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Category: <span>Air France</span>

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Air France Paris-New York Flight Turns Back Due to Ice


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Ken Iwelumo

What: Air France Airbus A330-200 en route from Paris to New York
Where: Paris
When: Dec 25th 2011
Who: 187 passengers and 12 crew
Why: On takeoff from Paris, the crew detected problems.

The engine anti-icing system indicated a problem, so the pilots returned to Paris two hours after leaving.

An anti-ice system valve was apparently repaired. After two more hours, the flight took off for New York.

Airbus Design Flaws Forced Pilots into Bad Decisions


In George’s Point of View

In the operation of the Airbus 330, a percentage of man-made decisions are taken away from humans in the cockpit. When you closely consider the Air France Airbus Flight 447 crash, it is easy to see that bad pilot decisions occurred when the pilots were not getting accurate feedback about what was happening. In old programmer lingo, this is “garbage in-garbage out.” And, unfortunately, when the data comes out of a computer, people tend to believe it, especially pilots in a falling plane, whose lives rely on that particular “garbage.”

Sure, mistakes were made. The pilot retired, leaving the cockpit to the copilots. If he had stayed in the cockpit, none of this would have happened.

Of the two remaining co-pilots, one still should have realized the other’s mistaken attitude (flying at a nose-up attitude with falling speeds.) Even something as basic as tandem cockpit control (where the flight controls move in tandem in the left and right cockpit), would have revealed to the second co-pilot what the other pilot was doing. But cockpit controls in the A330 are asymmetrical, and move independently.

If one co-pilot had caught that the junior co-pilot was flying at the nose-up attitude while the speed was dropping, none of this would have happened.

Not only did the failure of pitot tubes (the malfunctioning equipment that reads/relays airspeed) occur when they iced up, any failsafes that should have kicked in, didn’t. Thales Pitot tube icing was a known factor prior and considered by Airbus an “optional” fix. Because these tubes were frozen (iced over) airspeed data was incorrect.

If Airbus had demanded that the flawed Thales pitot tubes be replaced, the airspeed data would have been correct, and none of this would have happened.

The plane flew for a while with falling speeds, nose up. Then, the idiosyncrasy of the stall warning alarm system kicked in. When airspeed slowed too much, the warning went off, but when it slowed even more, it stopped. The pilots were in a feedback deadzone. Flying at a crawl, the warning quit. Speeding up from a crawl to slow turned set the warning off again. So when they tried to increase to the proper speed, the stall system went off.


If the stall warning system had been calibrated to go off at dangerously low speeds and keep going off until proper flight speed was attained instead of indicating to the pilots that they were wrong to increase the speed, then none of this would have happened.

It is a given that correct data and feedback are essential to a pilot. In the Airbus 330, the underlying design failed to provide accurate data and feedback. Could any pilots fly a plane if they did not know what is happening? It all comes down to a whole integration of synchronicity: a coetaneous concurrence of problems and failures converged on the pilots at once. Pilot error alone does not a crash make. Not even on an A-330.

Turkish Harpist Fatma Ceren Necipoglu Returns Home


Another victim is laid to rest in the ongoing saga of Air France Flight 447. This victim is neither Brazilian nor French. Among those whose remains were recently recovered and identified, Harpist Fatma Ceren Necipoglu was returned to Turkey on November 22, 2011, nearly two and a half years after the June 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447.

When she went to the Rio Harp Festival to perform two recitals, she never expected to be returning as a memory.

After a ceremony at Sisli’s Tesvikiye Mosque, Necipoglu was laid to rest. She was a 1999 graduate of the Department of Harp in Louisiana State University’s School of Music and piano and harp lecturer at the Anadolu University.

Download adobe flash


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Updating the Brazilian Statistics on the body count/recovery

Of the 58 Brazilians aboard the notorious Rio-Paris Air France Flight 447, 18 have been found and identified.

Of the 153 victims, 74 reside on the ocean floor. Some of those may be the 40 lost Brazilians.

During the recovery process, some families chose not to disturb the remains. Some of the bodies were simply lost at sea.

There is still a lot of finger-pointing going on. Whatever the cause, Air France Flight 447 stalled and crashed in bad weather, killing 153.

153 of AF447 victims identified

Seventy percent of the victims of Air France Flight 447 have been identified, according to Investigators of the Criminal Research Institute of the National Gendarmerie.

DNA examiniation of bodies retrieved in April resulted in 103 more passengers found and identified, in addition to the 50 who had been identified before the plane’s location had been pinpointed.

In France, Air France and Airbus, the aircraft manufacturer who built the A330 involved in the accident, are under investigation since last March for “manslaughter.”

The final report of judicial experts is due in June 2012.

Now we are going to see everyone jump on the pilots, and play the blame game. But these pilots were cleared to fly. In gathering up blame, the tragedy begins with the Airbus.

The manufacturer should require INTENSE training to include all possible situations a pilot might encounter while in flight. Certainly, with the computers running much of the show, they have all possibilities listed within their “brains.”

It is not enough to train a pilot to take off and land a monster like the A330.

And, of course, the operator, Air France, should stop rushing the process of training. Pilots flying a jet should simply not be mystified by anything that happens, because whatever happens, their training should have already covered it.

*snapshot from youtube


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Another Flight 447 Fatality

Air France-KLM tossed out its CEO Pierre-Henri Gourgeon, another fall guy in the ongoing disaster of Air France Flight 447.

Mr. Spinetta who ran Air France from 1999 until 2009 will resume his role at the helm until the expected replacement is Alexandre de Juniac, advisor to the French Minister of Finances takes the helm.

Gourgan had been in conflict Jean-Cyril Spinetta.French politics as usual.

Gourgeon, a former fighter pilot, had been re-appointed in July for a four year term. However, a committee made up of Jean-Francois Dehecq, Patricia Barbizet, Jean-Marc Espalioux and Cornelis van Lede chose to fire him Gourgan.

An interim report on the crash said pilots of the plane had not received training. Management has since then assessed it’s training program.

Air France 447 Revisited by Air France 471

Satellite Image Jul 22nd 00:00Z : NASA
Satellite Image Jul 22nd 00:00Z : NASA

What: Air France Airbus A340-300 en route from Caracas Venezuela to Paris
Where: NW of Point A Pitre Guadeloupe
When: Jul 22nd 2011
Why: In an experience that is being compared to Air France Flight 447, in night/instrument conditions, the AF Airbus flew through turbulence (reported by pilots, not on METAR) at 35,000 feet, accelerated (to 0.66 mach), and autopilot quit. Pitch attitude increased to 11 degrees and decelerated. Turbulence reduced, and pilots were able to level off and return the flight to normal parameters.

Hopefully the events of this flight will inform us of what is going on in the Airbus at high altitude

In George’s Point of View


Perhaps this flight recapitulates the events of Air France 447. It certainly seems to. Because of what history shows us, I wonder if there was a repeat of faulty input from the pitot tubes. The pilots, in this case managed to regain control of the plane. (I doubt if there is an airbus pilot now who hasn’t studied the events of AF447 and worked out some kind emergency response.)

Pilots blame the equipment. The BEA blames the pilots. Air France blames the instruments.

When the dust settles and the finger-pointing stops, we want those involved to stop blaming, and start taking responsibility.


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Protestations of Bias in Official BEA Report

In George’s Point of View


Like the pilot association, we wonder how blaming the victims will improve the state of aviation.

The pilots of Air France Flight 447 had already lost valid data before the Airbus A330 stalled. Fell for three minutes down into the Atlantic in June of 2009, carrying the 228 people aboard to their death. Fell, with pilots flying blind. Fell, with only erroneous data available. Fell with the warning system squawking confused messages. Yet the Bea report says this was was the pilot’s fault.

We want to know if this investigation will turn out to be deliberate persecution of the pilots instead of legitimate prosecution of Airbus flawed design?

It is no wonder that the families of the victims are crying foul that the report criticizes pilot performance but not the faulty stall alarms.
It is no wonder that pilot associations all over the world are protesting.
It is no wonder that the BEA is being accused of protecting Airbus.

Why would the recommendation to improve the warning system be removed from the report?
Why, if not to protect Airbus, scheming to avoid the legal and financial consequences of the crash?

Pilots say that the stall alarm tends to sound while simultaneously messaging the pilots to ignore the “superfluous” warning. Airbus denies this ever happens.

How valid can the report be if it is being skewed to protect Airbus and blame the pilots? Should the BEA be placed under criminal investigation alongside with Air France and Airbus?


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Safety Investigation into Air France Flight 447

The BEA has released the following document:

Safety Investigation into the accident on 1 June 2009 to the Airbus A330-203, flight AF447 which we have available in English as a PDF

This Interim report comes about after the readout of the flight recorders and breaks down the flight into three phases related to the CVR, autopilot and stall warning.


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Antwerp Cargo Flight Cancelled by Fire Indication


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Joop Stroes

What: Air France/Cityjet Fokker 50 en route from Antwerp to Manchester
Where: Antwerp
When: July 20 2011
Why: On takeoff out of Antwerp the flight developed complications.

The crew made an emergency landing, due to a cargo fire alarm, and the flight
was cancelled.


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Flight Data Recorders Beyond 447

Honeywell could be resting on its laurels, since the Honeywell Flight Data Recorders aboard Air France Flight 447 certainly performed, resisting two years worth of extreme water pressure and temperature. Skeptics did not expect the data to be recoverable. The fact is that the flight data recorders working for two years at 12,800 feet is operability beyond the design parameters. They were only expected to last about 28 days under water.

The FDR reports confirmed that in the minutes leading up to the crash, pilots were given conflicting speed readings.

The event does provide Honeywell a wakeup call with at least one FDR feature.

The only thing that gave out within 28 days was the battery. Honeywell plans to extend battery life.

The Callous Abandonment of Air France Flight 447

It’s difficult for me to comprehend why we cancelled earlier searches. I’m certain we do not have any new technology now that we didn’t already have 2 years ago. The subs used have been gradually fine-tuned, but not significantly in the past two years.

It is common knowledge now that the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute team, running a couple of AUVs (Autonomous Underwater Vehicle) Remus 6000’s were barely a week into the fourth search when they discovered the location of pieces of the wreckage of the fallen Airbus, flight 447 in an area thought of as an underwater “Himalayas”. Mike Purcell, Senior Engineer of the Woods Hole team, has attributed the discovery to the ability of the Remus being able to submerge to 6000 meters (which means being able to follow the underwater mountain range cliffs, ravines, and slopes); and to the decision to start close to the last known position of the plane.

I do wonder why this was the fourth search; there should have been only one— a single search that continued until the wreckage was found.

Maybe there is no correct time to be critical, and if I am critical, it is not of the search team who did a splendid, if not all but impossible job, in finding the wreckage. It is entirely the human effort that made the difference, because although the AUVs are autonomous, they are not truly intelligent. They had to be daily programmed, and with three units running, this means three times the (sonar) data had to be daily downloaded, processed and analyzed. The team learned how to deal with managing the challenging demersal topography, and reading the visual output which were sonar abstractions that look like etch-a-sketch scribbles. The expert on board analysts had 15 years of experience in interpreting this data.

For the search team, I have only praise.

My point of criticism is for the decision makers, and it is founded on behalf of concern for the families.

We are hearing how well preserved the remains were, due to the temperature and water pressure. We are hearing about how only some of the remains were retrieved.

Why only some?

All the bereaved families should have the right to retrieve their loved ones. All of the families should have the right to place their loved ones in a known and tangible resting place.

It is a chilling callousness on behalf of the planners to advise their team to knowingly leave behind even so much as a single hair, if that hair was known to be that of one of the victims. The decision betrays a chilling callousness; an act of deliberate abandonment. It reminds me of those all fallen into a “deep place…where the sun is silent”, in Dante’s hell. “Abandon all hope, all ye who enter here.”

And now, we’re back to where we started, only worse. Many bodies were not recovered. Are they lost forever?

I can all but guarantee you that the future holds some grisly Titanic/Disney-esque treasure-seeking macarbre (or sugared) revisitation of the tragic ground, private touring expeditions seeking out the latitude and longitude, with camera, wallet, and catching net in hand. Movie rights and treasure hunters-a marriage made in hell, or Hollywood.

This is no Dante’s tale. For the bereaved families there will be no poetic justice. They will live knowing forever that their loved ones were found…came this close to being returned…and left behind, if not in the nine circles of hell, then across the oceans in that “deep place…where the sun is silent” and all hope abandoned.


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Bea Briefs-Air France 447 Recovery Boat End Run

The BEA has officially published its June 7 brief regarding Air France 447

7 June 2011 briefing

The operations on board the Ile de Sein came to an end on the afternoon of Friday 3 June. The vessel is on its way to Las Palmas (Canary Islands) for demobilisation on 9 June.

In the course of next week, it will arrive in the port of Bayonne (south-west France), from where the airplane parts will be transferred to a hangar belonging to the DGA/Technique in Toulouse and the human remains taken to a forensic mortuary.


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Get in Line to Sue Air France

The latest entity to sue Air France (over flight 447) is Motorola, who is blaming Air France (formerly Societe Air France) in a “multi district litigation” for the June 1 2009 crash.

The blame game goes like this: Motorola is being sued for designing flight control computer microprocessors which (allegedly) prevented software from functioning. And Motorola is blaming the accident on Air France.

Although U.S. District Judge Charles R. Breyer dismissed the litigation in October on forum non conveniens grounds, plaintiffs want U.S. jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend that French courts cannot exercise jurisdiction and the cases would be thwarted for years 

Families are asking the manufacturers (Motorola Honeywell International, Intel Corp and General Electric ) be tried in the US because “unilateral submission to jurisdiction in France is not effective to create jurisdiction under European Council Regulation 44/2001” because none of the parties live in France or the European Union. Other companies operating in the US (Honeywell International, Intel Corp and General Electric

The latest black box analysis confirms that invalid (Thales pitot tube) readings were outputted right before the plane crashed.

view docket
view docket


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Anniversary of Air France 447-Personal Consequences of Death on the Flying Brick

Elie Wiesal said “Because I remember, I despair. Because I remember, I have the duty to reject despair.”

It is not time to despair. It is time to remember. We are remembering Air France 447, and the families whose lives have forever changed. Families left behind have to deal with carrying on.

Experts say that there are five steps (called the Kubler-Ross model) of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance.

After a year, or two, or three one might be able to say that families with tragedies to process have come to acceptance; but the model is not a hard truth. Those suffering grief may hopscotch between stages, or get stuck at any of them. And just as smells tend to refresh memory, so too can dates. And June 1 for Air France 447 families is one of those dates.

Maybe it is a blessing that everything changes. Maybe it is a blessing that the first moment of finding you have lost a loved one in a plane crash is not frozen in amber, to be felt always at the original intensity. It is inevitable that the depth of grief will fluctuate.

In the beginning, the deaths of those aboard the plane were shrouded in mystery. A black hole of mystery, in fact, one that swallowed up the craziest theories, from abductions, to terrorism, to aliens. The investigation marched on, to the tune of millions of dollars, and hundreds of investigators and professionals marched to that tune, working to uncover the puzzle pieces and put them together to shed light on what really happened. At least now, with the black boxes recovered, there are facts to deal with rather than crazy speculation.

But even facts will not change the reality. Those gone are still gone. At whatever stage you are experiencing it, the grief you feel is real. I have no advice for you. Anyway, advice comes across as condescending. But we all have suffered pain and grief and loss, and I can only hope for the families that you remember.

Remember the good things.

Remember mornings across your breakfast tables, the rush to begin the day, the slow times after the day is done.

Remember the moments spent together. Remember the depths as well as the peaks. Remember the places you went together, and when you revisit the places, you will revisit your loved ones.

The heart is not buried along with the victim. The heart goes on.


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Airbus Birdstrike over Athens

What: Air France Airbus A320-200 en route from Athens to Paris
Where: Athens
When: May 30th 2011
Who: 152 passengers and 6 crew
Why: While over Athens, the plane incurred a bird strike. In Athens, a dismembered sea gull was found on the runway. The plane continued until unusual vibration of the engine made them decide to return to Athens. They had to burn off fuel.

They made a safe landing.


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Notes on Air France Flight 447: Thoughts on the CVR Facts

So there you have it: the short version of the investigation’s reading of the Cockpit Voice recorder.
If you missed it, we have posted it here in this blog in it’s entirety:

https://airflightdisaster.com/?p=17147

If you don’t like the visual rendition, you can click at the bottom for the .pdf.

The problems seem to begin at 2 h 08 min 07; then at 2 h 10 min 05 autopilot & auto thrust disengages. The pilots note that the speeds do not agree,( which means the speeds are incorrect, and it is an indication that pitot tubes are malfunctioning. Around this time, ACARS sent a PITOT error message, which was not mentioned in the CVR summary.) The PIC (captain) re-enters at 2 h 11 min 40 and it is all downhill from there.

As far as we can tell, everything in the cockpit voice recorder still indicates that the main cause for this crash is Thales defective pitot tubes which froze over and sent incorrect data back. How could anyone make correct decisions without knowing the speed at which the plane was traveling? How would the pilots have discerned when the incoming data was faulty and which of it—if any—was correct?

Based on the pilots’ response to the stall, we can also reiterate points made at the February 24 hearing, where Justice Zimmerman pointed out a lack of training for pilots on how to respond to a catastrophic failure. Shouldn’t pilots (and not just the PIC) be trained in this procedure to the point that the correct corrective response is second nature? The time to try to figure out how to respond is not during the catastrophe, with 228 lives hanging in the balance.

There does not appear to be an emergency procedure from the manufacturer. (This was also noted in the February hearing by Justice Zimmerman.)

It appears that the plane stalled, and that could not be corrected in time to prevent the catastrophe.

So now, all eyes will turn to the DVR, which will hopefully help decode what happened mechanically in the stall.

And I do have questions about the notation, which seems to imply that even if autopilot is not online, some (background?) processes continue to be determined by digital input, which may be faulty.
When the measured speeds are below 60 kt, the measured angle of attack values are considered invalid and are not taken into account by the systems. When they are below 30 kt, the speed values themselves are considered invalid. (Or I am misreading the data and the fact of unrecoverability is due to other system factors. It does appear that the Flight Control System is unwieldy or badly conceived.)

It seems to me as a layman, that this is a fly-by-wire conundrum. If the plane is in crisis, but it is logically disregarding the correct input when it is beyond a “safe or logical” range, then how can it be corrected, if there are no manual controls? (Not to mention no emergency procedures to fall back on.)

Friday: Factual Data on Air France 447

Media excesses, and rumor mongering (my words) have moved the BEA to publish an informational note for the families of the victims, and the general public. The following “chain of events” comes from the initial reading of the Flight Data Analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder. There are new facts in the timeline, but the interim report will not be published until the end of July. Interested parties should remain aware that this is not a substitute for later reports. Causes of the accident and safety recommendations will only be revealed and understood after “long and detailed investigative work.”



Point Enquête 270511 on site

Air France, Providing an Example

Air France


For the last ten years, the victims families of the Air France 4590 Concorde crash have been provided memorials arranged by Air France.

Air France continues that tradition by providing two anniversary memorial services for Air France Flight 447 victims, one in Rio de Janeiro for 100 participants, and one in Paris for 400 participants. Air France is providing transportation and facilities for the memorials and reunions.

The glass monument recalling the victims was placed in Leblon (Rio); it has 228 swallows etched into it, each representing someone who died aboard the flight.

Air India Express


There was also a monument placed in Kenjar, India of six scribed granite slabs remembering 158 people killed in the May 22 Air India Express crash, but it was vandalized in October of 2010. One tragedy compounded by a senseless act of malicious mischief.

Air Blue


Where is the memorial to the 152 victims of Air Blue Flight 202? Airblue management promised that the names of 19 whose bodies were consigned to a communal grave would be scribed on a monument. Where is this monument?

Where is the monument to all the 152 victims, Airblue?

Where will you be holding the anniversary service on July 28?

As the homemade cardboard tribute says “Sympathy is no substitute for action.”


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CVR FDR NOT a Flight of Imagination

Read in Portuguese
In the continuing pursuit of the unvarnished reality behind Air France Flight 447, it does not matter why “Le Figaro” posted rumors and factoids in lieu of truth after the BEA reported that the complete data (flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder) was successfully recovered in Paris.

It does not matter if “Le Figaro” is more concerned with stimulating traffic than it is about veracity, legitimacy and validity in reporting truth.

Perhaps someone at “Le Figaro” is heavily invested in Airbus, and hopes to falsely boost the airline’s reputation. We have no idea of what their motives might be.

What matters are the facts.

What matters is that on recovery of the data from the data containers, the information appears to have been intact (according to the BEA).

What matters is that the data recovery teams were able to open, extract, clean and dry the memory cards, and retrieve the actual data.

There is no reason the data would not support exactly what the ACARS data already indicates, which is that the pitot tubes failed, and started a catastrophic landslide of mechanical events that led inevitably toward systems failure.

We believe the aircraft stalled all the way from 35000 feet to the ocean. If the BEA had considered this, they would have found the plane in weeks.

The plane sent out automated messages from which the sequence of failure has been inferred.

It is an acknowledged FACT that the mechanical systems on board Air France Flight 447 were standard Airbus A330 systems, a “fly by wire” technology which is known to remove responsibility and action from the pilots when in certain situations. A fly-by-wire system modifies manual inputs of the pilot in accordance with control parameters.

The pilots on this type of fly-by-wire system are unable to manually override if faulty data come streaming in from the frozen pitot tubes. The current thinking is that in the Air France Flight 447, the faulty Thales tubes streamed in faulty data to the on board systems. Disaster was all but inevitable.

(In Sept 2009, the FAA sent out a directive indicating that “use of the Thales model has resulted in reports of airspeed indication discrepancies while flying at high altitudes in inclement weather conditions …(that) …could result in reduced control of the airplane.” )

Prior to receiving the content of the black boxes, the collected data pointed to the following series of events:

The Thales pitot tubes are small devices affixed to the plane exterior which measure air speed, but which have a proven tendency to freeze over, which obfuscates the data. Simply put, the Airbus system requires correct data input for the plane to fly correctly. When the frozen-over tubes began sending corrupted data, the system could no longer manage flight. On the 330, there is no way for pilots to manually override the failing systems.

No one expects the black boxes to indicate anything else. What is expected, perhaps is a clarification of data, and a way to study the events in order to prevent a repetition of the same.

The BEA strongly objected to media speculation. In fact, it sent out a press release specifically naming “Le Figaro” as the sensationalist publisher of invalid information. Here is what the BEA said:

According to an article that appeared in « Le Figaro » on the evening of Monday 16 May 2011, the « first elements extracted from the black boxes» would exonerate Airbus in the accident to the A330, flight AF 447, which killed 216 passengers and 12 crew members on 1st June 2009.

Sensationalist publication of non-validated information, whilst the analysis of the data from the flight recorders has only just started, is a violation of the respect due to the passengers and the crew members that died and disturbs the families of the victims, who have already suffered as a result of many hyped-up stories.

The BEA repeats that, in the framework of its mission as a safety investigation authority, it alone has the right to communicate on the progress of the investigation. Consequently, any information on the investigation that comes from another source is null and void if it has not been validated by the BEA.

Collection of all of the information from the audio recordings and from the flight parameters now gives us a high degree of certainty that everything will be brought to light concerning this accident. The BEA safety investigators will now have to analyse and validate a large quantity of complex data. This is long and detailed work, and the BEA has already announced that it will not publish an interim report before the summer.

At this stage of the investigation, no conclusions can be drawn.

So while we do respect our own experts who believe what they already believe (based on what was then available about the pitot tubes and fly-by-wire), we trust the BEA analysis will provide a solid analysis of the data and are aware that they have not released any new conclusions.

We reiterate their emphasis, rejecting non-validated information, and agree no one should be jumping on any band-wagon of opinion, at least not until the authorities apply their proficiencies and start analyzing the data that no one was expecting would surface.

While we are ruling nothing out and closing no doors, we are impervious to the contingent of nay-sayers who—regardless of the drastically different facts of every given situation—chant the same chorus in every aviation event, blaming the dead pilots because they are easy targets and can not defend themselves. Also, let us not ignore that liabilities due to pilot error are capped by International Convention. So no matter what the actual error, Airlines prefer “pilot error” because it means less coming out of their pockets.

The Montreal Convention imposes two tiers of liability on airlines:
-the first tier provides automatic compensation, deals with claims up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights ($155,000 US). The airline has no defense against claims up to this amount.
-the second tier deals with the portion of a claim exceeding the $155,000 limit. An airline can avoid liability of this portion only by proving it was not negligent or otherwise at fault. To avoid the liability the airline must prove a negative. There are, in fact, infinite ways an airline’s negligence can be involved, all of which the airline must disprove-a burden which is next to impossible to meet.

If we as armchair analysts must err, let us err believing until proven otherwise, that the pilots were dependable, reputable, and rock-solid; let us remember that they too were passengers aboard the flight, human beings who fought as best they could, against whatever forces or failures brought them down. We believe pilots are valiant men who know the weight of their office, who know they are responsible for the lives they carry, and when they do their human best to survive, even in face of overwhelming physics, nature, weather, or mechanical failure, it is rash and unworthy of us to blame them precipitously. Sure, pilots can err, but let us not tar them with that brush without the facts.

But for a single action, delayed reflex or overwhelming odds, those dead pilots who are so often blamed because they are defenseless targets, are themselves dead heroes.

The Only U.S. Family Settles

The families of Mike and Anne Harris have settled their lawsuit against Air France. Michael was 60, from Greenville, South Carolina, a graduate of Clemson University, an expert in geology and oil field operations with Devon Energy in Rio and West Africa Group. (Devon Energy is based in Oklahoma.) Ann was 54, from Lafayette. She suffered from Fibromyalgia, was Fibromyalgia Association of Houston volunteer and a physical therapist. They had been married sixteen years, by the time they booked the fatal flight; and the trip was business and pleasure, because they were going to a training seminar in Paris, and for vacation. They left behind them friends in Lafayette, Houston and Brazil where they had lived.

Mike and Anne Harris were the only Americans on the flight. According to their lawyer, the case has settled.

Crash History
The 4 year old Air France Airbus A330-200 en route from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to Paris when it went missing over the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009. Two hundred sixteen passengers (including seven children and one baby, 82 women and 126 men) and 12 crew were aboard. There were two Americans and 60 French citizens were on the plane. Italy said at least three passengers were Italian.The pilot had 11,000 hours of flying experience, and 1,700 hours flying this aircraft.

The last known radio contact was an automatic message made at 0133 GMT when the plane was near the Island of Fernando de Noronha; since then, the airplane has made no radio communication. Fifteen minutes after flying through a storm and strong turbulence, there was an electrical short-circuit. Search planes left Fernando de Noronha Island looking for signs of the plane concentrating in an area 230 miles off the northeast Brazil coast. The flight left Rio at 7 p.m. and was expected in Paris on Monday at 11:15 a.m. The wreckage broke apart, the pieces scattered at sea, and the black boxes were not recovered until May 2011.

It is an interesting time to settle the case–right when the world is on the cusp of discovery of what caused the crash.

Arm-wrestling Damages from the Mother Country: Brazil vs France


In the continuing saga of Air France Flight 447, whether the victims are Brazilian or French, they certainly qualify for compensation. The question is how much. Everyone involved, the airlines, the insurance companies, the lawyers, the families all have different numbers in mind.

Recovery of the black boxes is not the only Air France news.

In the poker game of damage recovery, Air France must have blinked. The Brazilian Court system rejected the latest offer to the family of the deceased Luciana Clarkson Seba, a 31-year-old Brazilian who died along with her husband and stepparents.

Brazil rejected the appeal and raised compensation from1.2 million reals ($744,000) to 1.4 million reals ($868,000). The decision was unanimous.

Currently French courts are considering manslaughter charges against Airbus. At least Airbus has some good news to temper the bad, since the search has revealed the black boxes. Whether or not the integrity of the boxes has been breached has not yet been revealed. Experts predict both extremes: complete data loss due to the pressure and time and complete data recovery. We tend to believe the data is safe, since these memory devices must pass certification at 3400 G/ 600 psi.

And when that data is recovered, the experts will be examining it, looking at the rest of the gathered evidence, including the wreckage that is being recovered right now, which will have its own tale to tell.

It remains to be seen if the pitot tube theory will be supported by the CDR and FDR; but with all of these various sources coming together, we can anticipate a dimensional inquiry, a coordinated synthesis, and a profound deduction to explicate the enigma that is Air France Flight 447.

Dive and Recovery and CVR Recovery Flight AF 447

In the continuing quest recovering the bits and pieces of the Air France Flight 447 Airbus, and the Flight Data Recorder was recovered, the French navy sent a patrol to carry the black boxes to Cayenne, French Guyana, and then flown to Le Bourget to the BEA. The BEA Investigator-in-charge, a CENIPA Investigator, and French Judicial Peace officer will be present in the ten day exchange process.

BEA briefings indicate that on Monday the Cockpit Voice Recorder was identified. On Tuesday, it was recovered by the Remora 6000 ROV at 2:40, Tuesday May 3, 2001, and raised on board the Ile de Sein.

Bea Photos Documenting the Recovery

From the May 3 Briefing

447 History Uncovered, Black Box Memory Secured


In April, most of the Airbus jet was found, including the motors and some of the bodies. On April 27, we reported that the empty case was recovered after the Ile de Sein came in on the 26th from Senegal to assist in performing recovery operations in the current phase of Air France flight 447 project.

At that time, the Remora 6000 robot found the chassis of the CSMU but not the actual CSMU memory module, which (after the human remains) is the key prize wanted in this search, being the one thing that can shed light on what occurred on June 21 2009.

An hour ago (May 1, 2010) the news was released that the missing memory was located partially buried in the sand. The memory unit is now aboard the Ile de Sein.

BEA experts are cautiously optimistic about data recovery, and cite two years of water pressure as a disturbing factor.

In the search, the robot sends images up to the crew, who examines the transmissions for signs of the wreckage.

The official BEA statement is
“The investigation team localized and identified the memory unit from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) at 10 h UTC this morning. It was raised and lifted on board the ship Ile de Sein by the Remora 6000 ROV at 16h40 UTC.”

Now the question remains if the data will be recoverable.

* images and information are from Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses

Disappeared Memory-And the 447 Recovery Continues

Ile de Sein came in on the 26th from Senegal to assist in performing recovery operations in the current phase of Air France flight 447 recovery. The Remora 6000 robot found the chassis of the CSMU but not the actual CSMU memory module, which (after the human remains) is the key prize wanted in this search, being the one thing that can shed light on what occurred on June 21 2009.

Where is the memory unit? Even if this is just a question of a badly designed insecure containment system, where is the crucial unit?

68 people aboard the Ile de Sein are working the scene, armed with a crane and the Remora 6000 submarine.

* images and information are from Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses

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