Aviation News, Headlines & Alerts
Tag: <span>safety</span>

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

British Airways Plane Rejects Take Off From Malaga

British Airways flight BA-2713 had to reject take off from Malaga, Spain, on January 3rd.

The plane was accelerating to take off for Gatwick Airport, United Kingdom, when the crew rejected take off due to a safety warning.

The plane safely returned to the apron. All passengers and crew members remained safe.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Pilot Killed after Small Plane Crashes in Alaska

A small plane crashed near the town of Butte in Alaska, on October 29th.

Authorities said the Cessna 172 plane crashed into a Knik River gravel bar.

The pilot, who was the only one aboard, was killed in the crash. He was identified as 25-year-old Ray Justen.

According to Alaska National Transportation Safety Board chief Clint Johnson, “Witnesses said this airplane came in, made a touch-and-go on a gravel bar and during a fairly steep climb out there was an aerodynamic stall…The airplane descended nose-first and struck the gravel bar.”

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Small Plane Crashed in Texas; Fatalities Feared

A small plane crashed between Granger and Taylor in Texas, on April 9th.

Authorities said the eight-seater twin-engine turboprop went down near FM 1331. The plane had taken off from Georgetown airport.

According to Department of Public Safety Trooper D.L. Wilson, “There are going to be fatalities…We just can’t confirm or deny how many are in there until we get it under control down there.”

Philippine Airlines Jet Returns to Ninoy Aquino International Airport

Philippine AirlinesPhilippine Airlines Express flight 2P 2021 had to return and make an emergency landing at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Philippines on September 8.

The plane took off for Moises R. Espinosa Airport, Masbate but had to return shortly afterwards after a safety patrol unit spotted one of its tires on the runway.

The plane landed safely. None of the 32 passengers reported any injuries.

The passengers were accommodated in another flight.

FAA Receives Unleaded Fuels Proposals in Safe Fuel Initiative

vintageFAA Receives Unleaded Fuels Proposals

The Federal Aviation Administration announced today it has received ten replacement fuel proposals from producers Afton Chemical Company, Avgas LLC, Shell, Swift Fuels and a consortium of BP, TOTAL and Hjelmco, for further evaluation in the Piston Aviation Fuels Initiative (PAFI). The industry-government initiative is designed to help the general aviation industry transition to an unleaded aviation gasoline. The FAA will be assessing the viability of the candidate fuels to determine which fuels may be part of the first phase of laboratory testing at the FAA’s William J. Hughes Technical Center.

The goal is to have a new unleaded fuel by 2018.

“We’re committed to getting harmful lead out of general aviation fuel,” said Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx. “This work will benefit the environment and provide a safe and available fuel for our general aviation community.”

The 167,000 general aviation aircraft in the US that rely on 100 low lead aviation gasoline for safe operation are running on the only remaining transportation fuel in the United States that contains the addition of lead.

Commercial planes have never used leaded gas.

Congress authorized $6 million for the fiscal year 2014 budget to support the PAFI test program at the FAA Technical Center. PAFI was established to facilitate the development and deployment of a new unleaded aviation gasoline with the least impact on the existing piston-engine aircraft fleet.

The FAA asked fuel producers on June 10, 2013 to submit proposals for replacement fuels by July 1, 2014. The goal is to identify, select, and provide fleetwide certification for fuels determined to have the lowest impact on the general aviation fleet.

The FAA will analyze the candidate fuels in terms of their impact on the existing fleet, the production and distribution infrastructure, their impact on the environment, their toxicology and the cost of aircraft operations.

ICAO Safety report

2013 was the safest year ever recorded for international air carriers according to a preliminary report by the ICAO.

Some points:

  • fatalities were down 53.5 from 2012.
  • There were 173 fatalities in 2013
  • There were 372 fatalities in 2012
  • 2013 is the third consecutive year of a decrease in fatalities

The air transport system experienced a marginal overall increase of scheduled commercial departures in 2013 compared to 2012.

Download the official press release

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Revised Safety Rating for India

India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has been notified that the US is downgrading its aviation safety ranking, based on failure to meet the standards of the ICAO. The International Civil Aviation Organization regulates technical, training, inspection, records, airworthiness, and operations standards. The safety downgrade is partially due to a September FAA audit which found 33 DGCA deficiencies including too few experts, maintenance deficits and poor documentation.

India’s being lowered to safety category II means that there will be consequences affecting Air India and Jet Airways Indian flights.

See the release below:

Press release: FAA Announces Revised Safety Rating for India
The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced that India has been assigned a Category 2 rating under its International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA) program, based on a recent reassessment of the country’s civil aviation authority. This signifies that India’s civil aviation safety oversight regime does not currently comply with the international safety standards set by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); however, the United States will continue to work with India’s Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGCA) to identify the remaining steps necessary to regain Category 1 status for India. With a Category 2 rating, India’s carriers can continue existing service to the United States, but will not be allowed to establish new service to the United States.

India achieved a Category 1 rating, signifying compliance with ICAO standards, in August 1997. A December 2012 ICAO audit identified deficiencies in the ICAO-set global standards for oversight of aviation safety by India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). Subsequently, the FAA began a reassessment of India’s compliance with ICAO standards under the FAA’s IASA program, which monitors adherence to international safety standards and practices. The FAA has consulted extensively with the DCGA and other relevant Indian government ministries during its evaluation, including consultations in India in September and early December, and meetings this week in Delhi.

“U.S. and Indian aviation officials have developed an important working relationship as our countries work to meet the challenges of ensuring international aviation safety. The FAA is available to work with the Directorate General of Civil Aviation to help India regain its Category 1 rating,” said FAA Administrator Michael Huerta.

The Government of India has made significant progress towards addressing issues identified during the September 2013 IASA assessment. On January 20, the Government of India took further steps to resolve outstanding issues when the Indian Cabinet approved the hiring of 75 additional full-time inspectors. The United States Government commends the Indian government for taking these important actions, and looks forward to continued progress by Indian authorities to comply with internationally mandated aviation safety oversight standards.

Additional Background on the FAA’s IASA Program:

As part of the FAA’s IASA program, the agency assesses on a uniform basis the civil aviation authorities of all countries with air carriers that operate or have applied to operate to the United States and makes that information available to the public. The assessments determine whether or not foreign civil aviation authorities are meeting ICAO safety standards, not FAA regulations.

A Category 2 rating means a country either lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in accordance with minimum international standards, or that its civil aviation authority – equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters – is deficient in one or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained personnel, record-keeping or inspection procedures.

Countries with air carriers that fly to the United States must adhere to the safety standards of ICAO, the United Nations’ technical agency for aviation that establishes international standards and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Training! Training! Training!

The NTSB was discussing safety measures in late October, especially pilot training before stalls. The new rule has been a long time coming. Earl Weener, a member of the National Transportation Safety Board, talked about the serious history of pilots wrongly pulling the plane’s nose up till the plane fell to the ground. If training is part of the problem, then at least that is a lack that can be amended.

Only twenty-six percent of pilots train for high altitude stalls, but according to a NASA study, twenty-eight percent of stalls are high altitude stalls. Seventy-one percent of stalls happen while autopilot is on.

In early November we heard how the FAA unveiled a rule about pilot training to avoid stalling airliners. It came about because of four crashes: Those crashes were Colgan 3407 in 2009, Air France 447 in June 2009, Pinnacle Airlines 3701 in October 2004 and USAir 427 in September 1994. (Too bad there have to be stall issues before stall training came to the attention of officials.) In the February 2009 crash of Colgan Air, it was determined that the pilots–as in the three other flights–in the midst of a blizzard in Buffalo pulled up on the nose of the plane, causing the crash. A meeting of air safety leaders in late November has jump-started the plans. Though something that has taken so long in the works can hardly said to be jump—started.

The powers that be sound positive about the new rule.

The FAA speculates training will save nearly seven million because of prevention—at a program cost of $274 million. Within five years this will mean:

  • Better ground and flight recovery training
  • Better pilot flight monitoring each other
  • Better runway safety protocols
  • Better crosswind training.

I have been beating a drum for a long time about obvious solutions to obvious problems. Yes, things may fail, but why not implement preventative measures where available? So now rather than my usual battle-cry: Maintenance! Maintenance! Maintenance! Maybe I will be saying Training! Training! Training! I am looking forward to increased safety brought about by this new rule.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Press Release: Airline Consumer Complaints Down From Previous Year

WASHINGTON – Airline consumer complaints filed with DOT’s Aviation Consumer Protection Division during the first nine months of this year were down 14.1 percent from the first nine months of 2012, according to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Air Travel Consumer Report released today.
From January to September 2013, the Department received 10,439 consumer complaints, down from the total of 12,153 filed during the first nine months of 2012. In September, the Department received 1,008 complaints about airline service from consumers, down 6.8 percent from the 1,081 complaints filed in September 2012 and down 23.5 percent from the 1,318 received in August 2013.

The consumer report also includes data on tarmac delays, on-time performance, cancellations, chronically delayed flights, and the causes of flight delays filed with the Department’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) by the reporting carriers. In addition, the consumer report contains information on airline bumping, mishandled baggage reports filed by consumers with the carriers, and disability and discrimination complaints received by DOT’s Aviation Consumer Protection Division. The consumer report also includes reports of incidents involving the loss, death, or injury of pets traveling by air, as required to be filed by U.S. carriers.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270


National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
August 16, 2010

The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a two-day symposium on the role that airline code-sharing arrangements play in aviation safety. The event, chaired by NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman, will be held on October 26-27, 2010, in Washington, DC.

Code-sharing is a marketing arrangement in which one airline places its designator code on a flight operated by another airline, then sells and issues tickets for that flight.

Recent NTSB investigations of accident flights operated under code-sharing arrangements include the February 2009 accident near Buffalo, New York, in which a Colgan Air flight was operated as Continental Connection; a 2007 accident in Traverse City, Michigan, in which a Pinnacle Airlines flight was operated as Northwest Airlink; a 2007 accident in Cleveland, Ohio, in which a Shuttle America flight was operated as Delta Connection; and a 2006 accident in Lexington, Kentucky, in which a Comair flight was operated as Delta Connection.

Today, most airlines participate in some type of code- sharing arrangement, either with domestic or international partners. More than half of passenger enplanements in the U.S. this year are on regional airlines, almost all of which are involved in code-sharing arrangements.

“In the past twenty years, code-sharing arrangements have so proliferated within commercial aviation that today the vast majority of airlines are involved in what are often complex business and operational arrangements.” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. “We have investigated many accidents in which passengers bought tickets on a major carrier and flew all or part of their trip on a different carrier – one that may have been operating to different safety standards than the carrier that issued the ticket. While all carriers are required to meet minimum standards, a clearer picture and deeper understanding of the best safety practices for code-sharing arrangements are the goals of this symposium.”

The symposium will be organized to elicit information on the following three issue areas: (1) structures, practices, and oversight of domestic and international code-sharing arrangements; (2) best practices regarding the sharing of safety information between airlines and their code-sharing partners; and (3) the role that a major airline would have in the family disaster assistance response for an accident involving a code-sharing partner.

These areas will be explored through presentations from major and regional airlines, industry organizations, and representatives of the traveling public.

The symposium, “Airline Code-Sharing Arrangements and Their Role in Aviation Safety” will be held at the NTSB Board Room and Conference Center, located at 429 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, DC. A detailed agenda will be released closer to the date of the event.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Testimony: Colgan Air

Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety: One Year After The Crash of Flight 3407

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. There is no question that the FAA’s job is to ensure that we have the safest aviation system in the world. The aviation safety record in the United States reflects the dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including the FAA’s inspector workforce. In an agency dedicated to aviation safety, any failure in the system, especially one that causes loss of life, is keenly felt. When accidents do happen, they reveal risks, including the tragic Colgan Air accident. Consequently, it is incumbent on all parties in the system to identify the risks in order to eliminate or mitigate them. As Administrator Babbitt noted when he appeared before you in December, history has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed upon solutions. The fastest way to implement a solution is for it to be done voluntarily, and that is what the Call to Action was intended to facilitate. On January 27, the FAA issued a report that describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the Call to Action and offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation safety. I would like to use this opportunity to review the issues the Administrator identified in December and let you know where we stand on them.

Pilot Flight Time, Rest and Fatigue: When Administrator Babbitt was last here he told you that the aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) he convened for the purpose of making recommendations on flight time, rest and fatigue, consisting of representatives from the FAA, industry and labor organizations, provided him with recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management in early September. While we were extremely pleased with the product provided, the ARC did not reach a consensus agreement on all areas and was not charged with doing any type of economic analysis. Consequently, in spite of the Administrator’s direction for a very aggressive timeline in which to develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), his hope that a rulemaking proposal could be issued by the end of last year was not realized. The complexities involved with these issues are part of the reason why the FAA has struggled to finalize proposed regulations on fatigue and duty time that were issued in the mid-1990s. However, with the Administrator’s continued emphasis on this topic, we hope to issue an NPRM this spring. Although this is slightly later that we originally hoped, it is still an extremely expedited schedule, and I can assure you the FAA team working on this is committed to meeting the target.

One of the issues contributing to fatigue that I know is of interest to many of you is that of pilots who commute by air to their job. I would like to describe some of the emails and letters the Administrator has been receiving on the issue of commuting from pilots who choose to commute by air to their job. As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. It is important to keep in mind these personal accounts because, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on. So we want to emphasize these issues are complex and, depending on how they are addressed, could have significant impacts on people’s lives.

Focused Inspection Initiative: From June 24, 2009 to September 30, 2009, FAA inspectors conducted a two-part, focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices. The FAA inspected 85 air carriers to determine if they had systems to provide remedial training for pilots. The FAA did not inspect the 14 carriers that have FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP) because AQP includes such a system. Seventy-six air carriers, including AQP carriers, have remedial training programs. An additional 15 air carriers had some part of a remedial training program. There were eight air carriers that lacked any component of a remedial training program that received additional scrutiny and have since instituted some component of a remedial training system. Since we started, all carriers have implemented some component of a remedial training program. The FAA inspectors also observed 2,419 training and checking events during the evaluation. In the few instances we observed regulatory non-compliance, we took corrective action.

Training Program Review Guidance: Based on the information from last summer’s inspections, the FAA is drafting a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) with guidance material on how to conduct a comprehensive training program review in the context of a safety management system (SMS). A complementary Notice to FAA inspectors will provide guidance on how to conduct surveillance. SMS aims to integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable, proactive systems. SMS programs emphasize safety management as a fundamental business process in the same manner as other aspects of business management. Now that we have completed our data evaluation and drafting, both guidance documents are in internal coordination.

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at the Call to Action, Administrator Babbitt sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards. Many airlines are now taking steps to promote the larger airline’s most effective safety practices at their smaller partner airlines. The Air Transport Association’s Safety Council is now including safety directors from the National Air Carrier Association and the Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. Several large air carriers are conducting periodic meetings with those with whom they have contract agreements to review safety information and we are encouraged by these efforts.

In addition, I am pleased to say that since July 2009, after the Call to Action, the FAA approved 12 new Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs. Three air carriers that had no Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) have now established them. Four more air carriers have established new ASAP programs for additional employee groups. All of this supports the contention that the Call to Action did make a difference.

Professionalism and Mentoring: Last week, the FAA met with labor organizations to discuss further developing and improving professionalism and transfer of pilot experience. In the interim, these organizations have answered the Call to Action and support the establishment or professional standards and ethics committees, a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings between the FAA and major and regional air carriers. We also believe that labor organizations can explore some of the ideas raised in the Call to Action road shows, such as establishing joint strategic councils within a “family of carriers,” use of professional standards committee safety conferences, and mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs, with the goal of coming up with concrete ideas on mentoring. These ideas merit further discussion and the FAA looks forward to continuing to work with these organizations on these concepts.

Crew Training Requirements: As the Administrator explained during his last appearance before this Committee, the FAA issued a rulemaking proposal in January 2009 to enhance training programs by requiring the use of simulation devices for pilots. More than 3,000 pages of comments were received. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued in the coming months to allow the public to comment on the revisions that were made based on the comments that were submitted.

One of the things that the Call Action has shone a light on is the issue of varying pilot experience. The FAA is attempting to address this issue with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in which we can consider possible alternative requirements, such as an endorsement on a commercial license to indicate specific qualifications. We know some people believe that simply increasing the minimum number of hours required for a pilot to fly in commercial aviation is appropriate. As Administrator Babbitt has stated repeatedly, he does not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations.

The ANPRM requests recommendations from the public to improve pilot performance and professionalism; specifically on whether existing flight crew eligibility, training and qualification requirements should be increased for commercial pilots engaged in part 121 operations. The FAA is requesting comments and recommendations on four concepts for the purpose of reviewing current pilot certification regulations. The four concepts are: (1) requirement for all pilots employed in part 121 air carrier operations to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with the appropriate aircraft category, class and type rating, or meet the aeronautical experience requirements of an ATP certificate; (2) academic training as a substitute for flight hours experience; (3) endorsement for air carrier operations; and, (4) new additional authorization on an existing pilot certificate. The FAA has also asked for recommendations from industry and the public on any other concepts they may wish to offer. The ANPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 8.

Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends its guidance to airlines, Administrator Babbitt asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. The airlines agreed to use this best practice for pilot record checks to allow for a more expansive review of records created over the course a pilot’s career. The expanded review would include all the records the FAA maintains on pilots in addition to the records airlines already receive from past employers. Of the 80 air carriers that responded to the FAA on this issue, 53 air carriers, or 66 percent, reported that they already require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15 percent reported that they plan to implement the same policy.

As the Administrator stated when he appeared before you in December, the core of many of the issues facing the air carrier industry today is professionalism. It is the duty of the flight crew to arrive for work rested and ready to perform their jobs, regardless of whether they live down the street from the airport or a thousand miles away. Professionalism is not something we can regulate, but it is something to which we must encourage and urge pilots and flight crews to aspire. The conversations we have been having, in part because of the Call to Action, help emphasize the importance of professionalism in aviation safety.

In conclusion, our efforts will not stop or even slow down just because the final report on the Call to Action was issued. We have been gratified with the response to this effort. We believe that the collective efforts of FAA, the airlines, labor unions and, of course, Congress, will continue to result in implementing best practices, transferring pilot experience, and achieving an overall improvement in safety. Safety is at the core of the FAA’s mission, and we will always strive to make a safe system safer.

Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Testimony: Icing

Statement of John Hickey, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Aircraft Icing

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the challenges icing conditions pose to flight operations and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to mitigate the safety risks posed by icing. For more than a decade, the FAA has been working to better understand the hazards posed by icing conditions and to improve regulations, policies and procedures to ensure safe airplane operation. Still, research into the complicated phenomenon of icing continues to yield new insights and mitigation measures.

Today, I want to highlight some of the known icing threats and mitigation measures as well as our icing program approach and a number of our recent efforts that have been crucial to further decreasing the risk associated with aircraft icing. First, however, it is important to understand the framework within which we work to address icing risks.

As the agency charged with setting the standards for safe aircraft operations, we establish the standards for operations during all types of meteorological conditions, including those that might result in icing on the ground or in flight. Aircraft manufacturers and operators meet these standards through a variety of means depending on where the icing risk occurs (on the ground or in flight), and the aircraft’s system capabilities and intended usage. Our standards for operations in icing conditions encompass both operational and aircraft certification requirements. Operational requirements include standards and aircraft specific operating procedures for icing encounters and pilot and dispatcher training. All pilots engaged in commercial operations must receive training on identification of, safe operation in, and how to avoid and exit icing conditions. They must also be trained on deicing system operation and capabilities of the particular aircraft they operate.

An aircraft design approval — what we call a “type certificate” — provides the design specifications that an aircraft must be built to, in order to meet the FAA’s standards for safe design. Aircraft must also comply with operation requirements, as set forth by the rules under which the airplane is being operated. Design and operation requirements must both be met in order to satisfy the FAA’s standards for safe operation. In order for an aircraft to be certificated for operations in icing conditions, the aircraft’s manufacturer must be able to demonstrate that the aircraft can safely operate within the icing conditions specified by FAA regulations. We know today that these specified conditions represent 99% of all known atmospheric conditions that result in icing. For the remaining 1%, we are conducting research and are working to translate our findings into certification standards. I want to emphasize that airplanes are prohibited from operations in known icing conditions unless they meet the certification standards for operations in those conditions and at no time may any aircraft continue to operate in severe icing conditions.

Aircraft Icing

Unmitigated icing presents risks to aircraft. The accumulation of ice on an aircraft’s wing changes the shape of the wing, and hence the aerodynamic capabilities of the wing to generate lift. For this reason, ice accumulation on an aircraft on the ground may impact the aircraft’s ability to takeoff, while ice accumulation in flight has the potential to raise the minimum speed at which the wing is capable of creating sufficient lift, and potentially causing the aircraft to stall.

Ground icing: Ground icing is, as the name implies, the accumulation of ice, snow or frost on the aircraft while it is on the ground. This form of icing is both common and meteorologically predictable. During the winter months, the conditions in which ice accumulation on an aircraft is possible become more prevalent and vigilant action becomes necessary to ensure planes are properly deiced and cleared of snow and ice prior to takeoff. Winter precipitation poses a threat to aviation operations because airplane performance is predicated upon the wings being free of contamination. The accumulation of ice, snow, or frost has an adverse effect on the wing’s ability to produce lift, potentially limiting an airplane’s ability to takeoff and climb.

Currently, the FAA prohibits takeoff unless the airplane’s critical surfaces are completely clear of wintry precipitation. As many of you have likely seen, this is typically achieved by applying deicing or anti-icing fluids to the critical surfaces of the airplane. To provide for a safe takeoff, it is important that a deiced airplane not remain on the ground for an extensive period after deicing during precipitation. At the start of this winter season, as in years past, the FAA issued its annual winter “hold over times” and list of approved anti ice and deicing fluids. “Hold over times” govern the amount of time that may elapse between deicing and takeoff. In the event that the aircraft exceeds the amount of wait time permitted between deicing and takeoff, FAA regulations require the aircraft to be reinspected for adhering contamination or exit the takeoff queue and be deiced again prior to departure. These holdover time tables are revised annually. Some of the reasons for the annual update include improvements in the effectiveness of deicing and anti-icing fluids, reduction of environmental impacts and new information learned through FAA fluid research.

In-flight icing: Unlike ground icing, in-flight icing knows no season and can be difficult to predict. In-flight icing results from atmospheric conditions that can occur at anytime of the year, regardless of the weather conditions on the ground. According to FAA regulations, any pilot who finds himself or herself in icing conditions while operating an aircraft that is not approved for operations in icing must immediately exit the icing conditions. This means redirecting the aircraft to a different altitude or route, or landing.

There are multiple atmospheric conditions that can result in the build-up of ice on an aircraft during flight. To mitigate the risk of ice build-up during flight, aircraft that are certificated to operate in icing conditions are equipped with devices that shed ice from the aircraft, such as expandable pneumatic boots, or prevent the formation of ice through the use of heat. A pilot’s ability to recognize icing conditions and activate deicing and anti icing systems in a timely manner is critical to those systems’ effectiveness. Because of the pilot’s critical role in managing flight in icing conditions, we have used both our rulemaking and advisory authorities, to provide pilots with the latest information on how to identify icing, to require early and systematic use of deicing systems and to require exit from icing conditions under certain circumstances.

Some aircraft are also equipped with ice detection systems. Ice detection systems assist the flightcrew with ice detection and timely activation of the ice protection system. These systems automatically detect ice accretion and annunciate the presence of ice accretion to the flightcrew. Some ice detection systems are designed to automatically initiate the operation of the aircraft deicing systems while others are what we call “advisory” and require the flightcrew to ensure ice protection systems are activated at the first sign of ice accretion on the airplane.

Although our current regulations address the vast majority of all known icing conditions, we have steadily worked to address two types of in-flight icing phenomena outside of the existing icing certification envelope: supercooled large droplets (SLD) and ice crystals. SLD icing can occur in freezing rain and freezing drizzle conditions — turning water to ice upon contact with the airframe, which can lead to larger accumulations or build up on areas of the wing and tail aft of the protected area. We expect to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address this small area of vulnerability, by incorporating atmospheric conditions that are associated with SLD icing into our certification criteria. In the interim, we have taken immediate steps through our airworthiness directive authority to ensure that pilots can identify severe icing which may be produced by SLD conditions and execute exit procedures.

Ice crystals are also a newly identified threat. We now believe that flight into certain types of storm clouds can cause ice to build up deep inside the core of jet engines and cause temporary shutdowns. Understanding this threat has been particularly challenging because, typically, by the time an aircraft lands, the affected engine has restarted and there is no evidence for us to evaluate. We are currently working with industry and other governmental research partners on developing ways to recreate the atmospheric conditions in which ice crystals form and learn all that we can about how to mitigate the threat of this phenomenon. Although there is research that still needs to be done in this area, we are closely monitoring the condition and its possible causes. To mitigate the risk, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directives (ADs) requiring operational changes when in or near convective weather and engine design changes to make jet engines more tolerant of ice crystal conditions.

Icing Safety Actions

Safety concerns about the adequacy of the icing certification standards were brought to the forefront of public and governmental attention by a 1994 accident in Roselawn, Indiana, involving an Avions de Transport Regional ATR 72 series airplane. The NTSB attributed this accident to what we now call SLD–an icing phenomenon that, at the time, was not fully understood. Shortly after this accident, the FAA initiated a review of aircraft safety in icing conditions to determine what could be done to increase safety. This review resulted in our current icing program.

As meteorologists will attest, simply understanding some of these icing phenomena are difficult and complex. Determining how to address these complex phenomena to support safe aircraft operations takes additional time and extensive research. That is why we tackle the dangers of icing with a multi-prong approach. To address those threats that are clearly understood or for which immediate mitigation is available, we take immediate safety action. In the meantime, concurrent research and development and rulemaking efforts are underway. To date, our icing program includes seven rulemaking initiatives–three have been adopted as final rules, while others are in various stages of development. Additionally, we have issued over 200 ADs on 50 different aircraft models, and have undertaken other operational training and mitigation initiatives.

Immediate Actions: The FAA’s icing program addresses the immediate icing safety concerns for the current fleet of aircraft through the use of ADs. The FAA has the authority to issue an AD if we determine that some aspect of flying in icing conditions on a particular airplane model creates an unsafe condition that puts the flying public in immediate danger. ADs carry the same force as a regulation and are targeted to specific aircraft makes and models. ADs must be complied with in order to continue operating a covered airplane. As described above, the FAA has been aggressive in issuing ADs when we determine they are needed. These ADs cover safety issues ranging from crew operating procedures and training, to design changes that have significantly reduced the icing risk to the overall fleet.

For example, with our AD authority, we require that pilots of airplanes equipped with deicing boots activate those boots at the first sign of icing conditions. We have also issued numerous ADs that direct the crews of certain airplane designs on how to monitor and detect early signs of the onset of severe icing and to exit the area immediately. Other ADs require stall warning systems of certain airplanes to be modified to provide an earlier warning of a potential stall in icing conditions and mandate changes to address any susceptibility to stalling of the horizontal tail in icing conditions. These ADs serve as effective safety measures for the current fleet.

Longer Term Actions: The FAA’s icing program also includes a number of longer term actions to further improve the safety of flying in icing conditions both for the current fleet and for future airplane designs. These actions include rulemaking, issuing safety bulletins, developing improved training material, drafting new or updating existing Advisory Circular guidance material, and further research. We recognize that fast action is an important goal for implementing any safety improvement. We also acknowledge that some actions, such as rulemaking, take longer than others. Rulemaking is a deliberative process that must involve the input of those stakeholders who are affected by the rules.

Also, in some cases, developing and implementing rules depends on extensive research to understand the particular phenomena and its effect on safety, and to develop appropriate risk mitigations.

For example, in order to understand SLD icing sufficiently to identify an appropriate set of requirements that airplane manufacturers could comply with, a significant amount of research had to be done. We needed to learn how to characterize SLD, then reproduce it, and finally, understand its effect on airplane operations and designs. For these reasons, at the same time that we tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to develop certification criteria for the safe operation of airplanes in SLD icing conditions, we also began supporting research efforts by NASA and Environment Canada to gather additional SLD data. Using existing and new SLD data and analysis, the ARAC completed the majority of the work defining the SLD icing envelope. But even after the SLD icing envelope was defined, we continued to learn more about the complexities of SLD, which led us to focus analysis of the impact of SLD on aircraft engines and determine that new standards for smaller aircraft should be considered in a separate rulemaking. The process took time, more time than we anticipated and more time than we wanted, but once we had a sufficient understanding of the science and the technical solutions, we moved forward with the SLD rulemaking. I am pleased to report that the SLD NPRM is now in executive coordination within the Department.

In the meantime, we formed and tasked an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to review the proposed regulations applicable to transport category aircraft for SLD, mixed phase, and ice crystals and recommend how they should be modified for smaller aircraft. The SLD research we conducted for the transport category SLD rulemaking provides the basis for our scientific understanding of SLD, upon which we can develop additional technological solutions for smaller aircraft.

In addition to the intensive efforts to understand and revise our regulations to address SLD and ice crystals, since 2007, FAA has completed three icing rules and just this week closed the comment period on an additional NPRM. The completed icing rules include:

  • Performance and Handling Qualities in Icing Conditions for Transport Category Airplanes, adding new airworthiness requirements that require designers to demonstrate specific airplane performance and handling qualities for flight in icing conditions.
  • Activation of Airframe Ice Protection System for Transport Category Airplanes, requiring either the automatic activation of ice protection systems or a method to alert pilots when they should be activated. Further, after the initial activation, the ice protection system must operate continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled.
  • Removal of Airplane Operating Regulations Allowing Polishing of Frost on Wings of Airplanes, effectively prohibiting all aircraft from taking off with polished frost on the wings.

The NPRM, for which the comment period just closed, would require certain scheduled airlines either to retrofit their existing fleet with ice-detection equipment or make sure the ice protection system activates at the proper time. For those aircraft with an ice-detection system, the FAA proposes that the system alert the crew each time they should activate the ice protection system. The ice protection system would either turn on automatically or pilots would manually activate it. For aircraft without ice-detection equipment, the crew would activate the protection system based on cues listed in their airplane’s flight manual during climb and descent, and at the first sign of icing during cruise.

We are also evaluating the comments received in response to an additional NPRM that included proposed changes to training and checking requirements for pilots operating flights under part 121. In addition to many other revisions, this NPRM proposed changes that would further specify training requirements for icing operations.

I want to acknowledge that throughout our ongoing and comprehensive effort to mitigate the risks presented by airplane icing, the National Transportation Safety Board icing recommendations have been instructive. Although we are not always able to take the exact action the Board recommends, we value and fully analyze their recommendations and benefit from their investigations of icing-related accidents. We firmly believe that our actions meet the intent of the vast majority of the Board’s icing recommendations.

Although we have made significant advancements in our understanding of icing since the tragic 1994 Roselawn accident, icing related threats continue to be a focus of the FAA’s safety experts. The total number of accidents related to environmental icing of airplanes has been decreasing steadily, year after year, for the last 13 years. This safety achievement is the direct result of our intensive focus on improving our understanding of complex icing phenomenon and the best methods for avoiding and mitigating icing conditions. The FAA is proud of this growing safety record and is committed to expanding it.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

New FAA Rules Coming

The British Airways Boeing 777 crashed on Jan. 17, 2008, in icy weather with 136 travelers and 16 crew members aboard.

The reason why it crashed is that the flow of fuel to both of the plane’s engines was cut off by ice that accumulated on prior flights in cold air at high altitudes. The plane was flying at minus 29 degrees Fahrenheit over Siberia.

These are the significant just-released details behind the FAA’s move to adopt new safety rules (Pilot procedures and in-flight throttle settings) regarding planes flying in cold weather. Fuel systems might even be changed to adapt to the problem of water (which accumulates in fuel) freezing inside the fuel system.

Content not attributed to or linked to original, is the property of AirFlightDisaster.com; all rights reserved.

Site Credits