAIN’S INAPPROPRIATE ACTIONS LED TO CRASH OF FLIGHT 3407 IN CLARENCE CENTER, NEW YORK, NTSB SAYS

    The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the
    captain of Colgan Air flight 3407 inappropriately responded
    to the activation of the stick shaker, which led to an
    aerodynamic stall from which the airplane did not recover.
    In a report adopted today in a public Board meeting in
    Washington, additional flight crew failures were noted as
    causal to the accident.

    On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
    400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight
    3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara
    International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed
    into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5
    nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2
    flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane
    were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the
    airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash
    fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
    Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey.
    Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
    time of the accident.

    The report states that, when the stick shaker activated to
    warn the flight crew of an impending aerodynamic stall, the
    captain should have responded correctly to the situation by
    pushing forward on the control column. However, the
    captain inappropriately pulled aft on the control column and
    placed the airplane into an accelerated aerodynamic stall.

    Contributing to the cause of the accident were the
    Crewmembers’ failure to recognize the position of the
    low-speed cue on their flight displays, which indicated that
    the stick shaker was about to activate, and their failure to
    adhere to sterile cockpit procedures. Other contributing
    factors were the captain’s failure to effectively manage the
    flight and Colgan Air’s inadequate procedures for airspeed
    selection and management during approaches in icing
    conditions.

    As a result of this accident investigation, the Safety Board
    issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) regarding strategies to prevent flight
    crew monitoring failures, pilot professionalism, fatigue,
    remedial training, pilot records, stall training, and
    airspeed selection procedures. Additional recommendations
    address FAA’s oversight and use of safety alerts for
    operators to transmit safety-critical information, flight
    operational quality assurance (FOQA) programs, use of
    personal portable electronic devices on the flight deck, and
    weather information provided to pilots.

    At today’s meeting, the Board announced that two issues that
    had been encountered in the Colgan Air investigation would
    be studied at greater length in proceedings later this year.
    The Board will hold a public forum this Spring exploring
    pilot and air traffic control high standards. This
    accident was one in a series of incidents investigated by
    the Board in recent years – including a mid-air collision
    over the Hudson River that raised questions of air traffic
    control vigilance, and the Northwest Airlines incident last
    year where the airliner overflew its destination airport in
    Minneapolis because the pilots were distracted by non-flying
    activities – that have involved air transportation
    professionals deviating from expected levels of performance.
    In addition, this Fall the Board will hold a public forum
    on code sharing, the practice of airlines marketing their
    services to the public while using other companies to
    actually perform the transportation. For example, this
    accident occurred on a Continental Connection flight,
    although the transportation was provided by Colgan Air.

    A summary of the findings of the Board’s report are
    available on the NTSB’s website at:
    http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm
    -30-

  • | |

    NTSB ADVISORY: NTSB TO MEET ON FINAL REPORT ON COLGAN AIR DASH-8 ACCIDENT NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

    ************************************************************
    NTSB ADVISORY
    ************************************************************

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    January 29, 2010

    ************************************************************

    NTSB TO MEET ON FINAL REPORT ON COLGAN AIR DASH-8 ACCIDENT
    NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

    ************************************************************

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a Board
    meeting on Tuesday, February 2, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. in its
    Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.,
    Washington, D.C. The Board will consider a final report on
    the following investigation:

    On February 12, 2009, a Colgan Air, Inc., Bombardier DHC-8-
    400, N200WQ, operating as Continental Connection flight
    3407, was on an instrument approach to Buffalo-Niagara
    International Airport, Buffalo, New York, when it crashed
    into a residence in Clarence Center, New York, about 5
    nautical miles northeast of the airport. The 2 pilots, 2
    flight attendants, and 45 passengers aboard the airplane
    were killed, one person on the ground was killed, and the
    airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash
    fire. The flight was a 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
    Part 121 scheduled passenger flight from Newark, New Jersey.
    Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the
    time of the accident.

    A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be
    available on the Board’s website at
    http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm. Technical
    support details are available under “Board Meetings” on the
    NTSB website. To report any problems, please call 703-993-
    3100 and ask for Webcast Technical Support.

    A summary of the Board’s final report, which will include
    findings, probable cause and safety recommendations, will
    appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of the
    meeting. The entire report will appear on the website
    several weeks later.

    Verizon wireless cellular service is accessible in the Board
    Room and Conference Center.

    Directions to the NTSB Board Room: Front door located on
    Lower 10th Street, directly below L’Enfant Plaza. From
    Metrorail, exit L’Enfant Plaza station at 9th and D Streets
    escalator, walk through shopping mall, at CVS store (on the
    left), take escalator (on the right) down one level. The
    Board Room will be to your left.

    NTSB Media contact: Keith Holloway
    202-314-6100
    hollowk@ntsb.gov