Aviation News, Headlines & Alerts
 
Day: <span>February 24, 2012</span>

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EASA Proposes Fatigue Across the Board

New European rules ‘harmonizing’ the workload limits across 27 member states could allow pilots to fly aircraft for 22 hours without sleep, increasing a pilot’s work day from 16 hours 15 minutes to 20 hours, and the maximum shift time for a long haul flight with two pilots from 12 to 14 hours, as well as eliminating the need of a third pilot on long-haol flights.

The proposals have raised the attention of BALPA, The British Airline Pilots Association.

The seventeen percent increase in workload will result in a 5.5% higher chance of an accident.

It is inconceivable how EASA can call “flying farther with less rest-time, more frequently (7 starts in a row), no back up crew and more fatigue” bringing standards “up” when it is actually leveling down safety standards. Such a workload flies in the face of the constructs of human biology.

But the UK’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) “has said they have no fundamental problem with the rules.”

Ground Resonance Rattles Brazilian Chopper to Bits


What: Corpo de Bombeiros Militar do Estado do Pará Helibras HB 350BA Esquilo
Where: Benevides Brazil
When: Feb 22, 2012
Who: 4 aboard, no fatalities
Why: The rescue chopper vibrated itself apart after landing.

“Ground resonance” occurs when a sitting helicopter’s rotors become unbalanced while spinning. A resident expert says this can happen because of a hard landing; the best way to get it to stop is to pull collective and break contact with the ground. (At the time, that would feel counter intuitive, I would think!)


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NTSB Recommendations

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
February 23, 2012

The National Transportation Safety Board makes the following recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration:

Modify the design and test requirements for the attachment points of passenger service units to account for the higher localized loading that results from the relative motion of the attachment structure. (A-12-1)

Require that the installation design for overhead bins and passenger service units (PSU) manufactured by Boeing and installed in Boeing 737NG series airplanes be modified so that the PSUs remain attached to the bins or are captured in a safe manner during survivable accidents. (A-12-2)

Review the designs of manufacturers other than Boeing for overhead bins and passenger service units (PSU) to identify designs with deficiencies similar to those identified in Boeing’s design, and require those manufacturers, as necessary, to eliminate the potential for PSUs to separate from their attachments during survivable accidents. (A-12-3)

Develop test criteria and performance measures for negative-g strap assemblies to better evaluate their real-world loading capability during accident sequences. (A-12-4)

Once test criteria and performance measures are established as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-12-4, amend 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 25, as appropriate, to include the newly developed test criteria and performance measures for negative-g strap assemblies. (A-12-5)

Require that negative-g strap attachment brackets manufactured by Ipeco be retrofitted with stronger brackets. (A-12-6)

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The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Federal Aviation Administration:

Require Boeing to develop a method to protect the elevator power control unit input arm assembly on 737-300 through -500 series airplanes from foreign object debris. (A-11-7)

Once Boeing has developed a method to protect the elevator power control unit input arm assembly on 737-300 through -500 series airplanes from foreign object debris as requested in Safety Recommendation A-11-7, require operators to modify their airplanes with this method of protection. (A-11-8)

Require Boeing to redesign the 737-300 through -500 series airplane elevator control system such that a single-point jam will not restrict the movement of the elevator control system and prevent continued safe flight and landing. (A-11-9)

Once the 737-300 through -500 series airplane elevator control system is redesigned as requested in Safety Recommendation A-11-9, require operators to implement the new design. (A-11-10)

Require Boeing to develop recovery strategies (for example, checklists, procedures, or memory items) for pilots of 737 airplanes that do not have a mechanical override feature for a jammed elevator in the event of a full control deflection of the elevator system and incorporate those strategies into pilot guidance. Within those recovery strategies, the consequences of removing all hydraulic power to the airplane as a response to any uncommanded control surface should be clarified. (A-11-11)


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Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 Transponder again and again and again…


Click to view full size photo at Airliners.net
Contact photographer Serdar Yorulmaz
What: Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 en route from Chicago to Paris
Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 en route from Paris to New York over Prestwick
Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 en route from New York to Germany over Canada
Delta Airlines Boeing 767-300 en route from Dublin to New York (ferry flight)
Where: Atlantic
When: Feb 17th, 18th and 19, 2012
Who:
Why: While en route between Chicago and Paris, the plane’s transponder failed.
The same thing occurred on the Paris-New York flight on Feb 18;
and on the New York to Frankfurt flight on Feb 18 over Canada;
and on the Dublin to New York flight on Feb 19.

There has obviously been a problem here.

The transponder code (or “squawk code”) or altitude information is designed to help air traffic controllers to identify the aircraft and to maintain separation. The plane can fly without it, but what if the safety space is breached and there is an incident?

At least the last flight was a ferry flight, and on landing, the transponder is replaced, or whatever underlying factor that is causing this is corrected! The MEL (Minimum Equipment List) does have parameters for this.

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