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    ATR Takes Runway Tumble


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    Contact photographer Trevor Mulkerrins

    What: Aer Lingus/Aer Arann Avion de Transport Regional ATR-72-200 en route from Manchester to Shannon
    Where: Shannon
    When: Jul 17th 2011
    Who: 21 passengers, 4 crew
    Why: The pilot made a safe landing in turbulence but the front wheel collapsed (on landing or during taxi). The plane veered on to the grass.

    Passengers had to disembark on to the runway via stairs and were ported to the gate.

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    Cessna Crash under Investigation

    What: Cessna C-210
    Where: Airport Road near Pastoral Center St. Charles Borromeo, Romeoville, near Lewis University Airport
    When: June 26, 2011, 2:49 p.m.
    Who: Pilot Victor Pantaleo and passenger
    Why: After experiencing engine problems on taking off from the Brookeridge Airpark in Downers Grove, the pilot was attempting to return to the airport, when the plane struck trees before impacting the ground front of St. Charles Barromeo Pastoral Center in Romeoville. The plane took down powerlines when it crashed.

    The passenger was half ejected from the plane, and rescuers had to disengage him but he survived. Pantaleo was airlifted to Good Samaritan Hospital in Downers Grove and was pronounced dead.

    Firefighters from the Lockport Township Fire Department responded to the crash.

    The NTSB is investigating.

    The mass for Panatelo was held at at Our Lady of Mt. Carmel Church.

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    Series of Operational Errors by Pilot Led to 2009 Airplane Crash in Montana

    The National Transportation Safety Board determined today that the cause of the March 2009 deadly crash of a Pilatus airplane was a series of operational errors made by the pilot. The pilot failed to ensure that a fuel system icing inhibitor (FSII), commonly referenced by the brand name “Prist”, was added to the fuel prior to the accident flight.

    The pilot also failed to take appropriate remedial actions, including diverting to a suitable airport, after the airplane warning systems indicated a low fuel pressure state that ultimately resulted in a significant lateral fuel imbalance. And, the pilot lost control while maneuvering the left-wing heavy airplane near the approach end of the runway.

    “The pilot’s pattern of poor decision making set in motion a series of events that culminated in the deadly crash,” said NTSB Chairman Deborah A. P. Hersman. “Humans will make mistakes, but that is why following procedures, using checklists and always ensuring that a safety margin exists are so essential – aviation is not forgiving when it comes to errors.”

    On March 22, 2009, at about 2:32 pm (MDT), a Pilatus PC-12/45, N128CM, crashed about 2,100 feet west of runway 33 at Bert Mooney Airport (BTM) in Butte, Montana. The flight departed Oroville Municipal Airport in Oroville, California, en route to Gallatin Field in Bozeman, Montana but the pilot diverted to Butte for unknown reasons. The pilot and the 13 passengers were fatally injured and the aircraft was substantially damaged by impact forces and a post-crash fire. The airplane was owned by Eagle Cap Leasing of Enterprise, Oregon, and was operating as a personal flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

    During the investigation, the NTSB determined that the pilot did not add a fuel system icing inhibitor when the airplane was fueled on the day of the accident. The Pilatus flight manual states that a fuel system icing inhibitor must be used for all flight operations in ambient temperatures below 0 degrees Celsius to prevent ice formation in the fuel system. The NTSB concluded that the airplane experienced icing in the fuel system which resulted in a left-wing-heavy fuel imbalance. The increasing fuel level in the left tank and the depletion of the fuel from the right tank should have been apparent to the pilot because that information was presented on the fuel quantity indicator. This should have prompted the pilot to divert the airplane to an airport earlier in the flight as specified by the airplane manufacturer.

    The NTSB issued recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration and the European Aviation Safety Agency, to require fuel filler placards and guidance on fuel system icing prevention.

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    Luddington Crash Report Posted: Debris in Fuel

    TSB Identification: CEN10FA465
    14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
    Accident occurred Friday, July 23, 2010 in Ludington, MI
    Aircraft: CESSNA U206F, registration: N82531
    Injuries: 4 Fatal,1 Minor.

    On July 23, 2010, at 1017 eastern daylight time (edt), a Cessna U206F, N82531, sustained substantial damage when it was ditched in Lake Michigan about 5 miles west of Ludington, Michigan, after a loss of engine power. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. It departed the Gratiot Community Airport (AMN), Alma, Michigan, at 0850 and was en route to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The single-engine airplane was over Lake Michigan at 10,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) when the engine lost power. The pilot reversed course but was unable to reach the shore, and he ditched the airplane. The pilot survived and was rescued by a fishing boat about 38 minutes later. The pilot rated passenger and three other passengers did not survive. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated.

    (Full)
    HISTORY OF FLIGHT

    On July 23, 2010, at 1017 eastern daylight time (edt), a Cessna U206F, N82531, sustained substantial damage when it was ditched in Lake Michigan about 5 miles west of Ludington, Michigan, after a loss of engine power. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. It departed the Gratiot Community Airport (AMN), Alma, Michigan, at 0850 and was en route to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The single-engine airplane was over Lake Michigan at 10,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) when the engine lost power. The pilot reversed course but was unable to reach the shore, and he ditched the airplane. The pilot survived and was rescued by a fishing boat about 38 minutes later. The pilot rated passenger and three other passengers did not survive. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated.

    On July 23, 2010, about 0659, the pilot rated passenger called the Princeton Automated Flight Service Station to obtain a weather brief and to file an IFR flight plan. The briefer informed him that there was an airmen’s meteorological information (AIRMET) for IFR conditions for the entire route of flight that was valid until about 1100 – 1400. There was a Convective significant meteorological information (SIGMET) to the south that paralleled the route of flight. The briefer reported that the winds aloft were from 260 degrees at 41 knots at 9,000 feet, and 270 degrees at 35 knots at 12,000 feet. The pilot rated passenger filed the flight plan and identified the flight as a “lifeguard” flight.

    The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to take one of the passengers to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, for medical treatments. The flight was a personal flight and was not associated with a charity organization. The patient and his wife were seated in the aft seats, seats 5 and 6. The patient’s doctor was sitting in the middle row on the left in seat 3. The pilot was in the left front seat and the pilot rated passenger was in the right front seat, seat 2. The fuel tanks were filled to capacity the night before the flight. The pilot reported that after climbing to 10,000 feet msl, he leaned the fuel mixture to approximately 14 gallons per hour (gph).

    The pilot reported that all of the instrument readings were within normal limits as they crossed the shore near Ludington, Michigan. The head winds were about 40 knots “directly on the nose.” Near mid-point over the lake (about 24 statute miles from the shoreline), the engine began to misfire and lose power, with the fuel flow dropping to about 11 gph. The pilot attempted to regain power by pushing in the mixture control to full rich but without effect. About 1005, the pilot contacted the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and reported that the airplane was losing power. He reversed course toward the Michigan shoreline. The fuel flow dropped to about 8 gph. The pilot switched fuel tanks and adjusted the mixture control in and out to try to regain power. He attempted to prime the engine but that had no effect. He reported that he turned on the high boost pump and got a short burst of power for about 30 – 45 seconds, but then the engine “failed completely.”

    The airplane descended through a cloud layer. About 1012, the airplane was about 12 miles from Ludington and about 2,300 feet above mean sea level (msl) and the airplane was still in the clouds. The surface weather at Ludington indicated that the cloud bases were at 1,800 feet msl. The pilot reported that they had a few minutes before water impact after breaking out of the clouds, so he had everyone don and inflate their life vests. Before impact, the pilot unlatched the pilot’s door on the left side of the airplane, and he had the front door of the rear cargo door unlatched. The pilot reported that he did not lower the flaps since the cargo doors would not open if the flaps were extended.

    The pilot reported that when he ditched the airplane, either the tail or the landing gear hit the water as he pulled up to go over a swell. The airplane pitched forward, flipped over on its back, and began to fill with water. The pilot unbuckled his seat belt and shoulder harness, fell a short distance, pushed the door open, and got out. He reported that the airplane was sinking rapidly. He saw the right seat passenger and the doctor in the water. A wave hit the pilot and when he resurfaced “everything was gone.” He kept yelling but got no response. He eventually started to swim toward the shoreline. About 30 minutes later a US Coast Guard helicopter flew over him but they did not spot him. A few minutes later a fishing boat spotted him and rescued him from the water. He was transferred to a Coast Guard vessel and was taken to shore.

    Using side scanning sonar, the Michigan State Police Dive Team located the airplane in about 173 feet of water on July 30. The dive team recovered all the bodies, with the last body being recovered on the morning of August 1, 2010.

    The airplane was found resting on its main landing gear on the sandy lake bottom. The airframe and engine were separated by the water impact. Both were raised to the surface by a local commercial recovery service on August 1, 2010. The airframe and engine were taken to a local facility where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted its on-site investigation.

    PERSONNEL INFORMATION

    The 66-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. He reported that he had 2,660 total flight hours with 1,200 hours in a Cessna 206. He had logged 25 hours of flight time in the last 90 days, and 7 hours in the last 30 days. He held a third-class medical certificate that was issued in November 2008.

    The pilot reported that he had flown similar “lifeguard” flights in the airplane with the pilot rated passenger in the past. He reported that the pilot rated passenger performed copilot duties when he flew with him. The pilot rated passenger also owned an airplane. When they flew in the pilot rated passenger’s airplane, the accident pilot would perform copilot duties.

    The 70-year-old pilot rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. He held a third-class medical certificate that was issued on November 17, 2009. He had 2,150 hours of total flight time at the time of his medical examination.

    AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

    The airplane was a single-engine Cessna U206F, serial number U-206-01734, manufactured in 1972. It was designed to seat six and it had a maximum gross weight of 3,600 pounds. The airplane was equipped with a pilot (left) side door and a clamshell rear door serving the back two rows of seats. The accident airplane had its middle, right seat (Seat 4) removed. The engine was a 300-horsepower Continental IO-520-F3B, serial number 280171R.

    Annual Inspections
    The airplane’s maintenance logbooks indicated that four different inspection authorization (IA) mechanics had conducted the required annual maintenance inspections on the airplane within the last ten years. The logbooks indicated that the same IA mechanic had performed the last three annual maintenance inspections. On September 27, 2007, the IA mechanic performed his first annual maintenance inspection of the airplane. The total airframe time was 3,893.4 hours. His second annual inspection of the airplane was conducted on October 1, 2008, and the airplane had a total time of 3,908.1 hours. The last annual maintenance inspection was conducted on November 5, 2009, and it had a total time of 3,938.0 hours. At the time of the accident, the airplane had flown 7.5 hours since the last inspection and had a total time of 3,945.5 hours.

    FAA inspectors interviewed the IA mechanic concerning the annual maintenance inspections he had conducted on the accident airplane. According to the FAA inspectors, the IA mechanic reported that he used the inspection checklists provided by the pilot/owner in order to conduct the annual maintenance inspections. The pilot/owner provided the IA mechanic with the Cessna Service Manual for “Stationair Series, Skywagon 206 Series and Super Skylane Series, 1969 thru 1971.” The service manual indicated the items that needed to be inspected during a 50-hour inspection and 100-hour (annual) inspection. In the section of the checklist covering the “Engine Compartment,” Item 29 states that the “Fuel-air control unit screen” is required to be checked during every 100-hour inspection. In the section of the checklist covering the “Fuel System,” Item 2 states that the “Fuel strainer screen and bowl” is required to be checked during every 100-hour inspection.

    The Cessna Service Manual provides the following information about the fuel strainer:

    “Section 13-42. FUEL STRAINER DISASSEMBLY. (See figure 13.9.) To disassemble and assemble the strainer, proceed as follows:

    a. Turn off fuel selector valve.
    b. Disconnect strainer drain tube and remove safety wire, nut, and washer at bottom of filter bowl and remove bowl.
    c. Carefully unscrew standpipe and remove.
    d. Remove filter screen and gasket. Wash filter screen and bowl in solvent (Federal Specification P-S-661, or equivalent) and dry with compressed air.
    e. Using a new gasket between filter screen and top assembly, install screen and standpipe. Tighten standpipe only finger tight.
    f. Using all new O-rings, install bowl. Note that step-washer at bottom of bowl is installed so that step washer seats against O-ring. Connect strainer drain tube.

    The engine manufacturer’s “Operator’s Manual for IO-520 Series Aircraft Engines, FAA Approved September 1980,” also provided a checklist for 100-hours inspections of the engine. Item 14 of the 100-hour inspection checklist stated: “Fuel Metering Unit Inlet Screen: Inspect and clean.”

    According to the FAA inspectors, the IA mechanic reported that during the last annual inspection of the fuel strainer screen and bowl, he removed the bowl and found some water in it, but he did not remove the screen or gasket. According to the FAA, he also stated several times during the interview that he never checks the fuel metering inlet fuel screen, and that he did not check it during the last annual inspection.

    The aircraft logbook indicated that during the annual maintenance inspection on May 20, 2004, the following entry was made by a different IA mechanic: “Replaced fuel strainer cable assy [assembly] and replaced strainer screen assy [assembly].” The engine logbook for the same annual inspection had this entry: “Removed engine primer system and capped at engine.”

    METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

    At 0955, the observed surface weather observation at Ludington (LUD), Michigan, was: wind 290 degrees at 6 knots with gusts to 17 knots; visibility 10 miles; ceiling 1,800 feet overcast; temperature 24 degrees Celsius; dew point 22 degrees Celsius; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

    At 1016, the observed surface weather observation at Ludington (LUD), Michigan, was: wind 270 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 miles; ceiling 1,600 feet overcast; temperature 24 degrees Celsius; dew point 22 degrees Celsius; altimeter 29.82 inches of mercury.

    WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

    The postaccident inspection of the airframe and engine occurred on August 2 – 3, 2010. The inspection revealed that the fuselage was intact; however, the empennage was partially separated with extensive wrinkling and bending around the tailcone section aft of the rear seats. Some of the damage to the empennage was a result of the recovery effort. Both wingtips exhibited aft crushing. The engine was separated from the fuselage. The nose landing gear was separated from the fuselage and not recovered. All flight control surfaces remained attached to the airframe structure. Flight control cable continuity was established from all flight controls to all the primary and secondary flight control surfaces. The elevator trim tab measurement equated to about 10 degrees up. The flaps were found down about 30 degrees. The flap indicator and flap switch were found at the 20 degree position. The push pull rods to lift the flaps were cut by rescue divers during the recovery of the bodies. The rear cargo doors were found in the closed position, but they opened and closed normally. The key was still in the ignition and on the “Both” position.

    The inspection of the airplane’s fuel system revealed that about 60 gallons of fuel remained in the wing fuel tanks, about 30 gallons in each side. About the first five gallons drained from the wings appeared to be a mixture of fuel and water. The remaining liquid drained was light blue in color and appeared to be aviation fuel. Both wing fuel bladder tanks and exit port screens were clean. The fuel boost pump was removed and drained of water. The boost pump operated when it was powered by a 12 volt battery. The airplane was equipped with the optional fuel primer and the fuel primer control lever in the cockpit; however, the fuel line was capped-off (not operational) at the firewall.

    The inspection of the firewall fuel strainer revealed that the gasket did not provide a complete seal between the fuel screen and upper body. Instead, a portion of the gasket was positioned over the exit port which created a gap between the fuel screen and the upper body of the fuel strainer.

    The inspection of the engine revealed that all the cylinders and engine accessories remained attached to the crankcase. Oil was present in the engine. The crankshaft was rotated and drive train continuity to the cylinders and accessories was confirmed. All damage observed was consistent with impact. The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited aft bending toward the non-cambered side of the propeller blade.

    The inspection of the engine’s throttle and fuel metering assembly revealed that the fuel inlet filter screen was safety wired. The safety wire was removed and the fuel inlet screen was removed from the fuel metering assembly. The removal of the fuel inlet screen required a consistent pull (it did not come out freely) to remove it. The visual inspection of the inlet screen revealed that it was partially obstructed by debris that had become attached to the screen. The orifice of the fuel inlet passage was inspected. It contained the same debris material that obstructed the fuel screen and the debris blocked a majority of the orifice opening.

    The firewall fuel strainer, the fuel inlet screen, and debris found in the fuel inlet screen were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination. The engine was shipped to the engine manufacturer for further inspection.

    MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

    No autopsies were performed.

    SURVIVAL ASPECTS

    The pilot reported that he used the life vests that were in the pilot rated passenger’s airplane since he could not find his life vests the night prior to the flight. He put the life vests in the seat pockets so that they would be accessible to the passengers. He reported that the passengers donned their life vests during the descent prior to water impact. He had the pilot rated passenger take the controls momentarily while he donned his life vest. He stated that he heard “a couple of the vests go off” while still inside the airplane.

    During recovery of the airplane and its occupants, the patient and his wife were found in the airplane with the patient still seated in seat 6. The patient still had his vests on, but the wife’s vest had come off and it was found in the airplane. Both life vests were deflated when the bodies were recovered. The pilot rated passenger and the patient’s doctor were found on the lake bottom within 50 yards of the airplane. The doctor still had his vest on but in a deflated condition. The pilot rated passenger was not wearing a life vest. A life vest was found near the copilot’s seat, seat 2, in a deflated condition.

    The inspection of the life vests revealed that they were manufactured in the 1980’s and the CO2 cartridges used to inflate the vests were also manufactured in the 1980’s. The inspection of the life vests revealed that passenger life vests had one CO2 cartridge attached to the vest. All the cartridges were found expended during the on-site inspection. The pilot’s vest had two CO2 cartridges but only one cartridge had been expended. The pilot reported that he was not aware that the vest had two cartridges.

    Search Conditions
    According to the Mason County Sheriff’s Department, the weather was cloudy with good visibility during the initial on-scene search for the wreckage and survivors. The water temperature was between 68 and 72 degrees Fahrenheit on the surface with 2 to 4 foot seas. The waters current appeared to be moving north towards Big Sauble Lighthouse, and then moving to the northwest from the lighthouse.

    Cessna Stationair Owner’s Manual
    The Cessna Stationair Owner’s Manual provided information and procedures for emergency landing without engine power, ditching, clamshell cargo doors, cargo door emergency exit procedures, and glide distance.

    Emergency Landing Without Engine Power
    The Emergency Procedure section of the airplane Owner’s Manual provides the procedures for “Emergency Landing Without Engine Power.” The procedure stated the following:

    If an engine stoppage occurs, establish a flaps up glide at 85 MPH. If time permits, attempt to restart the engine by checking for fuel quantity, proper fuel selector valve position, and mixture control setting. Also check that engine primer is full in and locked and ignition switch is properly positioned.

    If all attempts to restart the engine fail and a forced landing is imminent, select a suitable field and prepare for the landing as follows:

    1. Pull mixture control to idle cut-off position.
    2. Turn fuel selector valve “OFF”.
    3. Turn off all switches except master switch.
    4. Approach at 90 MPH.
    5. Extend wing flaps as necessary with gliding distance of field
    6. Turn off master switch.
    7. Unlatch cabin doors prior to final approach.
    8. Land in a slightly tail-low attitude.
    9. Apply heavy braking.

    Ditching
    The Emergency Procedure section of the airplane Owner’s Manual provides the procedures for “Ditching.” The ditching procedures state:

    1. Plan approach into wind if winds are high and seas are heavy. With heavy swells and light wind, land parallel to swells.
    2. Approach with flaps 40 degrees and sufficient power for a 300 ft./min rate of descent at 75 MPH.
    3. Unlatch the cabin door.
    4. Maintain a continuous descent until touchdown in level attitude. Avoid a landing flare because of difficulty in judging airplane height over a water surface.
    5. Place folded coat or cushion if front of face at time of touchdown.
    6. Evacuate airplane through cabin doors. If necessary, open window to flood cabin compartment for equalizing pressure so that door can be opened.
    7. Inflate life vests and raft (if available) after evacuation of cabin.

    Information on Cargo Door
    The airplane’s Owner’s Manual states that when conducting the “Before Entering the Airplane” checklist during the preflight, it is important check the cargo doors are securely latched and locked. An “IMPORTANT” note states:

    “The cargo doors must be fully closed and latched before operating the electric wing flaps. A switch in the upper door sill of the front cargo door interrupts the wing flap electrical circuit when the front door is opened or removed, thus preventing the flaps being lowered with possible damage to the cargo door or wing flaps when the cargo door is open.”

    The Owner’s Manual section titled “Cargo Door Emergency Exit” states the following information:

    “If it is necessary to use the cargo door as an emergency exit and the wing flaps are not extended, open the forward door and exit. If the wing flaps are extended, open the doors in accordance with the instructions shown on the placard which is mounted on the forward cargo door.”

    The red placard found on the front cargo door of the accident airplane stated:

    EMERGENCY EXIT OPERATIONS
    1. OPEN FWD CARGO DOOR AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.
    2. ROTATE RED LEVER IN REAR CARGO DOOR FWD.
    3. FORCE REAR CARGO DOOR FULL OPEN.

    Glide Distance
    The Operator’s Manual indicated that the maximum glide distance for the airplane with the following parameters: 1) Speed 85 mph indicated airspeed; 2) Propeller windmilling; 3) Flaps up; and 4) Zero wind. The Maximum Glide chart indicated that the maximum glide distance from a height of 10,000 feet above the terrain is a ground distance of 15 statute miles.

    TESTS AND RESEARCH

    Life Vests
    The life vests were tested at a manufacturer’s facility. The vests were overdue their inspection requirements. The pressure tests indicated that the vests inflated when new CO2 cartridges were used and held pressure. No anomalies were found with the life vests that would have precluded normal inflation and operation. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91 regulations do not require life vests for each occupant if the airplane is operated not for hire.

    Engine Inspection
    The engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and operational testing. The engine was put on a test stand and run. The engine experienced a normal start. The engine RPM was advanced to 1,200 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 1,600 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 2,450 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; and at full throttle and held for 5 minutes to stabilize. The throttle was rapidly advanced from idle to full throttle six times and it accelerated and decelerated without hesitation or interruption in power. It produced rated horsepower.

    NTSB Materials Laboratory Examination
    The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined the debris found in the fuel metering assembly’s fuel inlet screen. The examination of the material removed from the filter revealed several categories of materials present within the mixture. The materials present included: 1) cellulosic material similar to wood and sawdust; 2) non-metallic amber-colored flakes similar to varnish or shellac; 3) thin, ribbon-like metallic shavings; 4) white flakes similar to paint; 5) granular particulates similar to sand or dirt; and 6) fibers similar to fabric and glass fiber

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    Pilots Blamed in Aires Crash


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    Contact photographer Juan_BOG

    What: Aires Boeing 737-700 en route from Bogota to San Andrés Island Colombia
    Where: Gustavo Rojas Pinilla International Airport on the Colombian island of San Andres
    When: August 15 2010, 2:15 a.m.
    Who: 131 aboard, 6 crew, 4 minors, 121 adult passengers
    Why: Prior to touchdown, the plane was struck by lightning (11 strikes recorded within 6 miles of the runway within a five-minute span of the crash)

    According to Colombian media sources, Colombian aviation inspectors blame the pilot for not “adjusting” to flying in the high wind due to flying in too low an altitude.

    The plane crashed and broke into three pieces. 115 were injured and one died; Maria Camila Angarita was a second casualty when she died in the hospital.

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    Thai Chopper Down

    What: Royal Thai Army Aviation Bell UH-1H Huey
    Where: between Phetchaburi and Ratchaburi, Thailand
    When: July 16 2011
    Who: 5 fatalities
    Why: A chopper on a mission (air ambulance flight) to rescue civilians trapped in Kaeng Krachan National Park crashed, killing 5 army officers aboard. Visibility was poor, with heavy rain and thick fog.

    The chopper had taken off from Thap Phraya Sua Camp in Ratchaburi’s Suan Phung district.

    The soldiers lost in that crash were Maj. Kitisak Chin-iam (First pilot), Lt. Pratya Nualsri (Second Pilot), Maj. Kitiphum Ekkaphan (Deputy Commander of the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment), Sgt. Maj. Rangsan Polsaibua and Sgt. Maj. Narongdet Pongnumkul (both Flight Mechanics).

    The crash occurred between Phetchaburi and Ratchaburi in the jungle. Retrieval has been hampered by continued bad weather, but four helicopters have participated in recovery, as well as forest rangers and border patrol.

    Condition and status of the stranded civilians has not been released but they appear not to have been aboard the chopper at the time of the crash.

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    Continentavia Diverts, Emergency Landing One Engine Shut down

    What: Continentavia Tupolev TU-154 en route from Barnaul to Norilsk, Russia
    Where: Abakan
    When: Jul 16th 2011
    Who: 56 passengers, 7 crew (also reported as 46 passengers)
    Why: The Continentavia TU-154 developed engine vibration and diverted to Abakan.

    The pilot shut down engine number two and made a safe landing in Abakan. The flight took 40 minutes on two engines.

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    RELEMBRANDO O VÔO 3054

    Estamos em meados de julho e meus pensamentos se voltam para o voo 3054 da TAM. Dia
    17 teremos o aniversário da tragédia. A tragédia ocorreu em 2007, já há quatro anos, quando o Airbus teve problemas ao tentar pousar no Aeroporto de Congonhas em São Paulo. Como
    pode já haver passado quatro anos? Porem o tempo passa. Foram quatro anos desde que as condições de tempo, a pista de pouso mal conservada e um dos reversos inoperante , que associados, acabaram por causar o pior desfecho possível, ceifando 199 vidas. É claro que o número de vítimas vai muito além, pois cada vida perdida levou tambem sua respectiva família junto, mudando-as de forma permanente, deixando-as órfãs.

    Quando vivenciamos a perda de entes queridos, feriados tornam-se verdadeiros pesadelos, substituindo cada celebração por dor e sofrimento. Esperamos que, para todas as
    famílias, estes quatro anos possam ter aliviado a comoção original. Felizmente, as famílias
    uniram-se e apoiaram-se mutuamente, permitindo que os sentimentos fossem expressos e
    abrandados. Em alguns dias, como nos aniversários e feriados, sentiremos suas presenças ou
    perda com maior intensidade. Tentaremos todos nos alegrar com suas memórias.
    Alguns familiares e amigos reunir-se-ão para marcar a data. Outros não. Alguns optarão por não lembrar a data de sua perda. Após passarem-se quatro anos para que a dor inicial arrefeça-se, aqueles que ficaram terão lutado para voltar à normalidade e, a essa altura, já terão construído novas rotinas e novas formas de enfrentar os dias e noites. Eles seguem em frente, mas já não são os mesmos. E querendo ou não, reunindo-se, eles se lembram.
    Eles não lembrarão o avião ou suas eventuais falhas mecânicas, a empresa aérea ou o aeroporto. Eles recordarão seus entes queridos, cuja ausência deixou um vazio em suas vidas.

    Essas são famílias visitadas por fantasmas. Elas vêm fantasmas em suas cadeiras vazias, em suas salas vazias, no assento do carona vazio, no banco do motorista vazio. Ouvem murmúrios de palavras que não foram ditas. Se tiverem sorte, vêm o rosto de seus amados em estranhos.
    Um rosto que se volta, o formato da parte posterior de uma cabeça. Vislumbres pungentes
    quando eventualmente o coração se alegra por um instante e então reconhece… não, não é você.
    As memórias perduram. Como rosas de verão durante um inverno, elas estão sempre conosco.
    Pedacinhos de memórias ficam conosco em nossos bolsos, como conchas que encontramos
    na praia, tesouros para serem guardados e apreciados. Temos sorte por termos isto.
    Mas temos mais do que isso. As pessoas que amamos são parte de nós. Assim como parte de
    nós se foi com eles, parte deles vive em cada um de nós.

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  • Remembering Tam 3054

    In mid July, my thoughts turn toward Tam 3054. The anniversary of the crash is on the 17th. The tragedy happened in 2007, four years ago that the Airbus failed its landing at São Paulo’s Congonhas airport. How can it be four years already? But time passes. Four years since the weather, the ill-prepared runway, and the inactivated-reverser converged into the worst case scenario that stole a hundred and ninety-nine lives. Of course the number of casualties is greater than that, because each of those lost lives took down their families with them, leaving them forever changed. Leaving them.

    When you have lost loved ones, holidays can become a nightmare, replacing celebration by grief and loss, magnifying sadness and pain. We can hope for the families that four years have muffled that initial response. Hopefully the families have been kind to themselves and allowed their feelings to express and ease. Some days —birthdays, holidays— we feel their presence or their loss more deeply. Let us all try to rejoice in the remembrance.

    Some family and friends will be gathering to remember. Some will not. Some will have chosen not to memorialize the date of the loss. After four years for the first pain to disperse, those who remain will have fought to regain normalcy, and by now will have found new routines, new ways of facing the day and the night. They continue; but they are changed. And whether or not they gather, they remember.

    They won’t be remembering the plane and its fatal flaws, the airline, or the airport. They’ll be remembering the loved ones whose absence has left a vacuum in their lives. These are families visited by ghosts. They see ghosts in their empty chairs, empty rooms, the empty passenger seat, the empty driver’s seat. They hear whispers of words not spoken. If they are lucky, they see the face of their loved ones in strangers. The turn of a profile, the shape of the back of a head. Poignant glimpses where the heart rejoices for an instant, then recognizes…no, it’s not you.

    Memories remain. Like summer roses in December, they are always with us. Tidbits of memories are tucked into our pockets like bits of shell found at the seashore, treasures to be taken out and examined. We are lucky that way.
    But we have more than that. The people we love are part of us. Just as part of us died with them, part of them lives on in us.

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  • |

    FAA Proposes $1.05 Million Civil Penalty Against Boeing

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is proposing a $1,050,000 civil penalty against the Boeing Company for allegedly failing to correct a known problem in production and installation of the central passenger oxygen system in its B-777 airliners.

    The FAA based its proposed civil penalty on inspections of nine newly assembled aircraft between April and October, 2010. Inspectors discovered that spacers in the oxygen delivery system distribution tubing on the aircraft were not installed correctly. Improper installation could result in the system not supplying oxygen to passengers should depressurization occur.

    “There is no excuse for waiting to take action when it comes to safety,” said Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We will continue to insist on the highest levels of safety from our aircraft manufacturers.”

    “The FAA has strict regulations when it comes to the maintenance and installation of aircraft systems that all manufacturers and operators must follow,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt.
    Boeing has 30 days from the receipt of the FAA’s enforcement letter to respond to the agency.

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  • | | | |

    Turkish Crash Kills Two in Aegean Sea


    What: Turkish Air Force Cessna T-37C Tweet
    Where: Aegean Sea off the coast of Güzelbahçe, Turkey
    When: July 14, 2011, noon
    Who: 2 aboard
    Why: The Turkish Airforce flight fell into the Aegean Sea, killing both the pilot and passenger. The Cessna is normally used for training. The flight took off from the Jet Base Flight Training Center but it has not been released if this was a training exercise. The pilot and passenger have not yet been recovered.

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  • | | | | | |

    Airbus Instrument Failure Behind Emergency Landing in Greece


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Ilgaz Deger

    What: Saudi Arabian Airlines Airbus A330-300 en route from Jeddah to Paris
    Where: Athens
    When: Jul 14 2011
    Who: 168 (?) 187 aboard
    Why: While en route, the Airbus experienced instrument failure. The pilot decided to divert to Greece.

    The pilot made an visual (ILS?) approach to Athens airport, with its instruments inoperable.

    The plane made a safe landing with no injuries reported. After maintenance went over the plane, it was back in the air within five or six hours.

    On July 12, a Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 777 en route from Washington to Riad made an emergency landing in Athens due to instruments indicating a fire in the luggage compartment. (No fire was found.) according to Thailand News Agency.

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  • |

    NTSB Investigating Taxiway Collision at Boston Logan Airport

    The National Transportation Safety Board has opened an investigation into last night’s collision of two jetliners on a taxiway at Boston Logan Airport.

    On July 14, 2011, about 7:33 P.M. EDT, a Delta Air Lines B767-300ER, N185DN, operating as Delta flight 266, was taxiing on taxiway B for departure on runway 04 at Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), when its left winglet struck the horizontal stabilizer of an Atlantic Southeast Airlines CRJ900, N132EV, operating as ASA flight 4904, which was number three in line on taxiway M waiting for departure on runway 09.

    As the B767 approached and passed the intersection with taxiway M, the left winglet of the B767 struck the horizontal tail of the CRJ900. The CRJ900 sustained substantial damage, which included damage to the horizontal tail and vertical tail; the airplane lost fluid in all three hydraulic systems. Parts of the B767 winglet were sheared off and embedded in the tail of the CRJ900. The passengers on the CRJ900 were deplaned on the taxiway, and the B767 taxied back to the terminal.

    Flight data recorders from both airplanes are en route to NTSB headquarters. Air Safety Investigator Dan Bower is the Investigator-In-Charge. Parties to the investigation include Delta Air Lines, Atlantic Southeast Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Air Line Pilots Association.

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  • | | | |

    Firefighter Dies as Chopper Falls Apart

    What: Robinson R22 helicopter
    Where: Garfield
    When: June 27, 2011
    Who: Steve Titsworth
    Why: Steve Titsworth, a retired (30 year) firefighter was flying the Robinson R22 chopper belonging to Don Arsenault when the chopper began falling apart. The propellers split and flew into the river; the rotor fell into the trees; and the rest of the chopper crashed hit a tree about 300 feet south of the river. The wreckage caught fire and was engulfed.

    The chopper had recently been overhauled.

    Ex-firefighter was copter crash victim : kxan.com

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  • | | | |

    Turbulence Injures Attendant


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Rotate

    What: Horizon Air de Havilland Dash 8-400 en route from Billings to Seattle
    Where: Billings
    When: Jul 8th 2011
    Who: 1 injured
    Why: Encountering turbulence while en route, one flight attendant aboard the Horizon Air flight was injured. The pilot returned to Billings and made a safe landing.

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  • | | |

    Fatalities Rise in Congo Crash, ATC Trainee at Fault?


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Guido Potters

    What: Hewa Bora Airways Boeing 727-100 en route from Kinshana N’Djili to Kisangani (Democratic Republic of Congo)
    Where: Kisangani
    When: Jul 8th 2011
    Who: 112 passengers and 6 crew
    Why: Attempting to land in heavy rain, limited visibility, thunderstorms in the area, the plane broke up on impact, and came to rest 984 feet from the runway. The plane struck a tree about 1000 meters short of runway 13.

    53 survived the crash. Emergency services rescued 43. Two flight attendants were the only surviving crew.

    85 died as a result of the crash. Prior to this posting, the number of reported dead grew from 46 to 68 to 85. *

    The cause of the crash has been attributed to a mistake by a trainee air traffic controller but ATC service provider at Kisangani Airport, denies allegations of controller error.

    Update: Hewa Bora’s license “has been suspended until further notice.”

    The captain had a total experience of 7,000 hours with around 5,000 hours on the Boeing 727.

    Survivors are in hospital care in various hospitals of Kisangani

    *Current death toll is 85

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    Russian Flight Ditches on River Ob, 7 lost, 22 hospitalized


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Gleb Osokin – Russian AviaPhoto Team

    What: Angara Airlines Antonov 24RV en route from Tomsk-Bogashevo Airport to Surgut Airport, Russia
    Where: near Strezhevoy, Russia
    When: July 11, 2011, 11:55
    Who: 4 crew, 33 passengers, 6 fatalities
    Why: The plane took off from Tomsk at 10:10, and developed an engine fire around 11:48. The pilot attempted to divert to divert to Nizhnevartovsk Airport and had to make an emergency landing, crashing into the Ob river. The tail and port engine detached on impact.

    Twenty passengers were hospitalized, and seven passengers died in the crash.

    Film of the crash


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  • | | | | |

    Recife-Natal Flight Crashes After Takeoff, 16 lost


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Gustavo Bolson Maia

    What: NOAR Linhas Aéreas Let L-410UVP-E20 en route from Recife to Natal
    Where: 1.1 miles SSE of Recife-Guararapes International Airport
    When: July 13, 2011
    Who: 2 crew, 14 passengers, 16 aboard
    Why: Shortly after takeoff from Guararapes-Gilberto Freyre International airport in Recife, the Noar LET L410 Turboprop, the pilot declared an emergency. The crew said it would attempt to land at Boa Viagem beach, and made a steep descent.


    Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
    Contact photographer Wagner Damasio – Cavok Brasil Team
    The plane reportedly into a vacant lot sandwiched between the Piedade and Boa Viagem neighborhoods at 0651 local time. The fire burned the plane, leaving a charred shell 300 feet short of where the pilot had intended to land. There was a total loss of life, but the black boxes have been recovered.

    The plane had a recent history of power loss on takeoff.

    The pilot had 15.000 flight hours and 2.000 on type.

    The pilot avoided landing on a densely populated area.

    LET is a Czech-built plane that had been in operation for a year. According to a spokesperson, two LET-410 twin-engine aircraft were purchased new in the Czech Republic. The Noar began its daily operations in the Northeast on June 14, 2010.

    Noar is a small regional airline

    12 second capture of the plane coming down behind a building.

    Raw video

    Raw video in traffic

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  • | | |

    Linhas Aéreas Flight 4896


    Noar Linhas Aéreas Flight 4896 took off from Boa Viagem, Recife, Brazil, on 13 July 2011, issued a mayday shortly after, and after experiencing trouble with one engine, the Let L-410UVP-E20 crashed 1,300 yds from the end of the runway. Two crew and fourteen passengers were killed on the scene.

    From the final:

    The CVR data indicate a change in the emotional state of the PIC on account of the aircraft adverse condition, to which he had to respond with an operational procedure that was different from the one for a normal flight situation.
    The copilot, in turn, in his communications, gives the impression of being highly tense on account of the emergency situation.
    This became clear with the delay of the copilot in retracting the landing gear, and in the PIC’s initiative to “feather” the propellers that had already been feathered by the copilot, after an order given by the very PIC.
    The evident anxiety identified in the cockpit is reflected in the barriers and filters that influenced the process of communication between the two pilots, sensitively affecting the PIC’s situational awareness.
    Moreover, it is a known fact that non-routine situations can cause a rise in one’s level of anxiety, but such alteration of the emotional state may be intensified when one does not have enough knowledge to manage the circumstance, and this interferes in the analysis of the scenario and adoption of appropriate measures.

    See Final Report (Text Only)

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  • | | |

    Family lost in Cessna Disappearance in Puerto Rico Day Trip

    What: Ernesto Ortiz(private owner) Cessna A185F Skywagon en route from Culebra to Ponce Mercedita
    Where: 1 mile from Yabucoa Puerto Rico
    When: July 1, 2011
    Who: 5 aboard
    Why: When the plane failed to reach its destination, a search began for the lost Cessna. It was apparently lost in a storm.

    The family was visiting from Hapeville Georgia and had flown to Puerto Rico for a day trip.

    The missing were identified as Antonio Torregrosa Sánchez, 65, pilot of the ship, Sonia Torregrosa Torres (68 years), Edd Diorio (58), Rosarito Villa Gomez (19 years) and Mario Villa Gomez, 13. Coast Guard Cutter Key Biscayne and response boats from the San Juan boat station have continued to search, along with local authorities and Puerto Rican Emergency Management. The Federal Aviation Administration tracked the plane’s radar history to its last point of contact, approximately a mile off the Yabacoa coast. Only the remains of Maria have been found.

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  • |

    Never Forget

    Lives have been shattered by the events I record.

    I know you could drive a mid-seventies Cadillac Fleetwood through the gaps in these records, but that is partly because I generally write about an event only once, partly because my content is based on a couple of randomly gathered secondhand observations, partly because I do not follow up, and partly because I am not an expert. (I never claim to be an expert in anything but my own life experience.) How could I be? The actual investigations take years, and are based on combined expert opinions of a whole boatload of bona fide experts. I am only a bystander, a bystander of second-hand bystanders, in fact. The reporters who inform me frequently misstate, interpret or misinterpret the facts, or add little imaginary flourishes. I still do my best to get the facts out as accurately as I can.

    Official final reports are the result of the combined knowledge and experience of experts (some of whom have agendas and bias) in “air traffic control, operations, meteorology, human performance, structures, systems, powerplants, maintenance records, survival factors, aircraft performance, cockpit voice recorder, flight data recorder, and material factors,” interviewers, rescue observers and specialists as needed. Sometimes the reports are obfuscated by agenda, bias or politics.

    I am just another pair of eyes, and untrained eyes, at that.

    I never, or hardly ever, write about what happens in the seats. Ironically, this is what I write now as I sit in one of those seats myself. Picture me in the cabin of a flight to Argentina. A young family is also on this flight, with hyperactive children running up and down the aisle whenever possible. Picture an infant or two, their safety seats empty as their mothers rock them to still their tears, to the relief of the couple across the aisle, and the irritation of one of the flight attendants. Picture a couple of newlyweds off on their honeymoon, and another couple of newlyweds returning from their honeymoon. Students flying home for the holidays, others returning after. Vacationers in Hawaiianwear. Nearer to me, an assortment of business people in summer suits appropriate for Argentina in July. This accidental ensemble of humankind is engaged in various activities: thumbing through magazines, cloud gazing through the windows, watching movies, listening to music, reading, studying paperwork, connecting intimately in intense whispers (or avoiding) a seatmate, sleeping.

    Just as all around me are engaged in making it through the flight, in a moment precisely like this one, other lives were interrupted. Maybe it was an instant, maybe a four minute fall. Maybe there was no time to process what was happening, or enough time to feel horrible bone-deep terror, and to endure for long moments the fight-flight reflex while belted into a seat. The detail of each event through individual eyes is simultaneously unique and identical.

    I don’t write about these moments. It is too horrible to contemplate except in cases like when Chesley Burnett Sullenberger is making a miracle happen.

    Out of the generous experiences of the decades of a whole, full life, families want to remember their loved ones in their entirety. They don’t want or need to be haunted by the torment of that single moment of horror, a final dark exclamation point.

    So when I write about these terrible crashes, I talk about system failures, or spatial disorientation, ATC schedules, fumes, pressurization, sleepy pilots, malfunctioning radar, stick shakers or a couple hundred other possible causes I have seen frequently enough for them to become familiar even to a layman like me.
    But it is not about the machine. It is about those who boarded that flight in perfect trust, expecting to disembark and fill more decades with passion and life. It is always and only about the passenger.

    I don’t mention them.

    But not an article is written, not a character is typed that I forget that the only matter is the passenger and the family.

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  • |

    NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

    National Transportation Safety Board
    Washington, DC 20594

    July 7, 2011
    http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2011/A-11-056-059.pdf
    The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Airborne Law Enforcement Association:

    Revise your standards to define pilot rest and ensure that pilots receive protected rest periods that are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of pilot fatigue during aviation operations. (A-11-56)

    Revise your accreditation standards to require that all pilots receive training in methods for safely exiting inadvertently encountered instrument meteorological conditions for all aircraft categories in which they operate. (A-11-57)

    Encourage your members to install 406-megahertz emergency locator transmitters on all of their aircraft. (A-11-58)

    Encourage your members to install flight-tracking equipment on all public aircraft that would allow for near-continuous flight tracking during missions. (A-11-59)

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  • |

    Fatigue Understanding between NATCA and FAA

    The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) announced agreement on important fatigue recommendations that were developed by a joint FAA-NATCA working group which was established under the 2009 collective bargaining agreement.

    “The American public must have confidence that our nation’s air traffic controllers are rested and ready to work,” said Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood. “We have the safest air transportation system in the world but we needed to make changes and we are doing that.”

    The agreement reinforces existing FAA policy that prohibits air traffic controllers from sleeping while they are performing assigned duties. The FAA will continue to provide air traffic controllers breaks on the midnight shift based on staffing and workload. While on break, air traffic controllers are expected to conduct themselves professionally and be available for recall at all times.

    The FAA and NATCA also agreed that all air traffic controllers must report for work well-rested and mentally alert. It is the employee’s responsibility to notify their supervisor if they are too fatigued to perform their air traffic control duties. As a result of this agreement, air traffic controllers can now request to take leave if they are too fatigued to work air traffic.

    This agreement marks the completion of the tasks required by this joint FAA-NATCA fatigue working group. The FAA and NATCA will continue to collaborate to reduce the risk of fatigue in the workplace.

    “Air traffic controllers have the responsibility to report rested and ready to work so they can safely perform their operational duties,” said FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt. “But we also need to make sure we have the right policies in place to reduce the possibility of fatigue in the workplace.”

    “We are pleased that the efforts of the joint NATCA-FAA fatigue workgroup that produced these science-based recommendations have resulted in an agreement and their implementation into the schedules and work environments of our nation’s dedicated and highly professional air traffic controller workforce,” said NATCA President Paul Rinaldi.

    “We supported the FAA’s action to enhance aviation safety by eliminating single staffing on the midnight shift and we fully support these recommendations that address fatigue. They are common sense solutions to a safety problem that NATCA and fatigue experts have consistently raised for many years.”
    Air traffic controllers will also now be allowed to listen to the radio and read appropriate printed material while on duty during the hours of 10PM and 6AM as traffic permits.

    The FAA had previously adjusted work schedules to give air traffic controllers a minimum of nine hours off between shifts. The FAA and NATCA will develop new watch schedule principles that incorporate fatigue science for schedules beginning no later than September 1, 2012. The FAA and NATCA are already beginning to work with local facilities on watch schedules that reduce the possibility of fatigue in the transition from the day shift to the midnight shift.

    The FAA has also agreed to develop policies that will encourage air traffic controllers to seek medical help for sleep apnea. Currently, air traffic controllers lose their medical qualification if they are diagnosed with sleep apnea. The FAA will work to develop a process for most air traffic controllers with sleep apnea to regain their medical qualification once they receive proper medical treatment. The FAA’s Office of Aerospace Medicine will also develop educational material to raise awareness of the symptoms and the physical effects of sleep apnea.

    As a result of this agreement, the FAA will develop a Fatigue Risk Management System for air traffic operations by January of next year. This management system will be designed to collect and analyze data associated with work schedules, including work intensity, to ensure that the schedules are not increasing the possibility of fatigue. Systems like these are commonly used in other areas of aviation to evaluate levels of risk. The FAA is also designing a comprehensive fatigue awareness and education training program for employees.

    Read the agreement pdf here.

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  • |

    Australian Civil Aviation Safety Authority Files No Fly Order for Tiger Airways Australia


    The Civil Aviation Safety Authority is to seek to extend the suspension of Tiger Airways Australia Pty Ltd.

    An application will be made to the Federal Court which will have the effect of continuing the suspension.

    CASA is seeking a continuation of the suspension until 1 August 2011.

    The application will be lodged at the Federal Court in Melbourne.

    If CASA completes its investigations and determinations before 1 August 2011 and is satisfied Tiger Airways Australia no longer poses a serious and imminent risk to air safety it may be possible for it to resume operations earlier.

    The suspension of Tiger Airways Australia’s operations remains in place until either the Federal Court refuses CASA’s application or CASA withdraws it.

    CASA is making the application to the Court because investigations into Tiger Airways Australia will not be completed by the end of the initial five working day suspension period.

    CASA will continue to work in a constructive and co-operative manner with Tiger Airways Australia during the investigation.

    CASA suspended Tiger Airways Australia’s operations on 2 July 2011 because it believed permitting the airline to continue to fly posed a serious and imminent risk to air safety.

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