

ACCIDENT

Aircraft Type and Registration:	Boeing 737-8AS, EI-DCH
No & Type of Engines:	2 CFM CFM56-7B26 turbojet engines
Year of Manufacture:	2004 (Serial no: 33566)
Date & Time (UTC):	2 December 2017 at 1643 hrs
Location:	London Stansted Airport
Type of Flight:	Commercial Air Transport (Passenger)
Persons on Board:	Crew - 6 Passengers - None
Injuries:	Crew - 1 (Serious) Passengers - N/A
Nature of Damage:	None
Commander's Licence:	Airline Transport Pilot's Licence
Commander's Age:	32 years
Commander's Flying Experience:	5,500 hours (of which 5,300 were on type) Last 90 days - 236 hours Last 28 days - 67 hours
Information Source:	Aircraft Accident Report Form submitted by the pilot

Synopsis

A catering cart became dislodged from its stowage in the aft galley when the aircraft landed. It travelled down the centre aisle and seriously injured one of the cabin crew, who was sitting in an aft-facing jumpseat by the forward left door.

History of the flight

The aircraft was being positioned without passengers from Cologne Airport to London Stansted Airport by a crew that consisted of two pilots and four cabin crew. Earlier that day they had operated a passenger flight from Stansted to Eindhoven on the same aircraft but, due to poor weather, they had diverted to Cologne where the passengers had disembarked.

The commander expected the cabin crew to occupy their assigned jumpseats in the cabin for the takeoff but, during the flight, he allowed the Number 2 crew member (No 2) to move to a jumpseat in the flight deck, to observe the descent and landing. He believed the cabin would be secured for landing in accordance with the aircraft operator's procedure for flights with three cabin crew and that the No 1, the No 3 and the No 4 would then sit in their assigned jumpseats, in accordance with the operator's guidance (see *Organisational information*).

With the flight deck door closed, the passenger address system was used to inform the cabin crew that 10 minutes remained before landing and the No 1 subsequently advised

the pilots that the cabin was secure. Following a normal touchdown, the brakes were applied and the commander then heard a scream from the cabin, so he slowed the aircraft, and the No 2 left the flight deck to investigate and assist. Soon after this the pilots were told that one of the No 3's legs might be fractured and, therefore, they asked ATC to arrange for medical assistance to attend the aircraft on arrival at its parking stand.

After the aircraft had been shut down, the commander found that the No 3, whose assigned jumpseat is on the right side of the aft galley, was lying on the cabin floor, blocking the main access door at the front of the cabin. During the landing, a catering cart had dislodged from its stowage in the aft galley and had travelled down the aisle until it struck the No 3, who was sitting in the aft-facing jumpseat assigned to the No 4, at the front of the cabin on the left side.

Having seen the cart heading towards him, the No 3 had tried to protect himself by raising his knees towards his chest but when the cart struck him it fractured his left femur and caused a minor hand injury. Being unaware his leg was broken, he had attempted to stand up but collapsed onto the floor.

Because the main door was blocked, the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) personnel were delayed from providing first aid for several minutes. Later, after liaison with the local ambulance service, the RFFS disembarked the casualty on a stretcher and he was taken temporarily to the aircraft operator's offices before being transported to a local hospital.

An engineering check found no fault with the catering cart's latching system.

Cabin crew actions

After the flight, the cabin crew reported that the No 2 sat on the forward left jumpseat for the takeoff but the other crew members sat in passenger seats, believing this to be allowed for a flight without passengers.

During the flight, the No 3 had moved the catering carts in the aft galley in order to place new bar seals on them. The No 1 reported that, after hearing that 10 minutes remained until landing, she had checked the security of these carts and believed they were all correctly stowed. She then moved forward and opened the flight deck door for a short time, to inform the pilots the cabin was secure for landing, despite being aware that the No 3 was still standing in the aft galley. After the flight, it emerged that no pre-landing security checks were actioned in cabin areas for which the No 2 was normally responsible, because procedures for flights with only three cabin crew were not used when the No 2 was in the flight deck.

A few minutes before landing, the No 3 moved forward to the front left side of the cabin and sat on the inboard jumpseat, near the main access door, while the No 1 and the No 4 sat in the front row of passenger seats. The No 3 stated that the aft catering carts had appeared to be secure when he left the aft galley to move forward.

Organisational information

The Aircraft Operator's Manual Part A, '*Safety and Emergency Procedures*' (SEP), states that all cabin crew are to be in their seats before the No 1 informs the flight deck, using the interphone system, that the cabin is secure. According to the SEP manual, the cabin crew are assigned aft-facing seats as follows: for the No 1 and the No 4, two jumpseats adjacent to the front left door, for the No 2, a jumpseat near the aft left door, and for the No 3, a jumpseat near the aft right door. In addition, the manual states that cabin crew must sit in their assigned seats for takeoff and landing and also that cabin secure checks are to be actioned during positioning flights.

Aircraft Operator's Report

An internal investigation by the aircraft operator assessed that deceleration forces during the landing were normal and it was not possible to explain how the catering cart unlatched. However, had the No 3 cabin crew been seated in his assigned jumpseat in the aft galley, he might have seen the catering cart become insecure and been able to prevent it from moving.

The cabin crew participated in an accident debrief, during which they were reminded of the seating requirements for positioning flights and the cabin security procedures. Following this debrief the No 1 cabin crew received additional training, and the aircraft operator included the procedures for positioning flights in its recurrent training sessions for all cabin crew.

The aircraft operator has circulated a memorandum to all its crews reminding them of the cabin procedures which are to be followed during a positioning flight.