Aviation News, Headlines & Alerts
 
Category: <span>Official Report</span>

Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Costly Mistake

What: SAS Airbus 321 en route from London to Copenhagen
Where: Heathrow airport
Who: 175 passengers
Why: The cart that crashed into an SAS plane at Heathrow caused £1 million worth in damage, all because driver Dennis Jackson had forgotten which vehicle he was driving when he drove a too tall vehicle under the plane’s too low tail. The SAS Airbus 321 impacted the rear of the craft near the fuel line and sliced through the plane. The plane was subsequently evacuated.

Jackson’s employer Dnata gave him a written warning.

It was, as one attorney said, an “expensive accident,” costing a fine of a week’s wages, £150(fees), £85 (costs) and £15 (victim surcharge).

The official ATSB Report


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

FAA Fact Sheet – What is the Airport Privatization Pilot Program?

The airport privatization pilot program is designed to allow airports to generate access to sources of private capital for airport improvement and development. The 1996 Reauthorization Act, Title 49 United States Code §47134, authorized the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish the pilot program. The 2012 Reauthorization Act increased the number of airports that could participate in the program from five to 10. The same restrictions on participation apply. Only one large hub airport can participate in the program; one of the airports must be a general aviation airport. Commercial service airports can only be leased and general aviation airports can be sold or leased. The program now permits up to 10 public airport sponsors to sell or lease an airport with certain restrictions, and to exempt the sponsor from certain federal requirements that could otherwise make privatization impractical. Most commercial service airports in the United States are owned and operated by local or state governments. Public-use general aviation airports are both publicly and privately owned.
AIRPORTS IN THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Chicago Midway Airport (MDW)

Chicago Midway Airport (MDW), a large air carrier hub airport, owned and operated by the city of Chicago, handles more than 17 million passengers and 253,000 aircraft operations (calendar year 2008). The City also owns and operates Chicago O’Hare International Airport.
Status:The FAA expects to receive a revised preliminary application including a revised timetable and a distribution ready copy of a request for qualifications or interest from the city of Chicago by December 31, 2012.
Hendry County Airglades Airport (2IS)
Airglades Airport, a general aviation reliever airport in Clewiston, Florida, is located 80 miles from Miami International Airport. The airport is owned and operated by Hendry County. The airport has a 5,603-foot runway, a general aviation terminal and hangars. Hendry County’s preliminary application was approved by the FAA on October 18, 2010.
Status:The airport sponsor is negotiating an agreement with a private operator.
Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU)
Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport, a medium-hub airport is owned and operated by the Puerto Rico Ports Authority. In 2008, the airport had 4.6 million passenger boardings. The FAA approved the Authority’s preliminary application for the Luís Muñoz Marín International Airport on December 22, 2009.
Status: The airport sponsor published a Request for Qualifications in July 2011 and prequalified six potential bidders to submit proposals. On July 19, 2012, the Puerto Rico Ports Authority selected Aerostar Airport Holdings as the winner of a public bidding process to become the private operator of the Luis Munoz Marin International Airport.
AIRPORT INFORMATION IN THE DOCKET
To review information on the airports submitted to the docket go to: www.regulations.gov.
Chicago Midway, Docket Number FAA-2006-25867
Airglades, Docket Number FAA-2008-1168
Luís Muñoz Marín International, Docket Number FAA-2009-1144
AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION FACTS
What does FAA’s acceptance of the preliminary application mean?An airport sponsor who wants to participate in the airport privatization pilot program must receive preliminary FAA approval, through an application process, to reserve one of the five slots available under the program. Once the FAA approves the preliminary application, the sponsor can select a private operator to manage the airport, negotiate an agreement with the private operator, and prepare a final application for submittal to the FAA.
Application process. A public airport sponsor and the private operator selected to purchase or lease an airport may request participation in the pilot program by filing an application for exemption under Title 49 United States Code §47134(a).
A public sponsor may submit a preliminary application for FAA review and approval. It must contain summary narratives identifying the objectives of the privatization initiative, a description of the process and a realistic timetable for completing the program, current airport financial statements, and a distribution ready copy of the request for proposal. The FAA has 30 days to review the preliminary application.
When the FAA approves the preliminary application, the applicant is guaranteed one of the five slots in the program.
The airport sponsor may select a private operator, negotiate an agreement, and submit a final application to the FAA. There is no timeline for the FAA to complete its review of the final application.
After the FAA reviews and approves the final application and lease agreement, it publishes a notice in the Federal Register for a 60-day public review and comment period.
The FAA completes its review, prepares its Findings and Record of Decision (ROD), addresses the public comments in the ROD, and publishes the agency decision.
If the FAA approves the ROD, it monitors the legal settlement and transfer of the airport from public owner and sponsor to the new private operator and sponsor.
Number and category of airports. The legislation authorizes 10 airports to participate in the program. At least one must be a general aviation airport and no more than one large hub air carrier airport may participate. Under the pilot program, general aviation airports may be leased or sold, but an air carrier airport may only be leased.
Exemption from federal requirement. The 1996 Reauthorization Act permits the FAA to exempt an airport sponsor from certain requirements that could otherwise make privatization unattractive. First, the public airport sponsor may receive an exemption to use the lease or sale proceeds for non-airport purposes. Generally, all proceeds from the lease or sale of airport land must be used for the capital or operating costs of the airport. This exemption requires the approval of 65 percent of the air carriers at the airport (by number of carriers and by landed weight). The FAA also can exempt a public sponsor from an obligation to repay federal grants and return property acquired with federal assistance upon the lease or sale of the airport.
Conditions for granting exemptions. The FAA approval is based upon a number of conditions listed in Title 49 United States Code § 47134. These include the private operator’s ability to assume the public operator’s grant obligations, and ensure continued access to the airport on reasonable terms. The private operator must operate the airport safely, maintain and improve the airport, provide security, mitigate noise and environmental impacts, and abide by existing collective bargaining agreements. The public operator must provide a plan for continued operation of the airport in case of bankruptcy of the private operator.
Federal assistance. The private operator of an air carrier airport may receive Airport Improvement Program (AIP) grants, collect Passenger Facility Charges, and charge reasonable fees. Airport rates and charges that exceed the Consumer Price Index require approval of 65 percent of air carriers. Private operators of general aviation airports can receive AIP discretionary grants.
Federal oversight. Airports in the pilot program must comply with Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 139 and with Transportation Security Administration requirements for airport security.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Dana Air Preliminary Report


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Peter Tonna
What: Dana Air McDonnell Douglas MD-83 en route from Abuja to Lagos, Nigeria
Where: Iju neighborhood, Lagos
When: June 3, 2012
Who: 153 passengers
Why: According to the Dana Crash Preliminary report, the captain and the first officer were in a discussion of a non-normal condition regarding the correlation between the engine throttle setting and an engine power indication. They did not voice concerns then that the condition would affect the continuation of the flight.

The report included records of visual examination of the aircraft wreckage, review maintenance records and other historical information of the aircraft, documentation of the training and experience of the flight crew, determination of the chronology of the flight, review of recorded data, reconstructing the aircraft refueling, and collection of related fuel samples and interview of related personnel.

See report below:

The BEA releases the “Final report” on Air France Flight 447


The BEA report (pp 200-201) concluded:

  • The crew possessed the licenses and ratings required to undertake the flight.
  • The aeroplane possessed a valid Certificate of Airworthiness, and had been
    maintained in accordance with the regulations.
  • The aeroplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits.
  • The aeroplane had taken off from Rio de Janeiro without any known technical
    problems, except on one of the three radio management panels.
  • The composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures.
  • The meteorological situation was not exceptional for the month of June in the
    inter-tropical convergence zone.
  • There were powerful cumulonimbus clusters on the route of AF 447. Some of
    them could have been the centre of some notable turbulence.
  • An additional meteorological analysis showed the presence of strong
    condensation towards AF 447’s flight level, probably associated with convection
    phenomena.
  • The precise composition of the cloud masses above 30,000 feet is little known,
    in particular with regard to the super-cooled water/ice crystal divide, especially
    with regard to the size of the latter.
  • Several aeroplanes that were flying before and after AF 447, at about the same
    altitude, altered their routes in order to avoid cloud masses.
  • The crew had identified some returns on the weather radar and made a heading
    change of 12° to the left of their route.
  • At the time of the autopilot disconnection, the Captain was taking a rest.
  • The departure of the Captain was done without leaving any specific instructions
    for crossing the ITCZ.
  • There was an implicit designation of a pilot as relief Captain.
  • There was an inconsistency between the speeds measured, likely following the
    blockage of the Pitot probes by ice crystals.
  • The AP then the A/THR disconnected while the aeroplane was flying at the upper
    limit of a slightly turbulent cloud layer.
  • The aeroplane systems detected an inconsistency in the measured airspeeds. The
    flight control law was reconfigured to alternate 2B.
  • No failure message on the ECAM clearly indicates the detection by the system of
    an inconsistency in measured airspeeds.
  • The pilots detected an anomaly through the autopilot disconnection warning
    that surprised them.
  • The engines functioned normally and always responded to the crew’s inputs.
  • The PNF called out imprecise flight path corrections. They were however essential
    and sufficient for short-term management of the situation.
  • The last recorded values were a pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up, roll of
    5.3#degrees to the left and a vertical speed of -10,912 ft/min.
  • The Pitot probes installed on F-GZCP met requirements that were stricter than
    the certification standards.
  • Analysis of the events related to the loss of airspeed indications had led Airbus
    and Air France to replace C16195AA Pitot probes by the C16195BA model. The
    first aeroplane had been modified on 30 May#2009.
  • EASA had analyzed Pitot probe icing events; it had confirmed the severity of the
    failure and had decided not to make the probe change mandatory.
  • The flight was not transferred between the Brazilian and Senegalese control
    centres.
  • Between 8 h 22 and 9 h 09, the first emergency alert messages were sent by the
    Madrid and Brest control centres.
  • The crew was not able to use the ADS-C and CPDLC functions with DAKAR Oceanic.
    If the connection had been established, the loss of altitude would have generated
    an alert on the controller’s screen.
  • The first floating aeroplane parts were found 5 days after the accident.
  • The flight recorders were recovered 23 months after the accident.

The accident occurred after the following events:

  1. Temporary inconsistency between the airspeed measurements, likely following
    the obstruction of the Pitot probes by ice crystals that, in particular, caused the
    autopilot disconnection and the reconfiguration to alternate law;
  2. Inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path;
  3. The lack of any link by the crew between the loss of indicated speeds called out
    and the appropriate procedure;
  4. The late identification by the PNF of the deviation from the flight path and the
    insufficient correction applied by the PF;
  5. The crew not identifying the approach to stall, their lack of immediate response
    and the exit from the flight envelope;
  6. The crew’s failure to diagnose the stall situation and consequently a lack of inputs
    that would have made it possible to recover from it.

Download the complete final report here:

BEA FINAL REPORT on AF 447


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Hunan Airlines Crash Report Released; Captain and 19 Others Blamed

The report of the Henan Airlines crash suggests that Henan Airlines be fiend $795,000 due to safety issues and suggests the chief pilot should have his pilot’s license revoked, be removed from his post and expelled from the Communist Party, and should also face criminal charges.

The report says “says chief pilot Qi Quanjun did not locate the runway before landing.” The jet crashed 2260 feet short of the runway. The pilot crash landed under conditions of poor visibility, then left the plane, failed to evacuate the passengers and rescue the injured. The report names 19 people in all as contributing to the accident. Airline officials and local civil aviation authorities are also cited in the report and may be subject to “disciplinary penalties, be demoted or dismissed.”


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Weimeng

What: Shenzhen Airlines/Kunpeng/Henan Airlines Embraer ERJ-190 en route from Harbin to Yichun China
Where: Yichun China
When: Aug 24th 2010
Who: 91 passengers (including 5 children) and 5 crew; 43 immediate deaths, 3 serious injuries and 50 minor injuries
Why: The plane overran the runway—and departed the runway on landing—at Lindu airport in Yichun city in Heilongjiang province at 10:10 p.m, split on impact, exploded, and burst into flames. 53 people were rescued, three of whom with serious injuries.

An investigation in 2008 revealed 100 pilots employed by Henan Airlines’ parent company had falsified their flying credentials; and about a hundred pilots flying for other airlines were found to have done the same thing.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

NTSB Warns Old Weather Data on Pilot Displays Can Contribute to Plane Crashes

The NTSB has sent out a safety alert concerning weather information that is up to twenty minutes old, although it may be advertised as real time data. The discrepancy in time can be fatal when weather conditions are in rapid flux. The NTSB has related this old weather information to two recent crashes that occurred at night:

  • March 2010 med-evac helicopter Tennessee crash where the pilot was racing to home base trying to beat a storm
  • December 2011 Piper PA-32 Bryan Texas where the plane broke up in stormy weather.

In both these crashes, “the time stamps indicated the one-minute time interval used to create the image, and not the actual age of the data used to create the image.”

The Tennessee crash involved information five minutes old; the Texas crash involved information six to eight minutes old.

The night crashes in particular are affected by old data. Pilots need to be aware that the data can be old, and not use the weather display to navigate around bad weather.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Nigerian Aviation Under Scrutiny

The numbers for the Dana Air crash may be as high as 222: 153 passengers and crew and a possible 69 ground casualties. The Voice of America puts the Nigerian death toll from 110 recorded crashes since 1943 with a total of 1500 fatalities. AllAfrica puts that number at 162 fatalities and 16 crashes.

Can we say there has been improvement when there were three crashes in 2005-2006 that killed a whopping 320 people? Regardless of the exact recorded figures, the list of Nigerian plane crashes makes a long, sad story. Carriers have a history of financing problems or corruption.

Prior to Dana Air, the last big crash was Oct. 29, 2006, when an Aviation Development Co. flight from Abuja to Sokoto crashed, killing 96 people after two minutes in the air. There was also the Bellview Airlines Crash in 2005, and Sosoliso Airlines–a plane full of children.

On Wednesday Nigeria’s Federal Executive Council established a nine-man Technical and Administrative Review Panel headed by Group Captain John Obakpolor to “determine the remote and immediate causes of the crash.” But here’s the problem–studies have already been made, and findings found. But where is the implementation of concrete reform?

Is Nigerian aviation industry in a tailspin? We can only hope that progress is being made in this country where governmental corruption has rendered airline regulation ineffective. We have seen time and again in aviation safety, when corners are cut, lives are lost.

After looking at the November 2006 ICAO audit here, we can only hope that Nigeria will redouble its efforts at aviation safety reform.

NTSB Investigation Arrives in Lagos
Questions follow Dana Air
Dana Air Semantic Wars
Husband Files Dana Air Flight 992 Lawsuit
Dana Air’s license Suspended
Witnesses of the Dana Air Crash Recount What they Saw
First Report of Dana Air Crash in Lagos


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

NTSB Safety Recommendations

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

April 10, 2012

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following
recommendations to the Reno Air Racing Association:

Require aircraft owners, as a condition of eligibility to
participate in the Reno National Championship Air Races, to
provide an engineering evaluation that includes flight
demonstrations and analysis within the anticipated flight
envelope for aircraft with any major modification, such as
to the structure or flight controls. (A-12-13)

Evaluate the design of the unlimited class course and safety
areas to minimize maneuvering near and potential conflicts
with spectators; if warranted by the results of the
evaluation, implement changes to the race course. (A-12-14)

Take the following actions to raise the level of safety for
spectators and personnel near the race course: (1) relocate
the fuel truck away from the ramp area and (2) in front of
any area where spectators are present, install barriers more
substantial than those currently in place. (A-12-15)

Provide high g training to pilots, including techniques to
mitigate the potential effects of high g exposure, as part
of preparations before the Reno National Championship Air
Races (NCAR) and during daily briefs at the NCAR. (A-12-16)

Evaluate the feasibility of requiring pilots to wear g suits
when racing at the Reno National Championship Air Races; if
the evaluation determines it is feasible, implement a
requirement. (A-12-17)


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Ill-Run PIA Approaching EU Banned List

Forty uncertified defects found on PK-734 operated by A310 at Paris on 9 Aug 2011 leads the European Union to declare CAA regulatory control “unreliable.” A ban will likely be imposed in March 2012.

DGAC France has been authorized to perform routine inspections on PIA on behalf of EASA since November and has found and documented problems. Pia’s poorly maintained fleet of old Boeing 747 and A310 fleet is already banned. The supposedly penniless airline is making payments on new Boeing 777s and is arranging financing of 1.5 billion for 5 more, and possible 5 more after that.

Flakey and unreliable scheduling of flights has resulted in bad credibility and lack of confidence in the national airline; and that lack of credibility is trickling down to the financing. As recently as March 2, a flight was delayed over 24 hours, and the scene at the airport was described as pure chaos.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Augusta Westland Tail Rotors Fall Off Making Emergency Choppers Into Instant Emergencies

A dozen Augusta Westland helicopters Ontario purchased for $144 million have problems with tail rotors falling off.

EASA issued an air worthiness directive for the AW139. A directive from the European agency last Aug. 19 ordered helicopter owners to replace the tail rotors after 600 hours of flight following a fatal accident “possibly caused by cracks in a TR (tail rotor) blade.” A Feb. 17 directive called for inspections and maintenance of the tail rotors every 25 hours in the air.

In Ontario, Augusta Westland helicopters are in use as air ambulance helicopters. Ornge Founder Dr. Chris Mazza was fired, and an investigation is underway.

ORNGE helicopters are forbidden from entering U.S. airspace and must land at the border and use land ambulances. Issues relate to ORNGE’s new AgustaWestland helicopters, not the old fleet. A ground protocol exists for transporting burn unit or neurology bed patients. Former deputy minister of government services Ron McKerlie is now interim CEO of ORNGE, now non-profit.

Volcanic Ash Manual Now Available from ICAO


MONTRÉAL, 5 March 2012 ? Air transport operators now have a scientific basis for decision making in the event of a volcanic eruption thanks to a manual published by ICAO and endorsed by industry partners*.

Entitled Flight Safety and Volcanic Ash (Doc 9974), the manual provides guidance which States may recommend to aircraft operators when there is forecast volcanic ash contamination, placing the responsibility for such operations on the operator, under the oversight of the State regulatory authority.

The manual is based primarily on the work of the ICAO International Volcanic Ash Task Force (IVATF), set up by the organization and the aviation community following the 2010 eruptions of Eyjafjallajökul Volcano in Iceland which caused enormous disruption to air travel across western and northern Europe.

“The impact on air travel of the Eyjafjallajökul eruption was unprecedented. It forced us to align our guidance material with the latest technological and scientific developments. The new approach, while ensuring the safety of flight operations, provides more flexibility and recommends that the decision to operate a flight in airspace containing volcanic ash rest with airlines, under the supervision of State regulatory authorities,” said Raymond Benjamin, Secretary General of ICAO.

To ensure that the safety-critical information is readily available to Member States and the industry, the manual is now accessible in English at www.icao.int/publications/Pages/doc-series.aspx.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

NTSB Safety Recommendation A-12-7


The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendation to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Require repetitive inspection of Engine Components, Inc. cylinder assemblies produced between May 2003 and October 2009 (serial numbers 7709 through 52884) installed on Teledyne Continental Motors model 520 and 550 engines and removal of these cylinder assemblies once they reach the engine manufacturer’s recommended normal time (hours) in service between overhauls. (A-12-7)


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Kotaite Lecture on the Future of Aviation Safety

National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Deborah A. P. Hersman delivered the 8th Annual Assad Kotaite Lecture last evening at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Headquarters in Montreal, Quebec, Canada. Hosted by the Montreal Branch of the Royal Aeronautical Society, the annual lecture is a tribute to Dr.Assad Kotaite, former Secretary General of ICAO and President of the Council of ICAO.

Chairman Hersman’s talk, “Assuring Safety in Aviation’s Second Century,” highlighted the past, present, and future of accident investigation and addressed how accident investigation must adapt to play an even more pivotal rolein creating civil aviation’s safer and stronger future. Citing examples from recent accident investigations, Hersman said that it’s clear that future accident investigations will depend far more on data and cooperation than in the past.

“While traditional tin-kicking will never go away, it is increasingly being joined by sophisticated data analysis,” Hersman said. “In this era of dynamic growth and greater complexity, data is more important than ever.”

Hersman applauded the agreement reached last year at the 37th ICAO Assembly to foster data sharing through the creation of the Global Safety Information Exchange. This information can be vital to investigators as they seek to learn what really happened and determine what can be done to
improve safety.

“Data and cooperation is how the aviation community will maintain – and enhance – its strong safety record into the second century of powered flight,” Hersman said.

See Speech Here

All Nippon Report UPSIDE DOWN

The official report is out, concluding that because it was dark, passengers were unaware that the plane was flying upside down.

Excuse me? Are we to believe that passengers were unawere the plane was flying UPSIDE DOWN?

I don’t think so. If they were upside down they had to FEEL it, dark or not. Or else they weren’t upside down.


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Andrew Bowden

What: All Nippon Airways Boeing 737-700 en route from Okinawa to Tokyo Haneda
Where: Hamamatsu
When: Sep 6th 2011
Who: 2 crew injured
Why: While en route, the co-pilot accidentally activated the rudder trim switch instead of the door mechanism.

The plane descended 6000 feet and rolled, injuring a couple of flight attendants. The first officer—2400 hours— leveled off, and was able to admit the captain who was stuck outside the cockpit, waiting to get in.

The flight continued without incident

See George’s editorial Sept 8


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

DCGA Releases Final Investigation of Pawan Hans Helicopter

Type Dauphin 365 N3
Nationality: INDIAN
registration: VT – SOK
Owner/operator: Pawan Hans Helicopter Ltd.
PIC: Flying under rule 160
injuries: Minor
copilot: Holder of CPL (H)
injuries: Minor
Location: Chandigarh Airport
point of departure: Chandigarh Airport
point of arrival (intended): Secretariat, Chandigarh
Date: 16th December, 2010; 04:30 UTC (Approx.)
passengers: n/a
Phase: Taxing
Type: During Taxi the helicopter Toppled toward left side.

DCGAPawan Hans Final Report


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

DCGA Releases Final Report on JET AIRWAYS 27th Aug’2010

Type & model Engines Nationality Registration:
Type:B737-800
Engines:CFM56-7
Nationality:Indian
Registration:VT–JGM
Owner:M/s Jet Airways, Mumbai
PIC: ALTP Holder
1st: CPL Holder
Other: cabin crew 4,
One trainee first officer
Passengers: 139 Minor
INJURIES:21, Serious:4
LOCATION: Mumbai Airport
DATE: 27th Aug?2010,1525 UTC
INCIDENT TYPE: Serious injuries during evacuation

https://airflightdisaster.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/VT-JGM.pdf


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Lebanon Crash Investigation Hung Up


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Alastair T. Gardiner

Lebanon’s public works minister announced the investigation report (re: Ethiopian jet that crashed into the Mediterranean in 2010 four minutes after takeoff on Jan. 25, 2010) has been finalized.

Ethiopia Airlines accused Lebanon of failing to provide evidence critical to the investigation. According to the airline, “The Lebanese government had failed to deliver documents, evidence, and data critical to the investigation.”

Ethiopia Airlines said that the report is only in the technical stage, that the analysis has not begin. Therefore the report is not finalized.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Easa Proposes Airworthiness Directive for Airbus

Angle of Attack (AoA) Probes Faulty:

Testing shows that data from two different Airbus planes were found inaccurate.

Investigation conducted by Airbus and Thales on the removed probes revealed oil residue between the stator and the rotor parts of the AoA vane position resolvers. This oil residue was the result of incorrect removal of machining oil during the manufacturing process of the AoA resolvers. At low temperatures, this oil residue becomes viscous (typically in cruise), causing delayed and/or reduced AoA vane movement. Multiple AOA probes could be simultaneously affected, providing incorrect indications of the AoA of the
aeroplane. If not corrected, this could lead to erroneous AOA information and consequent delayed or non-activation of the AoA protection systems which, if during flight at a high angle of attack, could result in reduced control of the aeroplane.

View the proposed Directive here in PDF


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Easa Issues CF-2011-27 : Air Driven Generator Failure to Power Essential Buses

From Canada, Bombardier CL-600 has been issued an airworthiness directive concerning failure of the air driven generator with an effective date: 13 August 2011

“The aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 use the same ADG generator control unit (GCU) as models CL-600-2B16 and CL-600-2B19. However the aeroplane models CL-600-2C10, CL-600-2D15, CL-600-2D24, and CL-600-2E25 are installed with a different hydraulic pump and do not experience the same failure due to the low threshold setting of the circuit protection. However, it was found that the same ADG GCU transformer primary winding can break due to thermal fatigue. Broken transformer primary winding can prevent the supply of power from the ADG to the essential buses. In the event of an emergency, failure for the essential buses to remain powered can prevent continued safe flight.”

The corrective action is to replace within 10 000 hours air time or 60 months from the effective date of this directive. Whichever occurs first, remove and replace the ADG GCU Part Number (P/N) 604-90800-7 with a new ADG GCU P/N 604-90800-27.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Ethiopia Flight 409: More Promises and Procrastination

Beirut’s Public Works & Transport Minister Ghazi Aridi says the joint investigation committee will be finally providing the public works minister the committee’s report on the crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 409. The crash occurred on 25 January 2010, carrying 90 people aboard to a watery grave, more than a year and a half ago.

The investigative committee is composed of Boeing representatives, plus Lebanese and Ethiopian representatives who say the report will take at least another month. An NTSB analysis of black spots were caused by hot oil, and one segment of a cockpit voice recorder was unsalvageable.

The Boeing turned after taking off from runway 21, was instructed to bank hard to the left, at which time it spiraled down 8000 feet.

Prior to the latest announcement, the last public announcement promised the Lebonese people that the report would be released before the end of July 2011. Of course, it is August now and it has not yet been made public.

On that flight, there were 23 young Ethiopian women returning home from an abusive stint hired as domestic workers.

The Ethiopian passengers in the crash were:
Addis Abera Demise (Ethiopia)
Bahrnesh Megersa (Ethiopia)
Kidist Wolde Mariam (Ethiopia)
Elisabeth Tilhum Habtermariam (Ethiopia)
Rahel Tadese (Ethiopia)
Etenesh Admasie (Ethiopia)
Woinshet Meugistu Melaku (Ethiopia)
Azeb Betre Kebede (Ethiopia)
Tigist Shikur Hajana (Ethiopia)
Hani Gebre Gembezo (Ethiopia)
Alunesh Tkele (Ethiopia)
Shitu Nuri (Ethiopia)
Selam Zigdaya (Ethiopia)
Yikma Mohamed (Ethiopia)
Seble Agezc (Ethiopia)
Aynalem Tessema (Ethiopia)
Eyerus Alem Desta (Ethiopia)
Mekiya Sirur (Ethiopia)
Lakesh Zeleke (Ethiopia)
Tigist Anura (Ethiopia)
Askalesh Soboka (Ethiopia)
Meselu Beshah (Ethiopia)
Kevin Graingur (UK)
Marla Sanchez Pietton (France)
Akram Jassem Mohammad (Iraq)
Mohammad Abdel-Rahman Saii (Syria)

The Lebanese passengers in the crash were:

Hanna Nakhoul Kreidi
Haidar Hasan Marji
Ali Youssef Jaber
Ali Ahmed Jaber
Abbas Mohammed Jaber
Mohammed Mustafa Badawi
Khalil Ibrahim Saleh
Hasan Adnan Kreik
Saeed Abdel Hasan Zahr
Hussein Ali Farhat
Ali Suheil Yaghi
Rawan Hasan Wazneh
Bassem Qassem Khazaal
Haifa Ahmed Wazneh
Ali Ahmed Tajeddine
Tanal Abdallah Fardoun
Mustafa Haitham Arnaout
Fouad Mahmoud al-Laqiss
Mohammed Kamal Akoush
Tony Elias al-Zakhem
Hamzeh Ali Jaafar
Hasan Mohammed Issawi
Hasan Kamal Ibrahim
Ghassan Ibrahim Qaterji
Haifa Ibrahim al-Farran
Hussein Youssef Hajj Ali
Fares Rashid Zibian
Farid Saad Moussa
Mohammed Ali Qatbi
Yasser Youssef Mehdi
Anees Mustafa Safa
Hussein Moussa Barakat
Antoine Toufiq al-Hayek
Elias Antonius Rafeeh
Tareq George Barakat
Khalil Nami al-Khazen (MTV official)
Rana Youssef al-Harakeh
Mohammed Abdel Hussein al-Hajj
Hussein Kamal Hayek
Asaad Masoud al-Fghali
Ziad Naeem Qosseifi
Rida Ali Mistokirdi
Albert Jirji Assal
Imad Ahmed Hather
Fouad Mohammed Jaber
Khalil Mohammed Madani
Hasan Mohammed Abdel Hasan Tajeddine
Yasser Abdel Hussein Ismail
Jamal Ali Khatoun
Afif Krisht (Lebanese-British)
Abbas Hawilli (Lebanese-Canadian)
Anna Mohammed Abes (Lebanese-Russian)
Julia Mohammed al-Hajj, 3
Mohammed Hasan Kreik, 4


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Spanair JK5022: Final Report

Update
What: Spanair Flight JK5022, a 15-year-old MD-82 jet en route to Las Palmas in the Canary Islands.
Where: Madrid airport Terminal Four
When: Wednesday, Aug. 20, 2008 2:45pm
Who: Carrying 166 passengers and nine crew, at the time of this writing, the number of fatalities had mounted to 154 people.
Why: The jet swerved off the runway and caught fire during takeoff.

The final report of Spanair Flight JK5022 was released, it claims that the pilots failed to deploy the flaps for takeoff. The report blames the crash on “pilot error.” The automated voice warning to alert the crew did not sound.

Already more than one hour late, the flight experienced a technical issue with the plane (a sensor reporting excessive temperature in an air intake, and the temperature sensor was de-activated on the ground) that forced the first takeoff attempt to be aborted when there were failure signals taxiing away from the terminal. The aircraft was inspected and then tried to take-off for the second time, which ended in the crash.

The National Transportation Safety Board said that “that the probable cause of the accident was the flightcrew’s failure to use the taxi checklist to ensure the flaps and slats were extended for takeoff. Contributing to the accident was the absence of electrical power to the airplane takeoff warning system which thus did not warn the flightcrew that the airplane was not configured properly for takeoff. The reason for the absence of electrical power could not be determined.

A similar disaster occurred in the Northwest Flight 255 in Detroit in 1987 when 154 people also died in an MD-82 due to incorrect flap settings.

As a consequence, Spanair and McDonnell Douglas now require a TOWS* system check prior to every flight.

The Interim Report is available here.

Final report (Spanish).PDF

*The Take Off Warning System is part of CAWS. TOWS provides alert warnings on the following components involved in the configuration of the aircraft for takeoff: Flaps, Slats, Brakes, Auto brake, Auto spoilers, Spoilers and Stabilizer Trim.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Safety Investigation into Air France Flight 447

The BEA has released the following document:

Safety Investigation into the accident on 1 June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203, flight AF447 which we have available in English as a PDF

This Interim report comes about after the readout of the flight recorders and breaks down the flight into three phases related to the CVR, autopilot and stall warning.


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

Luddington Crash Report Posted: Debris in Fuel

TSB Identification: CEN10FA465
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Friday, July 23, 2010 in Ludington, MI
Aircraft: CESSNA U206F, registration: N82531
Injuries: 4 Fatal,1 Minor.

On July 23, 2010, at 1017 eastern daylight time (edt), a Cessna U206F, N82531, sustained substantial damage when it was ditched in Lake Michigan about 5 miles west of Ludington, Michigan, after a loss of engine power. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. It departed the Gratiot Community Airport (AMN), Alma, Michigan, at 0850 and was en route to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The single-engine airplane was over Lake Michigan at 10,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) when the engine lost power. The pilot reversed course but was unable to reach the shore, and he ditched the airplane. The pilot survived and was rescued by a fishing boat about 38 minutes later. The pilot rated passenger and three other passengers did not survive. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated.

(Full)
HISTORY OF FLIGHT

On July 23, 2010, at 1017 eastern daylight time (edt), a Cessna U206F, N82531, sustained substantial damage when it was ditched in Lake Michigan about 5 miles west of Ludington, Michigan, after a loss of engine power. The airplane was owned and operated by the pilot as a personal flight under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. It departed the Gratiot Community Airport (AMN), Alma, Michigan, at 0850 and was en route to Rochester International Airport (RST), Rochester, Minnesota. The single-engine airplane was over Lake Michigan at 10,000 feet above mean sea level (msl) when the engine lost power. The pilot reversed course but was unable to reach the shore, and he ditched the airplane. The pilot survived and was rescued by a fishing boat about 38 minutes later. The pilot rated passenger and three other passengers did not survive. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was activated.

On July 23, 2010, about 0659, the pilot rated passenger called the Princeton Automated Flight Service Station to obtain a weather brief and to file an IFR flight plan. The briefer informed him that there was an airmen’s meteorological information (AIRMET) for IFR conditions for the entire route of flight that was valid until about 1100 – 1400. There was a Convective significant meteorological information (SIGMET) to the south that paralleled the route of flight. The briefer reported that the winds aloft were from 260 degrees at 41 knots at 9,000 feet, and 270 degrees at 35 knots at 12,000 feet. The pilot rated passenger filed the flight plan and identified the flight as a “lifeguard” flight.

The pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to take one of the passengers to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, for medical treatments. The flight was a personal flight and was not associated with a charity organization. The patient and his wife were seated in the aft seats, seats 5 and 6. The patient’s doctor was sitting in the middle row on the left in seat 3. The pilot was in the left front seat and the pilot rated passenger was in the right front seat, seat 2. The fuel tanks were filled to capacity the night before the flight. The pilot reported that after climbing to 10,000 feet msl, he leaned the fuel mixture to approximately 14 gallons per hour (gph).

The pilot reported that all of the instrument readings were within normal limits as they crossed the shore near Ludington, Michigan. The head winds were about 40 knots “directly on the nose.” Near mid-point over the lake (about 24 statute miles from the shoreline), the engine began to misfire and lose power, with the fuel flow dropping to about 11 gph. The pilot attempted to regain power by pushing in the mixture control to full rich but without effect. About 1005, the pilot contacted the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and reported that the airplane was losing power. He reversed course toward the Michigan shoreline. The fuel flow dropped to about 8 gph. The pilot switched fuel tanks and adjusted the mixture control in and out to try to regain power. He attempted to prime the engine but that had no effect. He reported that he turned on the high boost pump and got a short burst of power for about 30 – 45 seconds, but then the engine “failed completely.”

The airplane descended through a cloud layer. About 1012, the airplane was about 12 miles from Ludington and about 2,300 feet above mean sea level (msl) and the airplane was still in the clouds. The surface weather at Ludington indicated that the cloud bases were at 1,800 feet msl. The pilot reported that they had a few minutes before water impact after breaking out of the clouds, so he had everyone don and inflate their life vests. Before impact, the pilot unlatched the pilot’s door on the left side of the airplane, and he had the front door of the rear cargo door unlatched. The pilot reported that he did not lower the flaps since the cargo doors would not open if the flaps were extended.

The pilot reported that when he ditched the airplane, either the tail or the landing gear hit the water as he pulled up to go over a swell. The airplane pitched forward, flipped over on its back, and began to fill with water. The pilot unbuckled his seat belt and shoulder harness, fell a short distance, pushed the door open, and got out. He reported that the airplane was sinking rapidly. He saw the right seat passenger and the doctor in the water. A wave hit the pilot and when he resurfaced “everything was gone.” He kept yelling but got no response. He eventually started to swim toward the shoreline. About 30 minutes later a US Coast Guard helicopter flew over him but they did not spot him. A few minutes later a fishing boat spotted him and rescued him from the water. He was transferred to a Coast Guard vessel and was taken to shore.

Using side scanning sonar, the Michigan State Police Dive Team located the airplane in about 173 feet of water on July 30. The dive team recovered all the bodies, with the last body being recovered on the morning of August 1, 2010.

The airplane was found resting on its main landing gear on the sandy lake bottom. The airframe and engine were separated by the water impact. Both were raised to the surface by a local commercial recovery service on August 1, 2010. The airframe and engine were taken to a local facility where the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) conducted its on-site investigation.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

The 66-year-old pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. He reported that he had 2,660 total flight hours with 1,200 hours in a Cessna 206. He had logged 25 hours of flight time in the last 90 days, and 7 hours in the last 30 days. He held a third-class medical certificate that was issued in November 2008.

The pilot reported that he had flown similar “lifeguard” flights in the airplane with the pilot rated passenger in the past. He reported that the pilot rated passenger performed copilot duties when he flew with him. The pilot rated passenger also owned an airplane. When they flew in the pilot rated passenger’s airplane, the accident pilot would perform copilot duties.

The 70-year-old pilot rated passenger held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land and airplane instrument ratings. He held a third-class medical certificate that was issued on November 17, 2009. He had 2,150 hours of total flight time at the time of his medical examination.

AIRCRAFT INFORMATION

The airplane was a single-engine Cessna U206F, serial number U-206-01734, manufactured in 1972. It was designed to seat six and it had a maximum gross weight of 3,600 pounds. The airplane was equipped with a pilot (left) side door and a clamshell rear door serving the back two rows of seats. The accident airplane had its middle, right seat (Seat 4) removed. The engine was a 300-horsepower Continental IO-520-F3B, serial number 280171R.

Annual Inspections
The airplane’s maintenance logbooks indicated that four different inspection authorization (IA) mechanics had conducted the required annual maintenance inspections on the airplane within the last ten years. The logbooks indicated that the same IA mechanic had performed the last three annual maintenance inspections. On September 27, 2007, the IA mechanic performed his first annual maintenance inspection of the airplane. The total airframe time was 3,893.4 hours. His second annual inspection of the airplane was conducted on October 1, 2008, and the airplane had a total time of 3,908.1 hours. The last annual maintenance inspection was conducted on November 5, 2009, and it had a total time of 3,938.0 hours. At the time of the accident, the airplane had flown 7.5 hours since the last inspection and had a total time of 3,945.5 hours.

FAA inspectors interviewed the IA mechanic concerning the annual maintenance inspections he had conducted on the accident airplane. According to the FAA inspectors, the IA mechanic reported that he used the inspection checklists provided by the pilot/owner in order to conduct the annual maintenance inspections. The pilot/owner provided the IA mechanic with the Cessna Service Manual for “Stationair Series, Skywagon 206 Series and Super Skylane Series, 1969 thru 1971.” The service manual indicated the items that needed to be inspected during a 50-hour inspection and 100-hour (annual) inspection. In the section of the checklist covering the “Engine Compartment,” Item 29 states that the “Fuel-air control unit screen” is required to be checked during every 100-hour inspection. In the section of the checklist covering the “Fuel System,” Item 2 states that the “Fuel strainer screen and bowl” is required to be checked during every 100-hour inspection.

The Cessna Service Manual provides the following information about the fuel strainer:

“Section 13-42. FUEL STRAINER DISASSEMBLY. (See figure 13.9.) To disassemble and assemble the strainer, proceed as follows:

a. Turn off fuel selector valve.
b. Disconnect strainer drain tube and remove safety wire, nut, and washer at bottom of filter bowl and remove bowl.
c. Carefully unscrew standpipe and remove.
d. Remove filter screen and gasket. Wash filter screen and bowl in solvent (Federal Specification P-S-661, or equivalent) and dry with compressed air.
e. Using a new gasket between filter screen and top assembly, install screen and standpipe. Tighten standpipe only finger tight.
f. Using all new O-rings, install bowl. Note that step-washer at bottom of bowl is installed so that step washer seats against O-ring. Connect strainer drain tube.

The engine manufacturer’s “Operator’s Manual for IO-520 Series Aircraft Engines, FAA Approved September 1980,” also provided a checklist for 100-hours inspections of the engine. Item 14 of the 100-hour inspection checklist stated: “Fuel Metering Unit Inlet Screen: Inspect and clean.”

According to the FAA inspectors, the IA mechanic reported that during the last annual inspection of the fuel strainer screen and bowl, he removed the bowl and found some water in it, but he did not remove the screen or gasket. According to the FAA, he also stated several times during the interview that he never checks the fuel metering inlet fuel screen, and that he did not check it during the last annual inspection.

The aircraft logbook indicated that during the annual maintenance inspection on May 20, 2004, the following entry was made by a different IA mechanic: “Replaced fuel strainer cable assy [assembly] and replaced strainer screen assy [assembly].” The engine logbook for the same annual inspection had this entry: “Removed engine primer system and capped at engine.”

METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

At 0955, the observed surface weather observation at Ludington (LUD), Michigan, was: wind 290 degrees at 6 knots with gusts to 17 knots; visibility 10 miles; ceiling 1,800 feet overcast; temperature 24 degrees Celsius; dew point 22 degrees Celsius; altimeter 29.81 inches of mercury.

At 1016, the observed surface weather observation at Ludington (LUD), Michigan, was: wind 270 degrees at 7 knots; visibility 10 miles; ceiling 1,600 feet overcast; temperature 24 degrees Celsius; dew point 22 degrees Celsius; altimeter 29.82 inches of mercury.

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION

The postaccident inspection of the airframe and engine occurred on August 2 – 3, 2010. The inspection revealed that the fuselage was intact; however, the empennage was partially separated with extensive wrinkling and bending around the tailcone section aft of the rear seats. Some of the damage to the empennage was a result of the recovery effort. Both wingtips exhibited aft crushing. The engine was separated from the fuselage. The nose landing gear was separated from the fuselage and not recovered. All flight control surfaces remained attached to the airframe structure. Flight control cable continuity was established from all flight controls to all the primary and secondary flight control surfaces. The elevator trim tab measurement equated to about 10 degrees up. The flaps were found down about 30 degrees. The flap indicator and flap switch were found at the 20 degree position. The push pull rods to lift the flaps were cut by rescue divers during the recovery of the bodies. The rear cargo doors were found in the closed position, but they opened and closed normally. The key was still in the ignition and on the “Both” position.

The inspection of the airplane’s fuel system revealed that about 60 gallons of fuel remained in the wing fuel tanks, about 30 gallons in each side. About the first five gallons drained from the wings appeared to be a mixture of fuel and water. The remaining liquid drained was light blue in color and appeared to be aviation fuel. Both wing fuel bladder tanks and exit port screens were clean. The fuel boost pump was removed and drained of water. The boost pump operated when it was powered by a 12 volt battery. The airplane was equipped with the optional fuel primer and the fuel primer control lever in the cockpit; however, the fuel line was capped-off (not operational) at the firewall.

The inspection of the firewall fuel strainer revealed that the gasket did not provide a complete seal between the fuel screen and upper body. Instead, a portion of the gasket was positioned over the exit port which created a gap between the fuel screen and the upper body of the fuel strainer.

The inspection of the engine revealed that all the cylinders and engine accessories remained attached to the crankcase. Oil was present in the engine. The crankshaft was rotated and drive train continuity to the cylinders and accessories was confirmed. All damage observed was consistent with impact. The propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. Both propeller blades exhibited aft bending toward the non-cambered side of the propeller blade.

The inspection of the engine’s throttle and fuel metering assembly revealed that the fuel inlet filter screen was safety wired. The safety wire was removed and the fuel inlet screen was removed from the fuel metering assembly. The removal of the fuel inlet screen required a consistent pull (it did not come out freely) to remove it. The visual inspection of the inlet screen revealed that it was partially obstructed by debris that had become attached to the screen. The orifice of the fuel inlet passage was inspected. It contained the same debris material that obstructed the fuel screen and the debris blocked a majority of the orifice opening.

The firewall fuel strainer, the fuel inlet screen, and debris found in the fuel inlet screen were sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for examination. The engine was shipped to the engine manufacturer for further inspection.

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION

No autopsies were performed.

SURVIVAL ASPECTS

The pilot reported that he used the life vests that were in the pilot rated passenger’s airplane since he could not find his life vests the night prior to the flight. He put the life vests in the seat pockets so that they would be accessible to the passengers. He reported that the passengers donned their life vests during the descent prior to water impact. He had the pilot rated passenger take the controls momentarily while he donned his life vest. He stated that he heard “a couple of the vests go off” while still inside the airplane.

During recovery of the airplane and its occupants, the patient and his wife were found in the airplane with the patient still seated in seat 6. The patient still had his vests on, but the wife’s vest had come off and it was found in the airplane. Both life vests were deflated when the bodies were recovered. The pilot rated passenger and the patient’s doctor were found on the lake bottom within 50 yards of the airplane. The doctor still had his vest on but in a deflated condition. The pilot rated passenger was not wearing a life vest. A life vest was found near the copilot’s seat, seat 2, in a deflated condition.

The inspection of the life vests revealed that they were manufactured in the 1980’s and the CO2 cartridges used to inflate the vests were also manufactured in the 1980’s. The inspection of the life vests revealed that passenger life vests had one CO2 cartridge attached to the vest. All the cartridges were found expended during the on-site inspection. The pilot’s vest had two CO2 cartridges but only one cartridge had been expended. The pilot reported that he was not aware that the vest had two cartridges.

Search Conditions
According to the Mason County Sheriff’s Department, the weather was cloudy with good visibility during the initial on-scene search for the wreckage and survivors. The water temperature was between 68 and 72 degrees Fahrenheit on the surface with 2 to 4 foot seas. The waters current appeared to be moving north towards Big Sauble Lighthouse, and then moving to the northwest from the lighthouse.

Cessna Stationair Owner’s Manual
The Cessna Stationair Owner’s Manual provided information and procedures for emergency landing without engine power, ditching, clamshell cargo doors, cargo door emergency exit procedures, and glide distance.

Emergency Landing Without Engine Power
The Emergency Procedure section of the airplane Owner’s Manual provides the procedures for “Emergency Landing Without Engine Power.” The procedure stated the following:

If an engine stoppage occurs, establish a flaps up glide at 85 MPH. If time permits, attempt to restart the engine by checking for fuel quantity, proper fuel selector valve position, and mixture control setting. Also check that engine primer is full in and locked and ignition switch is properly positioned.

If all attempts to restart the engine fail and a forced landing is imminent, select a suitable field and prepare for the landing as follows:

1. Pull mixture control to idle cut-off position.
2. Turn fuel selector valve “OFF”.
3. Turn off all switches except master switch.
4. Approach at 90 MPH.
5. Extend wing flaps as necessary with gliding distance of field
6. Turn off master switch.
7. Unlatch cabin doors prior to final approach.
8. Land in a slightly tail-low attitude.
9. Apply heavy braking.

Ditching
The Emergency Procedure section of the airplane Owner’s Manual provides the procedures for “Ditching.” The ditching procedures state:

1. Plan approach into wind if winds are high and seas are heavy. With heavy swells and light wind, land parallel to swells.
2. Approach with flaps 40 degrees and sufficient power for a 300 ft./min rate of descent at 75 MPH.
3. Unlatch the cabin door.
4. Maintain a continuous descent until touchdown in level attitude. Avoid a landing flare because of difficulty in judging airplane height over a water surface.
5. Place folded coat or cushion if front of face at time of touchdown.
6. Evacuate airplane through cabin doors. If necessary, open window to flood cabin compartment for equalizing pressure so that door can be opened.
7. Inflate life vests and raft (if available) after evacuation of cabin.

Information on Cargo Door
The airplane’s Owner’s Manual states that when conducting the “Before Entering the Airplane” checklist during the preflight, it is important check the cargo doors are securely latched and locked. An “IMPORTANT” note states:

“The cargo doors must be fully closed and latched before operating the electric wing flaps. A switch in the upper door sill of the front cargo door interrupts the wing flap electrical circuit when the front door is opened or removed, thus preventing the flaps being lowered with possible damage to the cargo door or wing flaps when the cargo door is open.”

The Owner’s Manual section titled “Cargo Door Emergency Exit” states the following information:

“If it is necessary to use the cargo door as an emergency exit and the wing flaps are not extended, open the forward door and exit. If the wing flaps are extended, open the doors in accordance with the instructions shown on the placard which is mounted on the forward cargo door.”

The red placard found on the front cargo door of the accident airplane stated:

EMERGENCY EXIT OPERATIONS
1. OPEN FWD CARGO DOOR AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.
2. ROTATE RED LEVER IN REAR CARGO DOOR FWD.
3. FORCE REAR CARGO DOOR FULL OPEN.

Glide Distance
The Operator’s Manual indicated that the maximum glide distance for the airplane with the following parameters: 1) Speed 85 mph indicated airspeed; 2) Propeller windmilling; 3) Flaps up; and 4) Zero wind. The Maximum Glide chart indicated that the maximum glide distance from a height of 10,000 feet above the terrain is a ground distance of 15 statute miles.

TESTS AND RESEARCH

Life Vests
The life vests were tested at a manufacturer’s facility. The vests were overdue their inspection requirements. The pressure tests indicated that the vests inflated when new CO2 cartridges were used and held pressure. No anomalies were found with the life vests that would have precluded normal inflation and operation. Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 91 regulations do not require life vests for each occupant if the airplane is operated not for hire.

Engine Inspection
The engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and operational testing. The engine was put on a test stand and run. The engine experienced a normal start. The engine RPM was advanced to 1,200 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 1,600 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; 2,450 rpm and held for 5 minutes to stabilize; and at full throttle and held for 5 minutes to stabilize. The throttle was rapidly advanced from idle to full throttle six times and it accelerated and decelerated without hesitation or interruption in power. It produced rated horsepower.

NTSB Materials Laboratory Examination
The NTSB Materials Laboratory examined the debris found in the fuel metering assembly’s fuel inlet screen. The examination of the material removed from the filter revealed several categories of materials present within the mixture. The materials present included: 1) cellulosic material similar to wood and sawdust; 2) non-metallic amber-colored flakes similar to varnish or shellac; 3) thin, ribbon-like metallic shavings; 4) white flakes similar to paint; 5) granular particulates similar to sand or dirt; and 6) fibers similar to fabric and glass fiber


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

NTSB SAFETY RECOMMENDATION

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

July 7, 2011
http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2011/A-11-056-059.pdf
The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Airborne Law Enforcement Association:

Revise your standards to define pilot rest and ensure that pilots receive protected rest periods that are sufficient to minimize the likelihood of pilot fatigue during aviation operations. (A-11-56)

Revise your accreditation standards to require that all pilots receive training in methods for safely exiting inadvertently encountered instrument meteorological conditions for all aircraft categories in which they operate. (A-11-57)

Encourage your members to install 406-megahertz emergency locator transmitters on all of their aircraft. (A-11-58)

Encourage your members to install flight-tracking equipment on all public aircraft that would allow for near-continuous flight tracking during missions. (A-11-59)


Warning: Trying to access array offset on value of type null in /home/airflight/www/www/wp-content/themes/fluida/includes/loop.php on line 270

A330 and A340 Landing Gear Airworthiness Directive

EASA Emergency AD No.: 2011-0122-E has been published limiting the life of A330 and A340 landing gear parts.

During ground load test cycles on an A340-600 aeroplane, the MLG bogie beam prematurely fractured. The results of the investigation identified that this premature fracture was due to high tensile standing stress, resulting from dry fit axle assembly method. Improvement has been introduced subsequently with a grease fit axle assembly method.

Click to read the full pdf

Content not attributed to or linked to original, is the property of AirFlightDisaster.com; all rights reserved.

Site Credits