NTSB Advisory

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    NTSB BRIEFING TODAY AT 4:00 PM (ADT) ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN ALASKA

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    August 13, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a press
    briefing on its investigation into the airplane crash near
    Dillingham, Alaska.

    The briefing will take place today at 4:00 p.m. Alaska
    Daylight Time (ADT) at the Hotel Hilton Anchorage, Lupine
    Room, 500 West Third Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman will conduct the
    briefing.

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    NTSB BRIEFING TODAY AT 4:00 PM (ADT) ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN ALASKA

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    August 11, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a press
    briefing on its investigation into the airplane
    crash near Dillingham, Alaska.

    The briefing will take place today at 4:00 p.m. Alaska
    Daylight Time (ADT) at the Hotel Hilton Anchorage,
    Fireweed room, 500 West Third Avenue, Anchorage, Alaska.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman will conduct the
    briefing.

    -30-

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    NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 to require separate seats and restraints for every occupant. (A-10-121)

    Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 to require each person who is less than 2 years of age to be restrained in a separate seat position by an appropriate child restraint system during takeoff, landing, and turbulence. (A-10-122)

    Amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations Parts 121 and 135 to require each person who is less than 2 years of age to be restrained in a separate seat position by an appropriate child restraint system during takeoff, landing, and turbulence. (A-10-123)

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    NTSB BRIEFING TODAY AT 4:00 PM (ADT) ON AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN ALASKA

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a press
    briefing on its investigation into last night’s airplane
    crash near Dillingham, Alaska.

    The briefing will take place today at 4:00 p.m. Alaska
    Daylight Time (ADT) at the Signature Flight Support
    Building, 2nd floor conference room, 6231 South Airpark
    Place, Anchorage, Alaska.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman will conduct the
    briefing.

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    NTSB LAUNCHES TEAM TO INVESTIGATE AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT IN ALASKA

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    August 10, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board has launched
    a Go Team to investigate last night’s airplane crash near
    Dillingham, Alaska.

    At about 8:00 p.m. Alaska Daylight Time, a DeHavilland
    DHC-3T (N455A) crashed 10 miles northwest of Aleknagik,
    Alaska. Reports are that 5 of the 9 persons on board died
    in the accident.

    Senior air safety investigator Clint Johnson, from the
    NTSB’s Anchorage regional office, will serve as
    Investigator-in-Charge. He will be assisted by
    investigators from the Alaska office and from NTSB
    headquarters in Washington, D.C.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman is accompanying the
    team and will serve as spokesperson for the on-scene
    investigation. Terry Williams is the NTSB press officer
    traveling with the team. The full team is expected to
    arrive in Dillingham around mid-day today.

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    NTSB BOARD MEMBERS TO MEET WMATA BOARD

    NTSB Advisory
    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594
    August 8, 2010

    The five Members of the National Transportation Safety Board will meet the board of directors of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) on Monday, August 9, at 2:30 p.m. at the WMATA headquarters building, 600 Fifth Street, N.W. in Washington, D.C.

    The two groups will discuss the recently issued NTSB findings and safety recommendations related to the NTSB’s accident investigation of the June 2009 Red Line collision of two WMATA trains.

    At the conclusion of the meeting, there will be a brief press availability with Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman in the WMATA board room.

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    NTSB Safety Recommendation A-10-119

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594
    August 6, 2010

    NTSB Safety Recommendation A-10-119 and -120
    and Reiteration of NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-63

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the European Aviation Safety Agency:

    Modify European Aviation Safety Agency Certification Specifications for Large Aeroplanes CS-25 to ensure safe handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope, including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity. (A-10-119)

    After the yaw axis certification standard recommended in Safety Recommendation A-10-119 has been established, review the designs of existing airplanes to determine if they meet the standard. For existing airplane designs that do not meet the standard, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) should determine if the airplanes would be adequately protected from the adverse effects of a potential aircraft-pilot coupling (APC) after rudder inputs at all airspeeds. If adequate protection does not exist, EASA should require modifications, as necessary, to provide the airplanes with increased protection from the adverse effects of a potential APC after rudder inputs at high airspeeds. (A-10-
    120)

    In addition, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates the following recommendation to the European Aviation Safety Agency:

    Review the options for modifying the Airbus A300-600 and the Airbus A310 to provide increased protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds and, on the basis of this review, require modifications to the A300-600 and A310 to provide increased protection from potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at high airspeeds. (A-04-63

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    NTSB TO OFFER TRAINING ON EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS INVOLVED IN MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    August 5, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board is devoting two
    days at its Training Center to offer guidance to aviation
    public affairs professionals on how to most effectively
    manage emergency communications following a major aircraft
    accident or incident.

    The training will be offered on October 7-8, 2010, at the
    NTSB Training Center in Ashburn, Virginia, (near Washington,
    D.C.) and is aimed at communications professionals working
    with airports, airlines and corporations with aviation
    departments.

    Representatives from the NTSB Office of Public Affairs will
    explain the process by which investigation-related
    information is verified and released to the news media and
    the family members of those affected by a major accident.

    Members of the national news media will be there to discuss
    how previous accidents have been covered and to talk about
    how social media is changing how breaking news is
    disseminated and consumed. Airport and airline
    communications professionals will provide case studies on
    how communications during previous aircraft incidents and
    accidents were handled.

    Those interested in learning more should see the complete
    description of the training, registration information, and
    cost to attend at:
    http://www.ntsb.gov/TC/CourseInfo/PA302_2010.htm

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    NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594
    July 30, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

    Conduct research into and document the effects of mountain wave and downslope conditions at airports, such as Denver International Airport, that are located downwind of
    mountainous terrain (including, for example, airports in or near Colorado Springs, Colorado; Anchorage, Alaska; Salt Lake City, Utah; and Reno, Nevada), identify potential
    mountain-wave-related hazards to ground operations at those airports, and disseminate the results to pilots and airport air traffic control personnel to allow for more informed
    runway selection decisions. (A-10-105)

    Archive all low-level windshear alert system (LLWAS) data obtained from Denver International Airport and other airports that experience similar wind conditions and make these data available for additional research and the potential future development of an improved LLWAS algorithm for crosswind and gusty wind alerts on air traffic control tower ribbon display terminals. (A-10-106)

    Modify Federal Aviation Administration Order 7110.65 to require air traffic controllers at airports with multiple sources of wind information to provide pilots with the maximum wind component, including gusts, that the flight could encounter. (A-10-107)

    Review the required documentation for all low-level windshear alert system (LLWAS)-equipped air traffic control towers to ensure that a letter to airmen has been published
    and is easily accessible describing the location and designation of the remote sensors, the capabilities and limitations of the system, and the availability of current LLWAS remote sensor wind information on the request of a pilot, in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration Order 7210.3. (A-10-108)

    Require air traffic control towers to locally develop and implement written runway selection programs that proactively consider current and developing wind conditions and include clearly defined crosswind components, including wind gusts, when considering operational advantage with respect to runway selection. (A-10-109)

    Gather data on surface winds at a sample of major U.S. airports (including Denver International Airport) when high wind conditions and significant gusts are present and use these data to develop realistic, gusty crosswind profiles for use in pilot simulator training programs. (A-10-110)

    Require 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91K operators to incorporate the realistic, gusty crosswind profiles developed as a result of Safety Recommendation A- 10-110 into their pilot simulator training programs. (A-10-111)

    Once realistic, gusty crosswind profiles as asked for in Safety Recommendation A-10-110 are developed, develop a standard methodology, including pilot-in-the-loop testing, for transport-category airplane manufacturers to establish empirically based, type-specific maximum-gusting-crosswind limitations for transport-category airplanes that account for wind gusts. (A-10-112)

    Once a methodology as asked for in Safety Recommendation A- 10-112 has been developed, require manufacturers of transport-category airplanes to develop type-specific, maximum-crosswind takeoff limitations that account for wind gusts. (A-10-113)

    Until the actions described in Safety Recommendation A-10-113 are accomplished, require manufacturers of transport- category airplanes to provide operators with interim crosswind takeoff guidelines that account for wind gusts. (A-10-114)

    Work with U.S. airline operators to review and analyze operational flight data to identify factors that contribute to encounters with excessive winds and use this information to develop and implement additional strategies for reducing the likelihood of wind-related runway excursions. (A-10-115)

    Require cockpit crew seats installed in newly manufactured airplanes that were type certificated before 1988 to meet the crashworthiness standards contained in 14 Code of Federal Regulations 25.562. (A-10-116)

    Require operators to perform periodic inspections on the Burns Aerospace model 2501-5 jumpseats for fatigue cracks within the jumpseat structure and replace the jumpseat if fatigue cracks are found. (A-10-117)

    Require that operators of transport-category airplanes that use galley latches or latch plates secured solely by adhesives that may degrade over time modify the latches to include mechanical fasteners. (A-10-118)

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    NTSB SENDING TEAM TO ASSIST GOVERNMENT OF SAUDI ARABIA WITH MD-11 FREIGHTER ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    The National Transportation Safety Board is dispatching a team of investigators to assist the government of Saudi Arabia with its investigation of today’s cargo airplane accident in Riyadh.

    At about 11:38 a.m. local time today, a Lufthansa MD-11(D-ALCQ) freighter crashed while landing at the King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh. The two crewmembers on
    board survived the accident. Flight 8460 originated in Frankfurt.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman has designated Senior Air Safety Investigator Bill English as the U.S. Accredited Representative. The U.S. team will also include NTSB flight operations specialists, an NTSB aircraft systems specialist, and technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration and Boeing.

    The investigation is being conducted by Saudi Arabia’s General Authority of Civil Aviation
    (http://www.gaca.gov.sa/GACA/Home.aspx?l=EN), which will release all information on the progress of the investigation.

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING TURBULENCE EVENT OVER MISSOURI

    NTSB Advisory
    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    The National Transportation Safety Board is investigating yesterday’s turbulence event experienced by United Airlines Flight #967 (N773UA).

    The airplane, a Boeing 777-200, en route from Washington, D.C. (Dulles) to Los Angeles, Calif.(LAX), encountered severe turbulence at approximately 6:14 p.m. (MDT) about 60 miles southeast of Kansas City, Missouri and about 40 miles north of Springfield, Missouri, at approximately 34,000 feet. The aircraft diverted and landed in Denver, Colorado.

    The airplane had 255 passengers and 10 crew members onboard. Seventeen passengers and four flight attendants reported minor injuries. Initial reports indicate minor damage to the interior of the cabin.

    Information from the flight data recorder was downloaded in Denver and was received at NTSB headquarters today where it will be studied by investigators.

    Senior Air Safety Investigator, Bill English, is the Investigator-in-Charge. Mr. English and the NTSB technical experts assisting him will conduct the investigation from the NTSB headquarters in Washington, D.C. and will not travel to the scene.

    Crew member, passenger, and weather information will be gathered over the coming days.

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    NTSB Release: Probable Cause of Denver Runway Accident Cited

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: July 13, 2010

    Lack of Rules Requiring Dissemination of Wind Condition Data and Pilot’s Insufficient Rudder Control Cited as Probablye Cause of 2008 Denver Runway Accident

    Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the probable cause of the 2008 Continental Airlines flight 1404 runway excursion accident was the captain’s cessation of rudder input, which was needed to maintain directional control of the airplane, about 4 seconds before the aircraft departed the runway, when the airplane encountered a strong and gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and experience.

    Contributing to the accident was the air traffic control system that did not require or facilitate the dissemination of key available wind information to air traffic controllers and pilots, and inadequate cross wind training in the airline industry due to deficient simulator wind gust modeling.

    On December 20, 2008, Continental Airlines flight 1404 veered off the left side of runway 34R during a takeoff from Denver International Airport. As a result, the captain initiated a rejected takeoff and the airplane came to rest between runways 34R and 34L. There was a post-crash fire.
    All 110 passengers and 5 crewmembers evacuated the airplane immediately after it came to rest. The captain and five passengers were seriously injured.

    At the time of the accident, mountain wave and downsloping wind conditions existed in the Denver area and the strong localized winds associated with these conditions resulted in pulses of strong wind gusts at the surface that posed a threat to operations at Denver International Airport.

    “This aircraft happened to be in the direct path of a perfect storm of circumstances that resulted in an unexpected excursion in an airport with one of the most sophisticated wind sensing systems in the country,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “It is critical that pilots receive training to operate aircraft when high wind conditions and significant gusts are present, and that sufficient airport-specific wind information be provided to ATC controllers and pilots as well.”

    As a result of this accident the NTSB issued 14 recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration regarding mountain waves, wind dissemination to flightcrews, runway selection, pilot training for crosswind takeoffs, and crashworthiness.

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    NTSB TO MEET ON 2008 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES FLIGHT 1404 ACCIDENT AT DENVER AIRPORT

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    July 8, 2010

    The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a Board meeting on Tuesday, July 13, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. in its Board Room and Conference Center, 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. There is one item on the agenda.

    On December 20, 2008, Continental Airlines flight 1404 departed the left side of runway 34R at Denver International Airport during takeoff. There was a post-crash fire. The captain and five of the 110 passengers were seriously injured.

    A live and archived webcast of the proceedings will be available on the Board’s website at http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm.

    Technical support details are available under “Board Meetings” on the NTSB website. To report any problems, please call 703-993- 3100 and ask for Webcast Technical Support.

    A summary of the Board’s final report, which will include findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations, will appear on the website shortly after the conclusion of the meeting. The entire report will appear on the website several weeks later.

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    NTSB RELEASES 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: July 1, 2010
    SB-10-26

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – The National Transportation Safety Board
    today delivered its 2009 Annual Report to Congress, which
    provides a comprehensive accounting of ongoing and completed
    investigations, as well as other agency activities. The
    report also highlights successes for the Most Wanted List of
    Transportation Safety Improvements.

    “The NTSB is dedicated to executing thorough accident
    investigations and issuing recommendations for improved
    transportation safety,” said Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman.
    “The report issued today shows this dedication through
    detailed and clear accounts of our work and achievements in
    2009.”

    New to the 2009 report are enhanced features that illustrate
    the scope and complexity of the NTSB’s work. Among these
    features are: maps of regional office locations in addition
    to investigation launch-site maps; additional information
    describing how non-investigative units support the NTSB
    mission; key industry facts showing the impact and breadth
    of completed agency work; and updated “At A Glance” boxes
    calling out the status of recommendations, investigation and
    report production statistics, and staff demographics.

    Among the highlights from the year’s activity described in
    the report are that the NTSB issued 240 new safety
    recommendations across all transportation modes. Closed
    recommendations encompass 42 aviation, 10 highway, 14
    marine, 6 railroad, and 2 pipeline safety improvements.
    During 2009, the NTSB also initiated 13 major accident
    launches and released 19 major investigative reports.

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    This Months Bad News: Trans States Holdings Inc

    This month’s poster child for how not to run your commuter airline:

    Trans States Holdings Inc.

    After two incidents in the last four months, there’s now a $2.5 million civil penalty in the offing for Trans States Holdings Inc. from the FAA. But more crucial than the last two incidents, the problem really comes down to hundreds of safety violations on 320 flights over the past two years, all related to maintenance, after repeated warnings and reoccurring violations.

    What is it I always say?

    Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance.

    See Below:

    FAA Proposes $2.5 Million in Civil Penalties Against Trans States, GoJet

    WASHINGTON — The Federal Aviation Administration is proposing $2,476,075 in civil penalties against Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines of Bridgeton, Mo., for violation of various maintenance procedures and operating nine jets on 320 revenue passenger flights when the aircraft were not in compliance with Federal Aviation Regulations.

    Trans States Airlines and GoJet Airlines are both owned and operated by Trans States Holdings. Trans States Airlines performs maintenance and training on GoJet aircraft.

    The proposed civil penalties involve seven GoJet+ Canadair Regional Jets and two Trans States Embraer 145 regional jets. The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet operated aircraft when maintenance had been carried out incorrectly, and that the company failed to complete required maintenance record-keeping.

    The FAA alleges Trans States and GoJet violated a number of maintenance regulations and procedures, including use of outdated manufacturers’ maintenance instructions to perform repairs; failure to connect a wing flap actuator to its torque tube, rendering the flaps inoperative; failure to document an inspection after an aircraft was damaged by severe turbulence; failure to document and carry out proper repairs after aircraft warning systems identified problems; improper repair of an engine oil leak and failure to comply with minimum equipment list regulations.

    “Air carriers cannot ignore maintenance requirements or allow employees to take a pass on following regulations,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “Safety depends not only on maintenance work being done correctly, but also being recorded properly.”

    Trans States and GoJet have 30 days from receipt of the civil penalty letters to respond to the agency.

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    DR. EARL F. WEENER SWORN IN AS NTSB MEMBER

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 30, 2010
    SB-10-25

    Earl F. Weener, Ph.D., took the oath of office today as a
    Member of the National Transportation Safety Board.

    Dr. Weener is a licensed pilot who has dedicated his entire
    career to the field of aviation safety. He most recently has
    been a consultant and fellow for the Flight Safety
    Foundation, where he worked to reduce accidents through
    coordinated industry programs.

    From 1984 to 1999, Dr. Weener held a series of positions
    with The Boeing Company, including three Chief Engineer
    positions, in Airworthiness, Reliability and
    Maintainability, and Safety; in System Engineering; and in
    Safety Technology Development. He also served four years as
    Boeing’s Manager of Government Affairs.

    He has served as a general aviation flight instructor and
    Part 135 pilot.

    Dr. Weener earned all three of his academic degrees in
    Aerospace Engineering at the University of Michigan – his
    bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate.

    Among his awards are a 1994 Laurel Award from Aviation Week
    and Space Technology magazine and, in 2005, the Honeywell
    Bendix Trophy for Aviation Safety.

    Dr. Weener’s term as a Member of the NTSB expires December
    31, 2015.

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    American Airlines eyes Boeing Engine Pylons

    Cracks in the engine pylons of three American Airlines Boeing 767’s are prompting concerns over the need of more frequent inspections of Boeing 767’s. The FAA says American and Boeing are looking for the cause of the cracking, which was discovered during routine metallurgical tests. Boeing is preparing a service bulletin establishing new guidelines for inspecting this particular part, over and above the every “1500 flights” which stands now. The flight which originally caught American’s attention had developed the cracks during the last 500 flights since its last pylon inspection. Caution about underlying structural issues is being addressed.

    The preliminary conclusion is that certain maintenance practices may play in the underlying cause of the cracking. A known issue is that some of the cracks arise from holes used to install bolts, implying that the bolt holes may compromise the structural integrity, or at least affect the pylon’s longevity; and may affect “fail-safe” design.

    The FAA has not yet mandated inspection of 767 other jets operated by other carriers, nor have they determined if winglets are a contributing factor.

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    NTSB SENDING TEAM TO CANADA TO ASSIST WITH INVESTIGATION OF RUNWAY EXCURSION ACCIDENT

    The National Transportation Safety Board is dispatching a team of investigators to assist the Transportation Safety Board of Canada with its investigation of today’s airplane accident in Ottawa.

    At about 2:30 p.m. EDT, a Trans States Airlines Embraer-145 regional jet operated as United Express flight 8050 (N847HK), overran runway 25 while landing at Ottawa International Airport. Preliminary reports indicate that there were several injuries among the 33 passengers and three crewmembers onboard. The flight originated from Washington Dulles International Airport.

    NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman has designated Air Safety Investigator John Lovell as the U.S. Accredited Representative. The U.S. team will also include an NTSB flight operations specialist, an NTSB survival factors specialist, and technical advisors from the Federal Aviation Administration. The team will arrive in Ottawa on Thursday morning.

    The Transportation Safety Board of Canada
    (http://www.tsb.gc.ca/eng/contactez-contact/index.asp) will
    release all information on the progress of the
    investigation.

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    Taxi and Ground Movement

    NOTICE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
    FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION N JO
    Air Traffic Organization Policy
    Effective Date:
    June 30, 2010
    Cancellation Date:
    March 10, 2011
    SUBJ: Taxi and Ground Movement Operations
    1. Purpose of This Notice. This notice amends Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)Order JO 7110.65, Air Traffic Control, Paragraph 3-7-2, Taxi and Ground Movement Operations, by deleting the phraseology and procedure of issuing “taxi to” when authorizing an aircraft to taxi to an assigned takeoff runway, thus allowing an aircraft to cross all runways/taxiways which the taxi route intersects except the assigned runway.

    2. Audience. This notice applies to the Terminal Services organization and all associated air traffic control facilities.

    3. Where Can I Find This Notice? This notice is available on the MYFAA employee Web site at https://employees.faa.gov/tools_resources/orders_notices/ and on the air traffic publications Web site at http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications.

    4. Explanation of Policy Change. This change establishes the requirement that an explicit runway crossing clearance be issued for each runway (active/inactive or closed) crossing and requires an aircraft/vehicle to have crossed the previous runway before another runway crossing clearance may be issued. At airports where the taxi route between runway centerlines is less than 1,000 feet apart, multiple runway crossings may be issued after receiving approval by the Terminal Services Director of Operations.

    5. Procedures. Change FAA Order JO 7110.65, paragraph 3-7-2, to read as follows:
    3-7-2. TAXI AND GROUND MOVEMENT OPERATIONS Issue the route for the aircraft/vehicle to follow on the movement area in concise and easy to understand terms. The taxi clearance must include the specific route to follow. When a taxi clearance to a runway is issued to an aircraft, confirm the aircraft has the correct runway assignment.
    NOTE-
    1. A pilot’s read back of taxi instructions with the runway assignment can be considered confirmation of runway assignment.
    2. Movement of aircraft/vehicles on nonmovement areas is the responsibility of the pilot, the aircraft operator, or the airport management.
    a. When authorizing an aircraft/vehicle to proceed on the movement area, or to any point other than assigned takeoff runway, specify the route/taxi instructions. If it is the intent to hold the aircraft/vehicle short
    of any given point along the taxi route, issue the route and then state the holding instructions.
    NOTE-
    1. The absence of holding instructions authorizes an aircraft/vehicle to cross all taxiways that intersect the taxi route.
    2. Movement of aircraft/vehicles on nonmovement areas is the responsibility of the pilot, the aircraft operator, or the
    airport management.
    Phraseology, no change.
    06/30/10 N JO 7110.528
    2
    EXAMPLE-
    “Cross Runway Two Eight Left, hold short of Runway Two Eight Right.”
    “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed to the hangar.”
    “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed straight ahead then via ramp to the hangar.”
    “Taxi/continue taxiing/proceed on Taxiway Charlie, hold short of Runway Two Seven.”
    or
    “Taxi/continue taxing/proceed on Charlie, hold short of Runway Two Seven.”
    b. When authorizing an aircraft to taxi to an assigned takeoff runway, state the departure runway
    followed by the specific taxi route. Issue hold short restrictions when an aircraft will be required to hold short
    of a runway or other points along the taxi route.
    PHRASEOLOGY-
    “Runway (number) taxi via (route as necessary).”
    or
    “Runway (number) taxi via (route as necessary)(hold short instructions as necessary).”
    EXAMPLE-
    “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via taxiway Alpha, hold short of taxiway Charlie.”
    or
    “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Alpha, hold short of Charlie.”
    or
    “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via taxiway Alpha, hold short of Runway Two Seven Right.”
    or
    “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Charlie, cross Runway Two Seven Left, hold short of Runway Two Seven Right.”
    or
    “Runway Three Six Left, taxi via Alpha, Charlie, cross Runway One Zero.”
    c. Aircraft/vehicles must receive a runway crossing clearance for each runway that their taxi route
    crosses. An aircraft/vehicle must have crossed a previous runway before another runway crossing clearance
    may be issued.
    NOTEA
    runway crossing clearance is required to cross or operate on any active/inactive or closed runway.
    EXAMPLE-
    “Cross Runway One Six Left, hold short of Runway One Six Right.”
    06/30/10 N JO 7110.528
    3
    d. When an aircraft/vehicle is instructed to “follow” traffic and requires a runway crossing, issue a
    runway crossing clearance in addition to the follow instructions and/or hold short instructions, as applicable.
    EXAMPLE-
    “Follow (traffic), cross Runway Two Seven Right.”
    or
    “Follow (traffic), cross Runway Two Seven Right, hold short Runway Two Seven Left.”
    e. At those airports where the taxi distance between runway centerlines is less than 1,000 feet, multiple
    runway crossings may be issued with a single clearance. The air traffic manager must submit a request to the
    appropriate Terminal Services Director of Operations for approval before authorizing multiple runway
    crossings.
    REFERENCEFAAO
    JO 7210.3, Para 10-3-10 MULTIPLE RUNWAY CROSSINGS
    Renumber subparagraphs d thru f as f thru h.
    6. Distribution. This notice is distributed to the following Air Traffic Organization (ATO) service
    units: Terminal, En Route and Oceanic, and System Operations Services; the ATO Office of Safety;
    Office of the Service Center; the Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service; the William J. Hughes Technical
    Center; and the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center.
    7. Background. The FAA Runway Safety Call to Action Committee issued several recommendations
    to address improving runway safety across the NAS. In response to the Committee’s recommendations,
    the ATO convened a Safety Risk Management Panel to evaluate the safety of the Committee
    recommendations. These are two of the recommended changes from the Call to Action Committee.
    Changes will also be made to the AIM and AIP. Title14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 91.129(i),
    will be changed after the completion of the rulemaking period.

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    NTSB Safety Recommendations

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that The
    Air Care Alliance:

    Require voluntary pilot organizations to verify pilot
    currency before every flight. (A-10-102)

    Require that voluntary pilot organizations inform
    passengers, at the time of inquiry about a flight, that the
    charitable medical flight would not be conducted under the
    same standards that apply to a commercial flight (such as
    under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 or Part 135).
    (A-10-103)

    In conjunction with your affiliate organizations and other
    charitable medical transport organizations, develop,
    disseminate, and require all voluntary pilot organizations
    to implement written safety guidance, best practices, and
    training material for volunteer pilots who operate
    charitable patient transport flights under 14 Code of
    Federal Regulations Part 91. The information should address,
    at a minimum, aeronautical decision-making; proper preflight
    planning; pilot qualification, training, and currency; and
    self-induced pressure. (A-10-104)

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING AIRCRAFT EVENT AT REAGAN NATIONAL AIRPORT

    The National Transportation Safety Board today dispatched a team to investigate today’s aviation event that occurred at approximately 10:05 a.m. at Reagan National Airport, in Washington, D.C.

    A Boeing Stearman ST75 (N27WE) ground looped and then flipped on landing on runway 1.

    Senior Aviation Safety Investigator Robert Benzon has been designated as the Investigator-in-Charge.

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION OF US AIRWAYS A319 AND CARGOLUX AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL 747 IN ALASKA

    The National Transportation Safety Board has launched an investigation into the near midair collision of a passenger jetliner and a cargo jumbo jet.

    On May 21, 2010, at about 12:10 a.m. Alaska Daylight Savings Time, an Airbus A319, operating as US Airways flight 140, and a Boeing 747-400, operating as Cargolux Airlines International flight 658, came within an estimated 100 feet vertically and a .33 mile lateral separation as the B747 was departing Anchorage International Airport (ANC) and the A319 was executing go-around procedures at ANC.

    The A319, with 138 passengers and crew aboard, was inbound from Phoenix (PHX) to runway 14 and the B747, with a crew of 2, was departing Anchorage en route to Chicago (ORD) on runway 25R. The incident occurred in night visual meteorological conditions with 10 miles of visibility.

    According to the TCAS report from the A319 crew, that aircraft was approaching ANC when, because of the effects of tailwinds on the aircraft’s approach path, the crew initiated a missed approach and requested new instructions from air traffic control. The tower controller instructed the A319 to turn right heading 300 and report the departing B747 in sight. After the A319 crew reported the B747 in sight, the controller instructed the A319 to maintain visual separation from the B747, climb to 3000 feet, and turn right heading 320. The A319 crew refused the right turn because the turn would have put their flight in direct conflict with the B747. The A319 crew then received a resolution advisory to “monitor vertical speed” and the crew complied with the descent command. During the descent, the A319 crew lost sight of the B747. At about 1700 feet above ground level, the A319 crew received a “clear of conflict” aural command.

    There were no reported injuries or damage to either aircraft.

    NTSB investigator Dan Bartlett, an air traffic control specialist based in Washington, will be traveling to Anchorage to begin the investigation.

  • FOUR RECENT UNCONTAINED ENGINE FAILURE EVENTS PROMPT NTSB TO ISSUE URGENT SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS TO FAA

    Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board today issued two urgent safety recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The first recommendation asks that the FAA require operators of aircraft equipped with a particular model engine to immediately perform blade borescope inspections (BSI) of the high pressure turbine rotor at specific intervals until the current turbine disk can be redesigned and replaced with one that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. The second recommendation asks the FAA to require the engine manufacturer to immediately redesign the disk. The NTSB issued an additional recommendation for a requirement that operators perform a second type of inspection and another recommendation related to the engine manufacturer regarding the installation of the replacement disk.

    All four recommendations apply to the low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 (S3) rotor disk in the General Electric (GE) CF6-45/50 series turbofan engines that can fail unexpectedly when excited by high-pressure (HP) rotor unbalance.

    An uncontained engine event occurs when an engine failure results in fragments of rotating engine parts penetrating and exiting through the engine case. Uncontained turbine engine disk failures within an aircraft engine present a direct hazard to an airplane and its passengers because high-energy disk fragments can penetrate the cabin or fuel tanks, damage flight control surfaces, or sever flammable fluid or hydraulic lines. Engine cases are not designed to contain failed turbine disks. Instead, the risk of uncontained disk failure is mitigated by designating disks as safety-critical parts, defined as the parts of an engine whose failure is likely to present a direct hazard to the aircraft.

    In its safety recommendations to the FAA, the NTSB cited four foreign accidents, which the NTSB is either investigating or participating in an investigation led by another nation, in which the aircraft experienced an uncontained engine failure of its GE CF6-45/50 series engine.

    The date, location, and circumstances of these four events (none had injuries or fatalities) are as follows:

    On July 4, 2008, a Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) Boeing 747-300 experienced an engine failure during initial climb after takeoff from Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

    On March 26, 2009, an Arrow Cargo McDonnell Douglas DC-10F, about 30 minutes after takeoff from Manaus, Brazil, experienced loss of oil pressure in one engine. The pilots shut down the engine and diverted to Medellin, Columbia. This investigation has been delegated to the NTSB.

    On December 17, 2009, a Jett8 Cargo Boeing 747-200F airplane was passing through 7,000 feet above ground level (agl) when the flight crewmembers heard a muffled explosion and immediately applied left rudder. With one engine losing oil pressure, the airplane returned to land at Changi, Singapore. The NTSB is participating in the investigation that is being led by the Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore.

    On April 10, 2010, an ACT Cargo Airbus A300B4 experienced an engine failure while accelerating for takeoff at Manama, Bahrain. The crew declared an emergency, rejected the takeoff, activated the fire suppression system, and evacuated the airplane. The NTSB is participating in the investigation that is being led by the Bahrain Ministry of Transportation – Civil Aviation.

    The four recommendations to the FAA are as follows:

    Immediately require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to perform high pressure turbine rotor blade borescope inspections every 15 flight cycles until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor. (Urgent)
    Require operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to perform fluorescent penetrant inspections of CF6-45- 50- low pressure turbine stage 3 disks at every engine shop visit until the low pressure turbine stage 3 disk is replaced with a redesigned disk that can withstand the unbalance vibration forces from the high pressure rotor.
    Immediately require General Electric Company to redesign the CF6-45/50 low pressure turbine stage 3 disk so that it will not fail when exposed to high pressure rotor unbalance forces. (Urgent)
    Once General Electric Company has redesigned the CF6- 45/50 low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 3 disk in accordance with Safety Recommendation [3], require all operators of CF6-45/50-powered airplanes to install the newly designed LPT S3 at the next maintenance opportunity.

  • NTSB INVESTIGATING NEAR MIDAIR COLLISION OF US AIRWAYS A319 AND CARGOLUX AIRLINES INTERNATIONAL 747 IN ALASKA

    The National Transportation Safety Board has launched an
    investigation into the near midair collision of a passenger
    jetliner and a cargo jumbo jet.

    On May 21, 2010, at about 12:10 a.m. Alaska Daylight Savings
    Time, an Airbus A319, operating as US Airways flight 140,
    and a Boeing 747-400, operating as Cargolux Airlines
    International flight 658, came within an estimated 100 feet
    vertically and a .33 mile lateral separation as the B747 was
    departing Anchorage International Airport (ANC) and the A319
    was executing go-around procedures at ANC.

    The A319, with 138 passengers and crew aboard, was inbound
    from Phoenix (PHX) to runway 14 and the B747, with a crew of
    2, was departing Anchorage en route to Chicago (ORD) on
    runway 25R. The incident occurred in night visual
    meteorological conditions with 10 miles of visibility.

    According to the TCAS report from the A319 crew, that
    aircraft was approaching ANC when, because of the effects of
    tailwinds on the aircraft’s approach path, the crew
    initiated a missed approach and requested new instructions
    from air traffic control. The tower controller instructed
    the A319 to turn right heading 300 and report the departing
    B747 in sight. After the A319 crew reported the B747 in
    sight, the controller instructed the A319 to maintain visual
    separation from the B747, climb to 3000 feet, and turn right
    heading 320. The A319 crew refused the right turn because
    the turn would have put their flight in direct conflict with
    the B747. The A319 crew then received a resolution advisory
    to “monitor vertical speed” and the crew complied with the
    descent command. During the descent, the A319 crew lost
    sight of the B747. At about 1700 feet above ground level,
    the A319 crew received a “clear of conflict” aural command.

    There were no reported injuries or damage to either
    aircraft.

    NTSB investigator Dan Bartlett, an air traffic control
    specialist based in Washington, will be traveling to
    Anchorage to begin the investigation.

    A preliminary report of the incident will be available on
    the Board’s website within 10 business days.

    # # #

  • ADS-B Equipment Required in Next Decade

    Notice Number: NOTC2314
    New Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) Rule
    On May 27, 2010, the FAA published new rules (contained in 14 CFR §92.225 and §91.227) mandating airspace and avionics performance requirements after January 1, 2020. The avionics perform a function that is generally known as “ADS-B Out” which transmits precise location and other information about the aircraft to ground stations and other ADS-B equipped aircraft.

    The ADS-B rule mandates ADS-B Out avionics performance when operating within the designated airspace, giving aircraft owners approximately 10 years to equip.

    The ADS-B rule, like current transponder operating requirements, requires operators to have ADS-B Out avionics installed and operating in order to fly their aircraft in the busiest airspace, as described below:

    Class A, B, and C airspace.

    All airspace at and above 10,000 feet MSL (mean sea level) over the 48 contiguous United States and the District of Columbia.

    Within 30 nautical miles of airports listed in 14 CFR §91.225, from the surface up to 10,000 feet MSL.

    Class E airspace over the Gulf of Mexico from the coastline of the United States out to 12 nautical miles, at and above 3,000 feet MSL.
    FAA Technical Service Orders (TSOs) describe the equipment approved for ADS-B operations. The ADS-B rule states that avionics must meet the standards of either TSO-C166b (for 1090ES link equipment) or TSO-C154c (for UAT link equipment). TSO-C166b is required in Class A airspace and either link can be used in all other airspace.

    For more information about the FAA’s ADS-B program, visit www.adsb.gov.