When you read about an on board medical emergency such as the Continental Airlines medical emergency, it does make one think about the potential for on board emergency rooms. Not only is the technology (two-way air-to-ground RDT equipment) available, it is becoming cost effective, especially considering the expense of a 525-passenger Airbus A380 making an emergency landing can cost up to $200,000. Imagine if an online emergency room could care for a critically ill individual until the flight actually reached it’s destination. Or even if the equipment were only used DURING an emergency landing–it would result in a greater survival rate when a medical emergency occurs. It bears thinking about.

The death of 4 individuals–pilot, Martin Rhodes, 48, of Stoke-on-Trent, Simon Marshall, 51, of Lichfield, Ryan Birch, 15, and his father, Tony Birch, 52, of Wolverhampton, have been recorded as accidental deaths. They were flying to France in a Piper Cherokee light aircraft when it crashed close to the Isle of Wight Airport, in Sandown, on August 5, 2007.

source http://www.burtonmail.co.uk/burtonmail-news/displayarticle.asp?id=404453 author JONATHAN HORSFALL

What: easyJet London to Edinburgh
Where: priority landing in Edinburgh
When: Thursday
Who: unwary passenger
Why: unnamed passenger was rushed to hospital but was found to have no serious injuries

George’s Point of View

So here you are on the plane, minding your own business, and some guy opens an overhead locker and a champagne bottle rolls out and pops you on the head and knocks you out cold. That would hurt. The guy should have yelled “Fore!” or something.

Can you say “Lawsuit”?

[Federal Register: March 26, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 57)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 13148-13152]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr26mr09-30]

———————————————————————–

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 Series Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

———————————————————————–

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)

[[Page 13149]]

originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and
correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes
the unsafe condition as:

One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
* * * The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result
in the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.

* * * * *
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. The proposed AD would require actions
that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI.

DATES: We must receive comments on this proposed AD by April 27, 2009.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-40, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For service information identified in this proposed AD, contact
Airbus SAS–Airworthiness Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61
93 45 80, e-mail airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com; Internet http://
www.airbus.com. You may review copies of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221 or 425-227-1152.

Examining the AD Docket

You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Operations office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this proposed AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The street
address for the Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket
shortly after receipt.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425)
227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

We invite you to send any written relevant data, views, or
arguments about this proposed AD. Send your comments to an address
listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2009-0264;
Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-174-AD” at the beginning of your
comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this proposed AD. We
will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend
this proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to http://
www.regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact we
receive about this proposed AD.

Discussion

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008 (referred to
after this as “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for the
specified products. The MCAI states:

One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).

Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane. You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.

Relevant Service Information

Airbus has issued the service information described in the
following table. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI.

Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A330-27A3154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 02……………. March 2, 2007.
3110.
Airbus Mandatory Service 01……………. July 25, 2008.
Bulletin A340-27A4154.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- 01……………. March 2, 2007.
4115.
————————————————————————

[[Page 13150]]

FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This Proposed AD

This product has been approved by the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant
to our bilateral agreement with the State of Design Authority, we have
been notified of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI and service
information referenced above. We are proposing this AD because we
evaluated all pertinent information and determined an unsafe condition
exists and is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same
type design.

Differences Between This AD and the MCAI or Service Information

We have reviewed the MCAI and related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But we might have found it
necessary to use different words from those in the MCAI to ensure the
AD is clear for U.S. operators and is enforceable. In making these
changes, we do not intend to differ substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related service information.
We might also have proposed different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the proposed AD.

Costs of Compliance

Based on the service information, we estimate that this proposed AD
would affect 16 products of U.S. registry. We also estimate that it
would take between 1 work-hour per product to comply with the basic
requirements of this proposed AD. The average labor rate is $80 per
work-hour. Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of the proposed
AD on U.S. operators to be $1,280, or $80 per product.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
“Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

We determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this proposed AD and placed it in the AD docket.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39–AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

Sec. 39.13 [Amended]

2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:

Airbus: Docket No. FAA-2009-0264; Directorate Identifier 2008-NM-
174-AD.

Comments Due Date

(a) We must receive comments by April 27, 2009.

Affected ADs

(b) None.

Applicability

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A330-300, A340-200, and
A340-300 series airplanes; certificated in any category, except
those identified in paragraph (c)(1) and (c)(2) of this AD.
(1) Airbus Model A330-301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, –
342, and -343 airplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs) up to
and including MSN 588, except those on which Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110 has been embodied in service.
(2) Airbus Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313
airplanes, MSNs up to and including MSN 598, except those on which
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115 has been embodied in service.

Subject

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 27: Flight
controls.

Reason

(e) The mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
states:
One Long Range operator experienced a failure of one spoiler
servo-control, associated with surface deflection in flight and
hydraulic leak. On ground, this servo-control Part Number (P/N)
MZ4306000-02X was found with the maintenance cover broken.
Investigations showed that the rupture of the maintenance cover was
due to pressure pulse fatigue.
The maintenance cover allows switching the servo-control from
“Operational” to “Maintenance” modes. The same cover is
installed on all standard MZ spoiler servo-controls except on P/N
MZ4339390-12 and MZ4306000-12, which have a reinforced maintenance
cover. The rupture of the maintenance cover in flight may result in
the deflection of the associated spoiler surface up to the null-
hinge position (loss of the hydraulic locking). It may also result
in the loss of the associated hydraulic system (external leakage).
In the worst case, the three hydraulic systems may be affected,
which constitutes an unsafe condition.
For the reasons described above, this EASA AD requires the
identification and the modification of all standard MZ spoiler
servo-controls with initial maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-01X, –
02X, -10X for position 1 and P/N MZ4306000-01X, 02X, -10X for
positions 2 to 6) into standard MZ servo-controls with reinforced
maintenance cover (P/N MZ4339390-12 for position 1 and P/N
MZ4306000-12 for positions 2 to 6).
Loss of the three hydraulic systems could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane.

Actions and Compliance

(f) Unless already done, do the following actions.
(1) For airplanes that have accumulated more than 8,500 total
flight cycles since first flight as of the effective date of this
AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (f)(1)(ii)
of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 3 months after the effective date of this AD:
Identify the part number of spoiler servo-controls installed on the
airplane at all positions in order to determine the number of
affected hydraulic circuits in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154,
Revision 01; or Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154,
Revision 01; both dated July 25, 2008, as applicable. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number

[[Page 13151]]

identified in Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by
this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD, do all applicable actions
required by paragraph (f)(2), (f)(3), or (f)(4) of this AD.

Table 1–Spoiler Servo-Control Part Numbers
————————————————————————
Position 1 Positions 2 through 6
————————————————————————
MZ4339390-01X……………………….. MZ4306000-01X.
MZ4339390-02X……………………….. MZ4306000-02X.
MZ4339390-10X……………………….. MZ4306000-10X.
————————————————————————

(2) If three affected hydraulic circuits are identified during
the inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the
actions required by paragraphs (f)(2)(i), (f)(2)(ii), and
(f)(2)(iii) of this AD, at the time specified.
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,400 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 3 months after accomplishing the
requirements of paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on the second
hydraulic circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(iii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(3) If two affected hydraulic circuits are identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, do the actions
required by paragraphs (f)(3)(i) and (f)(3)(ii) of this AD, at the
time specified:
(i) Before the accumulation of 10,800 total flight cycles since
first flight, or within 6 months after accomplishing the
requirements in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD, whichever occurs
later: Modify the affected spoiler servo-controls on one hydraulic
circuit in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(ii) Within 18 months after the effective date of this AD:
Modify the remaining affected spoiler servo-controls in accordance
with the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin
A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115,
Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as applicable.
(4) If one affected hydraulic circuit is identified during the
inspection required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD: Within 18 months
after the effective date of this AD, modify the affected spoiler
servo-controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(5) For airplanes that have accumulated less than or equal to
8,500 total flight cycles since first flight as of the effective
date of this AD: Do the actions required by paragraphs (f)(5)(i) and
(f)(5)(ii) of this AD, as applicable.
(i) Within 9 months after the effective date of this AD: Do the
actions specified in paragraph (f)(1)(i) of this AD. If there is no
spoiler servo-control installed with a part number identified in
Table 1 of this AD, no further action is required by this paragraph.
(ii) If there is any spoiler servo-control installed with a part
number identified in Table 1 of this AD: Within 18 months after the
effective date of this AD, modify all the affected spoiler servo-
controls in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2, 2007, as
applicable.
(6) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may install
any spoiler servo-control with a part number identified in Table 1
of this AD on any aircraft as a replacement part, unless the part
has been modified in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions
of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110, Revision 02; or Airbus
Service Bulletin A340-27-4115, Revision 01; both dated March 2,
2007, as applicable.
(7) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with the service bulletins specified in Table 2 of this
AD are considered acceptable for compliance with the corresponding
requirements of this AD.

Table 2–Credit Service Information
————————————————————————
Service Bulletin Revision level Date
————————————————————————
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27- 01……………. March 26, 2004.
3110.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27- Original………. November 28, 2003.
4115.
————————————————————————

FAA AD Differences

Note 1: This AD differs from the MCAI and/or service information
as follows: No differences.

Other FAA AD Provisions

(g) The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to ATTN:
Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1138; fax (425) 227-1149.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your principal maintenance inspector (PMI) or
principal avionics inspector (PAI), as appropriate, or lacking a
principal inspector, your local Flight Standards District Office.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has approved the information
collection requirements and has assigned OMB Control Number 2120-
0056.

Related Information

(h) Refer to European Aviation Safety Agency Airworthiness
Directive 2008-0160, dated August 22, 2008, and the service
bulletins specified in Table 3 of this AD, for related information.

Table 3–Service Information
—————————————————————————————————————-
Revision
Service Bulletin level Date
—————————————————————————————————————-
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A330-27A3154. 01 July 25, 2008.

[[Page 13152]]

Airbus Service Bulletin A330-27-3110……….. 02 March 2, 2007.
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A340-27A4154. 01 July 25, 2008.
Airbus Service Bulletin A340-27-4115……….. 01 March 2, 2007.
—————————————————————————————————————-

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 18, 2009.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E9-6734 Filed 3-25-09; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

22 March: A small plane crashes shy of the Butte, Montana, airport killing 17 adults and children.

25 February: Istanbul to Amsterdam crashes shy of the runway at Schiphol international airport. Nine are killed and at least 50 injured. 150 on board.

12 February: Buffalo, New York, killing 49 people on board and one person on the ground.

8 February: Amazonas, Brazil, killing 24 people, most of whom were from the same family.

15 January: A US Airways Hudson River in New York. All 150 passengers, three flight attendants and two pilots are rescued. No loss of life.

14 September: Boeing-737 crashes on landing near Perm, Russia killing all 88 passengers and crew members

24 August: Passenger plane crashes after take-off from Kyrgyzstan’s capital, Bishkek, killing 68 people.

20 August: Spanair plane veers off the runway on take-off at Madrid’s Barajas airport, killing 154 people, injuring 18.

2 May: Engine trouble crashes a plane carrying a military delegation west of Juba. 22 dead.

15 April: DC-9 skids off the runway on take off in Goma Congo during heavy rain, smashing through a wall and into residential area. 40 die

24 January: Polish Casa C-295M military transport plane crashes killing officials who had attended an air safety conference. Nineteen die.

30 November: 56 die on Atlasjet flight when it crashes in Isparta province 7.5 miles from Isparta airport near the town of Keciborlu.

16 September: 87 people die in One-Two-Go plane crashed bad weather at Phuket Thailand.

17 July: TAM jet crashes at Congonhas airport in Sao Paulo, in Brazil. All 186 on board die and 13 on the ground.

5 May: Kenya Airways’ Boeing 737-800 crashes in southern Cameroon swamp, killing 114 on board.

29 September: Boeing 737 kills 154 passengers and crew crashed i Amazon rainforest in Brazil, killing all on board, after midair collision.

27 August: Comair CRJ-100 jet goes down in Kentucky, killing 49.

22 August: Russian Tupolev-154 passenger plane with 170 people on board crashes north of Donetsk, Ukraine.

9 July: Russian S7 Airbus A-310 skids off the runway during landing at Irkutsk airport in Siberia 124 on board die. 50 survive.

3 May: Armavia Airbus A-320 crashes in Black Sea near Sochi, killing all 113.

When looking at track records, the biggest question of safety in the Bombardier Q400 seems to be the failure of the landing gear to retract. Airworthiness directives in the archives refer to this issue as “fatigue failure of the nose landing gear electrical harness” although when gear retraction failed in 2007 on a Scandinavian Airlines plane, the cause of the failure was described as “hydraulics actuator top eyebolt was separated from the actuator.”

Of course in the Buffalo Crash, the landing gear issue did not come into play.

Significant icing may have been THE problem. It may have been icing that crippled the plane, period. It may have been a salvageable situation. It may have been a crisis situation that nine out of ten pilots could have handled–or 1 in 100.

Or it may have been one of several factors.

The Buffalo flight apparently slowed enough to lose lift.

When the stall-warning system angled the plane’s nose down to regain speed, instead of following the proper procedure–lowering the nose to get out of a stall–the captain pulled back on the controls and added power.

Pilot training is being discussed as a factor in the crash. Or was it as James Fallows postulates a “tailplane stall?”

Nasa Tailplane Stall Video

However speculation is simply a logical exercise. The NTSB investigation is ongoing as the FBI, NTSB, and FAA examine the flight data and the world waits for an answer.

What: Parker 77
Where: Phoenix AZ
When: 01/09/2009
Who: Pilot
Why: The pilot “ground looped” during a touch and go

What: Turkish Airlines en route from the Turkish resort of Antalya bound for St Petersburg, Russia
Where: The plane landed safely in St Petersburg.
When: Wednesday
Who: 164 passenger and 7 crew
Why: The hijacker gave the crew a note saying he had a bomb. The captain and crew followed procedure and locked the door. Passengers overpowerd the man; and the crew then took into custody the drunken man threatening to hijack the plane.

The note said ” Take me inside (the flight cabin) or I will explode the bomb I have”

Next time you fly on a US airline, you should think about those 9 U.S. airlines that outsource most of their aircraft maintenance. You’d think you wouldn’t have to worry about it because we all trust on that national resource, the FAA. The FAA is primarily responsible for the advancement, safety and regulation of civil aviation, as well as overseeing the development of the air traffic control system and commercial space travel.

But it’s time to supervise the supervisors. A government report on the FAA has turned up some unhappy details.
The FAA is behind on their supervision.

25% of that outsourced maintenance is farmed out to overseas contractors.The Federal Aviation Administration is supposed to track who and where maintenance is outsourced to. The responsibility for maintenance falls to hundreds of repair companies all over the world.

Currently the government is investigating the outsourcing practices of AirTran Airways, Alaska Airlines, America West Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, JetBlue Airways, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and United Airlines.

However, unlike the aforementioned airlines,American Airlines handles most of its maintenance in-house.

Repair facilities are subject to yearly government inspection at least once a year. One of the problems is that inspections are not up to standard, and not conducted by qualified inspectors; and the inspections have been as much as five years apart.