Five days before the flight 447 accident, flight JJ 8054 TAM Airbus, (just like flight 447) en route from Rio to Paris on the same route (just like flight 447), had problems with turbulence (just like flight 447) in the region near the islands of St. Peter and St. Paul (just like flight 447).

A passenger on TAM flight JJ 8054, Helaine Patrícia Pinto Coelho, spoke publicly about her experience on that turbulent flight.

Apologies here for our translation from the Portuguese.
“I recall that followed the path of the aircraft by the screen that is in front of seats. When we leave the mainland, the northeast of the country, the plane began to shake, light warning of the tie belt and on-board service was suspended. Suddenly the thing started to get worse. I felt like a rag in an old washing machine.”

Then, the nozzle of the aircraft was down. “This happened two other times. People started to scream. Some vomiting. I do not know how long it lasted. To me it seemed an eternity, A lady who was beside me also despair. Crying, said she had a daughter. The pilot, when possible, give information about the flight, such as speed, altitude of the aircraft, and asked to be kept tied belts. ”

Please find the original quote here in its entirety.

George’s Point of View

Sometimes we have fair warning, and never know it.

Helaine Patrícia Pinto Coelho concludes that the pilot of her flight made decisions on the fly, turning East. She attributes survival to the choices made by the team; and that the crew held the passengers lives in their hands.

I’m sure she felt relief to be back on the ground after her flight; and that she and her fellow passengers were grateful to be alive. But they probably didn’t realize just how much a miracle their survival was until the disaster of the French Airbus, that tragic flight which followed the same path but did not reach it’s intended destination.

The pilot and crew of an aircraft truly do hold the lives of their passengers in their hands. It is a grim and unnerving responsibility but one not limited to the obvious pilot. The responsibility extends beyond the cockpit to everyone whose craft involves the fabrication, operation and maintenance of that plane: the manufacturers, the builders, the authors of the manuals, the maintenance crew.

Purveyors of technology may be the keepers of progress… but we must cast a diligent eye on that progress that our technological reach does not exceed our grasp. We should remember that progress is an audacious thing. We can do our best to build technologically safe bubbles in which to lead our lives; but our control is an illusion. We are only ants on the face of the earth, shaking our fists at the sky.

There is something about the brush with death that reawakens us to how frail are our lives. It is the media, agencies like the FAA and the NTSB–and even the public eye– who are stewards of that frailty. We cannot reach back to May 31st and pluck the passengers from their tragedy. The best we can do is take lessons from the past. So we don’t have to be reminded again.

George’s Point of View

The first items found that were attributed to the airbus were from somewhere else. However, now a ship’s crew has recovered several bodies, luggage, etc. For all the families sake, I hope they can find everyone. It becomes ever more tragic each day a victim goes unfound.

Days tick by as searchers look for the beacon-small enough to fit in someone’s hand- lost somewhere in the Atlantic.

George’s Point of View

Yet another theory:

Problems with airspeed indicators led to excessive speed for the Air France A330, triggering the sequence of events leading to the crash. Blame it on pitot tubes. If the pitot tubes froze up during the storm, pilots would get mis-readings on their speed, accelerate, and subject the plane to stresses the structure was unable to withstand.

George’s Point of View

There’s a lot that is said in the world about gatekeepers. If you haven’t heard about them, you’ve run into them. They’re the low level filter that keeps the riff raff out, in positions that look plebeian but which wield far more authority than their level on the hierarchy would suggest. That’s the guy at the door who won’t let you in. If you’re hitting the trendy night spot, he’s the one whose thumbs up — or thumbs down–decides your fate. It’s the secretary that let’s your call go through. It’s the one at the ticket office who lets you in on the really good seats to the fight. Those are the gatekeepers you see.

The ones to watch out for, though, are higher on the feeding chain. They’re the ones who appoint the gatekeepers. Usually they have some kind of agenda, but you’re not going to see them, or their agendas, because the main thing about them is that they’re the part of the iceberg that you don’t see. They’re very good at staying underground, until something comes along like the Titanic.

So picture this:

Your job is inspecting planes. You’re sort of the gatekeeper for the plane. IF you say yes, it flies, then, well…it flies. If you say no, the plane goes back to the drawing board. Your whole purpose is to be discriminating–to keep out the riff raff. You keep the “plane” bakers from serving the planes before they’re “done.” You catch what problems there be, so there won’t be a disaster down the road. Imagine if you report a problem with a plane, and instead of getting commendations from the powers that be for your superlative discernment, you get shunted off to a desk, and the powers that be rule in favor of the airline. And then a year later, the plane you had issues with causes a disaster which you may have been able to prevent.

This is all under investigation, and it may all be smoke and mirrors and finger pointing.

It may be something more.

I’m talking about inspector Christopher J. Monteleon whose story is in the New York Times.

Monteleon got moved to a desk for doing his job. The situation seems to have been the catalyst for a whole lot of professional trouble for him. What if someone had paid attention to his concerns? Would the Bombardier Dash 8 Q400 been given more refinements? Would changes have been made that could have made it safer?

Then, Monteleon complained that the Office of Runway Safety “was using skewed methodology to understate the severity of safety concerns.” He wasn’t monitoring a flight that was subjected to dangerous icing that was being flown by a poorly trained and exhausted pilot. But maybe his is the kind of eye that would have made someone somewhere insert an extra page in the manual to cover the situation that would have saved 49 lives.

Maybe his contribution would have made no difference at all to the tragic Colgan/Buffalo NY flight.

But I’m looking past Monteleon and this particular incident to the bigger picture. I’m looking at his superiors who for some reason discounted the advice of their own expert. His bosses may not have liked the squeaky wheel, but his JOB was to do the squeaking. Apparently they wanted him to shut up, and stop getting in the way of the airline business. Apparently someone in the FAA forgot that the FAA does not work FOR the airlines. Their directive is to regulate civil aviation to promote safety–NOT commerce.

I am wondering if there is a part of the FAA iceberg that needs to be brought into the light. I suspect that Mr. Monteleon agrees with me.

George’s Point of View

First things first.

First we need to recover the decedents.

After that, the respects have been paid to them and their families.

Then, that wreckage has to be put back together to settle the matter of what caused this tragedy.

In just two days, already, there are a handful of theories. Already I have seen lightning strike theory; turbulence theory; hailstorm theory; electrical failure theory; fire on board theory; hijacking/sabotage theory; missile or bomb theory.

The theories won’t stop unless the wreckage is recovered along with the black boxes. We need as much of the wreckage as can be found, and the black boxes to put together the puzzle of what happened.

We only have thirty days before they’re silenced.

George’s Point of View

Air Consult International recently audited the safety factors of Nigerian Airlines.

Only Aero Contractor’s aircraft were all okayed.

Virgin Nigeria Boeing 767-300 aircraft and Arik Air’s Hawker HS-125 planes were judged to be at risk. In fact, the executive jet charter business is deemed to be a risky business which has not kept up with general aviation safety standards, according to 234Next which somehow obtained the confidential report.

The report says also that “The operating environment in Nigeria is still a difficult one. Vast areas of the country’s airspace do not have radar coverage and air traffic control is provided by radio and procedural means.”

Of course, it is public knowledge that many African air carriers are on the European Banned list Non-EU air carriers are vetted against internationally binding safety standards established by the 1944 Chicago Convention and its annexes. Failing criteria include poorly maintained, antiquated or obsolete aircraft and the inability of the airlines involved to rectify their shortcomings and respect safety standards.

Virgin Nigeria has deteriorated since its original audit, and is now operating with fewer employees and deteriorating standards. Also, HS-125 Executive jets operated by Arik Air got a Category 0 rating in the audit.

George’s Point of View

INDIA-The Director General of Civil Aviation has been inactive, unresponsive to Indian aviation statistics of the past few years, which reflect cockpit crew fatigue, relaxed aircraft maintenance norms in India, dearth of DGCA flight safety inspectors, pilots put under pressure by airlines to operate flights even in difficult conditions, and poor training.

I guess problems like this are all over the world.

The DCGA, like the United States NTSB National Transport and Safety Board, is an authority over general transportation; India has no agency like the FAA, dedicated exclusively to aviation. India does have a recently formed (and woefully inadequate) board of various government and individual concerns that is supposed to meet four times yearly. Apparently there is an inadequate store of safe, well thought-out policies, forcing pilots and air traffic control to act on the spur of the moment in dangerous situations, instead of having an encyclopedia of safe procedures on hand to increase the safety factor.

We can only hope that the Indian government does not drag its feet, so that this time at some future date, we will not be looking back at future Indian Aviation tragedies saying to ourselves “We should have known this would happen. We should have done something about it while we had the chance.”

You have the chance, now.

For some things, you don’t need experts.

Anyone who has ever attempted driving cross-country without taking an overnight knows the answer to the question of whether or not fatigue affects your judgment while driving. Of course fatigue has an affect on making serious assessments. It happens while driving on the nation’s highways, so why should it be any different on the nation’s skyways?

But of course the experts have to chime in. At least this time they agree with the rest of the real world that fatigue is hazardous to judgement. Furthermore, there is airline culpability here, since those low-wage pilots were flying cross-country just to get TO work, there’s no way they could start their shift fresh. Pilot Marvin Renslow had flown from his Florida residence to Newark and either had no hotel room, stayed up, or napped in the Newark crew lounge (which at Colgan Air is a fireable offense.) His abysmal training/test record stands as its own worst advocate. Co-pilot Rebecca Shaw who lived in Seattle had just pulled an all-nightter so she could get a free ride to work–and she was sick.

The pilot and co-pilot of the Colgan flight were facing multiple issues. The speed of the plane had dropped. Ice had gathered on the wings. The shaker stick had engaged. Neither pilot nor co-pilot appeared to be familiar with how to handle icing; neither were adequately grounded on emergency procedure; neither knew whether this was a wing or tail stall (which affected whether or not the nose should be down); and neither knew what to do with the shaker stick.

That the pilots were discussing subjects not related to flying is a “red herring.”

Admittedly, they could have been paying more attention to what was going on, but think of how many of us who have driven long distances use conversation to help us stay alert in similar circumstances. Even if they’d been speaking exclusively of the emergency, doing so would not have been the magic bullet that filled in the gaps left by inadequate training. They still would not have known what to do.

George’s Point of View

If you’re a frequent flying businessman, there’s a good chance you’ve noticed the decline of the number of people flying, and the resulting greater availability of smaller jets, and smaller regional aircraft.

The Regional Airline Association provides Regional Aircraft Statistics if you’re interested in that kind of thing.

There are trade-offs. Except for safety statistics, for frequent flyers statistics don’t matter as much as tangible factors like leg room, airport accessibility, lack of baggage space, availability of non-stop flights, etc… It’s really a matter of practical concern and personal choice. You’re not really packed like sardines in smaller planes, it just seems that way. And non-stop flights are probably worth it.

As long as your smaller plane has two engines (in case one quits), doesn’t ingest birds (because how many pilots are Chesley B. Sullenburger III?), and you’re not claustrophobic (and the guy sitting elbow to elbow with you didn’t forget to use his deodorant.)

One wonders if the trend toward smaller planes is going evolve smaller businessmen.

George’s Point of View

Most business jet fatal accidents happen on approach. I suppose this means that it is fine for businessmen to fly but not to land. (Conclusions like this are why they never have me on any study committees.)

But seriously, the latest Aviation study came out with these figures:

• The fatal accident rate for air taxis is 3.49 per million flying hours
• For corporate operations it is 0.24 per million
• For owner-operated business jets it is 1.28 per million
• The overall figure for all business jets flying civil operations is 1.45 per million flying hours.

  The fifty-nine fatal accidents under study show twenty-one occurred on ferry flights, seventeen on “private/business”, six carried cargo, five carried passengers, four were air ambulance flights, and three were training.

  Whether the problem is fatigue, pilot (or crew) training, plane maintenance, air traffic control, bureaucratic red tape, or gas-squeezing political policies, when the consensus is that more than half of these accidents are preventable, this is an indication that something is seriously wrong with Business Aviation.

George’s Point of View

Don’t be alarmed over that jet that flew low over the Hudson River around 10 a.m. today. Blame the Defense Department who is conducting a photo op with two F-16s and a Boeing 747. The whole experience is going to be over by 10:30.

As if New Yorkers on the Hudson haven’t had enough of aviation surprises. Next time you need a “photo op,” try Pixar Studios. No doubt it will be cheaper than gassing up two F-16s and a Boeing 747–not to mention all the medical bills from heart attacks and nervous breakdowns over planes flying low over NYC. There are going to be repercussions over the emotional factor AND the unnecessary expense. I would not want to be the one who 1. alarmed all of New York City AND 2. on their own dime. Talk about chutzpah.

* update
Looks like I’m not the only one who feels this way.

George’s Point of View

The IATA ( Air Transport Association) is an association representing the world’s airlines commitment to excellence and safety in aviation. All of its 224 Member airlines live up to best practice standards in airline safety. 8 airlines lost membership due to failing a 2008 IOSA ( IATA Operational Safety Audit) audit.

Airlines which fail the safety audit, or are otherwise unable to reach the safety standards are banned by the European Union. One of those banned airlines is Garuda Indonesia, the national airline of Indonesia. That’s the same airline which has been in the news for the recent sentencing of one of it’s pilots. Not that Garunda Indonesia even flies to Europe.

Marwoto Komar who was piloting Garuda Indonesia Flight 200 , ignored warnings not to land the plane when he brought it in at twice the safe speed, resulting in the plane slamming into the runway, skidding off and bursting into flame, killing 21. While he did not get life in prison, he did get jail time.

The pilot’s sentencing is really a symptom of what is going on with Garunda Indonesia, which is a lack of government supervision. In fact, aircrafts which would otherwise be considered safe, are NOT safe simply because of being part of GI’s under-supervised, under-inspected, under-maintained fleet. In fact, there is a $24 million Indonesian governmental program now in place to train Indonesian air safety inspectors, an ambitious program which may still take years to bring the airline up to acceptable safety standards.

In the meantime, apparently the burden of safety rests on the shoulders of pilots, which in view of recent history, does not particularly appear to be a good thing. Furthermore, no one yet has made it public exactly why Marwoto Komar ignored air traffic control AND his instruments AND his co-pilot to attempt a landing at twice the safe speed, but perhaps while he is in jail, the Indonesian skies may be marginally safer. Not that it does any good for the 21 victims of Flight 200.

George’s Point of View

Commerce and business growth is the sign of a healthy economy. However, news that …“groundwork has started on a wing assembly facility for Airbus 320 aircraft in the northern municipality of Tianjin” brings up the question:

Do we really NEED more Airbuses in the world?

Whether it is A380 design flaws, rudder problems, Airbus wiring flaws, , faulty Airbus latching system, with all of these hidden flaws coming to light, do we really need another Airbus Factory?

OF course it is insulting to the Edsel to make this comparison, because the Edsel was a well designed vehicle of its time. It was marketed badly, but it was not a lemon. But the Airbus…

According to the Preliminary Dutch Safety Board Report, “The Board is of the opinion that extra attention is needed for the role of the radio altimeter when using the automatic pilot and the automatic throttle system. The Board has issued a warning for Boeing today requesting extra attention to a part of a manual for the Boeing 737, in which is stated that in case of malfunction of the radio altimeter(s), the automatic pilot and throttle system that are connected to this may not be used for approach and landing. The Board would like Boeing to consider an investigation into whether this procedure is also applicable during flight. With the exception of the malfunction of the left radio altimeter the investigators of the Dutch Safety Board have not yet found any irregularities.

One question that remains now is how Boeing is going to follow up with the reminder for pilots to pay attention. Is this going to be handled with additional training or aircraft or procedure modifications? However–Boeing has said that the autopilot system is designed so that if it senses faulty data from the captain’s altimeter on the left side, the auto-throttle is supposed to switch to the altimeter on the right. In fact, AVweb summarizes it this way: ” The autopilot initiated a power-down of the engines in preparation for landing and the airplane slowed to near stall speed. The pilots responded to the situation too late.”

It seems to us like this is more of a problem of maintenance and pilot training at Turkish Airlines. How could the pilots not have noticed flying for more than a minute with no thrust?

We are eager to see what is going to be done to prevent a repetition of catastrophe. On Wednesday Boeing listed six warning signs that can alert a pilot that something is wrong with the altimeter. Maybe they should have included a Starbucks gift certificate for that extra jolt of caffeine-fueled pilot attentiveness.

The Dutch report indicates that the faulty radio altimeter initiated a sequence of events to which the pilots responded too slowly. The thing is that being a pilot means being aware. There is no margin for error.

Plus, any time I see that an automatic system did the thinking, it makes me pause: “the automatic system – with its engines at reduced power – assumed it was in the final stages of the flight.” If the autothrust/pilot starts to do something unusual, it is the pilot’s responsibility to disconnect it and fly the aircraft manually.

Another thing that seems crucial is the black box data:
“The black box – which can register 25 hours of flying time and which, in this case, covered 8 flights- showed that this problem had occurred twice previously in a similar situation, before landing.” It is crucial in conflicting ways. When it happened before, why was there no “crash” situation? How was it averted? (Probably the pilots flew in manually.)

And…if it happened before, doesn’t it make the faulty radio altimeter a “known problem” and therefore one which the carrier should have corrected before this plane ever went out again?

For those who survived, it really doesn’t matter why it happened.

The passengers–those who perished and those who were injured and those who lucked out and got away without a scrape (if there are any)–are innocents who purchased a ticket.

There’s no one on that plane who will ever board a plane again without thinking twice; some will suffer sleepless nights and develop phobias; and some have paid the ultimate price, losing their health, or their life.

Now they are owed a lot more than a refund.