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Category: <span>Testimony</span>

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CVR FDR NOT a Flight of Imagination

Read in Portuguese
In the continuing pursuit of the unvarnished reality behind Air France Flight 447, it does not matter why “Le Figaro” posted rumors and factoids in lieu of truth after the BEA reported that the complete data (flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder) was successfully recovered in Paris.

It does not matter if “Le Figaro” is more concerned with stimulating traffic than it is about veracity, legitimacy and validity in reporting truth.

Perhaps someone at “Le Figaro” is heavily invested in Airbus, and hopes to falsely boost the airline’s reputation. We have no idea of what their motives might be.

What matters are the facts.

What matters is that on recovery of the data from the data containers, the information appears to have been intact (according to the BEA).

What matters is that the data recovery teams were able to open, extract, clean and dry the memory cards, and retrieve the actual data.

There is no reason the data would not support exactly what the ACARS data already indicates, which is that the pitot tubes failed, and started a catastrophic landslide of mechanical events that led inevitably toward systems failure.

We believe the aircraft stalled all the way from 35000 feet to the ocean. If the BEA had considered this, they would have found the plane in weeks.

The plane sent out automated messages from which the sequence of failure has been inferred.

It is an acknowledged FACT that the mechanical systems on board Air France Flight 447 were standard Airbus A330 systems, a “fly by wire” technology which is known to remove responsibility and action from the pilots when in certain situations. A fly-by-wire system modifies manual inputs of the pilot in accordance with control parameters.

The pilots on this type of fly-by-wire system are unable to manually override if faulty data come streaming in from the frozen pitot tubes. The current thinking is that in the Air France Flight 447, the faulty Thales tubes streamed in faulty data to the on board systems. Disaster was all but inevitable.

(In Sept 2009, the FAA sent out a directive indicating that “use of the Thales model has resulted in reports of airspeed indication discrepancies while flying at high altitudes in inclement weather conditions …(that) …could result in reduced control of the airplane.” )

Prior to receiving the content of the black boxes, the collected data pointed to the following series of events:

The Thales pitot tubes are small devices affixed to the plane exterior which measure air speed, but which have a proven tendency to freeze over, which obfuscates the data. Simply put, the Airbus system requires correct data input for the plane to fly correctly. When the frozen-over tubes began sending corrupted data, the system could no longer manage flight. On the 330, there is no way for pilots to manually override the failing systems.

No one expects the black boxes to indicate anything else. What is expected, perhaps is a clarification of data, and a way to study the events in order to prevent a repetition of the same.

The BEA strongly objected to media speculation. In fact, it sent out a press release specifically naming “Le Figaro” as the sensationalist publisher of invalid information. Here is what the BEA said:

According to an article that appeared in « Le Figaro » on the evening of Monday 16 May 2011, the « first elements extracted from the black boxes» would exonerate Airbus in the accident to the A330, flight AF 447, which killed 216 passengers and 12 crew members on 1st June 2009.

Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories.

The BEA repeats that, in the framework of its mission as a safety investigation authority, it alone has the right to communicate on the progress of the investigation. Consequently, any information on the investigation that comes from another source is null and void if it has not been validated by the BEA.

Collection of all of the information from the audio recordings and from the flight parameters now gives us a high degree of certainty that everything will be brought to light concerning this accident. The BEA safety investigators will now have to analyse and validate a large quantity of complex data. This is long and detailed work, and the BEA has already announced that it will not publish an interim report before the summer.

At this stage of the investigation, no conclusions can be drawn.

So while we do respect our own experts who believe what they already believe (based on what was then available about the pitot tubes and fly-by-wire), we trust the BEA analysis will provide a solid analysis of the data and are aware that they have not released any new conclusions.

We reiterate their emphasis, rejecting non-validated information, and agree no one should be jumping on any band-wagon of opinion, at least not until the authorities apply their proficiencies and start analyzing the data that no one was expecting would surface.

While we are ruling nothing out and closing no doors, we are impervious to the contingent of nay-sayers who—regardless of the drastically different facts of every given situation—chant the same chorus in every aviation event, blaming the dead pilots because they are easy targets and can not defend themselves. Also, let us not ignore that liabilities due to pilot error are capped by International Convention. So no matter what the actual error, Airlines prefer “pilot error” because it means less coming out of their pockets.

The Montreal Convention imposes two tiers of liability on airlines:
-the first tier provides automatic compensation, deals with claims up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights ($155,000 US). The airline has no defense against claims up to this amount.
-the second tier deals with the portion of a claim exceeding the $155,000 limit. An airline can avoid liability of this portion only by proving it was not negligent or otherwise at fault. To avoid the liability the airline must prove a negative. There are, in fact, infinite ways an airline’s negligence can be involved, all of which the airline must disprove-a burden which is next to impossible to meet.

If we as armchair analysts must err, let us err believing until proven otherwise, that the pilots were dependable, reputable, and rock-solid; let us remember that they too were passengers aboard the flight, human beings who fought as best they could, against whatever forces or failures brought them down. We believe pilots are valiant men who know the weight of their office, who know they are responsible for the lives they carry, and when they do their human best to survive, even in face of overwhelming physics, nature, weather, or mechanical failure, it is rash and unworthy of us to blame them precipitously. Sure, pilots can err, but let us not tar them with that brush without the facts.

But for a single action, delayed reflex or overwhelming odds, those dead pilots who are so often blamed because they are defenseless targets, are themselves dead heroes.


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Actions Needed To Meet FAA’s Long-Term Goals for NextGen

On February 16, 2011, the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation testified before the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics regarding the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to develop and transition to the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). The Inspector General noted significant challenges FAA faces in achieving its long-term goals for NextGen across two areas: (1) addressing schedule delays and cost overruns with the En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM) program–without ERAM, other programs intended to provide more efficient data sharing and airspace routes will not be possible–and (2) reaching consensus with partner agencies on key research and development efforts that will affect the cost, schedule, and capabilities of NextGen. The Inspector General also highlighted several management actions that FAA can take now to strengthen FAA’s management of long-term NextGen initiatives. These include clarifying responsibility within FAA for critical NextGen development areas, finalizing performance goals and metrics for NextGen, establishing an integrated budget document to align and track all partner agencies’ NextGen resources, and fully leveraging the technology portfolios of partner agencies to assist with NextGen development.

See the Statement of the Honorable Calvin L. Scovel III Inspector General U.S. Department of Transportation


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Statement of J. Randolph Babbitt, Administrator Before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation, on Reauthorization of the Federal Aviation Administration Programs

Chairman Petri, Congressman Costello, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the need to pass comprehensive reauthorization legislation for the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) programs. Before I begin my statement, I would like to acknowledge the many changes that have occurred to this Committee and Subcommittee since I last appeared before you. The Committee has many new Members whom I look forward to getting to know. Since I am a frequent guest of this Committee, I am sure I will get to know those of you who are new to the process and I look forward to working with all of you.

FAA’s mission is to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world. We make sure the planes are safe. We make sure runways are safe. We make sure that aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) operate safely and efficiently. While this sounds simple, I can assure you it is not. Approximately 50,000 flights are operated on any given day. We move approximately 750 million people through the system on an annual basis. Yet, even as the number of passengers and flights increase, the accident rate continues to decrease. In calendar year 2010, there were zero commercial passenger fatalities in the United States. In the past four years, we have had only one fatal passenger accident. During that time, 42 million passenger flights were operated safely. Every fatality is a failure and we continue to strive to make those failures even rarer than they are today, but we are proud of the strides we’ve made.

As the sheer volume of the traffic indicates, aviation is critical to the way we live our lives and run our businesses. The aviation industry alone directly employs 1.1 million people and supports more than 11 million jobs in related industries and through spending by direct aviation employees. Altogether, this represents 6% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Consequently, long term authorization of FAA’s programs is extremely important.
For some of you who may not know the long history of the reauthorization effort, there have been 17 extensions of FAA’s programs since the last comprehensive legislation expired in 2007. There are many reasons why we are at this point, but the bottom line is that the failure to enact long term, comprehensive aviation legislation has had troubling impacts. While there has not been a gap in the authorization of FAA’s programs, there is always uncertainty about the passage of the next extension. Many of the extensions have been for relatively short periods of time, which has made managing our programs, particularly our airport grant program, extremely difficult. In addition, there are many legislative provisions that direct the agency’s action in certain areas. Some of these provisions would require the FAA to redirect resources or modify strategic decisions. Passage of long term legislation would provide needed clarity. Uncertainty about how Congress may act in certain areas makes moving forward in those areas more complicated. If we make a strategic decision that the legislation requires us to change, it could be costly and inefficient. We can no longer afford to operate in a continued state of uncertainty.

The program that has sustained the most profound effects of the short term extensions is the Airport Improvement Program (AIP). Airports and their contractors have been forced to divide construction projects into smaller components so that they can be funded by the money made available by a particular extension. Airport sponsors cannot risk embarking on a project for which the funds are not available in their entirety because of lack of a long term authorization. Some airports have chosen to delay important safety and capacity projects until a more certain funding source is in place. This has caused a major increase in the amount of entitlement funding being carried over each year. For several years before the expiration of our authorization, the average amount of funding carried over each year was approximately $400 million. Due to the serial extensions, the average amount carried over each year has consistently stayed in the $500-$600 million range, an indicator that the available funding is not being used in the best or most efficient way.

Administrative and project costs have increased due to the need for multiple grants to be issued for a single project. The number of AIP grants issued in 2008 through 2010 increased 35% over the three year period prior to the expiration of the last reauthorization in 2007. Such cost increases and project inefficiencies cannot be justified.

During my tenure as Administrator, I have not had the luxury of guiding the agency under a comprehensive, long term authorization. But I want to assure the Subcommittee that the agency has not been idle while awaiting passage of comprehensive authorization. This is a dynamic time in an extremely dynamic industry. NextGen will transform the way we fly and do business. It will move us from radar to satellite, from radio to data communications, from traditional airways to streamlined routes. Knowing what the future holds, it is imperative that we transform our national aviation system and the FAA over the next 15 years. Our goal is to work closely with industry to implement new technologies and procedures that are sustainable and to work with our international partners to establish uniform standards around the globe.

Last year, we asked an outside group to help us evaluate how we could effect change to better support the upcoming challenges. Representatives spent five months talking with employees and other stakeholders and surveying opinions. The review team talked with more than 100 executives, former FAA employees, and representatives from the Department of Transportation. Twenty-five hundred managers were surveyed, across the agency. The results showed that FAA’s culture is highly operational, tactical and safety-oriented. FAA employees are committed to and proud of our safety mission. However, the findings also indicated that, as an organization, we need to take a hard look at how we operate. We need to make sure we are structured to effectively implement the Next Generation Air Transportation System, or “NextGen,” deliver shared services and reach out and engage our stakeholders.

Based on the information obtained and evaluated, we are implementing recommendations for change in a variety of areas that will help us reach our long term goals and increase our effectiveness. One such recommendation is to avoid duplication of effort and streamline similar functions as much as possible. In addition, we need to improve our capabilities in areas such as hiring, promoting and retaining employees, so that we have the world class workforce necessary to support NextGen. This will require a more holistic approach with better collaboration across different parts of the organization. The agency is creating shared goals and metrics that all employees can work toward. Achieving these improvements will require strong leadership across the agency which can only happen if we improve the way we select and develop executives. Changes and streamlining in the agency will better position us to improve our flexibility and effectiveness, make the most of our resources, and meet the challenges presented by this dynamic period in aviation.

As it happens, this dynamic period in aviation coincides with a time of great economic challenges. That is why I feel very passionately that the FAA must demonstrate the strong business case for our major initiatives, and there is no greater example than NextGen. We need to demonstrate the operational and fiscal benefits to encourage widespread participation.

For example, we are moving forward with nationwide deployment of the satellite based surveillance system, Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). In the Gulf of Mexico, we’ve installed ADS-B radio stations on oil platforms as part of an agreement with Helicopter Association International, oil and natural gas companies and helicopter operators. ADS-B equipped aircraft will receive air traffic services direct to the platform, giving the users far greater flexibility than the restrictive grid system that was in place. We’ve opened up about a quarter of a million square miles of new, positively controlled airspace. In addition to the Gulf, ADS-B is up and running in Louisville, Philadelphia, and Alaska, all with very positive results. Just last week, we announced a partnership with JetBlue to demonstrate the benefits of ADS-B on flights between the Northeast and Florida.

NextGen is also helping us to improve efficiency and provide benefits through the deployment of Performance-based Navigation (PBN) procedures that save fuel and emissions of greenhouse gasses and other air pollutants. We are working in collaboration with Alaska Air Group on a program called “Greener Skies Over Seattle” to deliver reduced emissions and fuel burn through optimized descents and Required Navigation Performance approaches. Technical working groups are determining what FAA can do to make flights as environmentally friendly as possible. In the longer term, the FAA will explore the further leveraging of RNP to achieve even greater reductions in emissions and increases in efficiencies.

To date, we’ve published more than 900 Performance-based Navigation procedures, also known as Area Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation Performance (RNP) for precision arrival and departure routes and procedures. Again, making the business case, PBN pays for itself, having already saved millions of dollars in fuel at major U.S. airports. Southwest Airlines is a prime example. It is estimated that for every single minute of time saved on each flight, their annual savings quickly add up to 156,000 metric tons in emissions per year, which translates into a savings of $25 million in fuel costs. When commercial aircraft burn thousands of pounds of fuel per hour, seconds do count.

Surface management is another area where NextGen is making a difference. Airports need to manage, not only aircraft, but the many other types of vehicles that service the aircraft and airport, which can be challenging. We’ve deployed airport surface detection radar, ASDE-X, at 27 airports, with another eight scheduled to receive it by 2013. Initiatives at JFK and Memphis demonstrate that the technologies and procedures put in place reduced taxi times by about two to four minutes. Again, seconds count. But most importantly, ASDE-X provides another layer of safety by improving situational awareness for both operators and controllers.

Our NextGen goals include environmental and energy sustainability. As we implement NextGen operational capabilities, we will apply environmental management systems to improve environmental performance and streamline environmental reviews. We are also working to accelerate improvements in engine and airframe technologies to reduce noise, air pollution, and fuel burn through efforts such as FAA’s Continuous Lower Energy, Emissions, and Noise (CLEEN) technology partnership with industry. Our Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) achieved a landmark in 2009 with the approval of a fuel specification that allows alternative fuels to be deployed as jet fuels. We seek to strengthen efforts to achieve affordable commercial scale production of sustainable alternative aviation fuels.

One final point of pride that I would like to share with you is the results of our Navigation (NAV) Procedures Project or NAV Lean. NAV Lean is a good example of how FAA listens to our stakeholders and works to address their concerns. Airlines that invested in equipping their aircraft with technology to take advantage of PBN are dependent upon the FAA to approve, certify, and publish RNAV and RNP arrival and departure procedures. The existing procedure development process accomplishes the desired production goals with the highest level of safety. However, the question was, could we do our work more efficiently? To answer this, we set up NAV Lean team to evaluate our current processes for developing all Instrument Flight Procedures, both performance-based and conventional, to determine where streamlining could occur. Our goal was to maximize customer value, while minimizing waste. The group worked to identify areas containing unnecessary redundancies, inefficiencies or delays, know as the “Lean Process.” Obviously, the overarching goal is to ensure the safety and integrity of the process, procedures and training, but to do it in a smarter way.

The group worked for almost nine months. I am pleased to announce today that their report was recently issued. It contains 21 recommendations for streamlining the procedure development process which will result in up to a 40% reduction of the time it takes to develop and approve a requested procedure. A team is now working on our plan to implement the recommendations. We expect to complete our implementation plan for these recommendations by June 1. Not only will this mean users of the system will see the benefits of their navigation technology investments sooner, but the FAA will improve the efficiency and utilization of the airspace and demonstrate our commitment to NextGen.

In conclusion, although FAA has continued to work to improve safety and efficiency in the absence of a long-term authorization, I strongly urge the Committee to act to pass this much needed legislation. We need the certainty and clarity such legislation would provide. We need to understand the direction in which Congress wants us to move in order to act in an efficient and effective manner. We need to be able to rely on stable funding for the agency. And we need for programmatic efficiencies to be restored.

I think we all understand that the challenges of implementing NextGen and improving the safety and efficiency of aviation come at a time when tough investment choices need to be made. I plan to continue to make the case that investment in aviation is important, not only to airlines, passengers and pilots, but to the strength of the overall economy and businesses around the country. In an industry like aviation, standing still or moving backward is not an option. This Committee, in particular, demands a lot of the FAA, and rightly so. But meeting these demands requires investment. I think our case is compelling and the return on investment is not one we can or should ignore.

I look forward to continuing to work with those of you I know and getting to know those of you I don’t. We all have our work cut out for us.

This concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.


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Pilot Fatigue

Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety
Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Pilot Fatigue

Chairman Costello, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you this morning to discuss the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to mitigate the impacts of pilot fatigue to enhance aviation safety. Updating FAA’s regulatory requirements on pilot fatigue has been a high priority for Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt. As you know, Administrator Babbitt was formerly a commercial pilot, so his interest in and insights about pilot fatigue have been longstanding, and were helpful in making rulemaking on this matter an Administration priority. Their assistance and guidance on this matter have been invaluable. I am pleased that their focus has enabled the FAA to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on September 14, 2010, that proposes changes to the current flight duty and rest regulations. The NPRM represents a comprehensive proposal that is the result of extensive outreach to the aviation industry, labor and the scientific community. Unlike the existing requirements, the proposal would establish a single, scientifically-based regulatory approach for all Part 121 operators, including domestic and international passenger and cargo operations, as well as supplemental carriers.

While the publication of this NPRM is a huge step forward, I want to stress that it is the latest step in a long history of FAA efforts to mitigate fatigue. We held symposia on fatigue and worked with aviation industry and the scientific community to gather data to meet the scheduling demands of the industry (including ultra long-range flights), without compromising safety. As the science of fatigue matured, we worked to educate the industry to mitigate risks as they were identified. The new proposal reflects our drive to reach consensus across different facets of the aviation industry.

In the past, I have said something that is worth repeating now: regardless of what regulatory framework is in place, mitigating the effects of fatigue is a shared responsibility. The FAA has the responsibility to put the framework in place. The air carrier has the responsibility to schedule its flight crews responsibly and in accordance with that framework. The pilot has the ultimate responsibility to use the hours set aside for rest to actually rest, to report for duty in a fit condition, and to notify the airline when he or she is too fatigued or otherwise not fit for duty. Nothing about the latest proposal changes those basic responsibilities.

In the aftermath of the Colgan Air Flight 3407 accident in February 2009, the FAA placed great emphasis on all safety factors that either were, or could have been, a contributing cause to the accident. Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt issued an Airline Safety Call to Action for the foremost aviation safety experts to discuss the best ways to make an already safe industry even safer. Fatigue was clearly a factor of some concern, given that one member of the Colgan flight crew commuted from the West Coast prior to reporting for duty and the evidence suggested that she may not have had sufficient rest.

In addition to the Call to Action, Administrator Babbitt convened an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) comprised of representatives from airline management and pilot labor unions to review fatigue-related issues and to make specific scientifically-based recommendations that could be the basis of rulemaking. The ARC delivered its report and recommendations in September 2009. The report and recommendations reflected consensus on many issues, but there were a handful of issues where the ARC did not reach consensus. In addition, the ARC was not charged with performing any type of economic analysis, which the FAA must provide in any rulemaking initiative.

The NPRM utilizes accepted assumptions as to what causes fatigue and creates a framework that addresses those risks. For example, it is generally accepted that higher levels of activity cause more fatigue and that most people need eight hours of sleep in a 24 hour period in order to perform effectively and remain alert. It is also acknowledged that an average person needs in excess of nine hours of sleep in order to recover from accumulated sleep deprivation and the quality of the sleep an individual gets is usually affected by the time of day in which it occurs, with nighttime sleeping being more restorative.

Using these assumptions as a basis, the NPRM focuses on the nature of the operation. During a duty period, how many take-offs and landings does the pilot fly? Do the operations involved cross time zones and, if so, how many? Are the operations during the day or at night? The proposal recognizes that basing hourly restrictions solely on the total number of hours of duty time or flight time does not have as much meaning as factoring in what kind of operations were being flown during that period. Different operations result in different fatigue levels and that reality must be recognized in any new regulatory framework.

The NPRM would impose requirements for rest, flight time, and duty time. There is a proposed nine hour rest requirement prior to flying related duty. In addition, flight time restrictions include limits for every 28-day period, as well as annual limits. The flight time restrictions also reflect all operations flown for the carrier by the pilot, even if some of those flights are ferrying operations or other flights not flown under Part 121. Finally, both the flight time and duty time restrictions proposed would reflect differences in the types of operations flown as well as when they are flown, and require shorter duty periods for certain times of day and quantities of takeoffs and landings.

The proposal would also gives carriers the option of integrating a Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) into their scheduling systems. FRMS is a carrier-specific method of evaluating how best to mitigate fatigue, based on active monitoring and evaluation by the carrier and flightcrew members. In this case, the carrier would model its schedules to determine where there may be risk from fatigue. The carrier would develop mitigation strategies to eliminate or mitigate that risk. The FAA will determine that the FRMS provides an equivalent level of protection as afforded by the rule and approve the carrier’s system. FRMS were strongly supported by both labor and management in the ARC, because it ensures that each schedule is analyzed and proper mitigation is implemented.

This approach has the potential to provide a cooperative and flexible means of monitoring and mitigating fatigue during operations when the prescriptive approach is not optimal. We are seeking public comments about how best to realize that potential. An FRMS requires a carrier to develop numerous processes and structures within an operation. These measures lead to effective management and mitigation of fatigue on the part of both the carrier and its employees that might affect the operation.

One area that I know is of great interest to this Committee is pilot commuting, which our NPRM discusses in the preamble. The ARC made no recommendation on commuting. However, the ARC did point out that pilots are required to report to work fit for duty; and that means rested. Although our proposal does not include specific restrictions on commuting, it does make some modifications to ensure that all pilots, including those who commute, are meeting the existing requirements to report fit for duty.

As I noted at the beginning of this statement, pilot personal responsibility is critical to whatever fatigue rule is ultimately adopted, whether or not commuting restrictions are imposed. Pilots must commute responsibly, but this proposal broadens that responsibility to include the air carrier, who must be aware of how pilots are commuting to work and must make a determination that each pilot is fit for duty. It is unreasonable to assume that a pilot is resting while commuting, either locally or long distance, and our proposal requires air carriers to consider the commuting times pilots needs to reach their home base while still receiving the required opportunity for rest. It also calls on co-workers – other crew members, dispatchers, etc. – to determine that pilots they’re working with are fit for duty. We believe mandating this shared responsibility will address the risks posed by a pilot failing to identify that he or she is not sufficiently rested – and therefore not fit for duty.

Finally, one of the most challenging issues we have had to resolve in order to move forward with a new fatigue regulatory proposal is that of the costs associated with a new rule compared with the benefits that are expected to accrue from a new requirement. All of us in government and industry associated with aviation are dedicated to enhancing aviation safety. This is what we work for day in and day out. At the same time, we seek to ensure that rules do not impose excessive, unjustified, or unnecessary costs on airlines, airline employees, and consumers. We are required to provide the public with information about the projected costs and benefits associated with any regulatory proposal. Reducing fatigue, through whatever means, may result in the carriers having to add more pilots to comply with new standards, thus adding costs. We believe, however, that carriers will optimize their crew schedules within any new regulatory requirements to continue to be as efficient as possible.

While we prefer and seek out regulatory options that result in net benefits, there is no absolute requirement that monetary benefits of regulatory proposals outweigh monetary costs. But the benefits, both quantifiable and nonquantifiable, must justify the associated costs. While we have explicitly sought public comments about possible improvements in the proposed rule, we believe it meets that standard. It is important to understand that increasing airline safety creates a number of important social benefits, some of which are hard to quantify.

Though producing this NPRM did take longer than we expected, we believe we have a solid starting point for a new and better way forward in this area. While this is not the last step in this process, I am extremely proud of the FAA team for this achievement. I would like to thank the many, many members of the Administration, the aviation and labor community, and the scientific community for their tireless efforts to assist Secretary LaHood and Administrator Babbitt in moving forward with the proposed fatigue NRPM. I would also like to acknowledge the support of Congress and the families of victims of the Colgan accident and other family groups in this area.

There is work to be done in order to make the NPRM ultimately into a final rule, but I am confident that this comprehensive proposal is a step forward and I look forward to receiving public comments and to working with all interested parties, including this Committee, to finalize improved flight duty and rest standards that will enhance safety because that is our shared ultimate goal.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I would be happy to answer any questions at this time.


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Testimony: Colgan Air

Statement of Peggy Gilligan, Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation Operations, Safety, and Security on Aviation Safety: One Year After The Crash of Flight 3407

Chairman Dorgan, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me here today to provide you with an update on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Call to Action on airline safety and pilot training. There is no question that the FAA’s job is to ensure that we have the safest aviation system in the world. The aviation safety record in the United States reflects the dedication of safety-minded aviation professionals in all parts of our industry, including the FAA’s inspector workforce. In an agency dedicated to aviation safety, any failure in the system, especially one that causes loss of life, is keenly felt. When accidents do happen, they reveal risks, including the tragic Colgan Air accident. Consequently, it is incumbent on all parties in the system to identify the risks in order to eliminate or mitigate them. As Administrator Babbitt noted when he appeared before you in December, history has shown that we are able to implement safety improvements far more quickly and effectively when the FAA, industry, and labor work together on agreed upon solutions. The fastest way to implement a solution is for it to be done voluntarily, and that is what the Call to Action was intended to facilitate. On January 27, the FAA issued a report that describes the progress made toward fulfilling commitments made in the Call to Action and offers recommendations for additional steps to enhance aviation safety. I would like to use this opportunity to review the issues the Administrator identified in December and let you know where we stand on them.

Pilot Flight Time, Rest and Fatigue: When Administrator Babbitt was last here he told you that the aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) he convened for the purpose of making recommendations on flight time, rest and fatigue, consisting of representatives from the FAA, industry and labor organizations, provided him with recommendations for a science-based approach to fatigue management in early September. While we were extremely pleased with the product provided, the ARC did not reach a consensus agreement on all areas and was not charged with doing any type of economic analysis. Consequently, in spite of the Administrator’s direction for a very aggressive timeline in which to develop a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), his hope that a rulemaking proposal could be issued by the end of last year was not realized. The complexities involved with these issues are part of the reason why the FAA has struggled to finalize proposed regulations on fatigue and duty time that were issued in the mid-1990s. However, with the Administrator’s continued emphasis on this topic, we hope to issue an NPRM this spring. Although this is slightly later that we originally hoped, it is still an extremely expedited schedule, and I can assure you the FAA team working on this is committed to meeting the target.

One of the issues contributing to fatigue that I know is of interest to many of you is that of pilots who commute by air to their job. I would like to describe some of the emails and letters the Administrator has been receiving on the issue of commuting from pilots who choose to commute by air to their job. As you can imagine, those pilots who commute responsibly are understandably concerned that they could be forced to relocate because of the irresponsible actions of a few. Should some sort of hard and fast commuting rule be imposed, it could result in families being separated, people being forced to sell homes at a loss, or even people being forced to violate child custody agreements. It is important to keep in mind these personal accounts because, to people not familiar with the airline industry, the issue of living in one city and working hundreds of miles away in another does not make sense. But in the airline industry, this is not only a common practice, it is one airline employees have come to rely on. So we want to emphasize these issues are complex and, depending on how they are addressed, could have significant impacts on people’s lives.

Focused Inspection Initiative: From June 24, 2009 to September 30, 2009, FAA inspectors conducted a two-part, focused review of air carrier flight crewmember training, qualification, and management practices. The FAA inspected 85 air carriers to determine if they had systems to provide remedial training for pilots. The FAA did not inspect the 14 carriers that have FAA-approved Advanced Qualification Programs (AQP) because AQP includes such a system. Seventy-six air carriers, including AQP carriers, have remedial training programs. An additional 15 air carriers had some part of a remedial training program. There were eight air carriers that lacked any component of a remedial training program that received additional scrutiny and have since instituted some component of a remedial training system. Since we started, all carriers have implemented some component of a remedial training program. The FAA inspectors also observed 2,419 training and checking events during the evaluation. In the few instances we observed regulatory non-compliance, we took corrective action.

Training Program Review Guidance: Based on the information from last summer’s inspections, the FAA is drafting a Safety Alert for Operators (SAFO) with guidance material on how to conduct a comprehensive training program review in the context of a safety management system (SMS). A complementary Notice to FAA inspectors will provide guidance on how to conduct surveillance. SMS aims to integrate modern safety risk management and safety assurance concepts into repeatable, proactive systems. SMS programs emphasize safety management as a fundamental business process in the same manner as other aspects of business management. Now that we have completed our data evaluation and drafting, both guidance documents are in internal coordination.

Obtain Air Carriers’ Commitment to Most Effective Practices: To solidify oral commitments made at the Call to Action, Administrator Babbitt sent a letter to all part 121 operators and their unions and requested written commitments to adhere to the highest professional standards. Many airlines are now taking steps to promote the larger airline’s most effective safety practices at their smaller partner airlines. The Air Transport Association’s Safety Council is now including safety directors from the National Air Carrier Association and the Regional Airline Association in their quarterly meetings. Several large air carriers are conducting periodic meetings with those with whom they have contract agreements to review safety information and we are encouraged by these efforts.

In addition, I am pleased to say that since July 2009, after the Call to Action, the FAA approved 12 new Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs. Three air carriers that had no Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP) have now established them. Four more air carriers have established new ASAP programs for additional employee groups. All of this supports the contention that the Call to Action did make a difference.

Professionalism and Mentoring: Last week, the FAA met with labor organizations to discuss further developing and improving professionalism and transfer of pilot experience. In the interim, these organizations have answered the Call to Action and support the establishment or professional standards and ethics committees, a code of ethics, and safety risk management meetings between the FAA and major and regional air carriers. We also believe that labor organizations can explore some of the ideas raised in the Call to Action road shows, such as establishing joint strategic councils within a “family of carriers,” use of professional standards committee safety conferences, and mentoring possibilities between air carriers and university aviation programs, with the goal of coming up with concrete ideas on mentoring. These ideas merit further discussion and the FAA looks forward to continuing to work with these organizations on these concepts.

Crew Training Requirements: As the Administrator explained during his last appearance before this Committee, the FAA issued a rulemaking proposal in January 2009 to enhance training programs by requiring the use of simulation devices for pilots. More than 3,000 pages of comments were received. The FAA is now developing a supplemental proposal that will be issued in the coming months to allow the public to comment on the revisions that were made based on the comments that were submitted.

One of the things that the Call Action has shone a light on is the issue of varying pilot experience. The FAA is attempting to address this issue with an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in which we can consider possible alternative requirements, such as an endorsement on a commercial license to indicate specific qualifications. We know some people believe that simply increasing the minimum number of hours required for a pilot to fly in commercial aviation is appropriate. As Administrator Babbitt has stated repeatedly, he does not believe that simply raising quantity – the total number of hours of flying time or experience – without regard to the quality and nature of that time and experience – is an appropriate method by which to improve a pilot’s proficiency in commercial operations.

The ANPRM requests recommendations from the public to improve pilot performance and professionalism; specifically on whether existing flight crew eligibility, training and qualification requirements should be increased for commercial pilots engaged in part 121 operations. The FAA is requesting comments and recommendations on four concepts for the purpose of reviewing current pilot certification regulations. The four concepts are: (1) requirement for all pilots employed in part 121 air carrier operations to hold an Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) certificate with the appropriate aircraft category, class and type rating, or meet the aeronautical experience requirements of an ATP certificate; (2) academic training as a substitute for flight hours experience; (3) endorsement for air carrier operations; and, (4) new additional authorization on an existing pilot certificate. The FAA has also asked for recommendations from industry and the public on any other concepts they may wish to offer. The ANPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 8.

Pilot Records: While Congress is working to amend the Pilot Records Improvement Act of 1996 and the FAA amends its guidance to airlines, Administrator Babbitt asked that air carriers immediately implement a policy of asking pilot applicants to voluntarily disclose FAA records, including notices of disapproval for evaluation events. The airlines agreed to use this best practice for pilot record checks to allow for a more expansive review of records created over the course a pilot’s career. The expanded review would include all the records the FAA maintains on pilots in addition to the records airlines already receive from past employers. Of the 80 air carriers that responded to the FAA on this issue, 53 air carriers, or 66 percent, reported that they already require full disclosure of a pilot applicant’s FAA records. Another 15 percent reported that they plan to implement the same policy.

As the Administrator stated when he appeared before you in December, the core of many of the issues facing the air carrier industry today is professionalism. It is the duty of the flight crew to arrive for work rested and ready to perform their jobs, regardless of whether they live down the street from the airport or a thousand miles away. Professionalism is not something we can regulate, but it is something to which we must encourage and urge pilots and flight crews to aspire. The conversations we have been having, in part because of the Call to Action, help emphasize the importance of professionalism in aviation safety.

In conclusion, our efforts will not stop or even slow down just because the final report on the Call to Action was issued. We have been gratified with the response to this effort. We believe that the collective efforts of FAA, the airlines, labor unions and, of course, Congress, will continue to result in implementing best practices, transferring pilot experience, and achieving an overall improvement in safety. Safety is at the core of the FAA’s mission, and we will always strive to make a safe system safer.

Mr. Chairman, Senator DeMint, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.


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Testimony: Icing

Statement of John Hickey, Deputy Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety

Before the House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Aviation on Aircraft Icing

Chairman Costello, Ranking Member Petri, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the challenges icing conditions pose to flight operations and the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) efforts to mitigate the safety risks posed by icing. For more than a decade, the FAA has been working to better understand the hazards posed by icing conditions and to improve regulations, policies and procedures to ensure safe airplane operation. Still, research into the complicated phenomenon of icing continues to yield new insights and mitigation measures.

Today, I want to highlight some of the known icing threats and mitigation measures as well as our icing program approach and a number of our recent efforts that have been crucial to further decreasing the risk associated with aircraft icing. First, however, it is important to understand the framework within which we work to address icing risks.

As the agency charged with setting the standards for safe aircraft operations, we establish the standards for operations during all types of meteorological conditions, including those that might result in icing on the ground or in flight. Aircraft manufacturers and operators meet these standards through a variety of means depending on where the icing risk occurs (on the ground or in flight), and the aircraft’s system capabilities and intended usage. Our standards for operations in icing conditions encompass both operational and aircraft certification requirements. Operational requirements include standards and aircraft specific operating procedures for icing encounters and pilot and dispatcher training. All pilots engaged in commercial operations must receive training on identification of, safe operation in, and how to avoid and exit icing conditions. They must also be trained on deicing system operation and capabilities of the particular aircraft they operate.

An aircraft design approval — what we call a “type certificate” — provides the design specifications that an aircraft must be built to, in order to meet the FAA’s standards for safe design. Aircraft must also comply with operation requirements, as set forth by the rules under which the airplane is being operated. Design and operation requirements must both be met in order to satisfy the FAA’s standards for safe operation. In order for an aircraft to be certificated for operations in icing conditions, the aircraft’s manufacturer must be able to demonstrate that the aircraft can safely operate within the icing conditions specified by FAA regulations. We know today that these specified conditions represent 99% of all known atmospheric conditions that result in icing. For the remaining 1%, we are conducting research and are working to translate our findings into certification standards. I want to emphasize that airplanes are prohibited from operations in known icing conditions unless they meet the certification standards for operations in those conditions and at no time may any aircraft continue to operate in severe icing conditions.

Aircraft Icing

Unmitigated icing presents risks to aircraft. The accumulation of ice on an aircraft’s wing changes the shape of the wing, and hence the aerodynamic capabilities of the wing to generate lift. For this reason, ice accumulation on an aircraft on the ground may impact the aircraft’s ability to takeoff, while ice accumulation in flight has the potential to raise the minimum speed at which the wing is capable of creating sufficient lift, and potentially causing the aircraft to stall.

Ground icing: Ground icing is, as the name implies, the accumulation of ice, snow or frost on the aircraft while it is on the ground. This form of icing is both common and meteorologically predictable. During the winter months, the conditions in which ice accumulation on an aircraft is possible become more prevalent and vigilant action becomes necessary to ensure planes are properly deiced and cleared of snow and ice prior to takeoff. Winter precipitation poses a threat to aviation operations because airplane performance is predicated upon the wings being free of contamination. The accumulation of ice, snow, or frost has an adverse effect on the wing’s ability to produce lift, potentially limiting an airplane’s ability to takeoff and climb.

Currently, the FAA prohibits takeoff unless the airplane’s critical surfaces are completely clear of wintry precipitation. As many of you have likely seen, this is typically achieved by applying deicing or anti-icing fluids to the critical surfaces of the airplane. To provide for a safe takeoff, it is important that a deiced airplane not remain on the ground for an extensive period after deicing during precipitation. At the start of this winter season, as in years past, the FAA issued its annual winter “hold over times” and list of approved anti ice and deicing fluids. “Hold over times” govern the amount of time that may elapse between deicing and takeoff. In the event that the aircraft exceeds the amount of wait time permitted between deicing and takeoff, FAA regulations require the aircraft to be reinspected for adhering contamination or exit the takeoff queue and be deiced again prior to departure. These holdover time tables are revised annually. Some of the reasons for the annual update include improvements in the effectiveness of deicing and anti-icing fluids, reduction of environmental impacts and new information learned through FAA fluid research.

In-flight icing: Unlike ground icing, in-flight icing knows no season and can be difficult to predict. In-flight icing results from atmospheric conditions that can occur at anytime of the year, regardless of the weather conditions on the ground. According to FAA regulations, any pilot who finds himself or herself in icing conditions while operating an aircraft that is not approved for operations in icing must immediately exit the icing conditions. This means redirecting the aircraft to a different altitude or route, or landing.

There are multiple atmospheric conditions that can result in the build-up of ice on an aircraft during flight. To mitigate the risk of ice build-up during flight, aircraft that are certificated to operate in icing conditions are equipped with devices that shed ice from the aircraft, such as expandable pneumatic boots, or prevent the formation of ice through the use of heat. A pilot’s ability to recognize icing conditions and activate deicing and anti icing systems in a timely manner is critical to those systems’ effectiveness. Because of the pilot’s critical role in managing flight in icing conditions, we have used both our rulemaking and advisory authorities, to provide pilots with the latest information on how to identify icing, to require early and systematic use of deicing systems and to require exit from icing conditions under certain circumstances.

Some aircraft are also equipped with ice detection systems. Ice detection systems assist the flightcrew with ice detection and timely activation of the ice protection system. These systems automatically detect ice accretion and annunciate the presence of ice accretion to the flightcrew. Some ice detection systems are designed to automatically initiate the operation of the aircraft deicing systems while others are what we call “advisory” and require the flightcrew to ensure ice protection systems are activated at the first sign of ice accretion on the airplane.

Although our current regulations address the vast majority of all known icing conditions, we have steadily worked to address two types of in-flight icing phenomena outside of the existing icing certification envelope: supercooled large droplets (SLD) and ice crystals. SLD icing can occur in freezing rain and freezing drizzle conditions — turning water to ice upon contact with the airframe, which can lead to larger accumulations or build up on areas of the wing and tail aft of the protected area. We expect to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to address this small area of vulnerability, by incorporating atmospheric conditions that are associated with SLD icing into our certification criteria. In the interim, we have taken immediate steps through our airworthiness directive authority to ensure that pilots can identify severe icing which may be produced by SLD conditions and execute exit procedures.

Ice crystals are also a newly identified threat. We now believe that flight into certain types of storm clouds can cause ice to build up deep inside the core of jet engines and cause temporary shutdowns. Understanding this threat has been particularly challenging because, typically, by the time an aircraft lands, the affected engine has restarted and there is no evidence for us to evaluate. We are currently working with industry and other governmental research partners on developing ways to recreate the atmospheric conditions in which ice crystals form and learn all that we can about how to mitigate the threat of this phenomenon. Although there is research that still needs to be done in this area, we are closely monitoring the condition and its possible causes. To mitigate the risk, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directives (ADs) requiring operational changes when in or near convective weather and engine design changes to make jet engines more tolerant of ice crystal conditions.

Icing Safety Actions

Safety concerns about the adequacy of the icing certification standards were brought to the forefront of public and governmental attention by a 1994 accident in Roselawn, Indiana, involving an Avions de Transport Regional ATR 72 series airplane. The NTSB attributed this accident to what we now call SLD–an icing phenomenon that, at the time, was not fully understood. Shortly after this accident, the FAA initiated a review of aircraft safety in icing conditions to determine what could be done to increase safety. This review resulted in our current icing program.

As meteorologists will attest, simply understanding some of these icing phenomena are difficult and complex. Determining how to address these complex phenomena to support safe aircraft operations takes additional time and extensive research. That is why we tackle the dangers of icing with a multi-prong approach. To address those threats that are clearly understood or for which immediate mitigation is available, we take immediate safety action. In the meantime, concurrent research and development and rulemaking efforts are underway. To date, our icing program includes seven rulemaking initiatives–three have been adopted as final rules, while others are in various stages of development. Additionally, we have issued over 200 ADs on 50 different aircraft models, and have undertaken other operational training and mitigation initiatives.

Immediate Actions: The FAA’s icing program addresses the immediate icing safety concerns for the current fleet of aircraft through the use of ADs. The FAA has the authority to issue an AD if we determine that some aspect of flying in icing conditions on a particular airplane model creates an unsafe condition that puts the flying public in immediate danger. ADs carry the same force as a regulation and are targeted to specific aircraft makes and models. ADs must be complied with in order to continue operating a covered airplane. As described above, the FAA has been aggressive in issuing ADs when we determine they are needed. These ADs cover safety issues ranging from crew operating procedures and training, to design changes that have significantly reduced the icing risk to the overall fleet.

For example, with our AD authority, we require that pilots of airplanes equipped with deicing boots activate those boots at the first sign of icing conditions. We have also issued numerous ADs that direct the crews of certain airplane designs on how to monitor and detect early signs of the onset of severe icing and to exit the area immediately. Other ADs require stall warning systems of certain airplanes to be modified to provide an earlier warning of a potential stall in icing conditions and mandate changes to address any susceptibility to stalling of the horizontal tail in icing conditions. These ADs serve as effective safety measures for the current fleet.

Longer Term Actions: The FAA’s icing program also includes a number of longer term actions to further improve the safety of flying in icing conditions both for the current fleet and for future airplane designs. These actions include rulemaking, issuing safety bulletins, developing improved training material, drafting new or updating existing Advisory Circular guidance material, and further research. We recognize that fast action is an important goal for implementing any safety improvement. We also acknowledge that some actions, such as rulemaking, take longer than others. Rulemaking is a deliberative process that must involve the input of those stakeholders who are affected by the rules.

Also, in some cases, developing and implementing rules depends on extensive research to understand the particular phenomena and its effect on safety, and to develop appropriate risk mitigations.

For example, in order to understand SLD icing sufficiently to identify an appropriate set of requirements that airplane manufacturers could comply with, a significant amount of research had to be done. We needed to learn how to characterize SLD, then reproduce it, and finally, understand its effect on airplane operations and designs. For these reasons, at the same time that we tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) to develop certification criteria for the safe operation of airplanes in SLD icing conditions, we also began supporting research efforts by NASA and Environment Canada to gather additional SLD data. Using existing and new SLD data and analysis, the ARAC completed the majority of the work defining the SLD icing envelope. But even after the SLD icing envelope was defined, we continued to learn more about the complexities of SLD, which led us to focus analysis of the impact of SLD on aircraft engines and determine that new standards for smaller aircraft should be considered in a separate rulemaking. The process took time, more time than we anticipated and more time than we wanted, but once we had a sufficient understanding of the science and the technical solutions, we moved forward with the SLD rulemaking. I am pleased to report that the SLD NPRM is now in executive coordination within the Department.

In the meantime, we formed and tasked an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to review the proposed regulations applicable to transport category aircraft for SLD, mixed phase, and ice crystals and recommend how they should be modified for smaller aircraft. The SLD research we conducted for the transport category SLD rulemaking provides the basis for our scientific understanding of SLD, upon which we can develop additional technological solutions for smaller aircraft.

In addition to the intensive efforts to understand and revise our regulations to address SLD and ice crystals, since 2007, FAA has completed three icing rules and just this week closed the comment period on an additional NPRM. The completed icing rules include:

  • Performance and Handling Qualities in Icing Conditions for Transport Category Airplanes, adding new airworthiness requirements that require designers to demonstrate specific airplane performance and handling qualities for flight in icing conditions.
  • Activation of Airframe Ice Protection System for Transport Category Airplanes, requiring either the automatic activation of ice protection systems or a method to alert pilots when they should be activated. Further, after the initial activation, the ice protection system must operate continuously, automatically turn on and off, or alert the pilots when the system should be cycled.
  • Removal of Airplane Operating Regulations Allowing Polishing of Frost on Wings of Airplanes, effectively prohibiting all aircraft from taking off with polished frost on the wings.

The NPRM, for which the comment period just closed, would require certain scheduled airlines either to retrofit their existing fleet with ice-detection equipment or make sure the ice protection system activates at the proper time. For those aircraft with an ice-detection system, the FAA proposes that the system alert the crew each time they should activate the ice protection system. The ice protection system would either turn on automatically or pilots would manually activate it. For aircraft without ice-detection equipment, the crew would activate the protection system based on cues listed in their airplane’s flight manual during climb and descent, and at the first sign of icing during cruise.

We are also evaluating the comments received in response to an additional NPRM that included proposed changes to training and checking requirements for pilots operating flights under part 121. In addition to many other revisions, this NPRM proposed changes that would further specify training requirements for icing operations.

I want to acknowledge that throughout our ongoing and comprehensive effort to mitigate the risks presented by airplane icing, the National Transportation Safety Board icing recommendations have been instructive. Although we are not always able to take the exact action the Board recommends, we value and fully analyze their recommendations and benefit from their investigations of icing-related accidents. We firmly believe that our actions meet the intent of the vast majority of the Board’s icing recommendations.

Although we have made significant advancements in our understanding of icing since the tragic 1994 Roselawn accident, icing related threats continue to be a focus of the FAA’s safety experts. The total number of accidents related to environmental icing of airplanes has been decreasing steadily, year after year, for the last 13 years. This safety achievement is the direct result of our intensive focus on improving our understanding of complex icing phenomenon and the best methods for avoiding and mitigating icing conditions. The FAA is proud of this growing safety record and is committed to expanding it.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Petri, Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

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